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Abstract
The disparity between norms and their enforcement is a recurrent theme in 
international law. An examination of theory and practice undertaken in the first part 
of the research reviews national, intemationalised/hybrid and international judicial 
processes. This identifies both normative and structural weakness in the existent 
system for the enforcement of international criminal law. The second half of the 
study compares the relationship that is established between the International 
Criminal Court and national authorities with previous models to determine whether 
the Rome Statute promises heightened prospects for actual enforcement.
The study suggests that the reliance o f the ICC on the support o f national 
authorities will result in a persistence of enforcement gaps in the compliance levels 
of States with their pre-existing duty to prosecute crimes; in the ability o f the Court 
to secure enforcement of its requests and orders; and in the own Court’s operational 
capacity.
Evidence suggests, nonetheless, that the ICC is also helping to close 
enforcement gaps. At the national level, in particular, because of the Court’s 
jurisdictional and admissibility regime, the ICC is altering incentive structures for  
national authorities and profoundly altering State behaviour. This has been driven 
primarily by the desire o f States to limit admissibility challenges to domestic 
jurisdiction based on legislative inconsistencies or domestic inaction.
The research shows that the successful closing of enforcement gaps will 
require the close and effective interaction of national and international jurisdictions. 
For the treaty signed in Rome is not just about a Court, it is about a system; a global 
system based on national States. Without national authorities, the ICC will be unable 
to act. But also conversely, without the catalytic presence of the ICC, it is unlikely 
that national authorities would be willing to act. As such, the ICC Statute acts as both 
a standard setting instrument and a compliance-inducing mechanism.
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Introduction
The disparity between norms and their enforcement in practice is a recurrent theme 
in international law.1 In the absence of an international enforcement agent, the 
decisions of international courts are implemented indirectly by States, who are the 
proximate source of compliance. States comply on a voluntary basis or are otherwise 
induced or coerced to do so by third States. Because decisions on these choices are 
guided by numerous policy considerations, amongst which legality is but one 
element, the notion of impartial and routine observance of international law has 
encountered deep resistance.2 D
The inability of thduntemational system td effecfjcegulai^compliance with its \A /^ "  JL 
rules raises questions of fundamental impoffance foijudicial institutionsTlf a court X*-''” ^  *
cannot guarantee the enforcement of its decisions, the naturelmcrrelevance of the \ j  v v 
law it applies is brought into doubt. Is it a purely ‘legal’ system or rather a series o 
standards subject to discretionary modes of sanction? *
In the field of the law of armed conflict and human rights, this mismatch ( r  ,
between norms and enforcement has been exacerbated by the absence of robust \  '
compliance demands on convention members. Traditional formulations governing 
the jus in bello under Hague and Geneva law, for example, were drafted under the
premise of auto-enforcement via the national laws of signatories. This subjected
international regulation to the modalities, interpretation, reservations and effective 
discretion of each State. Moreover, the exclusion of a serious sanction mechanism 
was arguably a pre-requisite for the adoption of these instruments. Thus, although 
agreements such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions enjoy almost universal adherence,3 
the record of history bears out the culture of impunity where prosecutions, with rare
1 As Berman notes, “[i]t seems to many that the problem is not to discover what the law is, or how to 
apply it to the particular case, or even whether the existing rule is "satisfactory" or not, but rather how 
to secure or compel compliance with the law at all. It may be that we have now passed from a great 
phase of law-making to a period where the focus is not on new substantive law but on how to make 
existing law effective.” ‘Preface’, Fox and Meyer, eds., Armed Conflict and the New Law. Effecting 
Compliance (1993), xii
2 Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and the 
Rule o f Law (2003), 60
3 See Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws o f War (1995)
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and selective exceptions, simply have not occurred. Negotiating a Statute for a 
permanent international criminal court with the authority to hold national authorities 
accountable for their failings has altered these assumptions in a fundamental way, by 
shifting the paradigm from self-scrutiny to supranational accountability.
The efforts leading to the establishment of the Rome Statute and beyond 
suggest that notions about the purpose of international law are changing. Increasingly 
the responsibility to protect is serving to qualify an absolute assertion of sovereignty 
where States fail their own primary responsibility. This normative development, 
however, has not been matched by a maturity in compliance mechanisms. Instead, an 
ever greater gap has formed between the norms of internationally criminal conduct 
and the ‘institutionalisation’ of enforcement apparatus. The International Criminal 
Court (TCC’/‘the Court’) sits, thus, in a vacuum of global mechanisms. This lacuna 
creates both normative and structural ambiguities. The Court is supra-national in 
authority, yet it cannot enforce its jurisdiction without State cooperation. Thus, die 
implementation of international justice remains dependant on the irregular system of 
national support (including through international organisations) for all matters 
pertaining to the collection of evidence, the compelling of persons, the issuance of 
travel authorisations for witnesses to travel to the Court, the conduct of searches and 
seizures, the forfeiture of assets, the execution of arrest warrants, and the surrender 
of persons. Indeed, without such cooperation from States the Court cannot exercise 
its jurisdiction.4 In this sense, the enforcement regime established by the Rome 
Statute has not fundamentally altered the ‘inter-national’ framework of inter-State 
relations.
What impact will this have for the ICC? What consequence will accrue from 
relying on domestically determined modalities for the enforcement of die Court’s 
requests? Particularly in post-conflict settings, how will the ICC function if it must 
depend on the cooperation of the same national authorities that have been deemed 
unwilling or unable to conduct genuine domestic proceedings? Moreover, to what 
extent does the complementarity regime established by the Rome Statute portend the 
evolution of a system of international criminal justice?
The research will show that the reliance of the ICC on the support of national 
authorities will result in an unsatisfactory enforcement. Enforcement gaps will occur
4 Cassese, ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections’ (1999) EJIL 
10,164
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at different levels: (a) there will remain a gap in the compliance levels of States with 
their pre-existing duty to prosecute crimes at the domestic level; (b) there will be a 
gap between the orders issued by the Court and its ability to secure their enforcement 
against recalcitrant States, impeding as a result the exercise of the Court’s powers; 
and (c) because of resource constraints set by States Parties there will be gaps in the 
activism of the Court as to the number of situations it can concurrently handle and 
the number of persons it can try.
The study suggests, nonetheless, that while the bonds of dependency between 
the ICC and national authorities will result in a persistence of enforcement gaps, they 
may also prove to be the Court’s greatest strength. This is because the 
complementarity framework and the accompanying admissibility provisions grant the 
Court strong supervisory powers over domestic proceedings and create powerful 
incentives to promote compliance. Indeed, compared to the oft unfulfilled obligations 
created by previous regimes, the Statute establishes a far more profound set of 
interactions between international norms and domestic practice, resulting in 
heightened prospects for actual enforcement. In this sense, the entry into force of the 
Rome Statute is about more than the creation of a new court: it signals the 
inauguration of a new relationship between national and international authorities. The 
Statute, thus, binds national authorities in to an institutional framework for the 
application of international criminal law. The success of this new global system, 
however, will rely on the balance struck between incentive and coercion. It is the 
impact of this system on actual practice and its prospect for closing the gaps identified 
that is the focus of the present study.
From the outset the term ‘enforcement’ should be distinguished from related 
words such as ‘compliance’, ‘implementation’ or ‘adherence’. In particular, while 
‘compliance’ deals with the general aspect of conformity with a particular set of rules, 
‘enforcement’ refers to the specific obligation to suppress violations of those rules. In 
the context of the study, this relates to the obligation to investigate and prosecute 
internationally criminal activity. At the same time, the term is not employed within 
the particular meaning of Part 10 of Rome Statute which deals with the enforcement 
of sentences, and should be distinguished, similarly, from the other provisions dealing 
with the enforcement of fines, forfeiture orders, reparation orders, and offences 
against the administration of the Court.
Furthermore, the research gives primary focus to those ‘core crimes’ that give
U K
l A ;
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rise to individual liability directly under international law and that have formed the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.5 Other treaty based international crimes, such as hostage-taking, 
terrorism, apartheid and drug trafficking receive only passing examination. Moreover, 
the thesis focuses primarily on issues related to jurisdictional competence, rather than 
on the substantive construction of the elements of those crimes.
The research is divided into four sections. Part I explores the theoretical and 
policy frameworks guiding the exercise of international criminal jurisdiction. Chapter
1 begins with a clarification of basic concepts regarding international criminal law, 
reviews the legal capacity of individuals under international law, and concludes by 
examining jurisdictional questions related to criminalisation, the exercise of 
jurisdiction, differences in enforcement regimes, and actual implementation. Chapter
2 reviews compliance theories to explain the difference between the obligations of 
States and their actual behaviour. The section goes on to introduce the themes of 
horizontal and vertical powers and dualist and monist perspectives which recur 
throughout the analysis that follows.
Part II reviews international and domestic practice in the pre-ICC setting. Four 
different enforcement models are reviewed: international, national, ‘hybrid’ or 
‘internationalised’ courts, and decisions not to prosecute at all. The two chapters in 
this part demonstrate how difficult the investigation and prosecution of war crimes 
related offences have proven and how poorly State practice has faired. Domestic war 
crimes prosecutions have been highly selective and exceptional, subject to substantive 
and procedural variations. With the notable exception of the International Military 
Tribunals (‘IMT’) at Nuremberg and Tokyo, international and internationalised 
processes have likewise suffered from irregular enforcement. Moreover, blanket 
amnesties have served as a bar to prosecution in many States.
Part III turns to the ICC and explores, in four chapters, the tensions between 
national discretion and the Court’s powers. In Chapter 6, the preconditions to the 
exercise of ICC jurisdiction are set against the interaction of competing interests 
between State Parties, the Security Council and the Prosecutor. The analysis suggests 
that the complementarity regime offers a balanced approach to resolving those
5 The ICC Statute crime of aggression, which remains to be defined, is for that reason not considered in 
depth
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tensions where parties act in good faith, but allows considerable scope for procedural 
abuse by States bent on employing avoidance techniques.
The possibility for States to frustrate Court action through the lodging of 
challenges is discussed in the next chapter. Here, the Court’s ability to determine its 
own jurisdiction against competing jurisdictional claims is a critical strength. The 
section offers a set of criteria for assessing complementarity in practice.
The eighth chapter looks at the Prosecutor’s ability to secure cooperation, and 
the numerous obstacles that may be placed in his way. As experience shows, even 
with Security Council mandated authority, the ad hoc Tribunals have not been able to 
ensure compliance. Without the adoption of external incentive-inducing or coercive 
measures by the international community, the ICC may lack tools adequate for the 
performance of its functions.
State cooperation will also depend on effective implementing legislation. The 
last chapter in this Part reviews national practice on incorporation. Examination also 
focuses on the extent to which a gap may remain where the Court exercises 
jurisdiction due to an unwillingness or inability by national authorities to shoulder a 
distribution of caseloads, resulting in a continuation of impunity for lower level 
offenders.
Part IV offers a series of concluding observations on the extent to which, with 
the entry into force of the Rome Statute, the various gaps identified in the research 
look set to close or persist.
The primary text examined below is the ICC Statute and Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence,6 together with drafting history contained in documents issued by the 
International Law Commission (‘ILC’), the Ad Hoc, Preparatory Committee, 
Plenipotentiary Conference and Preparatory Commission on the ICC and the 
Assembly of State Parties.7 Domestic legislation and national jurisprudence, 
international customary and conventional law, as well as the Statutes and practice of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia8 (‘ICTY’) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda9 (‘ICTR’) and more recent 
internationalised or ‘hybrid’ forums are also examined. Moreover, the research draws
6 A/CONF. 183/9(1998); ICC-ASP/l/3 (part II-A)(2002)
7 See A/49/10(1994); A/50/22(1995); A/51/22(1996); A/51/10(1996); PrepCom classifications 
A/AC.249/1997..., A/AC.249/1998 ....; A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1(1998)
8 S/RES/827(1993)
9 S/RES/955(1994)
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on professional experience at the ICC and in the field, as well as interaction with 
colleagues from other judicial forums and acquaintances in diplomatic and non­
governmental organisation circles who have been involved with the establishment of 
the ICC over the last decade.
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Chapter I
Part I: Establishing International Criminal 
Jurisdiction 
I 
National and International Law
Chapter 1 will examine the theoretical framework that guides the exercise of 
international criminal jurisdiction by analysing the norms that define the repression of 
international criminal conduct and the obligations incumbent on States to give effect 
to their jurisdiction. The purpose of this section will be to discover if there are gaps in 
the applicable enforcement regimes; where these gaps occur, and why; and whether 
they matter. The discussion will set the context for an assessment of national and 
international practice in Parts II and III.
1. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
The concept of international crimes is neither new nor untested: records from the 
earliest annals of history, from the Sixth Century BC writings of Sun Tzu on The Art 
of War, to Herodotus’ expatiations on Greek warfare, to the later Roman principle of 
noxae deditio governing relations between sovereign criminal jurisdictions, dealt with 
the duty of individuals beyond the confines of municipal law. The first recorded 
instance of the establishment of an international criminal court dates back to 1474, in 
the convocation of 28 judges from Alsace, Austria, Germany and Switzerland to try 
Peter von Hagenbach for murder, rape, perjury and other crimes in violation of “the 
laws of God and man” following his siege and occupation of the town of Breisach.1 It 
was not until more recent times, however, that the momentum was generated towards 
the first serious efforts in creating a permanent international criminal tribunal (see 
below, Chapter 2).
1 Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by Courts and Tribunals (1968), 462-466
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Chapter I
The term international criminal law can be thought of as comprising two 
elements: the international aspect of domestic criminal law, and the criminal aspect 
of international law.2 The international aspect of domestic criminal law encompasses 
crimes under national law that have international aspects, and transnational crimes 
that are based on domestic law, but which are subject to international agreements 
governing issues of jurisdiction, apprehension, extradition and judicial cooperation. 
The criminal aspect of international law can be said to overlap, at a minimum, with 
traditional concepts of individual criminal liability under the jus in bello, and more 
generally to crimes that give rise to individual liability directly under international 
law. International criminal law may be prosecuted at the domestic or international 
level, but can be disguised also as internationally criminal conduct prosecuted 
domestically, for issues of preference, under comparable domestic rather than 
international norms.
(a) The international aspect o f domestic criminal law
The international aspect of domestic criminal law in some ways acts as the 
counterpoint to questions of conflict of laws in civil cases.3 It derives its primary 
historical basis from the need to clarify what domestic courts should do when faced 
with criminal cases involving foreign elements. These included questions of 
jurisdiction to punish crimes committed abroad or crimes committed domestically by 
foreigners; the choice of criminal law to be applied; and the recognition of foreign 
criminal judgements and limitations upon domestic jurisdiction. At this stage, 
international rules merely limited the extent to which a State might apply its domestic 
criminal law to alleged offences committed by a foreigner acting outside of the 
territory of the prescribing State, such as in the case of piracy on the High Seas.4 
Other early international elements to the considerations of domestic law dealt with 
exceptions with respect to diplomatic immunity and asylum, and forms of cross- 
boundary cooperation between States in criminal matters such as extradition.5 Such 
transnational practice governing activity across national boundaries forms the
2 See generally this section Paust, Scharf, Sadat, Bassiouni, Gurule, Zagaris, and Williams eds., 
International Criminal Law: Cases and Materials (2000), 3
3 Wise,‘Terrorism and the Problem of an International Criminal Law’ (1987) Conn. L. Rev. 19, 802
4 Rubin, The Law o f Piracy (1988), 337
5 Wise (1987), 801-804
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antecedents for a number of modem day regulations on cooperation between States. 
These include, inter alia, the transfer of criminal proceedings; the transfer of 
prisoners; the execution of sentences abroad; the seizure and forfeiture of assets 
deriving from criminal activity; and the taking of testimony and discovery of evidence 
in countries other than where the legal proceedings take place. These have been 
coupled with formal and informal cooperation between national law enforcement, 
such as though Interpol.
(b) The criminal aspect o f  international law
The criminal aspect of international law may be said to refer, broadly, to international 
custom and treaties that obligate States with respect to the administration of criminal 
justice in their own domestic courts. This may be through standard setting instruments 
governing procedural guarantees, as in article 14 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), or through the articulation of substantive 
offences requiring incorporation in each convention party’s national law, as in the 
numerous aut dedere aut judicare treaties.
A more narrowly defined criminal aspect of international law relates to a 
‘^ or e ^ s e ^ fjbtemational crimes that give rise to individual liability directly under 
international law, without a necessary nexus to the State.6 Such offences attract 
particular condemnation as crimes which shock the conscience of humanity and 
threaten-iriteniational peace and security,7 and may give rise to direct enforcement on 
behalf of shared community interests^bv an international tribunal. International 
cnTTTmal law is treated in the preft
u aA
7
research in this latter sense, to refer specifically j
to those core crimes that have formed the subject matter jurisdiction of the Nuremberg f f y
and Tokyo Tribunals, the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC. Moreover, in its treatment of . 
these crimes, the thesis focuses on issues related to jurisdictional competence rather 
than on the substantive elements of the crimes themselves. ^
, , /  7
o  j p  ( 4 ^ ' / /
6 Derby, ‘A Framework for International Criminal Law, in Bassiouni ed., International Criminal 
(1986), 33; Broomhall (2003), 9-10
7 See Preamble, ICC St^tutflpeee ‘Martens Clause’, Preamble, Hague Convention IVe^ LL Ma tfys L e
«v L 'M  t ' f a 0 " ~
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(c) International crimes and domestic offences
Must an international crime be committed at the instigation or the toleration of a State 
authority? Schwarzenberger opines that there is a distinction between international 
crimes and domestic offences on the basis of the active role of the State in the former. 
As such, he holds piracy, slave trading, terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental 
damage by private entities to be stricto sensu domestic offences, not international 
crimes. The rules of international law with respect to extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
criminal offences, he suggests, merely authorise States to assume “an extraordinary 
criminal jurisdiction under their own municipal law”.8 The tension suggested above is 
dispositive of the dual aspects of international criminal law noted above. Within the 
United Nations (‘UN’), the process of the codification and progressive development 
of offences has tended towards prohibiting offences under international law whether 
committed by State or non-State actors.
2. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Classical legal positivism regards States as the sole subject of international legal 
regulation, making international liability attributable to States alone.9 A second 
postulate suggests individuals also may be criminally liable under international law to 
the extent that they act as representative of the State. This is typified by the 
formulation of criminality expounded by the International Military Tribunals (‘IMT’) 
at Nuremberg and Tokyo.10 A third approach holds the individual directly culpable for 
internationally recognised criminal conduct before an international court without a 
required nexus to the State.11
Early discussions in the ILC over the establishment of an international 
criminal court often centred around the fact that there was no clearly defined corpus
8 Schwarzenberger (1968), 27
9 See,.e.g., contentions and ultimately abandoned draft art. 19 of 1996 ILC Draft Article on State 
Responsibility, A/51/10(1996). See generally Simpson, ‘War Crimes: A Critical Introduction’ in 
McCormack and Simpson, eds., The Laws O f War Crimes, National and International Approaches
(1997), 17-19
10 Charter o f the International Military Tribunal, 82 UNTS 279; Charter o f the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, 4 Bevans 20, 27; see also ELC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, A/51/10(1996)
11 See above; Simpson (1997), 18-19
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of law for such a court to apply, raising concerns of violations of the principle of 
nullem crimen nullem poena sine lege, in echo of the Nuremberg trials.12 While there 
is little general consensus on the definition and classification of all possible 
international crimes,13 today customary and conventional norms offer a basis for 
considerations of international criminal jurisdiction.
The Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments,14 together with subsequent proceedings 
under Control Council Law No. 10 for Germany,15 clearly recognised individual 
criminal liability for violations of international law:
That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well 
as upon States has long been recognised... Crimes against international law 
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law 
be enforced.16
Similarly, the Flick Case held,
It can no longer be successfully maintained that international law is concerned 
only with the actions of sovereign states and provides no punishment for 
individuals.... International law, as such, binds every citizen just as does 
ordinary municipal law.... The offender in either case is charged with personal 
wrong and punishment falls on the offender in propria persona. The 
application of international law to individuals is no novelty.17
The Nuremberg Tribunal upheld individual criminal responsibility with respect to 
violations of 1907 Hague Convention (IV), recognised as declaratory of customary 
law, and for the crimes listed in its Charter: ‘crimes against the peace’, (relating to the 
jus ad bellum), ‘war crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ (respecting the jus in 
bello). UN General Assembly Resolution 95 (I) unanimously affirmed “the principles 
of international law recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the 
judgment of the Tribunal”. This affirmation led shortly thereafter to die adoption of 
the 1948 Genocide Convention. The prosecution of crimes against humanity at
12 See A/CN.4/15(1950); A/1316(1950); A/2136(1952)
13 See generally Schwarzenberger, The Frontiers o f International Law,(1962),181-197; Malekian, 
International Criminal Law (1991), 3-10; Bassiouni, International Crimes: Digest/Index of 
International Instruments 1815-1985 (1985)
14 2 2IMT 447(1946); 2 IMTFE 1176 (1948)
15 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany (1946), 50-55
16 22 IMT 447
17 Flick case, Law Reports o f the Trial o f War Criminals ('L.R. T. W. C. ’), Vol. IX{1949), 1191
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Nuremberg filled a lacuna in the law where a State committed crimes of mass 
violence against its own nationals (such as Nazi Germany’s pogrom of its Jewish, 
Romany, and disabled populations) and therefore fell outside of the protected persons 
regime of the 1929 Geneva Convention. The IMT at Nuremberg held that atrocities 
committed against civilians were no longer simply a matter of sovereign internal 
prerogative, but were crimes that offended humanity as a whole. The effort set the 
ground for much of the human rights dialogue that was to follow. The four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, superseding those of 1864, 1899, 1906, 1907 and 1929, further 
developed the principle of individual responsibility by requiring Contracting Parties to 
“undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanction for 
persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the 
present Convention”. In more recent times, Security Council resolutions such as 
number 670 (1990) in relation to Kuwait, Resolution 814 (1994) on Somalia, 
Resolution 764 (1992) on Bosnia and Herzegovina (‘BiH’), have affirmed that 
“persons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the [Geneva] 
Conventions are individually responsible in respect of such breaches.” Moreover, 
post-WWII proceedings and later trials before the ICTY and ICTR have confirmed 
that individuals cannot escape responsibility for violations of international law by 
pleading lawfulness under domestic statutes.18
As to the scope of individual liability under customary humanitarian norms, 
the Secretary-General in his Report on the establishment of the ICTY opined:
The part of conventional international humanitarian law which has beyond 
doubt become part of international customary law is the law applicable in 
armed conflict as embodied in: the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for 
the Protection of War Victims; the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Regulations annexed thereto of 18 
October 1907; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide of 9 December 1948; and the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal of 8 August 1945.19
The Report was unanimously approved by the Security Council acting under Chapter
18 See inter alia, U.S. v Von Leeb (High Command case) L.R.T.W.C. Vol.XII, 489: “International law 
operates as a restriction and limitation on the sovereignty of nations. It may also limit the obligations 
which individuals owe to their states, and create for them international obligations which are binding 
upon them to an extent that they must be carried out even if to do so violates a positive law or directive 
of the state.”
19 S/25704(1993); compare Report o f the Secretary-General, S/1995/134(1994), [^12
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VII in Resolution 827 (1993) and was later recalled by the International Court of 
Justice (‘ICJ’) in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear 
Weapons?0 Debate and developments continue over the customary classification of 
other violations of humanitarian law and the norms applicable under non-international 
armed conflict. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in its landmark decision in the Tadic 
case, for example, held that customary international law imposes criminal 
responsibility for serious violations of humanitarian law committed in internal as well 
as international armed conflicts (see below).21 More recently, the ICRC has completed 
a study at the request of States on customary international humanitarian law that seeks 
to contribute to the promotion of respect for and compliance with the customary rules 
of the law of armed conflict.22
As to the scope of individual criminal responsibility, article 7 of the ICTY 
Statute (article 6, ICTR Statute) provides jurisdiction over persons who planned, 
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetting in the planning, 
preparation or execution of a crime listed its statute. Action carried out in an official 
capacity neither excludes nor mitigates responsibility, while acts committed by 
subordinates do not relieve a superior of personal liability if he knew or had reason to 
know of their commission and failed to take reasonable measures to prevent or punish 
their occurrence.23 ICTY Chambers have held that this provision “extends beyond the 
responsibility of military commanders to also encompass political leaders and other 
civilian superiors in positions of authority” and applies to “not only persons in de jure 
positions but also those in such position de facto”.24 Article 7(4) states that the 
superior orders may only be considered in mitigation of punishment. Note should also 
be taken of interpretative statements on adoption of Security Council 827 stating, 
inter alia, that superior order may be offered as a defence where the accused “did not 
know the orders were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and understanding 
would not have known the orders to be unlawful”.25
20 3 5 ILM 809(1996), 29
21 Prosecutor v Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,(2 
October \995)(‘Tadic Interlocutory Appeal’), 1(128,1(134
22 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (2005)
23 As Grotius, writing in 1625, has stated: “A community or its rulers may be held responsible for the 
crime of a subject if  they knew of it and did not prevent it when they could and should prevent it”; De 
Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, Bk.II, Ch.XXI, section ii
24 Delalic et al case, Judgment,(16 November 1998), 1(1(319-400. Tojo case, L.R.T.W.C. Vol.XIV; 
German High Command case, L.R.T.W.C. Vol.XH; Hostages case (US v List), L.R.T.W.C. Vol.VIII; 
Yamashita case, U.S. Mil. Comm'n (Dec 7 1945) 13 ILR 255 (1946)
25 Interpretative statement U.S. Representative, S/PV3217(1993)
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The corresponding provisions of die ICC Statute are similar in most respects. 
A person is criminally responsible and liable for punishment where he commits or 
attempts to commit, orders, solicits or induces, aids, abets or otherwise assists in the 
commission of a listed crime, or in any other way contributes intentionally to the 
commission or attempted commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a 
common criminal purpose (article 25). Jurisdiction and sentencing apply irrespective 
of official capacity, immunities or other special procedural rules under national or 
international law (article 27). A military commander or person effectively acting as a 
military commander (meaning, inter alia, a civilian) is criminally responsible for die 
conduct of forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective 
authority and control (‘effective’ denoting de jure and de facto command), where he 
knew or should have known that the forces were committing or were about to commit 
a listed crime, and failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or 
repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution (article 28(a)). In other superior and subordinate 
relationships not described in paragraph (a) (i.e. other civilian or political officials), a 
superior is criminally responsible for crimes committed by subordinates where the 
superior either knew, or ‘consciously disregarded’ information which clearly 
indicated, that the subordinates were committing or were about to commit such crimes 
(a higher threshold than ‘should have known’); the crimes concerned activities that 
were within the effective authority and control of the superior; and the superior failed 
to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or 
repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution. In a considered retreat during compromise negotiations 
from the Nuremberg threshold, superior orders may relieve a person of criminal 
responsibility for war crimes where die person was under a legal obligation to obey 
orders of the Government or the superior in question, he did not know that the order 
was unlawful, and the order was not manifestly unlawful; with the caveat that orders 
to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful (article 33). 
Interpretative guidance from the Element of Crimes document in the context of war 
crimes further provides that “[t]here is no requirement for a legal evaluation by die 
perpetrator as to the existence of an armed conflict or its character as international or 
non-international; [i]n that context there is no requirement for awareness by the 
perpetrator of the facts that established the character of the conflict as international or
25
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non-intemational; [t]here is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual 
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict that is implicit in the 
terms “took place in the context of and was associated with”.”26
In summary, the individual under international law may bear criminal 
responsibility for acts or omissions under both customary and conventional norms. 
This may be adjudicated before either domestic or international forums. Normative 
classification, to date, has been piecemeal and of varying precision. To this end, the 
statutes and jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC are enabling the emergence of 
a well defined corpus of substantive law to be applied consistent with requirements of 
the principle of legality.
3. ASSERTING CRIMINAL JURISDICTON
For which specific acts can individuals be held criminally liable under international 
law, and by whom? The assertion of jurisdiction over individuals for international 
crimes will be influenced by a number of factors. (1) It must be established whether 
particular conduct is illegal under international law, and (2) if so, whether it attracts 
individual criminal responsibility, i.e. is it criminal?27 Clearly, the fact that an act is 
prohibited under customary or conventional norms does not necessarily mean that an 
individual bears responsibility for it. (3) Who can exercise jurisdiction over the 
proscribed offence? This will require a careful review of the bases under international 
law by which a State may assert jurisdiction. (4) What obligation lies with that State 
to give effect to its jurisdiction: is the rule merely permissive, or is there a mandatory 
duty to do so? (5) What mechanisms are available to ensure compliance where a State 
declines to assert its criminal jurisdiction? Each factor will be assessed in order to 
identify possible gaps in the normative and institutional apparatus for the enforcement 
of international criminal law.
26 Introduction Article 8, ICC Elements of Crimes; ICC-ASP/1/3 (part II-B)(2002)
27 See approach adopted by Greenwood, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case’ (1996) 
EJIL 7, 277
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(a) Illegality
The illegality of conduct may derive from a prohibition formulated in either 
customary law or by convention. Examples of variants include piracy which began as 
a prohibition in customary international law and later became codified in 1958
9RConvention on the High Seas; the prohibition on die employment of poison or 
poisoned weapons in armed conflict originally stipulated in Hague Convention IV, but
90later recognised as reflective of international custom; torture or inhuman treatment 
of prisoners of war under the grave breaches regime of Geneva Convention III; and 
the prohibition on arbitrary arrest or detention under the ICCPR.31
(b) Criminality
The question of criminality may be specified in a number of ways. As noted above, 
this may include, inter alia, an explicit identification of a particular conduct as a 
crime under international law; a requirement to ensure that the proscribed conduct is 
an offence under domestic criminal law; or the formulation of a duty to prosecute or 
extradite alleged offenders or to cooperate in their investigation and prosecution.32 
Thus, for example, the Geneva Conventions require State Parties to “enact legislation 
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to 
be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention”.33 Similarly, 
under the Convention on the High Seas, national authorities are required to cooperate 
to the fullest extent in the repression of piracy and all States are affirmed as 
possessing broad bases of jurisdiction to arrest and punish offenders.34 The 
prohibition on arbitrary arrest or detention in ICCPR, by contrast, is not the object of 
criminal sanction since responsibility for the violation under the convention rests with 
the State and not with the perpetrator. Parties to the convention are required to adopt
28 Convention on the High Seas (1958); Convention on the Law o f the Sea (1982) (‘UNCLOS’)
29 Art.22-23, Hague Convention TV (1907)
30 Art. 130, Geneva Convention III (1949)
31 Art.9, ICCPR
32 Bassiouni (1985), leaves open the possibility for an inference of criminal liability in the absence of 
specific characterisation of an offence as a crime, where a breach of conduct nonetheless incurs 
individual responsibility
33 Art. 129-130, Geneva Convention III
34 Art. 14-22, Convention on the High Seas
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legislation giving effect to the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained, to ensure 
effective remedies through competent judicial, administrative or legislative 
authorities, and to enforce such remedies.35 The individual who violates the 
prohibition, however, is not held directly liable under the convention. Hague 
Convention IV similarly omits reference to individual criminal responsibility and 
instead declares that Parties are “responsible for all acts committed by persons 
forming part of its armed forces”, and “shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay 
compensation”.36 Subsequent interpretation by the Nuremberg Tribunal, however, has 
held that the convention must be read as imposing individual criminal liability even in 
the absence of explicit stipulation, by virtue of the necessary implication flowing from 
the express responsibility placed on States.37 The question of individual liability 
formed a central feature of litigation at Nuremberg given the absence of explicit 
criminal sanction in treaties before 1949. The issue of individual liability arose also in 
the Tadic case before the ICTY with respect to the non-grave breach offences of the 
Geneva Conventions and the Protocols additional thereto, as well as in relation to 
violations of Common Article 3 in non-international armed conflict. In its landmark 
interlocutory judgment, the Appeals Chamber held that the non-grave breach 
violations of the laws and customs of war, including violations of Common Article 3 
in non-international armed conflict, imposed criminal liability also with respect to 
those offences.38
Where the conduct in question is prohibited solely under customary norms it is 
necessary to examine State practice and opinio juris. Evidence of custom may be 
derived from numerous sources including: “diplomatic correspondence, policy 
statements, press releases, the opinions of official legal advisors, official manuals on 
legal questions, e.g. manuals of military law, executive decisions and practices, orders 
to naval forces, etc., comments by governments on drafts of the International Law 
Commission, State legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in 
treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties of the same form, the 
practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the 
United Nations General Assembly.” “Obviously”, as Brownlie observes, “the value of
35 Art.2 and 9, ICCPR
36 Art.3, Hague Convention IV
37 2 2 IMT447
38 Tadic Interlocutory Appeal, ^[86-95, ^[127-137. See Greenwood (1996), 279-81
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these sources varies and much depends on the circumstances”.39 The issue may be 
pertinent in situations where a State is not a signatory to a relevant convention, or 
where, despite subsequent codification of a customary offence, the time period 
applicable in a certain case occurred prior to its codification. For example, the 
customary crime of piracy jure gentium in its strictest sense is categorised in 
Oppenheim as having always been considered outlawed.40 Similarly, torture, by the 
time of its explicit criminalisation in the 1984 Torture Convention, was already illegal 
and subject to criminal sanction under customary law. As Burgers and Danelius note, 
the Convention did not create torture as an international crime, but aimed rather “to 
strengthen the existing prohibition” under customary law 41
In summary, not every prohibition under international law, whether custom or 
convention, can be considered an international crime. Secondly, not every 
international crime carries individual criminal liability, indeed a relatively small 
number do so. Where the conduct in question is subject to criminal sanction, this may 
be specified through conventional formulation or, exceptionally, may be established 
through subsequent judicial interpretation.
(c) Grounds by which a State may seize jurisdiction
After establishing that an offence under international law carries criminal sanction, it 
is necessary to consider issues of jurisdictional competence. The exercise of 
jurisdiction under international law can be distinguished into three forms. Executive 
(or enforcement) jurisdiction refers to the power of a State to enforce its own laws. 
This is normally limited to the territory over which a State is sovereign. As the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (‘PCIJ’) stated in the Lotus case: “the first 
and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that - failing the
39 Brownlie, Principles o f Public International Law, 6* ed. (2003), 6. Mendelson notes State behaviour 
does not count as State practice if  it is not communicated to another State -  customary processes being 
ones that are express and tacit, and thus not evidenced by covert practices or confidential legal advice 
nor secret instructions to armed forces. In appropriate circumstances, therefore, omissions can count as 
state practice also; Mendelson, ‘The Formation of Customary International Law’, Recueil des cours
(1998), 204-209
40 Jennings and Watts, eds., Oppenheim’s International Law (1996), §299
41 Burgers and Danelius, The UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment: A Handbook on the Convention (1988); see also R v Bow Street Magistrate, 
Ex parte Pinochet, [2000] 1 AC 147 (‘Pinochet in ')
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exercise of a permissive rule to the contrary - it may not exercise its power in any 
form over the territory of another State.”.42 Where a State does attempt to enforce its 
jurisdiction abroad by, for example, effecting an arrest, it can be said to violate both 
the territorial sovereignty of the host State, unless consent has been obtained,43 and 
arguably the rights of the individual who is not to be deprived of his or her liberty 
except in accordance with die law.44
By contrast, prescriptive jurisdiction and adjudicative jurisdiction may 
encompass activity occurring outside a State’s own territory. Prescriptive jurisdiction 
refers to the power of a State to legislate a particular offence, whether by enactment of 
criminal or civil or administrative codes. Adjudicative jurisdiction relates to the power 
to try accused persons in a State’s own courts for unlawful acts.45 As the Lotus 
decision went on to hold: “[i]t does not ... follow that international law prohibits a 
State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which 
relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some 
permissive rule of international law.”46 Accordingly, the PCIJ held that restrictions on 
the ability of States to extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their 
courts cannot be presumed. Rather, in the absence of a prohibitive rule, States may be 
said to enjoy “a wide measure of discretion”.47 In summary, enforcement jurisdiction 
cannot exist unless there is prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction, but there can be 
prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction without any scope for routine enforcement48
The general principles on the basis of which a State may seek to prescribe and 
adjudicate criminal conduct occurring abroad are reviewed in the 1935 Harvard
42 France v Turkey (Lotus case), PCIJ, Series A. No. 10 (1927), 18
43 Akehurst suggests that an act of one State in the territory of another may usurp the sovereign powers 
of the latter either because the nature o f the act is such that only officials of the local State are entitled 
to perform (e.g. arrest), or because of the purpose fo r which the act is done is contrary to international 
law absent permission (e.g. by a State conducting inquiries on the territory of another for the purpose of 
enforcing its own laws); ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’, (1972-73) BYIL 46,146-7
44 See Lawler Incident, (1860) 1 McNair Int’l L Opinions 78; France v GB (Savarkar case), Scott, 
Hague Court Reports, 275 (1911); Reg. v Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, Ex parte Bennett [1994] 
1 AC 42, (95 ILR 380); R v Staines ’ Magistrates ’ Court, Ex parte Westfallen [1998] 4 All ER 210; R v 
Mullen [1999] 2 Cr App R 143. Compare U.S. v Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 669 (95 ILR 355)
45 Akehurst (1972-73), 145; Bowett, ‘Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and 
Resources’ (1982) BYIL 53,1; Jennings and Watts (1996), §136
46 Lotus case, 19
47 Ibid. Compare Brierly who argues for a valid rule international custom establishing such jurisdiction; 
(1928) LQR 44, 154. Such broad grounds for asserting jurisdiction were later restricted and remain 
contested: see Convention on the High Seas (article 11), based on the prior Brussels Convention on 
Penal Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision (1952), and repeated verbatim in UNCLOS (article 97)
48 Bowett (1982), 1
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Research Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime*9 The ‘territorial’ 
principle is the primary basis for the exercise of jurisdiction and is determined by 
reference to the place where the offence was committed. The principle is extended in 
transnational criminal activity by modification through the ‘subjective territorial’ 
principle, whereby the offence is said to occur in the territory where the offence is 
begun although it is not completed there, and the ‘objective territorial’ principle 
where, inversely, the completion of the offence occurs in a State, although it may not 
have begun there. An extra-territorial extension of the latter principle is 
controversially exercised by those States that attempt to regulate the conduct of 
foreigners abroad which cause effects within their own territory. The so-called 
‘effects doctrine’, however, may be distinguished from the objective territorial 
principle since, whereas the effect caused in the latter is a constituent part of the 
offence, that arising in the former is a mere consequence or repercussion of conduct 
completed abroad.50 Anti-trust laws in the United States (‘U.S.’), as well as legislation 
aimed at restricting commercial activity abroad causing “direct effect in the United 
States” such as under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976,51 are notable 
examples. Concerns raised by third States at the time to this extreme assertion of 
jurisdiction brought U.S. courts into direct confrontation with European countries and 
resulted in the imposition of defensive blocking legislation. The United Kingdom 
(‘UK’) Protection of Trading Interests Act, for example, aimed to prohibit compliance 
with certain foreign requirements, such as the production of documents or information 
to courts or authorities in a foreign State.52 In response, U.S. courts sought to temper 
the excesses of anti-trust legislation by introducing the notion of balancing competing 
interests in order to take into account the legitimate interests of other States. The 
unilateral exercise of such extra-territorial jurisdiction, thus, will need to be weighed 
against fundamental values such as those of non-intervention and sovereign equality.
The principle of ‘nationality’ or the ‘active personality’ grants criminal 
jurisdiction over acts committed abroad by a State’s own nationals, even where the act
49 ‘Harvard Research Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime’ (1935) AJIL 29, Supp., 
443
50 Jennings and Watts (1996), §139; Timberlane Lumber Co. v Bank o f Maerica, 549 F.2d 597(1976); 
Laker Airwarys v Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (1984); Hartford Fire Insurance v California, 509 US 764,113 
Sup.Ct.2891(1993); F. Hojfman-LaRoche Ltd. vEmpagran S.A.124 S.Ct.2359(2004)
51 15 ILM 1388(1976); for extraterritorial application of anti-trust legislation in other States see 
Jennings and Watts (1996), §139, n.39 and n.43. See also Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
Act, (1996) (‘Helmes-Burton Act’)
52 1980 c .l l
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is legal in the territory where it occurs. Examples include UK legislation prescribing 
criminal sanction for sexual tourism offences committed abroad by British nationals.53
The ‘protective’ principle provides that a State may prosecute acts committed 
by foreigners abroad which threaten the vital interests or security of die State. Besides 
the political or military offences of espionage, sedition, falsification of official 
documents and attacks against consular staff or property and the like, this may include 
economic offences such as counterfeiting of currency or possibly ‘internet terrorism’. 
It may also include jurisdiction that is asserted on public health grounds, such as in 
the fight against drug-trafficking.54
By contrast, the principle of ‘passive personality’ refers to the assertion of 
jurisdiction over acts committed abroad by foreigners, but directed against the forum 
State’s own nationals.55 The principle was dismissed by Judge Moore in his dissenting 
opinion in the Lotus case, who objected against the situation “where a country claims 
either that its penal laws apply to other countries and to what takes place wholly 
within such countries or, if it does not claim this, that it may punish foreigners for 
alleged violations, even in their own country, of laws to which they were not 
subject”.56 While it has remained controversial, the principle has been applied with 
particular reference to terrorist attacks against a State’s own nationals.57 The main 
justification for the principle relates to crimes committed in uncertain jurisdictional 
contexts, such as on board aircraft where, rather than facing competing jurisdiction, 
there may be a risk that no State will exercise jurisdiction at all. It has, moreover, 
been applied to State-sponsored terrorism where the State of the nationality of the 
accused shields the offender from trial.
A final principle under the Harvard formulation of ‘universality’, determines 
jurisdiction not on the basis of any nexus with the forum State, but by virtue of
53 Sex Offenders Act 1997(UK), s.7; see also Official Secrets Act 1989(UK),s.l5; Crimes (Child Sex 
Tourism) Act 1994(Aus)
54 See Joyce v DPP [1946] AC 347(treason); U.S. v Bin Laden}92 F.Supp.2d,189(2000) (attack on 
foreign embassy); Liangsiriprasert v U.S. Government [1990] 2 All ER 866 (drug trafficking); R v 
Sansom [1991] 2 All ER 145 (drug trafficking); U.S. v Gonzalez 776 F.2d 931(1985) (drug trafficking); 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK), ss.47(7), 50(6), 51
55 Jennings and Watts (1996), §139. See generally Dickinson, ‘Introductory Remarks to the Harvard 
Research Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime 1935’ (1935) 29 AJIL, Supp., 443; 
Wolfrum, ‘The Decentralised Prosecution of International Offences through National Courts’ in 
Dinstein and Tabory, eds., War Crimes in International Law (1996), 233-235
56 Lotus case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Moore, 70
57 See U.S. Terrorist Prosecution Act (1985) and Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act 
(1986); U.S. v Yunis, 924F.2d, 1092. U.S. vAliRezaq, 134F.3d 1121, 1130(1998); U.S. v Bin Laden
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common interests which threaten the international community as a whole.58 Thus, 
although an act may have been committed by a foreigner against a foreign target 
outside the territory of the State, jurisdiction is ceded as a matter of international 
public policy.59 The offender “is treated as an outlaw, as the enemy of all mankind - 
hostis humanis generis - whom any nation may in the interests of all capture and 
punish”.60 A very limited number of crimes attract universal jurisdiction. The crime of 
piracy is the classical instance,61 but the modem day classification can be said to 
include slave trading,62 genocide,63 apartheid,64 and certain categories of war crimes, 
notably as reflected in grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.65 With 
respect to the latter, the British Manual of Militaiy Law reads: “[w]ar crimes are 
crimes ex jure gentium” granting jurisdiction over persons of any nationality to the 
courts of all States.66 The 1949 War Crimes Commission declared “the right to punish 
war crimes ... is possessed by any independent State whatsoever”.67 Similarly, the 
Supreme Military Tribunal of Italy in the Wagener trial held: “[t]hese norms [laws 
and customs of war], due to their highly ethical and moral content, have a universal 
character, not a territorial one ... They are .... crimes of lese-humanite ... and are to be 
opposed and punished, in the same way as the crime of piracy, trade in women and 
minors, and enslavement are to be opposed and punished, wherever they may have 
been committed.”68
None of the above methods of conferring jurisdiction, however, requires a 
State to exercise its authority over criminal offences. Rather, they display permissive 
mles. This may be distinguished from the legal duty imposed upon States to either
58 “[universal jurisdiction] is jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime”, Princeton Principles 
on Universal Jurisdiction and Commentary (2001)
59 Brownlie, 6th ed (2003), 304; ibid
60 Lotus case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Moore,70; Eichmann case, District Court of Jerusalem, 36 
ILR 5 (1961)
61 While there may be uncertainty as to the customary law definition of piracy (Jennings and Watts 
(1996), §.272), its customary status is beyond doubt. For a treaty definition see article 15, Convention 
on the High Seas (1958)
62 Jennings and Watts (1996), §429
63 Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime 
of Genocide, ICJ Rep. 1951, 15; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second 
Phase, ICJ Rep. 1970; Report o f the Secretary General, S/25704, ^35; Restatement o f the Law: Third 
Restatement o f US Foreign Relations Law, Vol.2 (1987), §702,3
64 Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States o f the Continued Presence o f South Africa in 
Namibia, ICJ Rep. 1971, 57
65 Report o f the Secretary General, S/25704
66 British Manual o f  Military War (1958),^|637
67 15 War Crimes Reports 26 (1949)
6813 March 1950, Rivista Penale 753,757 (unofficial translation)
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prosecute or extradite offenders under the principle of the ‘vicarious administration of 
justice’.69 In this instance jurisdiction is based upon the liability of persons for 
punishment in another State.70 According to this principle, a State commits itself to 
either try an offender in its own courts or to extradite him or her to a requesting State. 
The principle has found expression in a number bi- and multilateral extradition 
treaties as the obligation aut dedere aut judicare. Article 7 of the 1970 Hague 
Convention the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft provides the classic 
formulation:
The Contracting States in the territory of which the alleged offender is founds 
shall, it if does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever 
and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the 
case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.71
Criminal offences under various multilateral treaties based on variants of the principle
7 /k
include slavery, piracy, genocide, apartheid, counterfeiting of currency, war
77  7ft 7Q QAcrimes, drug trafficking, hijacking and sabotage of aircraft, sabotage on the 
High Seas,81 attacks on diplomats,82 the taking of hostages,83 and torture.84
In much of the legal literature on the subject, norms based upon the principle 
of the vicarious administration of justice are often conflated with those of the
69 Meyer, ‘The Vicarious Administration of Justice: An Overlooked Basis of Jurisdiction’, 31 Harvard 
ILJ 1 (1990), 108
70 Dinstein, International Criminal Law’ (1975) 5 Israel Yrbk on Human Rights 69; see generally 
Wolfrum (1996)
71 Art.7, Convention for the Suppression o f Unlawful Seizure o f Aircraft (1970)
72 Slavery Convention (1926); and Amending Protocol (1953)
73 Art. 14-22, Convention on the High Seas (1958); art. 100-107,UNCLOS (1982)
74 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f Genocide (1948)
75 Art.II-IV, International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment o f the Crime o f Apartheid 
(1973)
76 Art. 17, International Convention for the Suppression o f Counterfeiting Currency (1929)
77 Geneva Conventions^(1949); Additional Protocol I  (1979)
78 Art.36(2)(iv) Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961); art.4(2)(b) Convention against the Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs (1988)
79 Art.4, Convention for the Suppression o f Unlawful Seizure o f Aircraft (1970)
80 Art.5 Montreal Convention for the Suppression o f Unlawful Acts Against the Safety o f Civil Aviation
(1971)
81 Art.3, Convention for the Suppression o f Unlawful Acts against the Safety o f Maritime Navigation 
(1988); art.2, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety o f Fixed Platforms 
Located on the Continental Shelf (1988)
82 Art.3, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (1973)
83 Art.5, International Convention Against the Taking o f Hostages (1979)
84 Art.5(2), Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984). A number of the treaties cited above were listed in the Annex to the 1994 ILC 
Draft Statute as possible ‘treaty crimes’ pursuant to draft article 20(e).
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principle of universality such that aut dedere aut judicare treaties are spoken of as 
being dispositive of universal jurisdiction.85 There are important differences, however, 
between the two based on both purpose and operation. Under try or extradite 
provisions, a State is obligated because of the liability of an offender for prosecution 
in another State. There need not be an existent extradition request before this duty is 
put to test: in the wording of the relevant conventions, the State must prosecute even 
in the absence of a request since it is “obliged, without exception whatsoever and 
whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”87 Enforcement is required, 
moreover, through domestic legislation incorporating the penal standards inculcated 
in the treaty.88 Finally, obligations to prosecute or extradite are owed to parties with a 
specific jurisdictional nexus. The 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, for example, provides for 
jurisdiction based on territory, flag, or nationality of the accused. The Hostages 
Convention and Torture Convention add jurisdiction based on the nationality of the 
victim. The 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism is the 
broadest in this range by not requiring any nexus beyond being a party to the 
convention. In each of these cases, the custodial State is vicariously enforcing a norm 
that the (harmed) State itself could repress under its own criminal law statutes.89
Under universal jurisdiction, by contrast, the offender is deemed liable for 
prosecution in all States pursuant to a public policy expression of the international 
community. States are under no obligation under international law, however, to 
exercise their jurisdiction. Moreover, the principle, given its universality, applies to 
criminal offences recognised under international custom. It may be correct to say that 
a treaty, by its intrinsic State-Party constraints cannot create a rule of universal 
jurisdiction applicable to all States. Rather, it can only establish a specified range of 
jurisdictional grounds linked to a try or extradite rule applicable to convention 
members.90 A treaty, however, may later converge with the principle of universal
85 Most recently, the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction state: “Universal jurisdiction is 
one means to achieve accountability and to deny impunity to those accused of serious international 
crimes. It reflects the maxim embedded in so many treaties: aut dedere aut judicare, the duty to 
extradite or prosecute”, 50
86 Wolfrum (1996), 236. See generally for this section
87 Art.4, Convention for the Suppression o f Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
88 Art.4 and 7,ibid
89 Wolfrum (1996), 236
90 See Higgins, Problems and Process (1996), 65
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jurisdiction where its substantive provisions into customary law. Such has become the 
case with the prohibitions under Hague Convention IV or die grave breach provisions 
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Alternatively, a convention may codify an existing 
customary crime operating under universal jurisdiction, such as piracy or torture, and 
seek to provide a binding legal mechanism for its adjudication and enforcement.91 In 
such an instance, the overlaying of a binding procedural rule over a prior permissive 
customary norm is only applicable to convention members. In both these cases, the 
treaty rule may be said to reflect universal jurisdiction, but, importantly, it does not 
create it.
In the case of the ICC, the Rome Statute neither creates universal jurisdiction 
nor does it impose an aut dedere aut judicare rule obliging non-Party States to 
surrender or otherwise prosecute persons in relation to an identified situation.92 It 
assumes, however, that such States will want to fulfil their pre-existing duty under 
international law in order to exclude the jurisdiction of the Court.93 Moreover, the 
required jurisdictional nexus of territoriality and active personality listed in the Rome 
Statute represent the most traditional grounds under international law.
The discussion above has important consequences for the debate regarding the 
exercise of jurisdiction by convention States over nationals of non-State Parties. Much 
of the legal difficulty surrounding this issue arises out of the failure to differentiate, 
on the one hand, between the inviolability of third State versus a third State’s 
nationals and to distinguish between aut dedere aut judicare treaties and universal 
jurisdiction on the other. Thus, the U.S. has objected to the jurisdiction of the ICC on 
the basis that the Rome Statute erroneously provides for the exercise of jurisdiction 
over nationals of States not party94 In support, it cites article 34 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’) which holds that “[a] treaty does not 
create either rights or obligations for a third State without its consent” 95 The assertion 
of jurisdiction on these grounds is said to represent thus a form of collective extra­
territoriality towards that non-obligated third State and amounts to unilateral, 
interventionist action. There is an important distinction, however, between an action 
that is sought against a third State, and an action taken against a national of a third
91 E.g. Torture Convention, see above
92 The only exception is where a situation has been referred to the ICC by the Security Council acting 
under Chapter 7
93 See below, Chapter 9
94 Scheffer, ‘The United States and die International Criminal Court’ (1999) AJIL 93,12
95 Art.34-37, Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties (1969) (‘VCLT’)
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State. In the latter scenario, no obligations are created by a treaty for the third State. 
On the contrary, the right of a State Party to proscribe and adjudicate certain conduct, 
including conduct committed abroad, is an expression of sovereignty. Thus, as noted 
above, the exercise of jurisdiction under an international convention over nationals of 
a non-Party State is not novel. It represents a generally recognised right of all States to 
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction pursuant to international cooperation in the 
suppression of a treaty-based crime. The U.S. itself has been among die strongest 
advocates of such extraterritoriality in areas of national interest. The only difference 
in the case of the ICC is that State Parties have authorised the Court to substitute itself 
for their own jurisdiction. The framer of the Nuremburg Charter established its 
jurisdiction on the same basis.96 The ICC, moreover, locks the regime into an 
institutional and vertical, rather than diplomatic or horizontal, mechanism for 
resolution. Another argument detractors could make is that the jurisdiction of 
international bodies differs from that of national forums because the protections under 
law of State immunities can be set aside by an international court. This arguably 
deprives a non-Party State of internationally recognised protections that seek to 
ensure the unimpeded conduct of foreign relations and non-interference in the 
performance of official functions. It is precisely for this purpose, however, that the 
Statute recognises applicable limitations under international law to the exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction over third State nationals based on State or diplomatic immunity 
or non-surrender agreements (article 98, ICC Statute).97 Thus, as argued elsewhere, 
U.S. objections to the jurisdiction of the ICC appear particularly misplaced given the 
multiple procedural safeguards in the Rome Statute.98 Indeed, the U.S. more recently 
has placed less reliance on this particular line of reasoning for its objections to the 
Court.99
96 “The Signatory Powers ... have done together what any one of them might have done singly; for it is 
not to be doubted that any nation has the right thus to set up special courts to administer law”; IMT 
Nuremberg, Judgment, 48
97 See below, Chapter 8
98 Scharf, ‘The ICC's Jurisdiction Over The Nationals Of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. 
Position’ (2001) Law & Contemp. Probs. 64, 67; Bergsmo, ‘Occasional Remarks on Certain State 
Concerns about the Jurisdictional Reach of the International Criminal Court, and their Possible 
Implications for the Relationship between the Court and the Security Council’ (2000) Nordic JIL 69:1
99 Wedgwood ‘The International Criminal Court: An American View’ (1999) EJIL 10,93
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(d) Obligation incumbent on States to give effect to their jurisdiction
None of the forms of jurisdiction reviewed above establish an enforcement duty to 
ensure that States assert their jurisdiction. Certain offences, such as those governed 
purely by customary international law, are often poorly defined and lack an explicit 
enforcement requirement. Other, treaty-based norms vary considerably in their 
enforcement demands. Under the non-grave breach provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions, for example, Contracting Parties are merely obliged to “take measures 
necessary for their [s/c] suppression”.100 The Genocide Convention creates a loose set 
of obligations which includes the enactment of necessary legislation and the provision 
of effective penalties. Actual prosecution is left to die territorial State where the crime 
occurred or to a competent international tribunal, where it exists.101 Even under the 
principle of the vicarious administration of justice, as enumerated in numerous aut 
dedere aut judicare conventions, although a State may be held in breach of its treaty 
obligations where it fails to implement domestic legislation incorporating the penal 
standards inculcated in the treaty, a failure to assert jurisdiction in a specific case will 
not trigger any sanctioning mechanism. On the contrary, national practice has shown 
that States with no direct connection to a particular offence have proved reluctant to
1 ryy
implement their obligation to try offenders in the absence of an extradition request.
The normative regime governing the enforcement of the grave breach 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions represents the most robust among the various 
mechanisms reviewed above. Under the Conventions, Contracting Parties are obliged 
not only to pass special legislation enabling their national authorities to try or 
extradite offenders, but also to search them out.103 As the ICRC Commentary to the 
Geneva Conventions underscores, this “imposes an active duty” on Contracting 
Parties:
As soon as a Contracting Party realizes that there is on its territory a person 
who has committed such a breach, its duty is to ensure that the person 
concerned is arrest and prosecuted with all dispatch. The necessary police
100 See R. v Zardad, [2004] Central Criminal Court (Old Bailey) (5 October 2004) rejecting the claim of 
a duty in English law to try or extradite a hostage taker in an internal armed conflict under the Geneva 
Conventions or Additional Protocols
101 Genocide Convention, art.V-VI; 1969 Genocide Act [UK]
102 Roberts, ‘The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts’, (1995) Duke 
J. Comp.& Int'lL.6, 36-37
103 Art.49 GCI; art.50 GCH; art. 129 GCIH; art. 146 GCIV
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action should be taken spontaneously, therefore, and not merely in pursuance 
of a request from another State.104
Even here, however, State practice in actively implementing this obligation has 
proved exceptional and sporadic.105
The failure to establish a truly mandatory regime has arisen because of the 
absence of a serious mechanism to enforce convention norms against a State that fails 
to exercise its treaty obligations. To date, the principal international agency with 
coercive powers, the UN Security Council, has rarely held States accountable for a 
breach of their obligations towards other States.106 Thus, although there may be a 
legal duty to obtain a specific result, extra-legal considerations dictate that such issues 
are typically left to the effective discretion of States. As longstanding ILC debates
107attest to the difficulty of defining and enforcing notions of State responsibility, 
jurisdiction may be described as effectively permissive or discretionary because of the 
absence of a mechanism that would convert specific obligations into a sanctionable 
legal duty.
(e) Mechanisms to ensure compliance
It is only with the establishment of international tribunals with potentially coercive 
powers that obligations on States can be placed in a hierarchical and institutionalised 
context. For the IMT at Nuremberg and Tokyo, the issue was hardly one of State 
cooperation, given that the Allied powers were exercising executive administrative 
powers in occupied Axis territory. In the case of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
the ad hoc Tribunals have been established as Chapter VII enforcement measures and 
thus require the mandatory cooperation of all States according to article 25 of the UN
104 Pictet, The Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949: Commentary, Vol.III (1952), 623
105 See below, Chapter 3. Roberts (1995) notes “much of the compliance system [relating to the laws of 
war] scarcely has worked at all and shows few signs of doing so now”, 72
106 For rare exceptions see S/RES/731(1992) whereby the Security Council called on Libya to respond 
to requests by U.S., UK and France for the arrest and extradition of two suspects in the Lockerbie case, 
but did not rely on the try or extradite provisions of the 1971 Montreal Convention invoked by Libya; 
by S/RES/748(1992) and S/RES/883(1993) the Council imposed and extended sanctions against Libya. 
See Questions o f Interpretation and application o f the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Jamahiriya v United States o f America), ICJ Rep. (1992), 114; 
Michael Plachta, ‘The Lockerbie Case: The Role o f the Security Council in the Enforcing o f the 
Principle Aut Dedere Aut Judicare’ (2001) EJIL 12, 129. See also S/RES/1333(2000) demanding that 
the Taliban regime arrest and surrender Usama bin Ladan.
107 See comments of States on ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, A/54/10(1999); ILC Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility o f States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, A/56/10(2001)
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Charter. Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), for example, specifies that all States 
shall cooperate with the Tribunal, shall take all measures necessary under their 
domestic law to implement the provisions of the resolution and the Statute, and shall 
comply with request for assistance and orders issued by the Tribunal under article 29 
of the Statute.108 It might perhaps be argued that the obligations on States with respect 
to the grave breach provisions of the Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention 
and of the laws and customs of war are thereby given compulsory form by the ad hoc 
Tribunal. The correct view, however, is that the Security Council has established a 
specific binding regime for State cooperation with the ICTY and ICTR. This is borne 
out by the fact that although the crimes under the Statutes of both Tribunals are 
reflective of the subject-matter of particular treaties, they depart from the procedural 
mechanisms established by those conventions and do not rely on the grounds of 
jurisdiction established therein. Indeed, outside cooperation with the Tribunals, the 
obligations of States with respect to their conventional duties is not altered. Thus, the 
failure of a State to try or extradite an accused not indicted by the Tribunals is not 
subject to scrutiny by either Tribunal. In short, the source of obligation for States with 
regard to the ICTY and ICTR is not the conventions, but the duty, under article 25 of 
the UN Charter, to comply with binding decisions of the Security Council. That 
obligation takes priority, by virtue of article 103 of the Charter, over obligations under 
any other treaty.109
The ICCjs_often considered the weaker sibling of ad hoc Tribunals because of 
ita'complementary ftamework. The institutional relationship created between the ICC 
analiational--0Trffmrities7^o\vev^ is far more profound that of the ad hoc Tribunals. 
A State Party to the Rome Statute is not^nfy required to cooperate with the Court in 
course of its investigations and trials, but is obligate^first and foremost to try the 
alleged offenders in its own domestic courts. Under^omplementam^ if a State Party 
is unwilling or unable to undertake genuine investigations and-pr6secutions, it must 
surrender jurisdiction to the Court.110 Moreover, the ICC has a central role in 
evaluating the effectiveness of national enforcement of humanitarian norms where a 
State fails to do so since the activation of the Court’s jurisdiction is intimately linked
108 See ICTR article 28, S/RES/955 (1994); Prosecutor v Blaskic, 110 ILR 607 (29 October 
\991)(‘Blaskic Subpoena Appeal’)
109 See below, Chapter 9
110 Non-Party States may be placed in a similar position where a situation is referred by the Security 
Council (see below, Chapter 8)
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to such efforts. The Rome Statute, thus, compels States to enforce humanitarian 
norms in a way the International Tribunals have been unable to.111
The overlaying of an international judicial forum over international norms, 
however, will not be sufficient to ensure compliance. An agency capable of securing 
routine enforcement will be necessary. Lacking this, international courts and tribunals 
will remain dependant on State cooperation for the exercise of their powers. Where 
such support is not forthcoming, an international court alone will be unable to compel 
compliance. The enforcement of international criminal law, thus, must be placed in 
the wider context of extra-legal motivations that may induce or coerce State action. It 
is the explanation of this disparity between State obligations under international 
regimes and their actual behaviour, which forms the focus of the next chapter.
111 See below, Chapter 3 on the supervisory powers of the ICTY over certain national proceedings via 
Rule 116«
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II
National and International Authorities
1. BETWEEN NORMS AND PRACTICE
In general, most States routinely comply with their obligations under international 
law. From meteorology to aviation law, international sale of goods to the law of 
treaties, conflict of jurisdictions to diplomatic immunity, to international law that has 
been incorporated into national law, there is much of a legal system that covers of 
most, if  not all, aspects international life. As Jessup notes, “the vast majority of such 
engagements are continuously, honestly, and regularly observed even under adverse 
conditions and at considerable inconvenience to the parties . . . The record proves 
that there is a ‘law habit’ in international relations.”1 This represents the functional 
core of international life where States comply either because the multilateral 
agreements concerned are coordination mechanisms that States have a strong 
incentive to participate in (such as trade and monetary regimes) or are modest 
regulatory frameworks that place few demands on parties and reflect existing 
practice (such as arms proliferation regimes).2
Notwithstanding this general habitual law-abidingness, the regulatory 
frameworks contained in an international agreement that require a more ambitious 
departure from actual State behaviour frequently encounter problems with 
enforcement.3 Among the most ambitious set of agreements where non-compliance is 
obvious are those in the field of human rights and international humanitarian law.4 
Moreover, the most persistent violators of such regimes often are poor, weak or
1 Jessup, A Modem Law o f Nations (1948), 6-8
2 As Brierly observes, “The volume of this work is considerable, but most of it is not sensational ... it 
means that international law is performing a useful and indeed a necessary function in enabling states 
to carry on their day-to-day intercourse along orderly and predictable lines”, The Law Of Nations 
(1963), 68-76; Downs and Trento, ‘Conceptual Issues Surrounding the Compliance Gap’, in Luck and 
Doyle, eds., International Law and Organization: Closing the Compliance Gap (2004), 36
3 Downs and Trento (2004), 20
4 ibid, 21. Bassiouni (1985) notes that offences with the least political content, such as piracy, are 
typically contained in instruments with the greatest penal and enforcement apparatus, whereas those 
targeting political and military officials/leadership often suffer from want of clearly formulated and 
binding enforcement provisions.
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undemocratic States in conflict situations or post-conflict transitions.
Using compliance as a measure of effectiveness depends also on the relative 
demands the regime places on parties and their resultant behaviour. A treaty 
monitoring mechanism that requires States to merely report on their activities may 
enjoy high levels of compliance, but may not be particularly effective in altering 
deviant practice. Conversely, a regime that places onerous duties on parties may 
suffer from under performance despite the genuine efforts of States to enforce its 
norms. There will, thus, be a level of non-compliance that the regime can be 
expected to bear between full enforcement and flagrant violation.5 As Colemen and 
Doyle point out, a number of will factors influence this balance, including “the 
willingness to invest in compliance, the cost of defections and the social benefits of 
compliance, whether defection is a matter of will or capacity ... and whether the 
regime is designed for homogeneous agents or covers leaders and laggards”.6 Full 
compliance by a State with its duties under international criminal law, for example, 
will be subject to public policy considerations and may require a trade-off with 
resources available for other societal goals.
Another consideration is the political effect of non-compliance and its impact 
on a State’s overall reputation on the international sphere. As Downs and Trento 
point out, compliance rates vary across different areas of international law. The 
incentives structures built into the world’s trade and finance regimes mean that the 
prospect of exclusion reduces the likelihood of significant or repeated divergence 
from required standards. By contrast, non-compliance with its environmental 
obligations, while it may impact on credibility of State in relation to further 
environmental treaties, typically will not undermine its future participation in other 
international initiatives nor incur direct penalties. Differentiation in the reputational 
assignment of States occurs because behaviour in one sector is seldom linked to 
behaviour in another.7 Where linkage has occurred, States have been willing to grant 
conditional loans and subsidies or technical assistance (such as technology transfers) 
in order to create positive incentives for compliance. The ‘soft-power’ pull of the 
European Union (‘EU’) for aspirant Member States and its European Neighbourhood 
Policy, nonetheless, is a rare but effective example of linking trading benefits not
5 Colemen and Doyle, ‘Introduction: Expanding Norms, Lagging Compliance’, in Luck and Doyle, 
(2004), 6
6 ibid, 7
7 Downs and Trento (2004), 23-24
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only to minority and human rights, but also to cooperation with war crimes 
prosecutions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (‘NATO’) has engaged in a 
similar process in the Balkans in return for participation in its Partnership for Peace 
programme. In general, however, the use of linkage strategies to coerce compliance 
has remained rare and has been employed only in connection with priority or high 
profile issues.8
The effectiveness of such compliance-inducing measures is dependent also on
the relative strength of the actor concerned. The exceptionalism claimed by non-
compliant powerful States, for example, will less easily succumb to incentive-
structures, which in turn may serve to erode the normative strength underpinning the
regime concerned. Moreover, certain compliance structures may be biased in favour
of powerful States and designed to protect their interests. Examples include
conventional prohibitions which seek to curb nuclear arms proliferation, but fail to
address weapon stockpiles.9
A number of approaches to systems theories have been developed by
international relations scholars to assess compliance.10 The realist school essentially
sees international laws and organisations as “arenas for playing out power
relationships between self-interested States concerned primarily with their own
relative power”.11 The task of world institutions is to add stability to the balance of
power between States in order to prevent resort to all out war.12 Compliance with
international law occurs where there is a convergence with State’s own interests, or it
1 ^is coerced into doing so by a more powerful actor.
The transformationalist or rationalist school is inspired by the Grotian view of 
why States obey international rules, including those that are inconvenient. The 
development and application of international laws and institutions, it is held, will 
gradually serve to transform the society of sovereign States to the extent that
8 Compare, notably, the competing linkage strategies on ICC issues employed by the U.S. (bilateral 
immunity agreements) and the EU (Cotonou Agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group 
of States) in their relations with third States.
9 Feiveson and Shire, ‘Dilemmas of Compliance with Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements’, in 
Luck and Doyle (2004), 15
10 See generally this section Downs and Trento, 26-31; Koh, ‘Review Essay: Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?’ (1997) Yale L.J. 8, 2599-2660; White, The Law o f International Organisations 
(1996), 1-23
11 Downs and Trento (2004), 26
12 Goodwin, ‘World Institutions and World Order’, in Cosgrove and Twitchett, eds., The New 
International Actors: The United Nations and the European Economic Community (1970), 63
13 Haas, ‘Why Comply? Or Some Hypothesis in Search of an Analyst’, in Weiss, ed., International 
Compliance with Nonbinding Accords (1997)
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participants come to place community interests above their own.14 Applied to the 
contemporary setting, the school argues that world institutions provide a framework 
for the transformation of State behaviour through the application of universally valid 
moral and legal principles. This will lead to the eventual establishment of a rule of 
law system analogous to that found at the domestic level.15 Moreover, international 
organisations will become increasingly autonomous with centralised coercive powers 
over parties as the international system develops.16
The Kantian liberal school argues that States will exhibit a ‘compliance pull’ 
out of a sense of moral obligation. The thesis has been adapted by Thomas Frank 
who argues that a system’s durability and effectiveness in securing compliance will 
depend on the extent to which the regulatory framework it establishes is perceived to 
be fair or just.17 The democratic process school offers a related approach, suggesting 
that compliance will be predicated by the contextual political infrastructure of each 
actor. Democratic States, buttressed by the rule of law, transparent government and 
public scrutiny, it is argued, will reduce the incidence of non-compliance because of 
the value placed by national authorities on legitimacy.18 In a further variant, the 
transnationalist school looks to the internalisation of norms at the national level into 
domestic legal systems through a trickle-down process of “vertical domestication”. 
This internalisation occurs through the influence of a variety of agents including 
transnational actors, governmental authorities, national legislative bodies, 
administrative compliance procedures, and issue linkages.19
The functionalist school describes international norms and institutions in 
terms of the incremental development of areas of cooperation according to the strict 
functional needs of the international system. At the micro-analytical level, this 
translates into a teleological approach to treaty interpretation which concentrates on 
the objects and purpose of a particular organisation as embodied in its founding legal 
instruments.20 At the macro level, functionalism asserts that world bodies will 
incrementally take on increasingly complex areas of common interest starting from 
basic fields such as telecommunications or postal services, but without creating an
14 Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics (1999)
15 Goodwin (1970), 55-57
16 White (1996), 10
17 Frank, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995)
18 Slaughter-Burley, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda’ (1993) 
AJIL 87,205-39
19 Koh (1997), 2599
20 See, e.g., approach of ICJ in the Reparations case, ICJ Rep. 1949,174; White (1996), 2
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overall-all political authority.21 As White observes, the difference between the 
functionalist perspective and that of rationalists is the view that “[w]orld government 
would stultify the natural development inherent in the functional approach because 
any change would require the agreement of the States within the world body leading 
inevitably to confrontation on purely political grounds ... fuelled by the dogma of 
State sovereignty and State equality” 22
In the field of political economy, the strategic school looks to the incentive 
structures created by international agreements and to the potential for nuancing these 
incentives in individual cases in order to increase the benefits a State may accrue 
from cooperation and the costs it will encounter through non-compliance.23 
Likewise, the managerial school treats non-compliance as a problem-solving 
exercise, rather than deviant practice requiring sanction. The ‘problem’ concerned 
may be affected by a number of external and internal factors, such as treaty 
ambiguity or a State’s genuine inability to implement an agreement. As with the 
strategic school, non-compliance may best be overcome by carrot and stick 
negotiation and by the creation of positive incentives such as conditional loans and 
technical assistance.24
As will be seen below, these approaches are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Each serves to highlight one element of the broader picture of how 
different States behave in different sectors and at different stages in the evolution of 
the international system.25 All of the approaches help to explain some aspect of non­
cooperation and under-performance by States with their duty to repress crimes under 
international law generally and their specific obligations under the Rome Statute. In 
particular, the study examines factors influencing non-compliance, including the 
degree of unwillingness and inability, as well as whether compliance-inducing 
incentive and coercive structures exist to encourage State action. Since the present 
study looks at the relationship between the ICC and national authorities, it concerns 
itself primarily with the causal impact the existence of the Court will have on State 
practice in the enforcement of international norms, not on its potential deterrent
21 Mitrany, A Working Peace System (1943)
22 White (1996), 6
23 Setear, ‘An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and 
International Law’ (1996) Harvard DLJ 37; Abbott, ‘Modem International Relations Theory: A 
Prospectus for International Lawyers’ (1989) Yale JIL 14
24 Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 
(1995)
25 Luck, ‘Gaps, Commitments and Compliance Challenges’, in Luck and Doyle (2004), 323
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effect on the perpetrators of crimes.26
2. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
a. Jurisdiction
Another theme which runs throughout the research is the notion of ‘horizontal’ versus 
‘vertical’ powers to describe the structural relationship between national and 
international jurisdictions. As employed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, the concept 
attempts to describe the consensual and reciprocal legal framework governing inter­
state mutual legal assistance in criminal matters as distinguished from the hierarchical 
and supranational relationship of an international court towards national authorities.27 
Similarly, Falk distinguishes between ‘statist logic’, representing the predominant 
horizontal ordering of international society since the Peace of Westphalia that is 
associated with the will of the territorial sovereign State, and a ‘supranational logic’ 
that aspires to a vertical ordering from above 28
In the horizontal model, a court can only exercise legislative or prescriptive 
jurisdiction, together with the power to adjudicate such crimes in its own national 
courts, but it has no enforcement jurisdiction beyond the territory over which it is 
sovereign. The model is typified by the existing relationship between national 
authorities, whereby one jurisdiction cannot force compliance with its request abroad, 
nor execute coercive powers on the territory of other States. As Swart notes, in inter­
state practice there is no customary rule of international law imposing a duty of States 
to cooperate in criminal matters beyond their treaty obligations. “Sovereignty, 
equality, reciprocity, the existence or absence of mutual interests, and, to a greater or 
lesser extent, the need to protect individual persons against unfair treatment by the 
requesting State are the main determinants of inter-State cooperation.”29 Treaty 
obligations arising out of requests for extradition and mutual assistance in criminal
26 On prevention see, inter alia, Akhavan, ‘Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice 
Prevent Future Atrocities?’ (2001) AJIL 95, 7
27 The ICTY Appeal Chamber employed these terms in the Blaskic Subpoena Judgment, borrowing 
from the Amicus curiae brief submitted by Frowein et al., (15 September 1997)
28 Falk, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights’, in Falk, ed., Human Rights and State Sovereignty 
(1981), 33
29 Swart, ‘General Problems’, in Cassese, Gaeta, Jones, eds., The Rome Statute o f the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002), 1591
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matters between States are normally executed in accordance with the law of the 
requested authority, are based on undertakings of reciprocity, and contain various 
provisions enabling refusal by the requested State. Direct contact with individuals or 
the conduct of investigations on a State’s territory by another State is normally 
excluded. Implementing procedures, moreover, are often cumbersome and protracted, 
with few mechanisms for resolving disputes beyond the voluntary referral to third 
party arbitration.30
In the vertical model, an international court enjoys supra-national authority 
over domestic jurisdictions. It can issue binding orders to national authorities and 
require mandatory cooperation according to a set of obligations that override 
inconsistent domestic legislation.31 Thus, for example, the repeated refusals of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (‘FRY’) to surrender persons to the ICTY by 
invoking the constitutional bar to extraditing nationals has not been recognised by the 
Tribunal.32 Similarly, the traditional prerogative of States in mutual legal assistance to 
refuse cooperation on the basis on national security is subjected to judicial 
examination (ICTY Rule 54 bis). Moreover, a State may not invoke a lacuna in its 
own domestic law, or deficiencies thereof, as justification for its failure to perform a 
treaty.33 Non-compliance with an international court can led to collective enforcement 
action by the international community. This may take the form of Security Council 
imposed measures (ranging from condemnation to military intervention) or the 
adoption of regional and bilateral sanctions (such as the imposition of trade and aid 
conditionality measures, travel bans, and the freezing of assets).
Under the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, the Tribunals are said to enjoy 
‘vertical’ powers that emanate from their establishment under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.34 This results from the obligation on UN Member States under article 25 of 
the UN Charter to comply with decisions of the Security Council, and to afford such
30 ibid
31 Cassese (1999), 164-5
32 ICTY Rule 58. See also dismissal in the Tadic Interlocutory Appeal of the plea of jus de non 
evocando (right to be tried by one’s national courts) which features in a number of national 
constitutions, holding that “[t]his principle is not breached by the transfer of jurisdiction to an 
international tribunal created by the Security Council acting on behalf of the community of nations”; 
TI62-3
33 Art.27 VCLT; Alabama Arbitration, Lapradelle et Politis, ii (1924), 891 ; Jurisdiction o f the Courts 
of Danzig (1928) PCU, Series B, No.15, 26-7; Greek and Bulgarian Communities Case (1930) PCU, 
Series B, No. 17,32; Jennings and Watts (1996), 84
34 Blaskic Subpoena Judgment, ^47,54
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obligations precedence over other those arising from any other treaty.35 Accordingly, 
the Secretary-General noted in his Report to the Security Council on the establishment 
of the ICTY that an order by a Trial Chamber ... shall be considered to be the 
application of an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations.”36 Thus, pursuant to article 29 of the ICTY Statute and article 28 of the 
ICTR Statute, the voluntary discretion of States to cooperate is replaced by a duty to 
comply which prevails over any other domestic or international impediment. 
Moreover, no reciprocity is owed by the Tribunal to States beyond such forms of 
assistance as the Tribunal’s organs may voluntarily agree upon. Where a State fails to 
cooperate, the Prosecutor may seek a binding order from the Trial Chamber to effect 
compliance.37 Non-compliance with decisions and orders of the Tribunals may also 
expose a State to sanction by the Security Council. Where a State is unwilling to 
cooperate, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has declared that the Tribunals are competent 
to enter into direct contact with individuals acting in their private capacity and 
otherwise subject to the sovereign authority of the State concerned without going 
through official channels, if it is necessary to prevent that State from jeopardising the 
Tribunals’ functioning. Such an individual would fall within the “ancillary criminal 
jurisdiction” of die Tribunals, and would be “duty bound to comply with its orders, 
requests and summonses”.38 Furthermore, requested States cannot impose grounds for 
refusal. Even with regard to disclosure that may prejudice national security interests, 
the requested State does not enjoy a right of refusal, but, at most, may file a notice of 
objection.39 Traditional extradition-based obstacles to transfer do not apply to 
surrender to the Tribunals (ICTY/ICTR rule 58). Finally, it is for the Tribunals, not 
die requested State, to determine the scope of cooperation owed. In this manner, the 
Tribunals function as a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism with respect to the 
obligations owed by State under their Statutes.40
As displayed below, as a treaty text arising from inter-State negotiations, the 
Rome Statue creates a mixture of horizontal and vertical powers. The manner in 
which tensions are resolved will be central to the relationship between the ICC and 
national authorities.
35 Art. 103, UN Charter. See below, Chapter 9
36 Report o f the Secretary General, S/25704, TJ126. See also S/RES/978(1995) and S/RES/1031(1995)
37 Blaskic Subpoena Judgment, 3^1
38 ibid, H55-56
39 ICTY rule 54bis; ibid, ^65
40 Sluiter, International Criminal Adjudication and the Collection o f Evidence (2002), 87
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b. Applicable law
A related concept dealing with the interaction between national and international law 
is the well known distinction between monism and dualism. The dualist and monist 
debate is well rehearsed and need not detailed repetition here, suffice to highlight a 
number of issues of relevance to consideration of the relationship between domestic 
and international criminal law and issues of enforcement arising therefrom.
Both theories seek to resolve questions of supremacy where competition arises 
between the national and international law. Dualism holds that the two legal orders 
represent distinct and autonomous systems governing different subject-matter: the 
sovereign internal laws of the State and the relations between States.41 Because they 
operate in separate spheres neither legal order has die authority to alter the governing 
rules of the other. As such, there can be no relationship of subordination between the 
two. Where there is a question of apparent conflict between international and 
national law in a domestic dispute, domestic law will always take precedence.
Monism essentially asserts the supremacy of international law in both 
international and domestic domains. This is partly based on a view of individuals as 
subjects of international law, and partly on a basic distrust of the State to safeguard 
international standards 42 As such, international treaty obligations are held to take 
precedence over conflicting domestic legislation, even in purely ‘domestic’ cases.
An alternative approach, focusing on considerations of co-ordination in 
international and domestic practice, attempts to distance itself from the whole notion 
of conflict between two systems in a common sphere. Municipal and International 
law are held to each operate in distinct fields, in which each is supreme. As Anzilotti 
writes “there cannot be conflict between rules belonging to different judicial orders 
.... To speak of a conflict between international law and internal law is as inaccurate 
as to speak of conflict between the laws of different States”.43 Rather than a clash 
between systems, Fitzmaurice posits a conflict of obligations, or “an inability for the 
State on the domestic plane to act in the manner required by international law”. In
41 Brownlie, 6th ed (2003), 33
42 See Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (1950); Kelsen, General Theory of Law and 
the State (1945), 363-80; see generally Brownlie ibid
43 Anzilotti, Corso di diritto intemazionale, cited in Fitzmaurice, ‘The General Principles of 
International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law’, 92 Hague Recueil 5 (1970II)
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such an instance, the State’s domestic laws are not abrogated, but it will have 
committed a breach of its international obligations for which will be held 
internationally responsible, and for which it cannot plead provisions of its own laws 
or deficiencies therein.44
An alternative model presented by Delmas-Marty, called ‘pluralism’, 
substitutes normative interaction for hierarchical subordination to more accurately 
reflect the interaction between different national legal systems between themselves 
and with international law. Pluralism is characterised by the ‘hybridization’ of norms 
which occurs through a process of synthesis and balance between the world’s legal 
systems. This process, it is held, will lead to the elaboration of common international 
rules and to the ‘harmonisation’ of the implementation of domestic law around these 
principles in order to render legal systems more compatible with each other45 
Developments in the sphere of the EU Member State activity mirrors this approach 46 
Two basic principles of treaty formulation bring these debates into focus: one, 
that an international convention may refer to national law as a means of describing a 
status to be created or protected,47 and the other the rule that a State cannot plead 
provisions of its own laws, or deficiencies thereof, in answer to a claim against it for 
an alleged breach of its obligations under international law 48
The potential for conflict between these twin principles is exemplified by the 
Breard case. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court had to rule on the reception in 
domestic law of a provisional measure indicated by the ICJ 49 The order had been 
sought by Paraguay in order to stay the execution of one of its national on death row 
pending consideration on merits of allegations of a violation of article 36(1) of the 
1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In refusing the measure, the 
Supreme Court centred its argument on a rejection of the above stated principles. It 
held first that under international law “absent a clear and express statement to the 
contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the
44 Art. 27, VCLT; Fitzmaurice, 70-80
45 Delmas-Marty, ‘L’Influence du droit compare sur l’activite des Tribunaux penaux intemationaux’, in 
Cassese and Delmas-Marty, eds., Crimes intemationaux et juridictions intemationales,(2002),95
46 See, e.g., European Arrest Warrant, Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA(13 June 2002) and 
European Evidence Warrant, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision COM/2003/0688(2003)
47 Brownlie, 6th ed (2003), 39. See, e.g. art.49, 50, 129 and 146 of four Geneva Conventions 
respectively
48 Art. 27, VCLT; see above n.33
49 Breard case, Order o f 10 November 1998, ICJ Reports. 1998,426
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treaty in that state”.50 Moreover, it declared that the 1996 U.S. Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (which denies a habeas petitioner alleging a violation of a 
treaty if he has failed to develop a factual basis for the claim in court) superseded and 
trumped the 1963 Vienna Convention. The decision placed international law and 
national legislation, thus, on an equal footing and suggested, moreover, that domestic 
legislation can override international norms and obligations.51 The problem this 
approach is that granting States full interpretative powers to determine the extent of 
their obligations under international conventions, or the power to derogate therefrom 
through domestic legislation, undermines treaty-making principles, which in turn 
creates doubts about the nature and relevance of international law.52
The above approach can be contrasted with the well established hierarchy of 
laws under regional mechanisms in Europe. The European Court of Human Rights 
under the Council of Europe,53 and the European Court of Justice under the European 
Community and later European Union treaties54 are empowered by Member States 
with the capacity to review a judgment of a national court and to give a binding 
pronouncement which is directly enforceable in domestic law. Such findings may 
implicate the State in changing its laws and paying compensation to the aggrieved 
party.
The debate over horizontal or vertical, monist or dualist approaches to die 
relationship between domestic and international law will be central to considerations 
of the complementarity as a framework for the obligations of State Parties under die 
Rome Statute. As discussed in the proceeding chapters, the Statute establishes a sui 
generis approach to resolving die tensions between domestic and international 
criminal jurisdiction and applicable law.
50 ibid
51 See Sands ‘After Pinochet: the Proper Relationship between National and International Courts’, 
Institute o f Advance Legal Studies Lecture Series (4 November 1999), 5
52 See ICTY Appeals Chamber: “Although it is a general principle of international law that it is for the 
State to determine how it will fulfil its international obligations, a State cannot impose conditions of 
form on the fulfilment of these obligations by enacting national legislation which results in the 
derogation thereof’; Prosecutor v Blaskic, Decision on the Objection o f the Republic o f Croatia to the 
Issuance o/Subpeona Duces Tecum, (18 July 1997) (‘Blaskic Subpeona Decision’)
53 Art. 19, Convention for Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950)
54 Art.234, EC Treaty (formerly art. 177,1957 Treaty of Rome)
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c. Immunities
A final aspect which serves to distinguish adjudication at national and international 
levels and which has a decisive bearing on the ability of courts to enforce 
international criminal law norms is the issue of State immunities. The law of State 
immunity is a manifestation of the principle of the sovereign equality of States and 
derives primarily from the rule that one State may not claim jurisdiction over 
another.55 It represents a time honoured doctrine aimed at ensuring the smooth and 
unimpeded conduct of foreign relations between States and non-interference in the 
performance of official State functions.56 The immunity provided serves to protect 
the State itself, and can only be waived by such a State.57 In order to prevent the 
indirect abuse of the rule, State immunity applies also to agents of the State that act on 
its behalf abroad.58 This derivative form of immunity for State officials has been 
codified in the 1961 Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations (1961) and on 
Consular Relations (1963).59 The primary focus of the present study is the effect of 
State immunities on criminal jurisdiction, although parallel developments in area of 
civil liabilities are briefly referenced.
The immunity attaching to State officials can be distinguished into two types. 
Immunity ratione materiae (or ‘functional immunity’) pertains to the official acts of 
all State agents. Because the functions carried out on its behalf remain attributable to 
the State, functional immunity persists even after such an agent leave office. 
Moreover, the person is excluded from individual liability under domestic and 
international law absent the waiver from his State because the acts in question cannot
55 Par in parem non habet imperium. See The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon 7 Cranch 116(1812)
56 See U.S. v Iran, ICJ Rep.3 (1980), 25; Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities o f States and their 
Property, A/KES/59/3 8(2004) (yet to enter into force); European Convention on State Immunities
(1972)
57 On the inviolability of State immunity with respect to civil suits brought in foreign jurisdictions, see 
Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Co. (No. 1), [1995] 1 WLR 1147; Al-Adsani v 
Government o f Kuwait (1996) 107 ILR 536; Siderman de Blake v Republic o f Argentina, 965, F.2d 699 
(9thCir.l992); Argentine Republic v Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation (1989) 488 U.S.428; Princz 
v Federal Republic o f Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C.Cir.1994); Al-Adsani v U.K., 34 EHRR 273(2001) 
(ECtHR); Bouzari v Iran, 243 DLR (4th) 406 (Ontario Court of Appeal); Jones v Saudi Arabia [2004] 
EWCA Civ 1394 (CA)
C O
See Propend Finance Pty Ltd v Sing [1997] 111 ILR 611(CA), holding that employees or officers of 
a foreign State must be afforded protection “under the same cloak as protects the State itself’; Church 
of Scientology case,( 1978)65 ILR 193(German Supreme Court); Jaffe v Miller (1993) ILR 446 
(Ontario Court of Appeal); Herbage v Meese (1990) 747 F.Supp.60 (U.S.). But see Jones v Saudi 
Arabia (CA) [2005] QB 699
59 See also Convention on Special Missions (1969)
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legally be imputable to him.60 Overlaid on top of functional immunity, a limited class 
of State officials, such as the serving Head of State and diplomats, additionally enjoy 
immunity ratione personae (or ‘personal immunity’). This form of immunity attaches 
to the person of State agent and aims to ensure absolute inviolability. As a result, the 
incumbent post holder enjoys immunity for any official and private acts conducted 
while in office, as well as those carried out prior to taking office. Since inviolability is 
only functionally necessary so long as the individual directly represents the State, 
personal immunity is lost upon cessation of office, leaving only immunity ratione 
materiae.
The application of State immunities for perpetrators of international crimes is 
an area of emerging State practice where national authorities have sought to resolve 
the competing tensions between the principle of sovereign equality and the need to 
uphold fundamental community values.61 Relatively straightforward is the situation 
where a State exercises its prerogative to assert its criminal jurisdiction over its own 
nationals or otherwise to waive the immunity of its officials for prosecution abroad.62 
A more far-reaching exception was applied by the House of Lords in the Pinochet 
ruling. The Law Lords held that while immunity ratione personae of an incumbent 
Head of State before a foreign jurisdiction is absolute, a former Head of State’s claim 
to immunity ratione materiae for his ‘official acts’ must be considered in the light of 
conventional prohibitions against international crimes, including those committed by 
State officials.63 As succinctly put by Lord Browne-Wilkinson: “[h]ow can it be for 
international purposes an official function to do something which international law 
itself prohibits and criminalises?”64 Accordingly, acts such as torture committed while 
in office were held to deprive an official or former official of his functional immunity. 
Despite the opinion of two Law Lords that the exception to immunity ratione 
materiae derived from the customary prohibition of torture, the majority held that 
exceptions to functional immunity must be based on a clearly defined treaty crime 
that requires the criminalisation of the offence under the domestic law of its State 
Parties and applies irrespective of the official capacity of the accused.
60 See Church o f Scientology case; Cassese, ‘When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for 
International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v Belgium Case’ (2002) EJIL 13, 863
61 See Congo v Belgium, ICJ Rep.2 (2002), Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and 
Buergenthal, TJ73
62 In some jurisdictions certain office holders are guaranteed constitutional protections from legal 
process, see Chapter 9
63 See, e.g., the prohibition against torture by State officials in the Torture Convention
64 Pinochet 7/7,20
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The ICJ recalled elements of the House of Lords Judgment in the Yerodia 
case.65 In its judgment, the ICJ upheld the claim brought by the Congo that Belgium 
had violated State immunity by instituting proceedings against an incumbent Minster 
of Foreign Affairs. The judges held that the role of a Foreign Minister entitles the post 
holder to occupy a position under international law similar to that of a Head of State 
or Head of Government, thereby enabling the enjoyment of “full immunity criminal 
jurisdiction and inviolability”.66 Although not stated explicitly in the decision, the 
categorisation of such immunity as absolute suggests the judges were referring here to 
immunity ratio personae. In the ICJ went on to elaborate in obiter dicta several 
exceptions to State immunity, including the following:
[Ajfter a person ceases to hold the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, he or 
she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in 
other States. Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of 
one State may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in 
respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as 
well as in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private 
capacity.67
This passage has been criticised for failing to distinguish adequately between the 
categories of State immunity outlined above 68 It, nonetheless, does appears to 
distinguish between the personal immunities that a post holder will lose upon leaving 
office (“he or she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international 
law”), and the residual functional immunity that will remain. More problematic is the 
distinction that is made between official and private acts. Since international crimes 
will almost always be conducted in the capacity of an official, the ICJ appears to have 
denied any exception to functional immunity that is not conducted in a private 
capacity or otherwise for purely personal motives. This would vastly limit the scope 
of proceedings against former post holders for international crimes committed while 
they were in office.69 It also would place the decision at odds with the House of Lords 
judgment which the ICJ recalled with approval. Under the Torture Convention, for 
example, the offence must be conducted by a person “acting in an official capacity”.
65 ICJ Rep.2 (2002)
66 Congo v Belgium, ffl|53-54
61 ibid,}J61
68 See, inter alia, Cassese (2002); Wirth, ‘Immunity for Core Crime? The ICJ’s Judgment in the Congo 
v Belgium Case’ (2002) EJIL 877
69 Cassese (2002), 868
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Such a narrow construction of the dictum, however, may be unwarranted, since the 
term ‘private acts’ may be read as encompassing either acts that are carried out for 
purely personal motives (such as self-aggrandisement or a perhaps instance of rape) or 
those acts which, while conducted in the capacity of an official, cannot be considered
7 A
as legitimate expression of such authority (borrowing the Law Lord’s reasonmg). 
Support for the latter view is emphasised in the separate concurring joint opinion of 
judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal. Thus, if one is to avoid an interpretation 
that would undermine emerging State practice, it can reasonably be surmised that the 
ICJ, notwithstanding the ambiguity of the majority decision, intended the latter 
categorisation.
A final, generally accepted exception to State immunity is applicable where an 
international court exercises criminal jurisdiction over State officials. Drawing on the 
precedent of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the official capacity of a person, 
as Head of State or Government or otherwise, cannot be a bar to jurisdiction.71 Thus 
with respect to an international trial, both immunity ratione personae and immunity 
ratione materiae can be set aside.
Emerging practice on State immunities will continue to impact on the scope 
for enforcement of international criminal law. It is unlikely that exceptions to 
immunity ratione personae, even for international crimes, will come to be accepted 
by national courts at the expense of disrupting inter-State relations and the principles 
of independence and non-interference.72 For the same reason, it is increasingly likely 
that the international community will turn to trials by a neutral international forum in 
cases involving incumbent senior State officials. Domestic State practice, however, 
appears to suggest a gradual acceptance of exceptions to functional immunities for 
certain international crimes.73 Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 9, the introduction of
70 Congo v Belgium, Separate Opinion of judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, ^85
71 See art.7 Nuremberg Charter; A/RES/95(1); art.6 Tokyo Charter; art.7(2) ICTY Statute; art.6(2) 
ICTR Statute; art.27 ICC Statute; Congo v Belgium, |^61; Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, Decision on 
Immunity from Jurisdiction, (SCSL-2003-01-I) (31 May 2004)
72 See, inter alia, Mugabe, Bow Street Magistrate (14 January 2004) and Mofaz, Bow Street Magistrate 
(12 February 2004), reproduced in (2004) ICLQ 53,769-774; Bo Xilai, Bow Street Magistrate (8 
November 2005), unreported; Fidel Castro, Audiencia Nacional, Order (auto) no. 1999/2723 (4 March 
1999)( Spain); Gadaffi, Cour de Cassation (13 March 2001), 125 ILR 490 (France)(the claimants in this 
case are taking France to the ECtHR over the grant of immunity)
73 See, inter alia, Pinochet III (1998); Pinochet, Audiencia Nacional, Order (auto) no. 1998/22605, 
(Spain); Scilingo, Audiencia Nacional, Order (auto) no. 1998/22604 (Spain); Bouterse, Gerechtshof 
Amsterdam [Court of Appeal] (20 November 2000) (The Netherlands); Cavallo, Supreme Court, 
Amparo en Revisidn 140/2002 (10 June 2003) (Mexico). Compare Habre, Cour de Cassation (20 
March 2001), 125 ILR 569 (Senegal)
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national implementing legislation by ICC State Parties has caused States to re­
examine sovereign immunities.
3. ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
As noted earlier, historically there has been a gap in enforcement of international 
humanitarian law. In order to contextualise the analysis undertaken in Parts II and HI 
of national and international practice, a brief discussion of historical efforts to create a 
permanent international enforcement mechanism may be helpful.
Modem day proposals to create a permanent international criminal court date 
back to Gustave Moynier, one of the founders of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross. In 1872, outraged by the atrocities of the Franco-Prussian War, he laid out 
detailed but generally ignored proposals that touched on trigger mechanisms, subject 
matter jurisdiction and the definition of offences, election of judges, parties to 
disputes, procedure, award of damages, and financing.74 After the First World War, 
the Treaty of Versailles provided for the establishment of an ad hoc international 
criminal tribunal to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II for “a supreme offence against 
international morality and the sanctity of treaties”, with ancillary trials in Allied 
military tribunals.75 With the flight of the Kaiser to the Netherlands, and the refusal of 
the Dutch to extradite him, however, the Allied Powers made no serious attempts to 
seize custody and efforts to establish a court died in their tracks. Furthermore, after 
objections by German authorities to the 895 strong list of alleged war criminals 
compiled by the Allies for extradition, an agreement was entered into for the transfer 
of indictments to the jurisdiction of the German Supreme Court in Leipzig. There, a 
revised list of 45 of the most serious offenders was reduced, by unavailability of 
custody, to 12 defendants, of which half were acquitted on lack of evidence and 
defences such as superior orders, while the remainder received light sentences.76 The 
trials outraged the French and Belgians, but the British refused to pursue the matter
74 Hall, ‘The History of the ICC Part I’, CICC Monitor 6 (1997). See generally Pella, ‘Towards an 
International Criminal Court’ (1950) AHL 44, 37-68
75 Art.227-230, Treaty o f Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Versailes 28 
June 1919). See Report o f the Commission on the Responsibility o f the Authors o f the War and on 
Enforcement o f Penalties (1920) AJIL 14,116
76 A proviso reserved the right of the Allies to enforce the original Treaty provisions if  they were 
unsatisfied of due process guarantees. See Mullins, The Leipzig Trials: An Account of the War 
Criminals ’ Trials and a Study o f German Mentality (1921)
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and no further Allied action was taken.
Despite their show trial quality, the Leipzig hearings served an important role 
in the evolution of international criminal liability by developing the concept of 
Volkerstrafrecht,77 “Criminal Law of Nations", as part of German domestic law and
7ftconsolidated the norm of individual liability for war crime offences. As Mullins 
States, “great principles are often established by minor events.... [These trials] 
undoubtedly established the principle that individual atrocities committed during a
70war may be punishable when a war is over”.
An even greater lack of commitment met attempts to prosecute war crimes 
violations committed by the Ottoman Empire following the Armenian massacre of 
1915 after the original Treaty of Sevres providing for trials was replaced by the Treaty 
of Laussanne and its accompanying Declaration of Amnesty for war crimes 
committed during World War I.80
Several attempts were made to address the issue of international criminal 
jurisdiction during the inter-war period. In 1921 Baron Deschamps of the Advisory 
Committee of Jurists appointed by the League of Nations to draft a statute for the 
Permanent International Court of Justice proposed the establishment of a High Court 
of International Justice “to try crimes against international public order and the 
universal law of nations”.81 Deschamps recommendations were rejected by die 
League's Third Committee on the opinion that the establishment of an international 
criminal court would be impossible “since there was no defined notion on 
international crimes and no international Penal Law”.82 A preferable mechanism, the 
Committee's Rapporteur advanced, would be to create a special chamber within the 
Permanent International Court of Justice, although such a move was deemed 
“premature”.83
77 The German writer Beling coined the still extant term to refer to individual liability for violations of 
the law of nations; Mueller and Besharov, ‘The Existence of International Criminal Law and its 
Evolution to the Point of its Enforcement Crisis’, in A Treatise on International Criminal Law, 
Bassiouni and Nanda (1973), 26
78 See Bassiouni (1992), 202-3
79 Mullins (1921), 202-3
80 Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy o f Punishing War Criminals o f the First 
World War (1982), 153-156
81 Baron Deschamps, PCIJ Advisory Committee of Jurists, Proces-Verbaux o f the Proceedings o f the 
Committee,(1920); reprinted in Ferencz, An International Criminal Court - A Step in the Right 
Direction? (1980), 223-4
82 Report o f the Committee No.III on the Recommendations by the Committee o f Jurists at the Hague, 
reprinted in Ferencz (1980), 240
83 ibid
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In response, a number of non-governmental organisations, such as the 
International Law Association, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and the International 
Congress of Penal Law, prepared and presented their own draft statutes. Although 
these received hostile criticism, they did generate greater awareness and support from 
a number of organisations and perhaps represented the first attempt to outline a statute 
and a possible structure and procedure for an international criminal court.84
The movement towards creating a permanent criminal court was finally 
acknowledged by the League in 1937 when France, at the Conference on the 
International Repression of Terrorism, pushed for the adoption of a Convention for 
the Creation of an International Criminal Court. The proposed Court would have 
parallel and jurisdictional reference to the simultaneously adopted Geneva 
Supplementary Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. The two 
treaties failed to enter into force due of lack of signatories and the outbreak of World 
War II.85
Proposals during WWH to establish a permanent court to try Axis war 
criminals were rejected in favour of an ad hoc international tribunal for the most 
serious offenders, with complementary national trials. The London Agreement of 8 
August 1945, establishing the legal basis for the Nuremberg and later Tokyo
o<r
Tribunals. The principles of international law contained in the Statute and Judgment 
of the IMT at Nuremberg were subsequently affirmed by the UN General Assembly at 
its inaugural session.87
Shortly thereafter, General Assembly Resolution 177 (II) (1947) directed the 
ILC to formulate the Nuremberg principles and to prepare a draft code of offences 
against the peace and security of mankind. Seven principles were drafted in 1950 and 
adopted by the General Assembly.88 In 1954, the ILC adopted a text on first reading 
for the Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.89
Also in 1947, the General Assembly had taken up the issue of establishing a 
permanent court to enforce the Genocide Convention, but deferred on taking specific
84 ibid
85 Texts reprinted in Ferencz (1980), 380-98; Simpson, ‘War Crimes: A Critical Introduction’, in 
McCormack and Simpson (1997), 54-55
86 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment o f the Major War Criminal o f the European Axis (8 
August 1945) (‘London Agreement’)
87 A/RES/96(1946)
88 A/RES/488(1950); Report o f the ILC, A/1316, Supp.No.12 (1950)
89 A/50/22, [‘draft Code’]. The draft Code was renamed in 1991 as the draft Code of Crimes Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind
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action beyond providing the possibility of prosecution by “such international penal 
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall 
have accepted its jurisdiction”.90 On the same day as it adopted the Genocide 
Convention, however, the General Assembly, in Resolution 260 B (III) (1948) 
directed the ILC to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an 
international criminal court to try perpetrators of genocide and other international 
crimes. The Commission responded in 1950, characterising the effort as both 
“desirable” and “possible”.91
The ILC followed a twin track approach linking the two projects together from 
the beginning. As such, a basic Statute was envisaged applying the substantive 
formulations of the Code. In 1954, the General Assembly postponed taking further
Q7action pending the formulation of a definition of the crime of aggression. Despite 
conclusion of a definition in 1974,93 progress on a legal code and statute was held in 
abeyance during the ensuing Cold War years. Meanwhile, Article 5 of the 1972 
Apartheid Convention also called for the creation of international criminal jurisdiction 
to prosecute the crime, but was never implemented 94
In 1981 the General Assembly invited the ILC to resume work on the draft 
Code.95 The Commission presented a preliminary Code in 1991 (which received 
widespread criticism for its expansive ambitions)96 and a final text in 1996.97 
Meanwhile, the possibility of establishing an international criminal court came to a 
head through the confluence of a number of different factors. In 1990, after repeated 
requests from the ILC for an institutional mechanism to give effect to the draft Code, 
and following calls from a coalition of Caribbean and Latin American States led by 
Trinidad and Tobago for the establishment of an international criminal court to 
prosecute illicit drug trafficking across national frontiers,98 the General Assembly 
once again requested the ILC to consider the possibility of establishing an
90 Article VI, Genocide Convention
91 Report o f the ILC (1950), 1J140
92 A/RES/898(1954); A/RES/1187(1957)
93 A/RES/3314(1974)
94 See Bassiouni and Derby, ‘Final Report on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court of 
the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and Other Relevant Instruments’ (1981) 7 Hofstra L. 
Rev, 523
95 A/RES/36/106(1981)
96 Comments and Observations o f Governments on the Draft Code o f Crimes against the Peace and 
Security o f Mankind, A/CN .4/448 (1993)
97 A/51/10. The ILC decided to separate the two projects in 1992; Report o f the ILC (A/47/10)
98 A/RES/44/39(1989)
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international criminal court." At the same time, the appeals of the U.S., UK and 
France to Libya over the extradition of terrorist suspects; early pledges to prosecute 
Saddam Hussein and Iraqi troops after invasion of Kuwait; the public appeal for an 
international forum to try Pol Pot after sham trials in Cambodia; and the 
unprecedented establishment in 1993 of the ICTY, and of the ICTR in 1994, all 
converged to lend political viability to the project.100 In 1993 the General Assembly 
requested the ILC to complete work on the draft statute “as a matter of priority”. The 
Commission presented its final draft in 1994 and recommended that it be submitted to 
a conference of plenipotentiaries.101 The proposal was defeated in the Sixth 
Committee, but an Ad Hoc Committee was established in 1995 by way of 
compromise to study the text.102 By 1996, sufficient support had been generated 
within the General Assembly to set up a Preparatory Committee (‘PrepCom’) to meet 
in two sessions during 1996, and subsequently extended over 1997-1998, with a view 
to drafting a widely acceptable consolidated text of a convention for a permanent 
court, to be finalised and adopted at a diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries 
convened in Rome, during June-July 1998. The Statute for the International Criminal 
Court was adopted by an overwhelming majority of States present at Rome.103 
Resolution F adopted as part of the Final Act at the diplomatic conference,104 
mandated the establishment of a Preparatory Commission (‘PrepComm’) to draft, 
inter alia, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Elements of Crimes, which were 
subsequently adopted by the Assembly of State Parties in June 2000.105
The sections that follow will analyse the efficacy of the pre-ICC system which 
relied primarily on the decentralised prosecution of mass crimes (Part II), and the 
challenges arising from the distribution of powers between the Court and national 
authorities under the ICC Statute (Part III), in order to assess whether the system 
established in Rome in 1998 will significantly impact on the routine enforcement of 
international criminal law (Part IV).
99 A/RES/45/41(1990); see also A/RES/44/32(1989)
100 See Crawford, ‘Prospects for an International Criminal Court’ (1995) 48 Current Legal Problems, 
312
101 A/49/10(1994)
102 A/RES/49/53( 1994)
103 A/CONF. 183/9(17 July 1998)
104 A/CONF. 183/10(17 July 1998)
105 PCNICC/2000/l/Add. 1 and Add.2(30 June 2000)
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Part II: Pre-ICC Practice 
III 
National and International Trials
How have the norms governing international criminal jurisdiction developed in 
practice? Part II will assess the degree to which States effected compliance with 
international obligations arising out of treaty and customary law prior to the entry into 
force of the ICC Statute. It will seek to identify the persistent gaps in enforcement, 
and to assess why they have occurred. An examination of the pre-ICC system will 
help to draw out the lessons to be learned from past practice with enforcement 
mechanisms through national, international or internationalised efforts. The 
consideration arising from this review will be important for the study of the ICC, 
since the complementarity framework of the Rome Statute closely links the exercise 
of the Court’s jurisdiction to the effectiveness of that of States.
Four approaches to prosecuting internationally criminalized conduct are 
reviewed in this and the proceeding chapter: prosecutions in international tribunals; 
prosecutions in national courts; prosecutions in internationalised or ‘hybrid’ courts; 
and the question of amnesties and decisions not to prosecute. The examples reviewed 
are illustrative rather than exhaustive as a cataloguing all modem day war crimes 
trials would be beyond the scope of the present research. Because the factors 
identified below distinguishing the immediate post-World War II (‘WWII’) period, 
the analysis focuses mainly on trials held in relation to subsequent conflicts. 
Examination will focus on the bases of jurisdiction claimed, the categorisation of 
offences under applicable law, and the resolution of any concurrent jurisdiction. The 
purpose of Part II will be to demonstrate how difficult the investigation and 
prosecution of war crimes related offences have proven and how poorly State practice 
has fared, particularly in States in conflict or in post-conflict transitions.
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1. POST WORLD WAR II
(a) International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo
Starting with a review of the trials related to World War II (WWII) makes 
chronological sense, but sits rather oddly with the general pattern of State practice 
both before and after. In many ways, the trials arising from immediate post-war 
period were an aberration departing from a traditional inter-State practice which 
rapidly reasserted itself. A convergence of a set of unique circumstances allowed for 
these trials to take place. This included an absence of sovereignty claims by the 
vanquished State and the complete control of occupied territory by the prosecuting 
State authorities; custody over accused persons; and an unprecedented unanimity of 
political will among the allied powers to hold enemy offenders accountable.
The International Military Tribunals established after World War II were 
granted primacy over the concurrent jurisdiction of national courts, although primacy 
was more of a practical than legal reality. The exact international character of the 
Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo is debatable, since their establishment was based 
on the exceptional exercise of territorial jurisdiction by the Allied powers over 
occupied territory.1 The Nuremberg Tribunal derived its legal basis from the London 
Agreement and Charter of 8 August 1945 signed by the four Allied powers and later 
acceded to by nineteen additional States under the supervision of the United Nations 
War Crimes Commission.2 The IMT at Nuremberg held that the Charter of the 
Tribunal “was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the countries to 
which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered”.3 The London Agreement 
furthermore based the exercise of jurisdiction on the broader authority “of acting in 
die interests of all the United Nations”.
The Tokyo Tribunal was constituted by Special Proclamation by General 
MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the occupying Allied Powers in the Far East, 
acting on the authority granted him by the Moscow Conference of 26 December
1 Another difficulty with the exercise of jurisdiction was the fact that only Axis offenders were brought 
before the IMTs. See generally, UN War Crimes Commission, History o f the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission and the development o f the laws o f war (1948), 203-4; Conot, Justice at 
Nuremberg (1983); Minear, Victor’s Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (1971)
2 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment o f the Major War Criminal o f the European Axis (8 
August 1945)
3 IMT Nuremberg, Judgment (30 September 1946)
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1945.4 Unlike at Nuremberg, the judges in Tokyo were in disagreement as to whether 
the Tribunal sat on the basis of exceptional exercise of territorial jurisdiction or via 
the consent of Japan.5 The Japanese government formally retained its sovereign power 
after the war. In the Instrument of Surrender the government accepted the provisions 
set forth in the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945, including the provision that 
“stem justice shall be meted out to all war criminals”, and agreed to “take whatever 
action may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any 
other designated representative of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect 
to the Declaration”.6 The Instrument of Surrender could thus be read as constituting 
Japan's consent and the jurisdictional basis for the Tribunal.7
The international judges sat as representatives of the provisional occupying 
powers in Nuremberg, and as members appointed by the Supreme Commander for the 
occupying Allied Powers in Tokyo.8 Despite the challenge of ex post facto application 
of law, the crimes listed in the statutes of the IMTs were held to be dispositive of 
international customary law obligations by 1939. Trials were held in Nuremberg 
against 24 accused persons,9 and against 28 accused person in Tokyo.10
(b) National trials
(i) Trials during the immediate post-war period
The same set of unique factors noted above was present for subsequent trials held in 
each of the occupied zones. Immediately after WWII, the Allies were able to 
efficiently divide prosecution caseloads between the trial of die leadership at the
4 See Communique and Report on the Moscow Conference (27 December 1945): “The Supreme 
Commander shall issue all orders for the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and 
control of Japan, and directives supplementary thereto”; Charter o f the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East (‘EMTFE’)
5 Roling and Ruter, eds., 77ie Tokyo Judgment (1977)
6 ibid, 19
7 Morris, ‘High Crimes and Misconceptions: the ICC and Non-Party States’ (Winter 2001) 64 Law & 
Contemp. Probs., 13
8 Article 2, Charter IMTFE
9 12 of the accused were sentenced to death by hanging; 3 were acquitted; 3 were sentenced to life in 
prison; 4 were sentenced to between 10 and 20 years; Robert Ley committed suicide before trial and 
Gustav Krupp von Bohlen was declared medically unfit.
10 7 of the accused were sentenced to death by hanging; 16 to life imprisonment; 2 to lesser terms; 2 
died of natural causes during trial; and one had a mental breakdown, was sent to a psychiatric ward, 
and was later released in 1948.
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international level, while processing the bulk of cases through military or criminal 
tribunals established in the State where the crime had occurred. The 1943 Moscow 
Declaration held that “those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party 
who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, 
massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable 
deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws 
of these liberated countries and of free governments which will be erected therein”.11 
The passage is repeated verbatim in the preamble to the 1945 London Agreement, 
which additionally provides, “[n]othing in this Agreement shall prejudice the 
jurisdiction or the powers of any national or occupation court established or to be 
established in any Allied territory or in Germany for the trial of war criminals”.12
Allied Control Council Law No.10 (‘CCL No.10’) sought to establish for the 
Allies in each of their respective zones of occupation “a uniform legal basis in 
Germany for the prosecution of war criminals and other similar offenders, other than 
those dealt with by the International Military Tribunal.” CCL No.10 purported to give 
effect to the London Charter, but derived its legal basis from the authority of the four 
occupying powers acting as the surrogate government of Germany; with jurisdiction 
again based on territoriality. The substantive law reflected almost verbatim the crimes 
listed in the Nuremberg Charter, with the notable exception that the threshold for 
crimes against humanity was divorced from a nexus to armed conflict. There was, 
thus, a measure of uniformity in the substantive crimes enunciated. Procedural law 
and sentencing, however, varied considerably.13 Despite a clear division of labour, 
there was no mechanism for international review of the numerous State-led 
proceedings.
Under Ordinance No.7 of the Military Government for Germany, U.S. Zone, 
the U.S. held twelve trials at Nuremberg, known as the Subsequent Proceedings.14 
These were accompanied by a number of trials based on CCL No.10 in each of the 
four occupied zones.15 Woetzel notes that collectively, the U.S. convicted 1,814
11 Declaration Concerning Atrocities Made at the Moscow Conference (30 October 1943) (‘Moscow 
Declaration’)
12 London Agreement; See also Triffterer, ‘Preliminary Remarks: The permanent ICC - Ideal and 
Reality’, in Triffterer, ed., Commentary on the Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court 
(1999), 37-38.
13 Art. Ill, CCL10: “.. .the mles and procedures thereof shall be determined or designated by each Zone 
Commander for his respective Zone”
14 See UN War Crimes Commission, Law-Reports o f Trials o f War Criminals (1947-1949)
15 See, e.g., Heinz Eck et al (JPeleus Trial), British Military Court, Hamburg (17-20 October 1945)
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persons, the UK 1,085, France 2,107, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic 
(‘USSR’) an inestimable figure;16 while adjacent trials were held in Australia, 
Kuomintang China, Greece, The Netherlands and Poland. The vast majority of war 
crimes trials, however, were processed through the national courts of the Federal 
Republic of Germany which, between 1947-1990, is reported to have prosecuted 
some 60,000 cases.17 Although there was no equivalent to CCL No.10 in Japan, 
Piccigallo estimates that between 1945 to 1951 Allied military tribunals throughout 
the Far East passed the death penalty on 920 Japanese from some 3,000 sentenced.18 
In contrast to Germany, very few cases were prosecuted by domestic authorities in 
Japan.
In combination, the IMT trials and the nationally run proceedings in the 
immediate post-war period offer a successful model of enforcement. The caseload 
was distributed effectively between complementary international and national 
jurisdictions as part of a common strategy adopted by the international community to 
hold perpetrators accountable. The model, however, does contain a number of 
structural weaknesses, not least of which is its reliance on the total collapse and 
capitulation of the State of nationality of the accused. The exclusive focus of these 
trials on crimes committed by Axis nationals also undermines die credibility of the 
system as an enforcement model. The substantial discrepancy between the different 
forums in their interpretation and application of international norms, moreover, 
undercuts the possibility for a systematic approach to enforcing international norms.
(ii) Later trials
Subsequent to this first wave of prosecutions after World War II there is almost a 
complete absence of war crimes trials. Mainly in the 1980s and 1990s, there was a 
resurgence of interest following reports that Nazi war criminals or collaborators were 
enjoying lives of peaceful retirement in their countries of emigration. Only a handful 
of cases led to trial.
In the trial of Adolf Eichman, the accused was charged with war crimes,
16 Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law (1962)
17 ibid, 226
18 Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945-1951 (1987), xi
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crimes against the Jewish people (modelled on Genocide Convention) and crimes 
against humanity under the Israeli 1951 Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law. The court 
dismissed defence pleadings over unlawfulness of Eichman's rendition, as well as 
allegations relating to violations of nullem crimen sine lege through the retroactive 
application of law. The judgment was particularly notable for its assertion of universal 
jurisdiction in respect a German national for offences that has taken place outside of 
the territory of Israel and during a period when the State of Israel itself had not yet 
come into being.19
In the Demjanjuk case, the accused had his U.S. citizenship revoked after a 
federal court in Cleveland found that he was ‘Ivan the Terrible’ from the Treblinka 
death camp, in Poland. After losing a lengthy appeals process,20 he was extradited to 
Israel in 1986, where he was tried on the basis of universal jurisdiction and sentenced
to death. In 1993, the Israeli Supreme Court reversed the conviction after prosecutors
0 1discovered evidence from the Soviet Union revealing a case of mistaken identity.
In France, the prosecution of war criminals was limited by the notable 
absence of a definition of war crimes in domestic legislation 22 This extraordinary 
lacuna arose out of the legacy of defeat, occupation and collaboration during the 
1940-44 period, and the interest of the French authorities after the war to resist the 
prospect of prosecuting scores of French citizens 23 A handful of prosecutions were 
conducted pursuant to a law of 26 December 1964 declaring crimes against humanity, 
as defined in the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal, ‘ imprescriptibles’ (not subject to 
statute of limitations).24 Three prosecutions, based on territorial and active personality 
jurisdiction, were successfully brought against Barbie, Touvier, and Papon.
R. v. Fintcr28 was the first case prosecuted in Canada under a 1987 statute 
enabling prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed
19 Attorney-General o f Israel v Eichman; 36 ILR 5 (1961)
20 Demjanjuk v Petrovsky 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.1985) (U.S.)
21 Although the Israeli Supreme Court found that Demjanjuk had been a guard at camps in Sobibor, 
Trawniki, Majdanek and Flossenburg (Poland), the court released him on grounds that he had been 
extradited to stand trial on the charge of being Ivan the Terrible.
22 Turns, ‘Aspects of National Implementing Legislation of the Rome Statute: The United Kingdom 
and Selected Other States’, in McGoldrick, Rowe, and Donnelly, eds., The Permanent International 
Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (2004), 366-7
23 ibid
24 Nouveau Code penal de 1964, art.211(2),213(5)
25 Cass.crim. [1983] Gaz.Pal.Jur.710; Cass. crim.,[1985] Bull, crim., no.7, 1038; [1986] JCP ft. 20655 
and Cass.crim. [1988] Bull.crim., no. 1,637
26 Cass.crim. [1975] D.J.Jur.386, [1975] Bull, crim., no.42,113
27 Cass.crim. [1997], Bull.crim., no.502; [1996] Bull, crim., no.806
28 R. vFinta, 50 C.C.C.3d. 236 (1994)
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abroad.29 Imre Finta was charged under alternate counts of unlawful confinement, 
robbery, kidnapping and manslaughter, with the charges characterised as domestic 
offences30 and in the alternative as crimes against humanity and war crimes.31 In 
addition to upholding his acquittal, the Supreme Court also unanimously dismissed 
the cross appeal challenging, in part, the alleged retrospective character of the 
legislation. Citing the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg Tribunal, it held that the 
relevant acts were already constituted offences by the time of their commission and 
that the IMT and subsequent national trials merely extended criminal jurisdiction over 
these pre-standing offences. As the Court stated, “[t]he rule against retroactive 
legislation is a principle of justice. A retroactive law providing individual punishment 
for acts which were illegal though not criminal at the time they were committed, 
however, is an exception to the rule against ex post facto laws.”32
In Australia, cases against Polyukhovich, Mikolay Berezovsky, and Heinrich 
Wagner were brought after the establishment in 1987 of a Special Investigations Unit 
for the prosecutions of war criminals. The unit was abandoned in 1992 after 841 
investigations and the acquittal or dismissal of charges in the three cases brought to 
trial.33 The cases were brought under the War Crimes Amendment Act 1989 which 
amended the War Crimes Act 1945 to include certain offences which occurred outside 
Australia during the period from 1939 to 1945. The Act defined war crimes as 
punishable by reference to the domestic law in force in Australia at the time the acts 
were committed, rather than by reference to international law.34 In Polyukhovich v 
Commonwealth, Justice Brennan was particularly critical of the domestic offence 
approach and noted the “disconformity between the statutory offence purportedly 
created by section 9 of the Act and a war crime in international law”. Accordingly, the 
bench held that universal jurisdiction under Australian law extended only to a crime 
defined by international law and not to ordinary offences. Before his later acquittal, 
Polyukhovich notably lost a challenge against the constitutional validity of the Act 
based on its alleged its retroactive effect in domestic law.35
In the first post-world war II trial before domestic courts in the UK, Anthony
29 Sc.7(3.71) Canadian Criminal Code
30 Criminal Code, RSC 1927,c.36
31 S. 7(3.71) Criminal Code
32 See above, Chapter 1 (illegality v criminality)
33 See MacDonland, ‘War crimes unit closed after five years, no results’, The Age (5 January 2000)
34 172 CLR(1991), 579
35 ibid, 501
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Sewoniuk was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1999 after being found guilty of 
murdering two Jews. At the time he was one of 376 suspects investigated under the 
1991 War Crimes Act. The Act was introduced as a counterpart to existing legislation 
granting jurisdiction over murder or manslaughter committed by British subjects 
abroad.36 The new Act enabled application to persons who became British citizens 
after the alleged offence. As debates on the bill at the time of adoption reveal, the 
intended aim was not to create generic legislation enabling prosecutions of all war 
crimes offences, but rather to focus on an “identifiable mischief’.37 Thus in contrast to 
other countries, the legislation was limited by temporal, geographic and substantive 
scope to UK nationals, irrespective of their nationality at the time of the offence, 
accused of committing between 1 September 1939 to 5 June 1945, in Germany or 
territory occupied by Germany, murder or manslaughter or culpable homicide in 
violations of the laws and customs of war.38 Given the assertion in the British Manual 
of Military Law that war crimes are “crimes ex jure gentium”,39 it is debatable 
whether it was strictly necessary for parliament to create statutory jurisdiction when 
UK courts could already assert jurisdiction through customary international law under 
common law.40 The Hetherington-Chalmers Report, however, while noting that war 
crimes were already the subject of universal jurisdiction by 1939, stated that the Act 
was necessary to enable domestic jurisdiction.41 It has also been suggested that 
jurisdiction could have been exercised under the pre-existing Royal Warrant of 1945, 
which formed that basis of post-World War II trials by British military courts “for the 
trial and punishment of violations of die laws and usages of war committed during 
any war in which WE have been or may be engaged at any time after the second day 
of September, nineteen hundred and thirty nine.”42 As Rogers has noted, “[t]he Royal 
Warrant of 1945, not having been revoked, is still in force.”43 The Hetherington 
Report, however, also rejected this assertion, doubting, firstly, whether military courts
36 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 [UK], sec.9
37 See generally Greenwood, The War Crimes Act 1991, in Fox and Meyer (2003), 215
38 War Crimes Act 1991[UK], sec.l(l)
39 British Manual o f Military War (1958) Part III, ^637
40 On the applicability of customary law in domestic English law see also Lord Millet’s minority 
opinion in Pinochet III
41 Hetherington and Chalmers, War Crimes: Report o f the War Crimes Inquiry, Presented to 
Parliament by the Secretary o f State for the Home Department (1989)
42 Reproduced in British Manual o f  Military Law (1958), Part lit, 347
43 Rogers, ‘War Crimes Trials under the Royal Warrant: British Practice 1945-1949’ (1990) ICLQ 39, 
795. Rogers, however, opines that the Royal Warrant could only be applied today (a) abroad in wartime 
or in a period of military occupation immediately afterwards, and (b) in the UK or any of its colonies 
during a state of martial law.
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could sit lawfully in the UK and, second, whether military trials would be acceptable 
so long after the events.44
In summary, these later trials can be distinguished from those occurring during 
the immediate post-war period for a number of reasons. They occurred under normal 
peace-time conditions and were greatly distanced from the events. Enforcement relied 
on national discretion on the establishment of jurisdiction, the launching of 
investigations and prosecutions, and the securing of cooperation through inter-State 
mutual assistance and extradition. Moreover these trials, spanning a 60 year period 
since the end of WWII, have been highly exceptional and subject to sporadic and 
selective interpretation and enforcement of international norms.
2. FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA
(a) International Criminal Tribunals
The political will to establish the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda arose out of failure of the international community to 
intervene effectively in those situations.45 The inaction of Western nations to the first 
major conflict on European soil since WWII, in particular, stood in stark contrast to 
the promise of global unanimity after the end of the Cold War and the successful 
exercise of collective security in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The 1993 
debacle in Somalia and the resultant withdrawal of U.S. support for robust 
intervention in foreign conflicts created the need for a response that fell short of 
military engagement, but which would add to a portfolio of international efforts to 
manage these crises through diplomacy, peacekeeping, and negotiation. As displayed 
below, although the Tribunals were granted wide-ranging powers on paper, the record 
of enforcement by States and by the Security Council has proved unsatisfactory.
The legal authority for the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR is based on 
the exercise by the Security Council of its powers under Chapter VII of the UN
44 Hetherington and Chalmers (1989)
45 As Ralph Zacklin, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, has written, the establishment 
of the ICTY and ICTR was more an acts of “political contrition” for the egregious failure of UN 
Member States to swiftly confront the situations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; Zacklin, ‘The 
Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals’ (2004) J. Int. Crim. Just. 2, 542
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Charter. The ad hoc Tribunals have been established as measures necessary for the 
restoration of international peace and security. In accordance with article 25 of the 
UN Charter the resolutions founding the Tribunals are legally binding on all UN 
Members States. The Tribunals function as subsidiary organs of the Council, 
exercising powers delegated to it.46 The lawfulness of the establishment of the 
Tribunals was subjected to unsuccessful legal challenge in their first cases. It was 
argued, in part, that the Security Council cannot confer the exercise of judicial 
functions which it itself is not competent to exercise. However, as Sarooshi points out, 
“the Council has not delegated to the Tribunals the performance of its own functions 
but rather those powers that are necessary for the exercise of their designated 
functions” 47 In a similar vein, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that the Tribunal 
serves an instrument for the exercise of the Council’s function with respect to the 
maintenance of peace and security.48
Both ad hoc Tribunals enjoy primacy over national courts, meaning that they 
may at any stage in proceedings formally request a national court to defer to its 
competence.49 The ICTY operates with a delimited geographic scope (States of the 
former Yugoslavia), but with open-ended temporal and personal jurisdiction. The 
temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR, by contrast, is restricted to crimes committed 
during 1994. Within that timeframe, however, the ICTR may exercise jurisdiction on 
die bases of territoriality (crimes committed in Rwanda) and nationality of the 
accused (crimes committed by Rwandan citizens in neighbouring States).50
The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR contain only one provision on 
cooperation, which unequivocally compels all States to cooperate with the Tribunals 
(ICTY article 29, ICTR article 28). The duty to cooperate is absolute and 
unconditional. Any refusal, such as on the basis of national security, is subject to 
evaluation by the Tribunals themselves.51 Moreover, the Appeals Chambers have 
stated that the provisions on cooperation “impose an obligation on Member States of 
the United Nations towards all other Member States or, in other words, an obligation
46 See Sarooshi, ‘The Powers of the United Nations Criminal Tribunals’, 2 Max-Planck Yrbk UN Law 
(1998)
47 ibid, 143
48 Tadic Interlocutory Appeal, 1J38
49 Art.9(2) ICTY Statute; art.8(2) ICTR Statute
50 Art.l ICTY Statute; art.l ICTR Statute
51 See above, Chapter 2; Sluiter, ‘To Cooperate or not to Cooperate?: The Case of the Failed Transfer 
of Ntakirutimana to the Rwanda Tribunal’ (1998) LJIL 11,386; Blaskic Subpeona Decision, \11
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terga omnes partes”\ 52
Despite their delegated Chapter VII authority, the Tribunals have experienced 
considerable resistance and obstruction, including from third States not party to the 
conflicts. Notwithstanding repeated notification by the Presidency of the failure of 
certain States to comply with the Tribunals, the Security Council has failed to take 
action to remedy these deficiencies beyond deploring and condemning non­
cooperation.54 As ICTR Prosecutor Hassan Jallow has stated, in echo of his 
predecessors, “[t]he most formidable challenges to the OTP lie in the field of 
international cooperation. Such support and cooperation is indispensable for the 
proper and effective administration of international criminal justice”.55
Faced with the effective absence of judicial coercive powers to compel 
cooperation, the OTP has tended to rely less on requesting binding orders in the 
realisation that, ultimately, the Tribunals, much like national authorities in traditional 
mutual legal assistance, must rely on voluntary compliance by States acting in good 
faith.56 Instead, the principal coercive tool at the disposal of the Tribunals has been 
political leverage. In the context of the Balkans, this has led to external policy 
linkages between ICTY cooperation and participation the EU Stabilisation and 
Association Process and NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. Similarly, the 
lifting of economic sanctions and the rendering of multilateral and bilateral assistance, 
notably by the World Bank and the U.S., has been made conditioned on substantive 
cooperation. Thus, while notifications of non-compliance have failed to result in the 
adoption of enforcement measures by the Security Council, they have had exercised 
considerable influence on multi- and bilateral assistance.
The ICTY and ICTR have made tremendous contributions to the development 
of authoritative jurisprudence, absent since Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. They have 
elucidated unsettled areas of law, such as the elements of crimes against humanity and 
the elaboration of command responsibility; defined notions with respect to the
52 Blaskic Subpoena Appeal, [^26
53 Sluiter (1998), 386
54 Meron has stated, “[v]erbal admonitions, even made under Chapter VII, not accompanied by credible 
sanctions or threats of use of force have not proved adequate to force compliance. The need to back up 
international criminal tribunals with power, power of enforcement, has been demonstrated once again.” 
‘Comments in the ILA Panel on the ICTY’ (1999) ELSA J. Int’l & Comp. Law 5, 347
55 Jallow, The OTP-ICTR: ongoing challenges of completion, Guest Lecture Series of the ICC Office of 
the Prosecutor (2004)
56 Interviews with senior officials of ICTY OTP; on file with author. See also Harmon and Gaynor, 
‘Prosecuting Massive Crimes with Primitive Tools: Three Difficulties Encountered by Prosecutors in 
International Criminal Proceedings’ (2004) J. I. Crim. Just. 2,403-426
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classification of armed conflicts; and adjudicated groundbreaking precedents in 
emerging areas of humanitarian law such as criminal liability during non-international 
armed conflict and the prosecution of sexual crimes. These gains, however, have 
come at a considerable financial cost. The two institutions, sharing more than 2,000 
posts and a heavily bureaucratic structure, have grown to command a combined 
annual budget equivalent to more than 15 percent of the total regular budget of the 
entire UN Organisation.57 Donor fatigue has combined with a sense that proceedings 
have been lengthy and inefficient. Moreover, although the Tribunals have contributed 
to isolating much of the war time criminal elite, they have failed to promote 
reconciliation in the region. The remoteness of the trials from the events has been 
exacerbated by the perception of victims and effected communities that the trials have 
failed to deliver on compensation, reparation, and the identification of missing 
persons.58 Thus, despite their historic significance in establishing a modem prototype 
for international adjudication, it appears unlikely that the ad hoc Tribunals will to be 
replicated as models of enforcement.
(b) National trials in situations where there is an International Tribunal
As with IMT at Nuremberg and Tokyo, the ad hoc Tribunals have focused on only the 
most senior perpetrators while the vast majority of cases have fallen to domestic 
authorities. The situation facing the ad hoc Tribunals, however, was radically 
different to the immediate post-WWII environment where most of the offenders were 
in friendly States that could easily be relied upon to hand over the accused or to 
initiate their own proceedings.59 Instead, the vast majority of perpetrators were 
shielded from domestic prosecution, and in many cases remained in power or had 
taken refuge in neighbouring States. At most, a few individuals were subjected to 
sham domestic proceedings in efforts to appease international calls against impunity. 
It was partly as a measure to guard against such abuse that the ad hoc Tribunals were 
granted wide-ranging primacy enabling them to seize jurisdiction “at any stage in the
57 Report o f the Secretary-General on the rule o f law and transitional justice in conflict and post­
conflict societies, S/2004/616 (3 August 2004), f42
58 Zacklin (2004), 542-545
59 Triffterer (1999), 38
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procedure”.60
Operating in the opposite direction, and introduced as part of their completion 
strategies, Rule 11 bis enables the Tribunals to reverse the process and refer a case to 
domestic authorities. A Referral Bench may order, either proprio motu or at the 
request of the Prosecutor, a referral of an individual to the authorities of a State “(i) in 
whose territory the crime was committed; or (ii) in which the accused was arrested; or
(iii) having jurisdiction and being willing and adequately prepared to accept such a 
case”.61 In determining a referral the Bench must consider, in accordance with the 
criteria set by the Security Council, the gravity of the crimes charged and the level of 
responsibility of the accused.62 Rule 11 bis also retains a degree of review over 
domestic proceedings by providing that the Referral Bench, at the request of the 
Prosecutor, may, at any time before the accused is convicted or acquitted by a national 
court and after affording an opportunity to the authorities of the State concerned to be 
heard, revoke the order and request the transfer of the accused back to the Tribunal.63 
Given the intention of the Tribunals to facilitate their completion strategies,64 it is 
highly improbable that referred cases would be recalled however. The establishment 
of the mixed international-national War Crimes Chamber in BiH under close 
international supervision, among other efforts, is intended to forestall this outcome.
Given the nascent life span of the ICC and the dearth of complementary 
domestic efforts to date, the problems arising from domestic prosecutions related to 
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda over die last decade are reviewed 
below in order to indicate the potential pitfalls that may he ahead of the ICC.
(i) Bosnia and Herzegovina
Domestic war crimes trials began early on in the newly independent States of the 
former Yugoslavia.65 Numerous local trials were held in absentia during the conflict
60 ICTY Article 9 & Rule 9; ICTR Article 8 & Rule 9
61 As revised on 30 September 2002; see also ICTR Rule 1 Ibis
62 See S/RES/1534(2004)
63 Address by the Prosecutor o f the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to the 
UN Security Council (27 November 2001). See also earlier withdrawal of charges (Chapter 1).
64 As of end 2005, the Prosecutor had filed 12 referral motions involving 20 accused, the majority for 
transfer to the BiH War Crimes Chamber. The Referral Bench has granted five motions: four for 
transfer to BiH and one for transfer to Croatia.
65 For an early report see Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Prosecuting War Crimes in the 
Former Yugoslavia (May 1995)
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alleging violations by members of rival ethnic communities who had since fled or 
been ‘cleansed’ from particular territories. These trials were often employed as tools 
of the war time machinery to prevent displaced persons and refugees from returning 
to their pre-war domicile, on pain of arrest pursuant to the in absentia verdict. In 
addition, large numbers of prisoners of war were held; although in most cases persons 
were detained for purposes of exchange rather than prosecution, and were often the 
subject of the most serious offences.
In the heightened tensions immediately following the signing of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement (‘DPA’), authorities of the respective Parties to the Agreement fell 
into a pattern of politicised war crimes arrests in BiH. The tit-for-tat manner of such 
arrests accelerated at an alarming rate, leading to a suspension of prisoner of war 
exchanges, and soon came to jeopardise the freedom of movement between the 
Federation of BiH (‘FBiH’) and Republika Srpska (‘RS’) and the consolidation of the 
Peace Agreement. In order to counter the threat to peace and security in the region 
and to promote impartiality in domestic war crimes processes, the Parties, overseen by 
the Office of the High Representative (‘OHR’) and the Contact Group,66 convened in 
Rome on 18th February 1996.67 Article 5 of the Statement arising from the meeting 
was commonly referred to as the ‘Rules of the Road’ because of its impact on the 
freedom of movement. The provision stipulated that persons suspected of war crimes 
could only be arrested or detained in BiH after an order, warrant, or indictment had 
been reviewed by the ICTY OTP in order to determine its consistent with 
international legal standards.
Although this legal review was not strictly within the mandate of the ICTY, 
the Prosecutor agreed to the measure in the light of the common goal of restoring 
peace and security in the region. The procedure was also of direct benefit to the OTP 
since it enabled the Prosecutor to examine all domestic case-files, to include evidence 
and witnesses into ongoing investigations and prosecutions, and to seek deferral of 
relevant national prosecutions to the Tribunal.68 The procedures and guidelines 
established by the OTP stipulated that after receipt of the case file and its supporting 
documents, it would undertake a legal review of the file applying prescribed
66 France, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation, UK and U.S.
67 The Rome Statement on Sarajevo, Reflecting the Work o f the Joint Civilian Commission Sarajevo (18 
February 1996)
68 War Crimes Prosecutions in Bosnia Herzegovina, Conference Materials (Sarajevo, 10-11 October 
2001), ICTY Rules of the Road Unit, Part B; on file with author
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international standards for the conduct of criminal prosecutions, including the 
requirement for the establishment of a sufficient body of evidence to constitute a 
prima facie case for detention of an accused person.69 The file would then be returned 
to the submitting authority with a series of standard markings indicating the 
conclusions of the review. As the OTP clarified, its review was only ‘on the papers’ 
meaning that it did not assess the credibility or veracity of the supporting evidence. It 
was also without prejudice to the existence of other incriminating or exonerating 
materials and to the outcome of any trial.70 In practice, nonetheless, the procedure 
could not guarantee that cases reviewed and returned would result in domestic 
proceedings.71 Approximately sixty individuals, less than ten percent of all reviewed 
cases, were prosecuted before BiH courts before the Rules of the Road unit was closed 
down in 2004 and incorporated into the prosecutor’s office for the new BiH War 
Crimes Chamber.
The Rules of the Road review undertaken by the ICTY Prosecutor represented 
a novel approach to managing the distribution of caseloads between concurrent 
jurisdictions. Prior to the implementation of Rule 1 Ibis, the procedure represented the 
only example of an international institution being vested with review functions over 
the exercise of domestic jurisdiction. There were, nonetheless, a number of significant 
differences with the complementarity regime of the ICC. The OTP reviewed only the 
contents and supporting documents of indictments submitted by domestic prosecutors, 
and not the actual conduct of these cases at trial.72 Moreover, the institutional link 
created was between the Prosecutor’s Office and domestic prosecutors/investigative 
judges, and not between the ICTY and national courts.
Alleged breaches by domestic authorities of the Rules o f the Road were 
subject to review before local courts and the BiH Human Rights Chamber. 
Established under Annex 6 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace 
(‘GFAP’), the Human Rights Chamber consisted of a mixed panel of international and 
national judges. It had competence to examine alleged or apparent violations of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) and of discrimination on any
69 Procedures and Guidelines for Parties for the Submission o f Cases to the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Under the Agreed Measures o f 18 February 1996,(10 September 
1996)
70 Conference Materials, Procedures and Guideline; ibid
71 Bach, Bjomberg, Ralston and Rodrigues, The Future o f War Crimes Prosecutions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: Consultancy Project Proposal (May 2002)
72 Note, Rule 11 bis provisions on the monitoring of domestic trials relate only to cases referred by the 
Tribunal to domestic courts and not to cases reviewed under Rules o f the Road
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ground with respect to the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by a series listed 
international agreements including the ICCPR.73 While the majority of cases 
concerned property claims, the Chamber dealt with a significant number of petitions 
alleging irregularities in the Rules of the Road procedure. These included violations of 
ECHR articles 5 (liberty and security), 6 (fair trial) and 7 (no punishment without 
law) and ICCPR article 14 (fair trial).74 In the Hermas case, for example, the 
Chamber found a violation of ECHR article 5(1) on the ground, inter alia, that the 
applicant had been arrested and detained in violation of the Rules o f the Road.
In spite of the indictment review role played by the Prosecutor, trial 
monitoring continued to expose serious shortcoming in domestic trials. In particular, 
doubts persisted over the ability of mono-ethnic police and judicial structures in 
rendering impartial justice, free from political and ethnic bias. The situation was 
exacerbated by the general lack of confidence in the safety of victims, witnesses and 
judicial personnel, the competence levels of BiH judges, and the failings of inter and 
intra-entity cooperation in war crimes cases.76 As die International Crisis Group 
noted:
Trials have been regarded as occasions for dispensing ‘ethnic’ justice or 
exacting revenge. Moreover, such trials are politically explosive, especially as 
various past and present national leaders are among those indicted or likely to 
be indicted. All this highlights the failings of the current system.77
Concerns over these failings led ultimately to the establishment of a hybrid national- 
international court within the State Court of BiH, as discussed in the next chapter.
A further issue of relevance for all the States of the former Socialist Yugoslav 
Republic is the question of applicable legislation. To illustrate, at die time of 
commission the applicable provisions were contained in the Criminal Law of the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (‘SFRY’), adopted as the law of the 
Republic of BiH by Presidential Decree in 1992 and continued under Annex 4 of the
73 The Chamber ceased to exist end 2003, and its responsibilities were transferred to local institutions. 
For listed grounds of discrimination see art.II(2)(b), Annex 6 GFAP
74 See http://www.hrc.ba/ENGLISH/DEFAULT.HTM
75 Hermas case, Decision on Admissibility and Merits (CH/97/45)(18 February 1998). Regarding the 
legal status of the Rome Statement and the binding nature of its provision on the BiH and Entity 
authorities see Cegar case (CH/96/21); Marceta case (CH/97/41); V.C. case, Decision on Admissibility 
and Merits (CH/98/1366)(9 March 2000)
76 Bach et al (2002), 1-2
77 International Crisis Group, Courting Disaster: The Misrule o f Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina (25 
March 2002), 2
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GFAP.78 A new criminal code was introduced in the Federation of BiH in 1998,79 in 
the Republika Srpska in 2000,80 and Brcko District in 2000.81 In early 2002, new set 
of harmonised criminal codes and criminal procedures codes were introduced at the 
level of the BiH State, the FBiH, the RS and Brcko District.82 The latest codes 
radically altered the inquisitorial role of the investigative and trial judges by 
introducing elements from adversarial based criminal justice systems. In particular, it 
bolstered the relationship between the prosecutor and the police in the collection and 
presentation of evidence at trial. Several decisions imposed by the High 
Representative have also amended aspects of the criminal procedure. The Rome 
Statement imposed a further set of specialised procedures. Finally, operating in a 
separate legal domain, the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (‘SFOR’) has conducted its 
own investigative activities on BiH territory related to terrorism offences, organised 
crime and persons indicted by the ICTY.84 This constant transformation of the legal 
framework, coupled with several years of extensive reform, restructuring and re­
training of the police and the judiciary, has taken its toll on the ability of judges, 
lawyers and the police to keep apace. As seen below, the challenges faced by 
domestic authorities in identifying, applying and interpreting relevant legislation are 
shared by other post-conflict States.
(ii) Croatia
As in BiH, a number of domestic war crimes trials were held in absentia during and 
after the conflict period against members of rival ethnic communities. Under Croatian 
law, persons arrested pursuant to in absentia convictions are guaranteed the right to a
78 Official Gazette (OG) SFRY 44/76,36/77,56/77,34/84,37/84,74/87,57/89,3/90,38/90,45/90; OG 
Republic BiH 2/92,8/92,10/92,16/92,13/94
79 OGFBiH 43/98,2/99,15/99,29/00
80 OGRS 22/00,37/01
81 Brcko District Criminal Code, OGBD 6/00,1/01; Brcko District Law on Criminal Procedure OGBD 
7/00,1/01
82 BiH CC & CPC,(OGBH 37/03,36/03); FBiH CC & CPC (OGFBiH 36/03,56/03); RS CC & CPC 
(OGRS 49/03,50/03); BD CC & CPC,(OGBD 10/03)
83 See http://www.ohr.int/decisions/iudicialrdec/archive.asp
84 Although SFOR’s mandate flows from Security Council and the DPA (Annex 1 A), BiH courts have 
reviewed the legality of the actions undertaken by domestic authorities at the request of SFOR; see BiH 
Human Rights Chamber Hadz Boudellaa, Boumediene Lakhdar, Mohamed Nechle and Saber Lahmar 
against BiH and FBiH (CH/02/8679,CH/02/8689,CH/02/8690,CH/02/8691) (11 October 2002); 
Nedjeljko Obradovic against BiH and FBiH (CH/02/12470) (7 November 2003)
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re-trial, although delays are not uncommon during pre-trial custody. Before Croatia 
underwent a change in the political climate from nationalists to moderates, the vast 
majority of war crime cases involved Serb accused persons. Since 2000, a large 
number of Serbs in pre-trial have had charges against them dropped or have been 
granted provisional release. Individuals whose cases were already completed, 
however, often remained imprisoned under verdicts of questionable integrity.85 In late 
2001, the State Prosecutor identified an initial group of approximately 1,850 cases to 
be reviewed by local prosecutors.86 As the State Prosecutor noted “... at the time of 
the Homeland War and also afterwards, ... prosecutors ... were submitting 
investigation requests indiscriminately in a number of cases, and based on 
insufficiently verified criminal charges”.87
As for cases that reached trial, international observers reported serious 
concerns over the bias against Serb defendants and in favour of Croat defendants at all 
stages of procedure from arrest to conviction.88 As the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (‘OSCE’) noted in a 2003 report:
Observations during the last year indicate that these cases remain highly 
charged and require particular attention to assess impartiality and 
professionalism. Thus, the Gospic County Court found a Serb returnee guilty 
not only for war crimes, but also of a 500-year history of Serb crimes against 
Croatia, and explicitly criticized the provision of Government assistance to 
returned refugees.89
The Supreme Court has had repeated occasion to order the retrial of cases. 
Irregularities by lower courts in war crimes cases, mainly related to insufficient fact­
finding led to 18 out of 19 lower court convictions being reversed in 2002, for 
example. Other concerns have included the intimidation and general security risks to 
which victims, witnesses and judicial personnel are routinely exposed; difficulties in 
securing evidence from witnesses living abroad, particularly in Serbia; and the overall 
lengthy delays in proceedings.90 Despite instructions to the contrary from the State
85 OSCE Croatia, Status Report No. 13 (December 2003), 13-14
86 In mid 2003, with 1,467 cases pending, 99 percent of cases involved non-Croat suspects; ibid
87 OSCE Croatia, Status Report No. 12 (03 July 2003)
88 OSCE Croatia, Status Report No.13 (2003): “While 83 per cent of Serbs (47 of 57) were found 
guilty, only 18 per cent of Croats (3 of 17) (although based on a limited number of cases) were 
convicted. Conversely, 17 per cent of Serbs were acquitted or the prosecution dropped, while 82 per 
cent of Croats were found not guilty.”
89 ibid
90 A new Law on Witness Protection was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in September 2003
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Prosecutor,91 reports from 2005 continued to reveal that local prosecutors and courts 
were pursuing in absentia proceedings.92
While irregularities and bias persist at the local level,93 the last years have 
witnessed some improvement in high profile cases subject to the Supreme Court’s 
oversight. Thus in March 2006, eight former Croatian military policemen in the Lora 
case were convicted on retrial, after the original verdict had been dismissed by the 
Supreme Court in 2004 as a miscarriage of justice.94 On 14 September 2005, also, the 
ICTY Referral Bench transferred its first case to Croatia after having satisfied itself as 
to domestic guarantees of genuine willingness in relation to the particular forum to 
which the case would be referred.95
(iii) Serbia and Montenegro
The judiciary in Serbia and Montenegro (‘SCG’), formerly FRY, has tried only a 
handful of offenders, usually ordinary soldiers or lower-ranking officers. The 
immediate post-Milosevic government confirmed the existence of evidence indicating 
large scale grave tampering and removal/destruction of evidence by the security 
forces.96 In more recent years efforts have been undertaken to strengthen domestic 
capacities following repeated calls for war crimes trials to be conducted domestically 
and in the light of the Rule 11 bis transfer procedure.
Legislation was introduced in 2003 establishing a War Crimes Panel within 
the Belgrade District Court.97 The law established an Office of the War Crimes 
Prosecutor, a War Crimes Investigation Service, and a Special Detention Unit. 
Applicable law is the existing provisions of the Basic Criminal Code,98 with the
91 OSCE Croatia, Status Report No. 10 (21 May 2002), 7-8
92 OSCE Croatia, Status Report No.17 (10 November 2005), 15-17
93 OSCE Croatia, Status Report No. 13 (2003), 13; Status Report No.17 (2005), 15-18
94 ‘Lora Policemen Convicted In Retrial’, IWPR Tribunal Update No. 442 (3 March 2006); see also 
Gospic Group case; OSCE Status Report No.12 (2003), 16
95 See Prosecutor v Ademi and Norac, Decision for Referral to the Authorities o f the Republic of  
Croatia Pursuant to Rule 7 ibis (14 September 2005)
96 Completed cases have concerned, inter alia, war crimes against civilian populations in BiH, Kosovo 
and Croatia; see OSCE Serbia and Montenegro, War Crimes before Domestic Courts (October 2003)
97 Law on Organisation and Jurisdiction o f Government Authorities in Prosecuting Perpetrators of  
War Crimes (1 June 2003)
98 Criminal Code (FRY), renamed the Basic Criminal Code, (OGSFRY Nos.44/76, 36/77, 34/84,37/84, 
74/87, 57/89, 3/90, 38/90, 45/90 and 54/90; OGFRY No.35/92, 16/93, 37/93, 24/94 and 61/2001; OG 
Republic of Serbia No.39/2003). See also Criminal Procedure Code OGFRY No.70/2001 and 68/2002
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inclusion of a new crimes against humanity provision that cross-references article 5 of 
the ICTY Statute. The law contains a number of omissions, however, that will hamper 
the prosecution of the wartime political and military leadership. Principal among these 
is the continued non-recognition of command responsibility. The definition of 
genocide continues also to suffer from a failure to incorporate the crimes of 
conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
attempt to commit genocide and complicity in genocide. Notably absent, moreover, 
are provisions relating specifically to sexual offences. The crime of instigating a war 
of aggression, as included in the law, is not defined at all in the Basic Criminal Code, 
rendering its application doubtful. The law also fails to mention the non-applicability 
of statute of limitations to the listed crimes or of immunities with respect to official
9 9capacity.
As the first fruit of these efforts, nonetheless, on 12 December 2005, the 
Belgrade District Court War Crimes Panel rendered its verdict against 14 Serb 
members of the Serb Territorial Defence forces of Vukovar and the Leva Supoderica 
paramilitary unit for the 1991 massacre of 200 Croat prisoners in the hamlet of 
Ovcara. Eight of the accused were given the maximum sentence of 20 years in prison, 
three to 15 year prison terms, one to a 9-year term, and one to 5 years in prison, and 
two were acquitted.100 A number of other important trials are pending before the 
Belgrade Panel.101
The lack of regional cooperation in criminal matters between the States of the 
former Yugoslavia has been another inhibiting factor in the successful investigation 
and prosecution of war crimes throughout the Balkans. Despite some progress in 
regional efforts,102 the legal framework remains woefully below European standards 
in areas such as cooperation and judicial assistance; transfers of accused persons; 
recognition of judgments and admissibility of evidence; and cooperation in enacting 
witness protection measures.103
99 OSCE and International Bar Association, Review of the Draft law on Organisation and Jurisdiction 
o f Government Authorities in Prosecuting Persons Guilty o f War Crimes, on file with author.
100 ‘Court sentences Vukovar war crimes convicts’, Southeast European Times (13/12/05). The facts of 
the case are related to the Mejakic et al. (‘Vukovar Three’) case before the ICTY.
101 See, inter alia, related proceedings in the trial of Milan Bulic (sentenced 10 January 2006) and the 
case of Sasa Radak; unreported
102 OSCE Croatia, Status Report No.17 (10 November 2005), 18
103 See European Convention on Extradition (1957); European Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters (1959), and Additional Protocol (1978); European Convention on the Validity o f  
Criminal Judgments (1970); European Convention on the Transfer o f Criminal Proceedings (1972)
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(iv) Rwanda
The devastating scale of the crimes committed in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, 
and their decimating effect on all aspects of the society, including the judiciary, is 
perhaps unparalleled in recent history. Moreover, the genocide and the ensuing armed 
conflict followed a long period “of human rights violations, the entrenchment of a 
culture of impunity and the polarization of the Rwandese nation”.104 Efforts to 
undertake impartial and independent trials have, thus, posed considerable challenges. 
With the ICTR focussing on only the principal leaders and major perpetrators, the vast 
bulk of trials have fallen to national courts. There has been no equivalent domestic 
indictment review procedure to that performed by the ICTY Prosecutor under the 
Rules of the Road. Indeed, the relationship between the ICTR and the Rwandan 
authorities has been strained from the start. Wide discrepancies between national and 
international processes have created also the perverse anomaly whereby serious 
offenders receive rigorous due process guarantees and relatively comfortable penal 
conditions unavailable to lesser offenders, who additionally may face the death 
penalty. Although the ICTR has adopted a Rule 11 bis procedure, it has appealed to 
third States that do not apply the death penalty to take on cases for domestic trial.105
During the first two years following the 1994 genocide, a pattern of massive 
and wide scale reprisal arrests led to the detention of over 120,000 persons in severely 
over-crowded facilities. The events of 1994 devastated what little existed of a judicial 
infrastructure wracked by corruption and incompetence even prior to the genocide. 
Most persons were unlawfully and extra-judicially detained on the basis of un­
investigated oral accusations and in the absence of case files containing prima facie 
evidence. By some accounts, overcrowding and unsanitary conditions within 
detention facilities led to 11,000 deaths.106 Early efforts to release detainees met with 
repeated resistance from the military, police and hardliners, including through re­
arrest or reprisal killings.
In August 1996, the Rwandan National Assembly adopted its long awaited and
104 Amnesty International, Gacaca: A question o f  justice (December 2002), 41
105 See, e.g., ‘ICTR Prosecutor Requests Transfer of Bagaragaza Case to Norway for Trial’, ICTR Press 
Release ICTR/INFO-9-2-471.EN (15 February 2006)
106 Amnesty International, Rwanda: End o f provisional release o f genocide suspects (2003); Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda: the ICTR and National Trials (1997)
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much debated specialised legislation on the prosecution of genocide and crimes 
against humanity.107 Covering the period of 1 October 1990 to 31 December 1994, the 
law provides greater temporal scope than the ICTR. It provides for Specialised 
Chambers each with several benches in the twelve Courts of First Instance (Cours de 
premiere instance). The law creates four categories: (1) planners, organisers and 
leaders of the genocide, persons acting in positions of authority, notorious killers 
distinguished by their zeal or excessive malice and persons committing acts sexual 
torture; (2) perpetrators and conspirators of accomplices to intentional homicides or 
serious assaults causing death; (3) other serious assaults; and (4) property related 
offences. The central feature of the legislation, which aims at the expeditious 
prosecution of large numbers of the ‘genocidaires’ is a plea bargaining procedure for 
category 2, 3 and 4 defendants. Those in category 1 face the death penalty in the 
absence of mitigating circumstances. In practice, the implementation of the plea 
bargaining arrangement, a feature previously alien to Rwanda's civil law tradition, 
resulted in only 20 percent pleading guilty.108 Defendants were ill-informed or 
misinformed of the plea-bargaining terms, or otherwise feared reprisals at the hands 
of fellow inmates with whom they were co-housed.109 As a result, the process suffered 
a loss of credibility and its ability to expedite trials was severely curtailed.
Other related problems relating to trials before Specialised Chambers have 
included failings in securing defence counsel, witnesses or sufficient preparatory 
time; concerns over the competence, impartiality and independence of some judges 
and lawyers, and the removal or suspension of others; and the environment of 
intimidation and fear that has led to witnesses retracting statements or failing to 
appear, and to defence lawyers and witnesses alike disappearing, being killed, or 
themselves being charged with genocide.110 In addition, no credible effort has been 
undertaken to prosecute offences committed by the victorious Rwanda Patriotic 
Front/Rwanda Patriotic Army.
107 Organic Law on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime o f  Genocide 
or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since 1 October 1990, Law No.8/96, (30 August 1996). See 
generally Schabas, ‘Justice, Democracy, and Impunity in Post-genocide Rwanda: Searching for 
Solutions to Impossible Problems’ (1996) Criminal Law Forum 7:3, 551; Morris, ‘The Trials of 
Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda’, 7 Duke Jm’l Comp. & Int’l Law, 349-374
108 Widner, Courts and Democracy in Postconflict Transitions: A Social Scientist's Perspective on the 
African Case (2001) AJIL 95,1
1 9 ibid,69. See also Sarkin, Tromoting Justice, Truth and Reconciliation in Transitional Societies: 
Evaluating Rwanda’s Approach In the New Millennium of Using Community Based Gacaca Tribunals 
To Deal With the Past’ (2000) International Law FORUM du droit international 2, 112-121
110 AI (2002), 14-16
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Having failed to process the massive backlog of cases, a new law was passed 
in 2001 establishing a radical alternative.111 The new legislation provided for the 
creation of ‘Gacaca Jurisdictions’ based on a traditional form of Rwandese 
community conflict resolution for inter-family and community dispute settlement, but 
adopted to incorporate certain modem legal characteristics. The Gacaca Jurisdictions 
exercise competences similar to ordinary criminal courts: they can hear testimonies; 
issue summons; order or conduct searches; take protective measures; pronounce 
sentences and fix damages; order the normalisation of an acquitted persons’ property; 
and issue arrest and provisional detention warrants. Applicable law and temporal 
jurisdiction are borrowed from the Specialised Chambers and individuals are 
classified into the familiar four categories. Persons in category 1 can only be tried by 
the Specialised Chambers.112 In line with its traditional precursor, the elected 
members of the local community who serve in the Gacaca Jurisdiction act 
simultaneously as parties, witnesses and judges. Hearings are public, but 
exceptionally may be held in camera. All decisions are deliberated in secret and are 
reached by consensus or otherwise by absolute majority. Judgements are given in 
public and must be reasoned. Decisions can be appealed to higher level Gacaca 
Jurisdictions. 10,000 Gacaca Jurisdictions are in the process of being established, 
with the aim to resolve the caseload of 100,000 genocide suspects over a projected 
five-year period.
There is concern, however, that the legislation establishing the Gacaca 
Jurisdictions fails to guarantee a number of basic fair trial standards. This includes the 
presumption of innocence; equality of arms; the right of a defendant to be informed of 
the charge against him/her and to have sufficient time to prepare a defence; the 
absence of provisions excluding confessions obtained under torture or duress; and the 
lack of ne bis in idem guarantees, resulting in some persons acquitted by ordinary 
courts being reportedly placed on gacaca lists. There have been concerns also with 
respect to judicial independence and political inference; the competence levels of the 
gacaca lay judges, who must preside over serious criminal cases with cursory legal 
training; the high degree of deference by most gacaca benches towards the often
111 Organic Law on the Establishment o f "Gacaca Jurisdictions” and the Organization o f  Prosecutions 
for Offences Constituting the Crime o f Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed between 1 
October 1990 and 31 December 1994, Law No 40/2000, Rwanda Official Gazette (26 January 2001)
112 The only difference is in Category 2 which additionally includes intentional attempted homicide 
resulting in serious assault.
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poorly constructed case files prepared by public prosecutor’s office; the influence of 
lobby groups on proceedings, including via the existence of so-called ‘syndicates of 
denunciation’ who, for a small fee, will offer to denounce any person; the climate of 
recrimination, fear, intimidation and discrimination that exists in most communities in 
which hearings are held; and the general climate of insecurity, particularly for defence 
parties and witnesses.113 Finally, there is concern that the plea-bargaining procedure 
incorporated into the gacaca law encourages self-incrimination, since persons in 
category 2, 3 and 4 who have already been detained for more than 9-10 years will 
normally be eligible for immediate release upon confession.
However, it is equally clear that neither the ICTR prosecuting some fifty 
individuals, nor the Specialised Chambers dealing with approximately 20,000 
individuals, will be able to clear the massive backload of cases against detained 
persons in an expedited manner. Experience to date indicates that the traditional 
justice experiment may result in serious substantive and procedural irregularities in 
criminal law. However, the gacaca model may offer also an innovative strategy to 
resolving the current impasse, and may be a preferable response than continued 
indefinite pre-trial detention. In addition, the community based nature of the 
adjudications offers some hope, despite the above noted failings, for the operation of 
reconciliation and truth telling processes at different levels throughout the country.
(v) Trials in third States
A number of domestic prosecutions have been undertaken in third States in 
connection with the situations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Security 
Council Resolutions 827 and 955 oblige States to enact implementing legislation to 
enable cooperation with the Tribunals. In the course of adopting such legislation or 
otherwise acting under existing penal codes, a number of States have asserted their 
own concurrent jurisdiction over persons not indicted by the ad hoc Tribunals for acts 
arising from these situations.114
113 AI (2002), 31-41
114 See generally this section Fiona Mckay, to whom I am indebted, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe, 
Criminal Prosecutions in Europe Since 1990for War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, Torture and 
Genocide, Redress Trust (30 June 1999)
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In 1994 at the height of conflict in Bosnia, Dusko Cvjetkovic was brought to 
trial in Austria for charges of genocide and murder under article 65(1)(2) Austrian 
Penal Code. The provision confers jurisdiction over foreigners in respect of offences 
committed abroad in situations where the accused cannot be extradited to the territory 
where the crime occurred due to reasons other than the nature and characteristics of 
the offence (such as the ‘political offence’ exclusion) and the double criminality 
requirement is met.115 At trial, Cvjetkovic was acquitted for insufficient evidence.116
In Prosecutor v Refik Saric, the accused (a Bosnian Muslim) was convicted by 
the Danish High Court for grave breaches of the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions (torture of prisoner of war and civilian detainees).117 Jurisdiction in this 
case was established under article 8(5) of the Penal Code, which requires Denmark to 
prosecute crimes it is under international treaty obligations to prosecute.
In Germany, Novislav Djajic was convicted on war crimes charges for 
abetting the murder of 14 unarmed Bosnian-Muslim civilians and the attempted 
murder of one other.118 Jurisdiction was established under article 6(9) of the Penal 
Code, whereby the State has a duty to prosecute offences committed abroad by non­
nationals if it is under an international obligation to do so. In this case, the Supreme 
Court of Bavaria found die State had a duty to prosecute under articles 146 and 147 
(grave breaches) of Geneva Convention IV and Additional Protocol I. The victim, the 
accused and the territory on which the crimes occurred were all alien to Germany. 
Jurisdiction under article 6(1) of the Penal Code (genocide) was also the basis for 
earlier proceedings before the Bavarian High Court against Dusko Tadic prior to his 
transfer to the ICTY.119 In another case, Nikola Jorgic (a former leader of a 
paramilitary Serb group) was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for 
genocide, murder, assault and deprivation of liberty under articles 6(1) (genocide) and 
6(9) (grave breaches) of the Penal Code.120 In the more recent case of Sokolovic, the
115 Judgment of the Oberster Gerichstshof, Vienna (13 July 1994) regarding a challenge to jurisdiction.
116 Republic o f Austria v Cvjetkovic, Landesgericht, Salzburg (31 May 1995)
117 Public Prosecutor v N.N., High Court (Ostre Landsrets), 3rd Division (25 November 1994). 
Confirmed on appeal in Public Prosecutor v T, Appeal Court (Hojesteret) (15 August 1995)
118 Public Prosecutor v Djajic, Case No. 20/96, Bayrisches Oberlandesgericht (Supreme Court of 
Bavaria), 3d Strafsenat(23 May 1997). See Safferling, Public Prosecutor v Djajic’, International 
Decisions (1998) AMIJ 92, 528
119 Dusko Tadic case, Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Supreme Court] (13 February 1994) 1 BGs 100/94
120 Oberlandesgericht Dusseldorf [Dusseldorf High Court] (26 September 1997); Bundesgerichtshof 
[Federal Supreme Court] (30 April 1999), 3 StR 215/98, NStZ 1999, 396. Note the traditional view 
expressed in this case that a “legitimizing link” is required to allow Germany to exercise its jurisdiction 
over crimes perpetrated outside its territory by foreigners against foreigners.
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Federal Supreme Court ruled that where jurisdiction is provided for in an international 
convention, such as the Genocide Convention, German courts are entitled to try 
persons for the offence under the Criminal Code absent any link between Germany 
and the crime, the victim or the offender (universal jurisdiction).121 This reversed the 
previous practice which required the prosecutor to establish a justifying link to 
Germany before cases could proceed.122
In The Netherlands, Darko Knezevid was charged with war crimes before the 
Military Chamber of the Arnhem Court of Justice, under article 8 of the Criminal Law 
in Wartime Act (1952) enabling jurisdiction over, inter alia, grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions.123
In Switzerland, the Code Penal Militaire enables jurisdiction of Swiss military 
tribunals to hear violations of the laws and customs of war, including the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols (articles 108-114). In the case of G.G., 
Goran Grabez was tried and acquitted for violations of the laws and customs of war 
(beating and degrading treatment of civilian prisoners).124 Jurisdiction was established 
by application of article 2(9) of the Code, which provides for jurisdiction over 
offences against international law and custom during an armed conflict committed 
abroad by civilians and members of foreign armed forces.125
A number of cases have also been brought in relation to the Rwandan 
genocide. In France, Rwandan priest Wenceslas Munyeshyaka was initially 
investigated in 1995 for genocide, crimes against humanity on the basis of articles 211 
and 212 of the French Penal Code, and article 689 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 
which govern the operation of extra-territorial jurisdiction. On appeal, the Cour de 
Cassation held that legislation implementing Security Council Resolution 955 
exceptionally enabled the operation of universal jurisdiction for French courts to 
prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws and 
customs of war, genocide and crimes against humanity.126
121 Judgment, Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Supreme Court] (21 February 2001), 3 StR 372/00. See also 
Djuradi Kusljic case, Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Supreme Court] (21 February 2001), 3 StR 244/00
122 See Wirth, ‘Germany’s New International Crimes Code: Bringing a Case to Court’ (2003) JICJ 1
123 See Decision on Jurisdiction, Hoge Raad Der Nederlanden [Supreme Court], Criminal Division, 
No.3717 Besch, (11 November 1997), unofficial translation in Yrbk IHL, Vol.l(1998)
124 In Re G., Military Tribunal, Division 1, Lausanne, Switzerland,(18 April 1997). See Ziegler, Jn re 
G .\ International Decisions (1998) AJIL 92,78
125 ibid
126 Nimes Court of Appeal (20 March 1996); Cour de Cassation, Chambre Criminelle (6 January 
1998), No. X96-32.491 PF; see Law No. 96-432,(22 May 1996)
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In Switzerland, the case of In Re N  concerned a former Rwandan mayor 
charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide before the Military 
Tribunal of Lausanne. The crimes were charged under article 108(2) of the Swiss 
Code Penal Militaire, which extends jurisdiction to treaty provisions applicable in 
non-international armed conflicts and to customary law. The Tribunal held that there 
was no jurisdiction in Swiss courts to try genocide solely under customary law, since 
Switzerland had not ratified the Genocide Convention. The charges of crimes against 
humanity under customary law were also dismissed. The accused was convicted of 
war crimes and sentenced to life imprisonment.127
In Belgium, although the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols were 
incorporated into domestic law in 1952 and 1986 respectively, legislation was 
introduced in 1993 for the repression of grave breaches of these treaties based on the 
principles of aut dedere aut judicare.m  In 1999, an amending Act added genocide 
and crimes against humanity and extended the application of grave breaches to both 
international and non-intemational armed conflicts.129 Under the law, Belgian courts 
could exercise jurisdiction irrespective of the place of commission, the nationality of 
the victim or that of the accused (universal jurisdiction). Trials could, moreover, be 
held in absentia. To bring a claim, an individual did not have to be a Belgian national 
or reside in Belgium. The law did not recognise immunities on the basis of the official 
position of the person.130 On adoption, the Belgian Government stressed that this 
jurisdiction enabling legislation reflected pre-standing treaty and customary law. By 
providing for a procedural mechanism for the enforcement of these norms, the 
enlisted crimes could be prosecuted retrospectively. The legislation was the basis for 
convictions obtained against the ‘Butare four’ for grave breach violations of the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols I and II.131
More than forty other cases, including against a number of high profile 
figures, were brought under the Belgian legislation, but failed to reach the stage of
127 In Re N., Military Tribunal, Division 1, Lausanne, Switzerland,(30 April 1999)
128 Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative a la repression des infractions graves aux Conventions intemationales 
de Geneve du 12 aout 1949 et aux Protocoles I  et II du 8 juin 1977, additionnels a ces Conventions 
(Moniteur Beige, 5 aout 1993)
129 Article 1(3) 1999 Act; Report o f  the Justice Commission, Senat de Belgique Session de 1998-99 (1 
December 1998) 1-749/3, pp.18-20
130 Proposition de loi relative a la repression des violations graves du droit international humanitaire, 
Belgian Senate 1 December 1998, 1-749/4; 38 ILM 921 (1999). See Smis and Van der Borght, 
‘Introductory note - Belgium: Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International 
Humanitarian Law’(1999) ILM 38,918
131 Assize Court of Brussels (8 June 2001)
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adjudication before the law was amended. One of these cases, against then Congolese 
Foreign Affairs Minister Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, was challenged before the 
ICJ. As noted in Chapter 2, the Democratic Republic of Congo (‘DRC’) challenged 
the legality of the Belgian legislation and the arrest warrant issued there under by 
contesting, inter alia, the law’s derogation from established rules of State
119immunity. In 2003, the legislation was amended to make it consistent with the ICJ 
ruling, by recognising applicable immunities established under international law as a 
procedural bar to criminal jurisdiction.133 Following sustained diplomatic pressure 
from, inter alia, the U.S. and Israel, a second set of amendments limited also the 
jurisdictional reach of the legislation. The new law observes more traditional 
formulations of jurisdiction based on the principles of active personality and, 
exceptionally, passive personality. In the case of the latter, Belgian courts can only 
accept petitions if the State of nationality of the accused does not criminalize 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity or cannot guarantee a fair trial: a 
recourse that is somewhat similar to the complementarity regime of the ICC.134
3. NATIONAL TRIALS IN SITUATIONS WHERE THERE IS NO 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
(a) Criminal prosecutions in national courts
Space permits consideration of only one example, the Pinochet case, encompassing 
legal actions brought, inter alia, in Spain, France, Belgium and the UK. The purpose 
of the case study is to illustrate the divergences of approach to prosecuting 
international crimes even amongst legal systems and States as relatively closely 
related as those of Europe. In each of these forums the grounds for jurisdiction and the 
categorisation of offences was different. The case also illustrates the fact that there is 
no regulation under international law governing forum determination where different
132 Congo v Belgium, ICJ Rep.2 (2002)
133 Loi modifiant la loi du 16 juin 1993 relative a la repression des violations graves du droit 
international humanitaire et I'article 144ter du Code judiciaire, p. 24846 (23 April 2003); Moniteur 7 
mai 2003 no. 167
134 Ref; See Smis and Van der Borght, ‘Belgian Law concerning The Punishment of Grave Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law: A Contested Law with Uncontested Objectives’ in ASIL Insights (July
2003)
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national jurisdictions seek to prosecute the same offender (see below, Chapter 7).
In Spain, the Criminal Division of the Audiencia Nacional (Supreme Court) 
unanimously upheld the jurisdiction of Spanish courts to hear allegations of genocide, 
terrorism and torture (included as a crime within genocide) committed abroad, further 
to orders issued by Judge Garzon of Investigating Court No.5.135 The Supreme Court 
relied on article 23(4) of the 1985 Judicial Branch Act which grants domestic courts 
extra-territorial jurisdiction over, inter alia, genocide and terrorism (as defined under 
Spanish criminal legislation) or other international crimes, committed abroad by 
either Spanish subjects or foreigners. As in other national jurisdictions, the 
Supreme Court held that the application of the Act to conduct occurring before its 
entry into force did not violate the principle of legality since the substantive criminal 
norms concerned were the object of criminal sanction at the time of the alleged 
offence. The Act provided for the retroactive application of a procedural and not a 
substantive norm. The Supreme Court went on to find prima facie grounds for 
violations of genocide under article 607 of the Spanish Criminal Code (incorporating 
the 1948 Genocide Convention) by interpreting a ‘national group’ to include any 
distinct national group, including opposition political groups. The interpretation 
appears strained given the express intent of the drafters of the Genocide Convention 
to exclude political groups,137 and as confirmed by ad hoc Tribunal jurisprudence.138 
The Supreme Court, nonetheless, reasoned that the concept of genocide was 
incomplete if the definition of a distinct group excluded persons who, although they 
fell outside of the standard definition of the Convention, were nonetheless specifically 
identified and targeted because of their common affiliation. On terrorism, the proof of 
terrorist intent to subvert the national order was held to apply irrespective of whether 
the State so endangered was Spain or another country, such as Chile. Torture, deemed 
a constituative offence within genocide, was not considered separately.
In France, several complaints were filed by French victims against Pinochet 
alleging offences of crimes against humanity, sequestration, torture and
135 Spanish National Court, Criminal Division, Case 19/97 (4 November 1998); Case 1/98 (5 November 
1998). See Carrasco and Fernandez, In Re Pinochet (Spanish Report) (1999) AJIL 93, 690-696
136 Ley Organica del Podor Judicial (1985)
137 See travaux preparatoires of the Genocide Convention, inter alia, E/447,E/794,A/C.6/SR69( 1948). 
Political groups were excluded from the Convention based in part on their lack of permanence, as 
opposed “to ‘stable’ groups objectively defined and to which individuals belong regardless o f their own 
desires”
138 Prosecutor v Rutaganda, Judgement and Sentence (6 December 1999), ffi|55-58; Prosecutor v 
Jelisic, Judgement (14 December 1999), TJ69
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disappearance.139 The juge d ‘instruction of the Tribunal de grande instance (Paris) 
issued two international arrest warrants, followed by a request for extradition to the 
UK. Jurisdiction was not based on universality, which, in general, is not recognised 
by the French legal system,140 but on passive personality jurisdiction.141 The principal 
conduct was not charged as genocide, given the doubtful satisfaction of the 
discriminatory intent requirement, nor as terrorism, but as a crime against humanity. 
At trial, the Tribunal dismissed all the crimes against humanity charges holding that 
the relevant provisions of the Penal Code (articles 211-12) did not enter into force 
until 1 March 1994. The remaining charges of sequestration accompanied by torture 
(article 224-2(2)) faced a statute of limitations. The Tribunal, however, held that in 
the cases of enforced disappearance occurring in connection with sequestration or 
torture, the crime remained ongoing until the victim is found and as such was not 
subject to temporal prescription.142 In creative application, die Tribunal held that 
while enforced disappearance did not form a discrete offence under French law, its 
suspensive effect on an act of sequestration or torture rendered the alleged conduct 
triable in France.
In Belgium, resident Chilean victims filed criminal complaints against 
Pinochet under the 1993 legislation regulating the suppression of grave breaches.143 
After holding that Pinochet was not immune from personal jurisdiction,144 the 
Bmssels Tribunal of first instance held that the legislation served as procedural 
instrument enabling jurisdiction over pre-existing common crimes (murder, 
manslaughter, assault, hostage-taking and torture). The Tribunal went on to hold the 
1993 legislation inapplicable given the absence of an armed conflict in Chile at the 
relevant time. Exercising ex officio powers, however, the juge d ’instruction found 
existence of a prima facie case against Pinochet for crimes against humanity under 
customary international law and as reflected in die ICTY, ICTR and ICC Statutes. 
This customary prohibition was said to possess a jus cogens character, was expressive 
of a universal obligation to suppress and trumped statute of limitation considerations.
139 See Stem, ‘In Re Pinochet (French Report)’ (1999) AJIL 93,696-700
140 See above, n.126. The exception is legislation enacting obligations towards the ICTY and ICTR 
Statutes; LawNo.96-432 (22 May 1996) [ICTR]; LawNo.95-1 (2 June 1995) [ICTY]
141 Articles 113-7, Code de Procedure Penale provides for criminal jurisdiction on the basis of 
territoriality, active personality and passive personality
142 See below, Chapter 4
143 Tribunal of first instance [Bmssels] (8 November 1998). See Reydams, ‘In Re Pinochet (Belgian 
Report)’ (1999) AJIL 93,700-703
144 The alleged acts could not be constituted under ‘official capacity’; ibid
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In the UK, Pinochet was arrested pursuant to a provisional warrant issued by a 
magistrate acting under the 1989 Extradition Act on the basis of the request issued in 
Spain. Pinochet successfully appealed his arrest to a Divisional Court of the Queen’s 
Bench Division, followed by an appeal by the Crown Prosecution Service, on behalf 
of Spain, to the House of Lords. In the extradition request Pinochet was charged with 
genocide (later dropped from the case), murder, torture and hostage-taking. After the 
first House of Lords decision was set aside, the reconstituted Appellate Committee 
held that Pinochet was immune from the charges of murder and conspiracy to commit 
murder outside Spain, leaving only the charges of conspiracy to commit murder in 
Spain. The charges of hostage taking were also dismissed, since the elements of the 
crime under the 1982 Hostages Convention had not been met. On torture, the double 
criminality rule dramatically reduced the scope of charges to those occurring after 29 
September 1988, the date by which Chile, Spain and the UK had all ratified the 1984 
Torture Convention.145 As noted in Chapter 2, the majority held the immunity ratione 
materiae attaching to a former head of State persists only for acts conducted in an 
official capacity in the exercise of head of State functions, and therefore cannot 
include torture.146 On murder and conspiracy to murder, by contrast, Pinochet was 
entitled to immunity for ordinary offences that were not the subject of an international
147treaty regime.
On 3 March 2000, Pinochet was released from house arrest in the UK on the 
ground that he was medically unfit to stand trial. On his return to Chile fresh charges 
were brought by the Chilean judicial authorities relating to human rights abuses, tax 
evasion and corruption. The Chilean courts circumvented an amnesty law preventing 
prosecutions for crimes committed between 1973 and 1978 by holding disappearance 
as ongoing crimes, and therefore not subject to the amnesty. In August 2000, the 
Chilean Supreme Court stripped Pinochet of his parliamentary immunity as senator- 
for-life, publicly revealing numerous facts surrounding his alleged crimes and 
opening the way for his prosecution. Since then, the Chilean courts have repeatedly
145 Pinochet III, 871. Subsequent to the decision, the Spanish authorities sought to add further charges 
to their request, relating to additional offences occurring after this date.
146 As Lord Browne-Wilkinson remarked, this was the first time that “a local domestic court has 
refused to afford immunity to a head of state or former head of state on the grounds that there can be no 
immunity against prosecution for certain international crimes”; ibid, 16
147 ibid,84%
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lifted Pinochet's legal immunity for each separate case, as required under domestic 
law.148
(b) Civil suits in national courts
Faced with the difficulties of effecting criminal jurisdiction, litigants in recent years 
have increasingly sought relief through civil action in third States.
In the 1980s, a number of civil claims began to be brought in U.S. courts 
under the long dormant Alien Tort Claims Act (‘ATCA’). The Act establishes original 
federal district court jurisdiction over “all causes where an alien sues for a tort ... 
[committed] in violation of the law of nations...”, thus enabling prosecution of human 
rights violators for offences committed abroad against non-U.S. nationals.149 In 
Filartiga v Pena-lrala, the first in a series of civil claims, the plaintiffs, Paraguayan 
citizens, brought proceedings for damages alleging wrongful death by torture of their 
son and brother against the former head of police in Asuncion.150 The confirmation of 
jurisdiction by the Court of Appeals recognised the prohibition of torture as part of 
U.S. common law, holding that “for the purpose of civil liability, the torturer has 
become - like the pirate and slave trader before him -  hostis generis, an enemy of all 
mankind”.151 Although no claim of State immunity was brought, the defendant on 
appeal relied on the act of State doctrine. In dismissing the argument, the Court of 
Appeal stated “we doubt whether action by a state official in violation of the 
Constitution and laws of the Republic of Paraguay, and wholly unratified by that 
nation’s government, could properly be characterised as an act of state”.
A number of later ATCA cases dealt with issues related to State immunity 
under the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. In particular, these cases 
distinguished between the absolute immunity from civil jurisdiction of a foreign
1 ^9State, and claims against State officials. Anticipating arguments later adopted by 
the House of Lords, U.S. courts held that certain conduct, such as torture, could not be 
considered as the legitimate functions of State officials and so properly fell outside
148 For most recent stripping of Pinochet’s legal immunity by Santiagio Appeal Court see Associated 
Press, ‘Pinochet Stripped of Legal Immunity’ (11 January 2006)
149 Judiciary Act 1789,28 USC§1350(1993)
150 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.1980)
151 Ibid, p.890. See also Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692 (2004) (U.S. Supreme Court)
152 Siderman de Blake v Republic o f Argentina (1992)
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the scope of State immunities.153
The Torture Victims Protection Act (‘TVPA’)154 was introduced in 1992 to 
clarify the legal basis of ATCA, to enable claims also by U.S. citizens.155 Litigants 
seeking civil redress for abuses committed abroad under the TVPA must establish 
jurisdiction via the ATCA. The TVPA provides “a Federal cause of action against any 
individual who, under actual or apparent authority or under color of law of any 
foreign nation, subjects any individual to torture or extrajudicial killing”.156 Personal 
jurisdiction under both Acts is obtained by serving the defendant with a suit while he 
is physically present in the U.S..
Two war crimes related cases were filed against Radovan Karadzic for 
offences committed by Bosnian Serb forces during the Bosnian war. In Doe v 
Karadzic, a class action (group petition) was filed on behalf of victims of Bosnian 
Serb atrocities seeking remedy, inter alia, for rape and sexual assault. Kadic v
1 57Karadzic concerned an individual claim seeking injunctive relief and damages. The 
two cases, joined at preliminary stages, were originally dismissed by the New York 
District Court for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the accused could not be 
considered a State official given that the Republika Srpska was not a recognised State 
entity. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling and held that customary international 
human rights law prohibited official torture without distinguishing between 
recognised or unrecognised States. It went on to hold that Karadzic could not enjoy 
immunity as a Head of State of an unrecognised entity, and also dismissed the 
possibility for objections under the act of State doctrine. As such, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that “Karadzic may be found liable for genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity in his private capacity and for other violations in his capacity 
as a State actor, and that he is not immune from the service of process”.158 The two
153 See Chuidian, (1990) 912 F.2d 1099; Trajano v Imee Marcos (1992) 978 F.2d 493; In re Estate of 
Marcos Human Rights Litigation,(1994) 25 F.3d 1467; Cabiri v Assasie-Gyimah (1996) 921 
F.Supp.1189 (SDNY)
154 Pub.L.No. 102-256,106 Stat.73 (1992), 28 U.S.C.§1350
155 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The Torture Victims Protection Act o f 1991, S. Rep. No. 102- 
249,3
156 ibid, 3
151 Doe v Karadzic, No.93-878(SDNY,1993); Karic v Karadzic, No.93-1163(SDNY,1993). See Ratner 
and Stevens, ‘Using Law and the Filartiga Principle in the Fight for Human Rights’ in American Civil 
liberties Report (December 1993)
158 70 F.3d 232(2d Cir.1995), 116 S.Ct.2524(1996). Compare Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic case 
(726 F.2d 774, 824 D.C.Cir.1984). See Enslen, ‘Filartiga’s Offspring: The Second Circuit Significantly 
Expands the Scope of the Alien Tort Claims Act with its Decision in Kadic v Karadzic’ (1997) Albany 
L R 48,695
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cases were sent back for trial, resulting in awards in excess of $5 billion against 
Karadzic.
As in the original Filartiga case, these cases have highlighted the inherent 
limitations of civil proceedings. The awards have been notable for the official 
recognition lent victims and judicial record provided for abuses that may otherwise 
have remained unheard.159 The judgments, however, have proved largely ineffective 
in enforcing their rulings against persons absent from U.S. territory and whose assets 
are not deposited in the U.S.. In the future, efforts to extend recognition of judgements 
between States may enable more effective remedies for the recovery of reparations 
from assets seized in a third State. In Hilao v.Estate of Marcos,160 the Federal 
Supreme Court of Switzerland relied on the civil judgment obtained in the U.S. to 
order the release of assets from Swiss banks to a fund in the Philippines to 
compensate human rights victims.161 The Swiss Court relied on the State obligations 
under article 14 of the Torture Convention to “ensure that the victim of torture 
receives indemnification and has an actionable right to fair and reasonable 
compensation, including the means for rehabilitation that is as complete as 
possible.”162 Any such outcome will only be possible where the accused has financial 
resources deposited overseas.
Beyond the examples of ATCA and TVPA in the U.S., State practice on the
163award of a civil remedy for human rights abuses committed abroad remains rare. 
The decisions of most national courts have confirmed the entitlement under 
international law to immunity from civil proceedings of officials for acts committed 
outside the forum, even where the acts are offend jus cogens This is based on the 
argument, as held in Propend, that any suit against a State official would indirectly
159 See Isenberg, ‘Genocide, Rape, and Crimes Against Humanity: an Affirmation of Individual 
Accountability in the Former Yugoslavia in the Karadzic Actions’ (1997) Albany LR 60,1051
160 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir.1996)
161 In re Federal Office for Police Matters, Case l-A.87/1997/err (10 Dec.1997)
162 Ibid, at I 7(a)(bb). See Dubinsky, Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law Working Document No. 
117: Proposals o f the Hague Conference and Their Effect on Efforts to Enforce International Human 
Rights Through Adjudication (November 1998)
163 See Prefecture o f  Voiotia v Federal Republic o f Germany, case no 11/2000, Areios Pagos (Hellenic 
Supreme Court) (4 May 2000) wherein the Hellenic Supreme Court found that the jus cogens norms 
arising from German atrocities in Greece during the Second World War overrode claims of state 
immunity; (2001) AJIL 95,198
164 See Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Co.(No. 1),[1995]1 WLR 1147; Al-Adsani v 
Government o f Kuwait^1996)107 ILR 536; Siderman de Blake v Republic o f Argentina, 965, F.2d 699 
(9th Cir.1992); Argentine Republic v Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation, (1989) 488 U.S. 428; 
Princz v Federal Republic o f Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C.Cir.1994); Al-Adsani v The United 
Kingdom, ECtHR, 34 EHRR 273 (2001); Bouzari v Iran, Ontario Superior Court of Justice 114 ACWS 
(3d)57,2002 ACWS
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implead the State itself and interfere with the internal affairs of another State. The 
recent ruling of the Court of Appeal in Jones v Saudi Arabia, however, indicates that 
English law may be moving towards recognising such exceptions to functional 
immunity under civil law for certain international offences as the Pinochet decision 
held with respect to criminal matters.165 Currently on appeal to the House of Lords, 
the ruling distinguishes between the absolute personal immunity from civil claims 
attaching to a foreign State (and its senior officials), which it upheld, and the 
functional immunity attaching to its ordinary officials. In particular, the Court of 
Appeal considered whether the cloak of State immunity should extend to acts or 
omission of ordinary State officials amounting to systematic torture. As Lord Justice 
Mance held, absent a rule expressly providing otherwise under die State Immunity 
Act, “it can no longer be appropriate to give blanket effect to a foreign state's claim to 
state immunity ratione materiae in respect of a state official alleged to have 
committed acts of systematic torture”. To do so, the decision observed, could deprive 
the right of access to a court under article 6 of the ECHR of real meaning where 
victims of serious human rights abuses had no effective recourse in the State where 
the offence took place. The decision, nonetheless, sets out a number of qualifications 
that seek to balance the exercise of jurisdiction against such factors as proportionality 
(i.e. as to the availability of effective domestic remedies) and the pursuit of legitimate 
aims (i.e. the repression of serious human rights violations), as well as jurisdictional 
issues related to discretionary principles and forum non conveniens}66
The Pinochet case and related national decisions, together with Appeals Court 
decision in Jones and established U.S. jurisprudence, indicate an emerging acceptance 
of exceptions to functional immunity for criminal or civil claims brought in respect of 
international criminal conduct offending jus cogens. This will have important 
consequences for the ability of national courts, in the absence of an international 
forum, to enforce international criminal law norms against State officials.
165 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2004] EWCA Civ 1394 (CA)
166 IbidffiJ92-99. Note: in the context of the appeal sought, the decision rejected exceptions to 
functional immunity for acts falling short of torture.
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IV
Other Responses to Criminal Jurisdiction
Located at a midway point between domestic and international trials is a mixed 
national-international model that has emerged in recent years. National courts have 
become ‘internationalised’ by combining international judges and lawyers with 
national counterparts and applying a hybrid of national and international law. 
Internationalising national trials has aimed to overcome the deficiencies experienced 
in domestic processes noted in Chapter 3. At the same time, such courts offer relief 
from the colossal resource and administrative costs required to establish a fully 
international body.1 Practice to date, however, indicates that this alternative model of 
enforcement has fallen short of expectations. Partly, this has resulted from practical 
factors such as under-resourcing and poor planning. Of greater concern, however, are 
the limited powers of internationalised courts. By operating on the horizontal plane of 
competing political and legal interests, they face the same limitations of purely 
national courts in situations where an accused person or evidence is located in the 
territory of a foreign State, and are, equally, unable to set aside the rules governing the 
immunity of foreign officials.
The chapter also examines an alterative response to accountability: the 
complete absence of criminal trials. The second section below reviews the status of 
amnesties and pardons under national and international law, and the extent to which 
truth and reconciliation processes can complement prosecutions.
1. HYBRID COURTS
Following the creation of the ICTY and ICTR the UN was increasingly turned to by 
countries devastated by conflict for technical and financial assistance in setting up war
1 Ingadottir, ‘The Financing of Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals’, in Romano, 
Nollkaemper and Kleffner, eds., Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals,(2004),271
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crimes trials which they were unable or unwilling to conduct alone.2 In the face of 
‘tribunal fatigue’ and in the absence of a permanent international criminal jurisdiction 
to which these situations could be referred, the Security Council tasked the UN 
Secretariat to come up with a mechanism that would dispense international justice, 
but fell short of requiring new international bodies.3
In 1997, the Government of Cambodia asked for UN assistance in prosecuting 
Khmer Rouge crimes. The ensuing negotiations that led to the proposal for a national 
court of mixed composition and jurisdiction formed the basic template which was 
adapted, with variations, for Sierra Leone, and later for Kosovo, East Timor, BiH and 
Burundi. Typical characteristics of these ‘hybrid’ courts include their location in situ 
in the territory where the crimes occurred, a mixed composition of national and 
international judges and lawyers, and the application of both domestic and 
international norms and standards. The various courts, nonetheless, do not form a 
uniform model.4 They vary considerably in the circumstances of their establishment, 
the scope of their jurisdiction, their organisational arrangement, and the degree of 
their internationalisation.
To date, internationalised criminal courts have been set up, primarily, in two 
manners: (a) in territories under UN administration and (b) pursuant to an 
international agreement negotiated between the State concerned and the UN.
(a) Courts established under UN Administration
Although it was the discussions surrounding Cambodia and Sierra Leone that gave 
rise to the mixed jurisdiction model, chronologically the concept was first tested in 
Kosovo and then in East Timor. The UN Administrations for Kosovo and East Timor 
were established by Security Council Resolutions 1244 (1999) and 1272 (1999) 
respectively to exercise the full range of legislative and administrative powers in the 
each territory and to re-establish and/or reform governance structures, including the 
justice sector. The United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (‘UNMIK’) 
embarked upon internationalising criminal trials in reaction to the biased
2 Zacklin (2004), 541-545; Shraga, ‘The Second Generation UN-Based Tribunals: A Diversity of 
Mixed Jurisdictions’, in Romano et al. (2004), 15, see generally
3 Shraga (2004), 15. Note, the various internationalised courts discussed below all relate to situations 
that would have fallen outside temporal jurisdiction of the ICC.
4 ibid
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administration of post-conflict justice by domestic courts. In East Timor, by contrast, 
the Security Council had specifically tasked the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (‘UNTAET’) to bring to account the perpetrators of the 
post-referendum violence. In both territories, the enterprise required the 
reconstruction of a new judicial system ad hoc in the wake of a conflict.5
(i) Internationalised Courts in Kosovo
UNMIK was able to re-establish the judiciary with the first weeks of its mission in 
mid 1999 due to the presence of a substantial number of predominantly Kosovan 
judges and prosecutor in the territory.6 Concern was soon raised, however, that the 
judiciary was unable to render impartial justice, particularly in complex and sensitive 
war crimes cases. Judges were exposed either to violent threats and attacks or fell 
prey to corruption. Decisions based on scant evidence led to previously convicted 
ethnic Albanians being released from jail and Serbs being placed in indefinite pre-trial 
detention.7 In September 1999, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
(‘SRSG’) set up a commission to study the structure and administration of the 
judiciary and prosecution service.8 The commission recommended the establishment 
of a special tribunal, the Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court (‘KWECC’), which 
would have mixed national and international composition and would stand outside of 
the existing court structure.9
The idea to create a special court was soon overtaken as events sparked in 
February 2000 led to a serious outbreak of violence in the divided city of Mitrovica.10 
In the face of the widespread lack of confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary to 
deal impartially with the aftermath of the violence, the SRSG issued Regulation 
2000/6 (15 February 2000). The Regulation for the first time allowed international 
judges and prosecutors to participate in domestic proceedings in Kosovo for all new 
and pending criminal cases before the District Court in Mitrovica. The measure was
5 Hansjorg Strohmeyer, ‘Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations 
Missions in Kosovo and East Timor’ (2001) AJIL 95,46
6 Cady and Booth, ‘Internationalized Courts in Kosovo: An UNMIK Perspective’, in Romano et al. 
(2004), 59
7 Bar Human Rights Law Committee (UK), Report on Kosovo 2000
8 UNMIK/REG/1999/6
9 Cady and Booth, in Romano et al. (2004), 60
10 ibid
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soon extended to all courts throughout the territory by UNMIK Regulation 2000/34 
(27 May 2000). Under the applicable law, serious criminal cases had to be heard 
before a panel of two professional and three lay judges, meaning that even with the 
appointment of two international judges the international presence Would represent a 
minority on the bench. Accordingly, Regulation 2000/64 (15 December 2000) enabled 
the SRSG to designate, at any stage in criminal proceedings, on the application of the 
prosecutor, the accused or defence counsel, a panel consisting of three judges which 
would include at least two international judges, one of whom would sit as the 
presiding judge (the so-called ‘Regulation 64 Panels’). The Regulation also enabled 
the SRSG to change the venue of the trial. As a result of these incremental measures, 
the need for a KWECC gradually became obsolete.11 As a result, the Kosovo 
experience is the only example of an internalised process that is not located in a 
specific court or panel, but rather is suffused throughout the entire judiciary as an 
intervention measure that can be applied on a case-by-case basis to any criminal 
process throughout the territory.12
Given the immediate need to re-establish legal structure after the conflict, both 
UNMIK and UNTAET initially chose to apply pre-existing national law, adapted 
where necessary in the light of international standards and supplemented, as 
necessary, by specific Regulations to fill in legislative gaps.13 The application of the 
law of the former regime, however, proved difficult to apply in practice.14 There was 
fierce opposition from Kosovar Albanian politicians and lawyers on the grounds that 
the FRY criminal laws were among the most active tools of discrimination. 
Eventually, UNMIK issued an amendment providing that the applicable law would be 
the law in force in Kosovo prior to 23 March 1989, the year Serbia first moved to 
restrict the constitutional autonomy of Kosovo.15 The task of identifying which laws 
and regulations were inconsistent with international standards, however, proved 
onerous for local lawyers. With little relevant training and practice, they were tasked 
to construe, interpret and apply international instruments to domestic penal codes, and 
to grapple with the complexities of creative substitution and incorporation for
11 ibid
12 Cerone and Baldwin, ‘Explaining and Evaluating the UNMIK Court System’, in Romano et al. 
(2004), 41. The ability of UNMIK to implement its regulations in Serb dominated areas, nonetheless, 
has been hampered by the continued use of parallel structures reporting directly to the Belgrade 
authorities; see, e.g., OSCE Kosovo, Parallel Structures in Kosovo (7 October 2003)
13 UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (25 July 1999)
14 Strohmeyer (2001), 59
15 UNMIK/REG/1999/24 (12 December 1999), amended by UNMIK/REG//2000/59(27/10/00)
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inconsistent laws.16 Supplementary regulations issued by the SRSG sought to react to 
specific problems as they arose, creating piecemeal solutions to the complex problems 
at hand.17 These interim measures eventually succumbed to the need for a 
comprehensive review of all legislation and the drafting of new criminal codes and 
criminal procedure codes.18 At the same time, as in BiH, operating on an extra-legal 
sphere, the NATO led Kosovo Force (‘KFOR’) peace-enforcement operation 
conducts its own investigative activities in accordance with its Chapter VII mandate, 
beyond the scope of local judicial review.19
The presence of international judges and prosecutors in Kosovo has served to 
enhance the perception of impartiality in sensitive cases. The vast majority of prior 
war crimes convictions were overturned under the Regulation 64 Panels, and new 
investigations and prosecutions incorporated an international component from the 
outset. The court system established by UNMIK, nonetheless, has struggled for a 
number of reasons, including a lack of resources, ad hocism in strategic planning, and 
the pressures of a highly charged political environment. Moreover, many of the 
international judges and prosecutors, like their national counterparts, lacked the 
professional experience or the background required for complex war crimes cases. 
Even at the level of the Supreme Court, whose role is to ensure the highest standards 
of legal interpretation and legal reasoning, internationalised judgements have been 
criticised for their “brevity (the average length of decisions is three to four pages), 
poor legal reasoning, absence of citations to legal authority, and lack of interpretation 
concerning the applicable law on war crimes and human rights issues”.20 This has 
limited die possibilities for capacity building. The court system has also suffered from 
problems common to other countries in post-conflict settings such as insufficient 
witness protection and inadequate security. Moreover, although Kosovo technically 
remains part of the sovereign territory of Serbia and Montenegro pending a decision
16 Strohmeyer (2001), 59
17 See, e.g., UNMK/REG/2002/6 (18 March 2002) On the use in criminal proceedings o f written 
records o f interviews conducted by law enforcement authorities', UNMIK/REG/2002/7 (28 March 
2002) On covert and technical measures o f surveillance and investigation.
18 See Bolander, ‘The Direct Application of International Criminal Law in Kosovo’, Kosovo Legal 
Studies vol.l, 2001/1, at 7. OSCE Kosovo, Kosovo’s War Crimes Trials: A Review (September 2002), 
29-31
19 The OSCE has criticised, in particular, the lack of formal charging related to KFOR detentions; 
OSCE Kosovo, Review o f the Criminal Justice System (March 2002-April 2003), 33-34
20 Kosovo’s War Crimes Trials: A Review, 48; OSCE Kosovo, Review 4: The Criminal Justice System 
in Kosovo, (29 April 2002), 26-37. For a contrary view see Cady and Booth (2004)
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on its final status, the internationalised panels have not been able to rely on the 
cooperation of the Belgrade authorities of that of third States.
(ii) Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor
Unlike in Kosovo, the departure of the Indonesian authorities after the violence that 
swept East Timor in September 1999 left the country in an administrative and legal 
vacuum. Almost the entire legal professional elite had departed after the referendum, 
leaving a bare handful of inexperienced young East Timorese lawyers and the 
physical administrative infrastructure that was all but destroyed. In response to the 
violence, the International Commission of Inquiry and the three thematic Special 
Rapporteurs sent by the UN Commission on Human Rights unanimously called for 
the creation of an international tribunal.21 In the face of fierce resistance from 
Indonesia and lack of consensus within the Security Council, the Secretary-General 
recommended a twin process. An international panel would be set up as part of the 
domestic judiciary in East Timor following the KWECC model then being considered 
for Kosovo, and Indonesia would be given the opportunity to fulfil its pledge to create 
a special human rights court in Jakarta. The two forums were meant to exercise 
concurrent jurisdiction and to cooperate in matters of legal assistance.
By Regulation of the UN Transitional Administrator, Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes were created in the District Court in Dili with exclusive jurisdiction 
over genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and certain domestic offences 
committed between 1 January 1999 and 25 October 1999 22 The prosecution service 
was internationalised through the creation of the Serious Crimes Unit, headed by a 
UN appointed Deputy General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes.23
Unlike Kosovo where international criminal law was applicable through pre­
existing domestic legislation, UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 enumerated applicable 
international offences. Notably, the substantive crimes and much of the general part of 
the Regulation were based on verbatim extractions from the Rome Statute. This meant
21 Report o f the International Commission o f  Inquiry on East Timor to the Secretary-General, 
PJ54/726, S/2000/59 (2000); see also A/54/660 (10 December 1999)
22 UNTAET/REG/2000/11 (6 March 2000). International offences were subject to universal 
jurisdiction; UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (6 June 2000)
23 UNTAET/REG/2000/25 (3 August 2000)
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that many of the standards, definitions and principles contained in the Rome Statute 
were applied for the first time by an internationalised domestic panel sitting in East 
Timor.24 This included, somewhat oddly, a provision mirroring article 27 of the ICC 
Statute which stipulated that the immunities attaching to the official capacity of a 
person, as Head of State or Government or otherwise, “whether under national or 
international law”, would not bar the Special Panels from exercising their jurisdiction 
(article 15, Regulation 2000/15). Since the Panels were established as domestic 
bodies, it is doubtful that they could have relied on the Regulation alone to require 
Indonesia or a third State to waive either constitutional or State immunities for 
persons sought. Such an obligation could more appropriately have been established 
had the Security Council adopted a Chapter VII resolution requiring States to render 
the Panels full cooperation and to waive applicable immunities.25
The Special Panels ceased operation on 20 May 2005 by decision of the 
Security Council. By that date, the Serious Crimes Unit had filed 95 indictments 
indicting 391 persons,26 and the Panels had tried 87 defendants, 84 of whom were 
convicted of crimes against humanity and other charges, and three were acquitted. At 
end of its mandate, the Serious Crimes Unit estimated it had investigated 
approximately half of the projected number of cases arising from the 1999 violence 
alone. Charges were pending against a further 339 accused, who remained at large 
beyond the jurisdiction of East Timor 27 These statistics, however, belie the reality 
that most cases involved low to mid-ranking Timorese militia members. The 10 
priority cases identified by the Serious Crimes Unit against 202 accused involved at 
least 183 persons who remained at large. Particularly notable was the absence of trials 
against persons bearing the greatest responsibility.28 In February 2003, the Serious
24 Linton suggests the incorporation of ICC provisions “has imported a regime created for a radically 
different setting ... into the district court of one of the world’s poorest nations”, thereby creating “a 
tremendous legal and financial burden”, ‘Rising from the Ashes: the Creation of a Viable Criminal 
Justice System in East Timor’ (2001) Melbourne Uni. LR 25, 148-150. More generally see Katzenstein 
‘Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East Timor’ (2003) Harv Hum. Rts. J; Yayasan HAK 
Briefing Paper, Serious Concerns regarding the Independence o f the Judiciary under United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (24 July 2001); Reports o f the Secretary-General, 
S/2000/738, S/2001/42
25 See discussion above on enhanced cooperation, Chapter 8
26 The total number of defendants in cases before the Panels was 440, since some accused persons 
faced multiple charges; see Report to the Secretary-General o f the Commission o f Experts to Review 
the Prosecution o f Serious Violations o f Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 
(‘Commission of Experts on East Timor Report’), S/2005/458 (26 May 2005)
27 End o f mandate report o f the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission o f Support in East 
Timor, S/2005/310 (12 May 2005)
28 Commission of Experts on East Timor Report, |^359
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Crimes Unit issued an indictment against Wiranto et al., charging the former 
Indonesian Minister of Defence and Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces 
(Tentara Nasional Indonesia or ‘TNI’), together with six high-ranking TNI 
commanders and the former Governor of East Timor. The indictment sparked a furore 
of controversy and was immediately disowned by the political leadership in East 
Timor, including the President, the General Prosecutor and the UN. Political 
expediency and the over-riding interest to achieve reconciliation with its powerful 
neighbour meant that the East Timorese government was unwilling to back the 
Special Panels in their pursuit of Indonesian officials. The Panels also failed to secure 
the required financial and administrative support, and had difficulties hiring and 
retaining international judges for the duration of trials. Other more familiar problems 
included inadequate interpretation and application of relevant laws; inexperience and 
lack of training on the part of both the international and domestic lawyers; poor 
secretarial and legal research resources; inadequate security; and the limited scope for 
capacity building.29
On review, the Commission of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General to 
examine the trials concluded that the Special Panels had achieved a measure of justice 
for victims and their families and had contributed to community reconciliation and the 
strengthening of the rule of law in the country.30 Its most serious flaw, however, was 
its inability to secure any cooperation from Indonesia.31 Particularly problematic was 
the non-implementation of a memorandum of understanding signed between 
Indonesia and UNTAET providing for the sharing of information and arrest and 
transfer of suspects, in consequence of the Indonesian parliament’s refusal to ratify 
the agreement.32 Moreover, the Jakarta government publicly stated it did not 
recognize the jurisdiction of the Special Panels to try Indonesian citizens. As 
Nicholas Koumjian, former Deputy General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes, has 
stated,
29 ibid, pp. 18-37. The Commission also noted that criticisms that the Serious Crimes Unit had initial 
adopted an arbitrary prosecution strategy based on the availability of suspects rather than a coherent 
focus, ibid. See also Bertodano, ‘East Timor: Trials and Tribulations’, in Romano et al. (2004), 79-97
30 Commission of Experts on East Timor Report, ^357-358
31 Bertodano (2004), 80-81
32 See Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic o f Indonesia and the UNTAET Regarding 
Co-operation in Legal, Judicial and Human Rights Related Matters, (6 April 2000), 
UNTAET/GAZ/2000/Add.2,93; Progress report o f the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor, S/2001/719 (14 July 2001), ^30
33 Commission of Experts on East Timor Report, [^82
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Had Indonesia abided by the agreement on cooperation, the results of the work 
of the Special Panels would undoubtedly have been very different. But without 
voluntary cooperation from Indonesia, the Special Panels have always been a 
flawed solution with no realistic chance of bringing to justice those high-level 
perpetrators most responsible for the crimes.34
The absence of cooperation was even more galling in the light of the total 
failure of the parallel judicial process in Indonesia. Legislation was passed on 6 
November 2000 to establish special Human Rights Courts.35 The Indonesian 
Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in East Timor (KPP HAM) 
submitted a comprehensive and credible report on the post-referendum violence 
Attorney-General naming 22 suspects in the military and the police command. From 
the list, the Attorney-General proceeded with charges against 18 individuals, notably 
omitting General Wiranto and Intelligence Chief Zacky Anwar Makarim both named 
in the KPP HAM report.36 The judicial investigations focussed on a geographical and 
temporarily limited number of incidents, rather than on a widespread and systematic 
nature of the abuses throughout 1999 or the previous twenty-five years of occupation. 
The resultant prosecutions were poorly prepared and suffered from serious lacunae in 
investigations, in protection of witnesses and victims, and the presentation of 
evidence. At several stages during trial proceedings, the prosecution itself moved to 
have the cases dismissed for lack of evidence. Of the eighteen accused, all were 
acquitted at trial or on appeal except for one, Eurico Guterres, an East Timorese 
former militia leader, who remains free pending his appeal. None of the accused was 
detained pending trial or after conviction, except for one, who was released after 
serving four months. None of the military officers accused were suspended from 
active military duties pending trial or appeal, and often failed to appear in court. The 
highest ranking military officer who was charged, Major-General Adam Damiri, was 
promoted to command operations in Aceh Province during his trial and pending his 
appeal. Another accused, Brigadier-General Tono Suratman, was promoted to chief 
spokesman for the TNI.37 The proceedings were marred by an overwhelming 
environment of intimidation against both witnesses and judges. The different court
34 Nicholas Koumjian, Accomplishments and limitations o f one hybrid tribunal: experience at East 
Timor, ICC-OTP Guest Lecture Series (14 October 2004, The Hague); on file with author.
35 Law on Human Rights Courts, Act No.26/2000
36 See, e.g. Indonesian Commission of Enquiry (KPP-Ham) Report on East Timor (31 January 2000)
37 Commission of Experts on East Timor Report, ^171
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panels took divergent approaches to the application of international human rights 
standards and in their treatment of evidence, reached inconsistent verdicts and factual 
findings, and displayed poor legal reasoning in their decisions. As the UN 
Commission of Experts concluded, “the judicial process before the Ad Hoc Court was 
manifestly inadequate with respect to investigations, prosecution and trials, and has 
failed to deliver justice. The atmosphere and context of the entire court proceedings 
were indicative of the lack of political will in Indonesia to seriously and credibly 
prosecute the defendants.”38
(b) Courts established by an international agreement
(i) Special Court for Sierra Leone
In 2000, in response to request by the Government of Sierra Leone to the UN for the 
establishment of an international court and faced with a lack of support for a third ad 
hoc Tribunal, the Secretary-General proposed the creation of a hybrid court. The 
Security Council accordingly mandated the Secretary-General to negotiate a treaty 
between the UN and the Sierra Leonean authorities for the establishment of a Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (‘SCSL’).39
Like other hybrid courts the SCSL has a mixture of national and international 
and judges, prosecutors and administrative staff; applies both international and 
domestic law; and sits in the territory where the offences took place.40 In the case of 
the SCSL, however, it may be more correct to talk of a ‘nationalised’ international 
court. Whereas the other forums considered in this section sit as a ‘court within a 
court’, the Special Court operates outside of the domestic judicial system altogether. 
Instead, much like the ad hoc Tribunals, it enjoys primacy over Sierra Leonean courts
38 ibid,V>15\ E/CN.4/2003/65/Add.2( 13 January 2003); Cohen, ‘Intended To Fail - The Trials Before 
the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta’, ICTJ (2003)
39 S/RES/1315(2000)
40 Substantive international crimes comprise crimes against humanity (based on Article 3 ICTR 
Statute); violations of common article 3; and other serious violation of IHL, including attacks against 
civilian populations, attacks against humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions (based on 
article 8(2)(e)(iii) ICC Statute), and abduction and forced recruitment of children under 15. Genocide 
was excluded given the determined absence of discriminatory intent. The omission of grave breaches, 
meanwhile, has the effect of pre-determining the conflict as non-intemational despite the intervention 
of other States; see Smith, ‘Sierra Leone: The Intersection of Law, Policy, and Practice’, in Romano et 
al. (2004), 135-136; S/2000/915, HI32-38
106
Chapter TV
and has the power to request a deferral of a case at any stage in the proceedings. The 
treaty establishing the SCSL, moreover, creates an international obligation for the 
Sierra Leonean authorities to render cooperation. The SCSL applies the ICTR Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence (subject to possible amendments), and its appellate level is 
guided by the decisions of the ICTY and ICTR Appeals Chamber.41 Moreover, the 
Special Court has a number of features classically associated with international 
organisations, such as legal personality and the capacity to enter into international 
agreements. In the light of these and related characteristics, the SCSL has declared 
itself as “a truly international criminal court” 42
There are a number of features, nonetheless, that distinguish the SCSL from 
purely international criminal courts. Because the SCSL has been established by a 
treaty between the UN and one State, the agreement binds only Sierra Leone. 43 The 
Special Court’s primacy powers, for example, do not extend to the national courts of 
third States. Similarly, it lacks the authority to require compliance from other States.44 
The international characteristics of the SCSL, therefore, arguably apply only with 
respect to its relationship with Sierra Leone.
The status of the Special Court formed the subject of the SCSL Appeals 
Chamber’s Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction. Citing the ICJ ruling in Congo v 
Belgium, the Appeals Chamber recalled that while a domestic court must respect the 
inviolability of a sitting Head of State, the jurisdiction of an international criminal 
court could act as an exception to such procedural immunity.45 Based on the factors 
outlined above, the decision went on to conclude that the SCSL was, indeed, an 
international criminal court. The reasoning behind the decision is troubling on a 
number of fronts. Particularly problematic is the suggestion that the SCSL Statute 
overrides the rights and obligations of third States under the international law on State 
immunities. As the ICJ indicates, for an exception to immunity to apply, a criminal
41 Art.20, SCSL Statute. In his Report, the Secretary-General advised against the appropriateness of one 
option proposed by the Security Council (S/RES/1315) that the SCSL share its Appeal Chambers with 
that of the ad hoc Tribunals, based on budgetary and practical grounds; Report o f the Secretary- 
General on the establishment o f a Special Courtfor Sierra Leone,S/2000/915 (4 October 2000)
42 Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction (SCSL-2003-01-I)(31 May
2004); Decision on Constitutionality and Lack o f Jurisdiction (SCSL-04-14)(13 March 2004), ^80
43 See Romano and Nollkaemper, ‘The Arrest Warrant Against The Liberian President, Charles Taylor’ 
ASIL Insights (June 2003)
44 “Beyond its legal and technical aspects, which in many ways resemble those of other international 
jurisdictions, the Special Court is Sierra Leone-specific”; S/2000/915
45 Congo v Belgium, [^61
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court must be (a) international and (b) it must have jurisdiction.46 Irrespective of the 
international characterisation of the court, the Appeal Chamber failed to articulate the 
manner in which jurisdictional competence is obtained under international law. The 
jurisdiction of a court over persons entitled to immunities under international law may 
be established in two ways: on the basis of consent or by virtue of a Security Council 
Chapter VII decision. The latter, in turn, may take the form of either a delegation of 
powers to a judicial body (as with die ICTY/R) or the adoption of a Chapter VII 
resolution directing UN Member States to render full cooperation to a court (as with 
the ICC). Thus, the ad hoc Tribunals posses jurisdiction over persons otherwise 
entitled to immunity under international law because they are constituted as 
subsidiary organs of the Security Council exercising such powers as are delegated to 
it. The ICC, by comparison, exercises jurisdiction over the officials of State Parties on 
the basis of the consent of those States to be bound by a treaty. With respect to 
officials of non-Party States who are entitled to immunity under international law, the 
ICC can only exercise jurisdiction with the consent of that State (article 98) or in 
consequence of a Security Council Chapter VII referral (article 13(b)) 47 At the time 
of the indictment was issued against then President Charles Taylor, by contrast, the 
SCSL could not rely on either the consent of Liberia or the authority of Chapter VII 
powers.
In its decision, the SCSL Appeals Chamber went to some lengths to infer 
delegated powers citing, inter alia, “the high level of involvement” of the Security 
Council in the Special Court’s establishment48 It also recalled the Council’s 
affirmation, in its initial resolution requesting the Secretary-General to negotiate an 
agreement, that the situation in Sierra Leone constituted a threat to international peace 
and security 49 These features, however, cannot be equated with measures capable of 
modifying the obligations of third States not Party to the Agreement. As noted earlier, 
for this to occur, the Security Council would be required to adopt a Chapter VII 
decision calling on State to implement specific measures, which would thereby 
prevail over the obligations of Member States arising from any conflicting
46 ibid
47 For further discussion on these twin issues see Chapter 8. In the case o f the IMT at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo, as discussed above, the basis of jurisdiction can be characterised either as (i) extraordinary 
territorial jurisdiction or (ii) on the basis of the will of the community of States comprising at the time 
the ‘united nations’.
48 Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 1fl|34-36
49 S/RES/1315(2000)
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international agreement (articles 25 and 103, UN Charter). The SCSL was not 
established on the basis of a decision of the Security Council, nor is there any Chapter 
VII resolution requiring States to render cooperation to the court.
In the alternative, the Appeals Chamber posited an argument based on 
consent. It suggested that since the Security Council had initiated the Agreement 
(Resolution 1315), and since the Council acts on behalf of UN Member States, the 
“Agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone is thus an agreement 
between all members of the United Nations and Sierra Leone”.50 While the Appeal 
Chamber’s pronouncement may reflect an expression of collective political will, it is 
clear that the Agreement cannot create legal obligations for States not parties without 
their express consent to be bound. As a result, the rights and obligations of States not 
party to the Agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone remain unaffected. For 
these reasons, the SCSL cannot be considered an international criminal court with 
jurisdictional competence to set aside the entitlement to personal immunity under 
international law of an incumbent foreign Head of State absent Liberia’s consent or 
the Security Council’s intervention.
The temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court is among other problematic 
aspects of die SCSL Statute. Article 1 provides that jurisdiction runs from 30 
November 1996 onwards, the date of the Abidjan Peace Agreement.51 The choice of 
dates, at the mid-point of a conflict beginning in 1991 has been questioned by 
numerous commentators, including the Sierra Leonean government itself. More 
problematic is the impact of the amnesties previously granted under the 1999 Lome 
Peace Agreement. Article 10 of the Statute provides that amnesties will not be a bar to 
jurisdiction with respect to international crimes.53 The provision, however, has the 
effect of accepting amnesties with respect to domestic crimes listed in die Statute. 
This means that the SCSL, in relation to a conflict that began in 1991, can only 
consider international crimes committed after 30 November 1996, and domestic 
offences occurring after 7 July 1999.
50 Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, ^37
51 Ninth report o f the Secretary-General on UNAMSIL, S/2001/228 (14 March 2001), [^54. See also 
S/2000/915, S/2000/1234, S/2001/40 and S/2001/95, and Tenth report o f the Secretary-General on 
UNAMSIL, S/2001/627 (25 June 2001)
52 The start date of 23 March 1991 was rejected on practical considerations as placing too onerous a 
burden on the investigations and prosecution process; see Smith (2004), 130-132
53 See S/2000/915,1ffl22-24
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The decision to focus the Special Court only on persons bearing the greatest 
responsibility, perhaps, has been the biggest perceived failing. In Resolution 1315, the 
Security Council had recommended that personal jurisdiction extend to those “who 
bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of the crimes”. In response, the 
Secretary-General suggested the phrase be understood to refer to both “command 
authority and the gravity and scale of the crime”.54 The Security Council confirmed 
that “the members of the Council share your analysis of the importance and role of the 
phrase ‘persons who bear the greatest responsibility’”, but maintained its preference, 
as reflected in the final wording of article 1 of the Statute, to retain an emphasis on 
those who played a leadership role.55 The SCSL Prosecutor, in turn, interpreted his 
mandate restrictively by indicting only thirteen leadership suspects. Of these, nine 
were taken into custody; the indictments against two were withdrawn as a result of 
their death;56 Charles Taylor was granted asylum in Nigeria; and Johnny Paul Koroma 
remains at large. Critics have argued that this approach has left a large gap of 
impunity with respect to other individuals who also bear the greatest responsibility for 
the conflict’s most brutal atrocities. The exclusive focus on hierarchical command 
structure, moreover, ignores informal command relationships within the organisations 
involved and degrees of culpability.57 As Kendall and Staggs point out, the 
Prosecutor’s pragmatic approach was guided by a number of extra-legal 
considerations including “completing the mandate within a politically acceptable 
amount of time, the ‘diplomatic and political blowback’ from particular indictments, 
and refraining from issuing indictments that could threaten the continuation of the 
court”.58 Irrespective of the quality of the SCSL’s jurisprudence, these temporal, 
political and financial constraints have served as inhibiting factors. The overall 
contribution of the SCSL to peace and security in the region, moreover, has been 
limited.59 The absence of the legal authority with respect to third States, in particular, 
has to date rendered the SCSL powerless to obtain custody over its most wanted
54 S/2001/40(2001)
55 S/2000/1234(2000), S/2001/95(2001)
56 Prosecutor v Sam Bockarie (SCSL-03-04), Withdrawal o f Indictment,(8 December 2003); 
Prosecutor v Foday Saybana Sankoh (SCSL-03-02), Withdrawal of Indictment,(8 December 2003)
57 Kendall and Staggs, From Mandate to Legacy: The Special Court for Sierra Leone as a Model for  
“Hybrid Justice" (Berkeley War Crimes Studies Center: April 2005)
58 ibid
59 Arguably, the most significant impact of the SCSL was the reputational risk attaching to Taylor’s 
indictment. His resultant de-legitimisation and marginalisation precipitated the final stages of the 
Liberian conflict, leading to his ouster, which in turn contributed to regional peace and security.
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target. Instead, the court has been left to await the outcome of negotiations conducted 
by external parties to determine the fate of Charles Taylor. The SCSL was projected 
by its staunchest supporters as a lean and efficient alternative to both the ad hoc 
Tribunals and to the much-lambasted ICC. However, despite its assertions to the 
contrary, the SCSL cannot exercise the same powers as its fully international 
counterparts.
(ii) Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia
If the SCSL views itself as predominantly an international court, the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia has been designed as a predominantly national 
with an international component.60 It is the least internationalised court considered in 
this section.
Calls have long been made for prosecutions in relation to the genocidal rule of 
the Khmer Rouge 1975-1979, which resulted in over 1.7 million deaths.61 In 1997, the 
Government of Cambodia requested the assistance of the UN in bringing to justice 
persons responsible for genocide and crimes against humanity committed during the 
period of the Democratic Kampuchea.62 In 1999, the Group of Experts appointed by 
the Secretary-General recommended an international tribunal should be established.63 
This option was rejected by Cambodia, which instead asked for UN technical 
assistance for the creation of a special national court which would include 
international judges and prosecutors. In 2000, Articles of cooperation were concluded 
between the UN and Cambodia,64 and domestic legislation was passed a year later.65
60 See generally Meijer ‘The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for Prosecuting 
Crimes Committed by the Khmer Rouge’, in Romano et al. (2004), 207-232
61 In 1979, a puppet government installed by Vietnam sentenced Pol Pot to death in absentia, along 
with former foreign minister Ieng Sary and several other close aides. When a peace accord was signed 
in 1991, Phnom Penh refused the inclusion of a genocide tribunal, as did China. In 1996, PM Hun Sen 
declared an official amnesty for Ieng Sary after negotiating the surrender of several middle-ranking 
cadres. Pol Pot died in 1998 without being brought to trial. Boyd, Cambodia's legal system on trial, 
Asia Times Online: Southeast Asia (May 20,2003)
62 See A/51/930-S/l 997/488, A/52/132
63 A/53/850-S/1999/231
64 Articles o f Cooperation Between the United Nations and the Royal Government o f Cambodia 
fin/Conceming] the Prosecution under Cambodian Law o f Crimes Committed During the Period o f  
Democratic Kampuchea; published in Phnom Penh Post, Issue 9/22, October 27-November 9, 2000.
65 Law on the Establishment o f the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts o f Cambodia for the 
Prosecution o f Crimes Committed during the Period o f Democratic Kampuchea, NS/RKM/0801/12, 
No. 174 Ch.L (Phnom Penh, 10 August 2001)
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The latter, however, differed from the agreement with the UN, by allowing, most 
notably, the dominance of Cambodian judges and lawyers. Talks broke down in 
February 2002 and the UN withdrew from the process. The impasse was resolved 
only in February 2003 when the UN General Assembly welcomed the Cambodian law 
and mandated the Secretary-General to resume negotiations without delay, with the 
proviso that the law be amended to allow for certain due process guarantees, an 
appellate chamber (resulting in a two and not the three-tiered structure), and to 
regulate the status and independence of judges and prosecutors.66 As a result, the 
Secretary-General was severely restricted in his scope for negotiation, and was unable 
to secure agreement on a number of other critical issues that had caused prior UN 
withdrawal.67
The principal features of the Extraordinary Chambers differ substantially from 
previous models of internationalised courts and are therefore treated in some detail 
below. The Extraordinary Chambers is to be established within the domestic 
judiciary. A Pre-Trial Chamber composed of three Cambodian and two international 
judges will act as an internal dispute settlement mechanism; the Trial Chambers will 
be composed of three Cambodian and two international judges; and the Supreme 
Court Chamber of four Cambodian and three international judges. Decisions are to be 
reached supermajority, meaning that at least one international judge must vote in 
favour. The Extraordinary Chambers will have two co-investigative judges and two 
co-prosecutors, comprised of a domestic and international official each. Dispute 
between the co-investigative judges or co-prosecutors may be referred by at least of 
them to the Pre-Trial Chamber. If the Pre-Trial Chamber fails to reach a decision by 
supermajority, the investigation or prosecution will proceed. Subject matter 
jurisdiction includes genocide as defined in the Genocide Convention, crimes against 
humanity as defined in the Rome Statute, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 
and other crimes including the domestic offences of homicide, torture and religious 
persecution, and violations of the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property and 
the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Temporal jurisdiction runs 
from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979. Personal jurisdiction is limited to senior 
leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for crimes 
falling within its jurisdiction (i.e. a focus on leadership suspects as well as on the most
66 A/57/228A(2003)
67 A/57/769,1117,23; See Agreement annexed to A/57/228B(2003)
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serious offenders). The granting of amnesties over the listed offences is prohibited. 
The one pre-standing amnesty granted to Ieng Sary in 1996 is left to the determination 
of the Chambers.
Rejected proposals of the Secretary-General included reducing the number of 
judges to three at the trial and five at the appellate level; the securing of a majority of 
international judges, with decisions taken by a simple majority; the appointment of 
one prosecutor and one investigative judge, both international; and the removal of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber mechanism. This would have created a structure similar to other 
hybrid courts.68 A savings clause in the final agreement provides that the UN may 
withdraw from the whole process, including its financial support (representing some 
two-thirds of the total budget), should the Cambodian Government make changes to 
the structure or organisation of the Chambers or otherwise cause them to function in a 
manner inconsistent with the terms of the Agreement. In turn, the Cambodian Law 
enables the Extraordinary Chambers to continue on their own if the UN withdraws, 
thereby transforming the enterprise into a purely domestic affair.69
A number of other features of the Agreement are problematic. The original 
report of the Group of Experts had noted widespread interference by the executive 
with the independence of the judiciary, including intimidation and threats; low levels 
of competence; and widespread corruption.70 A notable deficiency of the 
supermajority regime is its failure to establish a procedure to deal with the possibility 
for a ‘hung jury’, which will likely result in confusion and gridlock.71 The use of Pre- 
Trial Chamber for dispute resolution between key staff appears cumbersome and time 
consuming. It is unclear, moreover, if such a referral has suspensive effect, or if the 
Chambers is bound by a timeframe to render a decision. Rather than restricting the 
scope for possible inconsistent solutions by clearly establishing the applicable 
substantive and procedural law, the Agreement merely provides that any dispute 
between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Agreement is to 
settled “by negotiation, or by any other mutually agreed upon mode of settlement”, a 
solution that is likely to lead to further delays. These and other concerns were not
68 ibid, W 4-27
69 Article 46, Cambodian Law
70 A/53/850, S/1999/231
71 Human Rights Watch, Serious Flaws: Why the U.N. General Assembly Should Require Changes to 
the Draft Khmer Rouge Tribunal Agreement (Briefing Paper: April 2003), 5
113
Chapter IV
missed on the UN negotiating team.72 It is clear, however, that political rather than 
strictly legal considerations guided the process. In particular, Secretary-General 
candidly expressed in his report that he felt obliged to consent to the views expressed 
by States in support of Cambodia’s position.73 In his final assessment, the Secretary- 
General recalled that the UN Special Representative for human rights in Cambodia 
had “consistently found there to be little respect on the part of Cambodian courts for 
the most elementary features of the right to fair trial. I consequently remain concerned 
that ... established international standards of justice, fairness and due process might 
therefore not be ensured.”74
In summary, although the substantive law of the Extraordinary Chambers is 
reasonably sound, concerns persist over the delays, obstruction and possibly show 
trial quality that may result from the compromises reached on organisation and 
procedure.75 Perhaps most worrying, the slowly spun out nature of the process, a 
quarter century after the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime, may enable the persons 
most responsible to escape justice through natural death.76 The overall result has been 
to greatly depart from the previously established standards for internationalised 
judicial proceedings, and to provide an unwelcome alternative model for hybrid 
courts.
(iii) BiH War Crimes Chamber
Unlike other courts reviewed in this section, the BiH War Crimes Chamber did not 
arise from a government request and was not imposed by an international 
administrator.77 Instead, the establishment of the Chambers has been driven primarily 
by completion strategy of the ICTY.
72 Report o f the Secretary-General on Khmer Rouge trials, A/57/769 (2003), %L\
73 ibid
74 ibid, ffiJ28-29; The UNGA approved the statute on 22 May 2003, and on 6 June 2003 the Cambodian 
Government and the UN signed the Agreement Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law o f  
Crimes Committed during the Period o f Democratic Kampuchea; A/57/228B
75 Meijer (2004), 232
76 Human Rights Watch (‘HRW’), Serious Flaws’, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, A Court for 
Cambodia? (1 April 2003)
77 The OHR and the international community, nonetheless, led the process and applied considerable 
pressure on the fractured BiH political institutions to ensure that the package of laws for the War 
Crimes Chamber was adopted.
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Under the Dayton Peace Agreement, mixed courts and commissions have 
operated in BiH in a number of fields including property dispute settlement and 
elections, and at the level of die Human Rights Chamber and the Constitutional 
Court.78 In 2001, the ICTY Prosecutor suggested to the Security Council that either a 
specialised BiH court or chamber assisted by international judges and prosecutors be 
established to prosecute lower and middle ranking accused persons, including cases
7Qreferred by the Tribunal. The proposal resulted in die establishment of a specialised 
chamber for war crimes within the State Court of BiH.
The War Crimes Chamber started operation in 2005 with a majority 
international judges and prosecutors, but will evolve over a projected five year 
transition period into a majority national and finally exclusively national staffed
on
institution. The State Prosecutor’s Office includes a War Crimes Department headed 
by an international Deputy Prosecutor, while the Chamber is administered by an 
international Registrar. Subject-matter jurisdiction under the new BiH State Criminal 
Code is genocide, modelled on the Genocide Convention; crimes against humanity, 
modelled on article 7 of the Rome Statute; war crimes, modelled on the grave breach 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions; and violations of the laws and practices of 
warfare, modelled on the Hague Conventions.
The Chamber is intended to have jurisdiction over three categories of cases: 
those cases transferred by the ICTY in accordance with Rule 11 bis (approximately 15 
accused); those cases transferred by the ICTY, for which indictments have not yet 
been issued (approximately 45 accused); and those Rules of the Road cases before 
domestic courts which, due to their sensitivity, should be tried at the State Court 
level.81 Other less sensitive cases could be tried by entity level chambers for war 
crimes, which may be established in the light of the experience of the State level 
Chamber, or by ordinary national courts. Under domestic legislation, material 
provided by the ICTY on transfer of a case (such as pre-trial briefs, witness lists and
78 See DPA Annexes 4 and 6
19Address by the Prosecutor o f the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Carla 
Del Ponte, to the UN Security Council (27 November 2001)
80 Joint conclusions o f the Working Group o f the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Office o f the High Representative regarding domestic prosecution o f  war 
crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (The Hague, 21 February 2003)
81 Where the ICTY has issued an indictment, referred cases are subject to OTP review; where no 
indictment has been issued, collected evidence is transmitted to the national authorities, but there is no 
ICTY control. Some lower ranking perpetrators have therefore been indicted in order to ensure that 
they are brought to trial in local courts. Interview with ICTY OTP Chief of Investigations, on file with 
author.
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statements, deposition of witness who have given evidence in other trials or before 
presiding officers involving the same facts, exhibits and other physical evidence) will 
be admissible at trial before the Chamber.82
A feature which distinguishes both the Kosovo and BiH hybrid courts is their 
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher standing international body. Other hybrid courts 
were established as an alternative to an international tribunal rather than as a 
complement to it. Thus in both Kosovo and BiH, a rather advanced distribution of 
caseloads enables the concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by domestically based 
internationalised national courts, while the leadership trials are held in The Hague.
(iv) Special Chambers in Burundi
In 2002, the President of Burundi requested the Secretary-General to establish an 
international judicial commission of inquiry, as provided for in the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement of 28 August 2000. Following an assessment mission 
dispatched to Burundi in May 2004, the Secretary-General presented his 
recommendations to the Security Council, though not in the shape and form requested 
by the Burundi authorities. Instead, the report recommended the establishment of a 
twin track mechanism: a truth commission and a special chamber, both operating 
within the court system of Burundi, both internationalised.83 Drawing on lessons 
learned from past models, the special chambers would be based on die ‘court within a 
court’ model of East Timor and BiH and, as with the mechanisms set up in Sierra 
Leone and Cambodia, would be established on the basis of an agreement concluded 
between the UN and the Government. Moreover, like the SCSL, the negotiations 
would be based on a mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General by the Security 
Council.
The assessment mission recalled, in particular, that three UN commissions of 
inquiry had been established in the last decade at the request of Burundi. While each
82 See, inter alia, Prosecutor v Stankovic, Decision on Referral o f  Case Under Rule //bis,(17 May 
2005). The Referral Bench decided to grant the Prosecutor’s motion for referral having considered 
compatibility of BiH laws with the Tribunal’s Statute; reviewed the laws applicable to the events in 
1992 in BiH; reviewed fair trial guarantees before the War Crimes Chamber; satisfied itself as to 
domestic witnesses protection measures, and that the death penalty would not be imposed.
83 Report o f the assessment mission on the establishment o f an international judicial commission o f  
inquiry for Burundi, transmitted to the Security Council on 11 March 2005 (S/2005/158)
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had had a limited mandate to investigate specific incidents, no legal or practical effect 
had been given to their recommendations and no action had been taken by any UN 
organs. As the report concluded, the “United Nations can no longer engage in 
establishing commissions of inquiry and disregard their recommendations without 
seriously undermining the credibility of the Organization in promoting justice and the 
rule of law”.84
By resolution 1606 (2005) the Security Council requested the Secretary- 
General to initiate negotiations with the Government, to consult with all Burundian 
parties concerned on how to implement his recommendations and to report on the 
details of implementation, including costs, structures and time frame.85
c. Other internationalised courts 
(i) Iraqi Special Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanity
The Iraqi Special Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanity (‘Special Tribunal’) is 
included in the present discussion because its Statute shares a number of features 
common to hybrid courts. Nonetheless, the circumstances that led to its adoption 
under the aegis of the Provisional Coalition Authority are quite different, and its 
international component is composed of U.S. personnel who play an advisory role.86
The Statute of the Special Tribunal establishes a court with mixed jurisdiction 
and composition. Uniquely, however, the integration of international judges is 
required only “if it [the government] deems necessary”. Similarly, the Chief 
Investigative Judge and the Chief Prosecutor are to appoint non-Iraqi nationals to act 
in an advisory capacity or as observers with respect to “general due process of law 
standards”.
Temporal jurisdiction runs from 17th July 1968 to 1st May 2003; personal 
jurisdiction is limited to Iraqi nationals or residents of Iraq; while territorial 
jurisdiction covers listed crimes committed in Iraq or elsewhere, with specific
84 ibid, H72
85 S/RES/1606(20 June 2005); See Fifth Report on Burundi,S/2005/728 (21 November 2005), 1J45
86 On the controversy over whether the Iraqi Governing Council appointed by the Coalition Provisional 
Authority had the authority to create a court or to amend the criminal law of territories under 
Occupying Powers See HRW, Memorandum to the Iraqi Governing Council on 'The Statute o f the 
Iraqi Special Tribunal’ (17 December 2003)
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reference given to “crimes committed in connection with Iraq’s wars against the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and the State of Kuwait”. Much of the subject-matter 
jurisdiction and procedural provisions of the Statute are modelled on the ICC and 
ICTY Statutes. Subject matter jurisdiction includes genocide, based on the Genocide 
Convention; crimes against humanity, modelled with minor amendment on article 7 of 
the ICC Statute; war crimes, modelled with minor amendment on article 8 of the 
ICC Statute;88 and certain violations of Iraqi laws. The latter includes manipulation of 
the judiciary; wastage of national resources and the squandering of public assets; and 
abuse of position and the pursuit of policies that may lead to the threat of war or the 
use of force against an Arab country. Individual criminal responsibility is based on 
article 25 and 28 of the Rome Statute and article 7 of the ICTY Statute. Provisions for 
investigations and indictment, review of indictment, the rights of die accused, the 
protection of victims or witness, and trial proceedings are modelled on articles 18-23  
of the ICTY Statute. The Special Tribunal has concurrent jurisdiction with Iraqi 
national courts over offences under Iraqi law and enjoys primary jurisdiction over 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and may seek a transfer of a case 
at any stage of the procedure (article 9, ICTY Statute). As with the ICC Statute, an 
exemption in the ne bis in idem rule allows for a retrial of a person for acts 
constituting one of the listed crimes where previous proceedings before a national 
Iraqi court “were not impartial or independent, were designed to shield the accused 
from international or Iraqi criminal responsibility, or the case was not diligently 
prosecuted.”
In common with other post-conflict situations, the Special Tribunal will be 
governed by a complex web of laws. The Iraqi penal system is derived from French, 
Turkish and Islamic law. The Statute provides for the application of general principles 
of criminal law under the 1968 Iraqi criminal law for offences committed between 
17th July 1968 and 14th December 1969; the 1969 Iraqi Criminal Code “as it was as of 
December 15, 1969, without regard to any amendments made thereafter” for offences 
committed between 15th December 1969 and 1st May 2003”; and the 1971 Iraqi 
Criminal Procedure Law. In relation to the international crimes, the judges may resort
87 Omissions include enforced sterilization; apartheid; and the definition of gender in ICC art.7(3)
88 Omissions include the widespread and systematic chapeaux for article 8 ICC Statute; art.8(2)(b)(xx); 
art.8(2)(d)&(f); art.8(3); reduced chapeaux in art.8(2)(c); and enforced sterilization. Transfer of 
populations by an “Occupying Power” (art.8(2)(b)(viii) ICC Statute) is replaced by “the Government of 
Iraq or any o f its instrumentalities”.
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to the decisions of international courts or tribunals as persuasive authority. At the 
same time, the Coalition Provisional Authority has amended parts of the Iraqi 
criminal procedure code.89 Such complex provisions will place onerous 
responsibilities on the judges to identify, interpret and apply relevant norms. This will 
be particularly problematic given that most judges, after four decades under the 
Ba’ath regime, have become accustomed to conducting summary proceedings and 
lack the necessary experience and expertise to conduct complex trials.90 This concern, 
together with the absence of neutral and suitably qualified international judges and 
prosecutors, the inclusion of the death penalty, and the uncertain guarantee of 
adequate protection of both victims and witnesses and court personnel, does not bode 
well for ability of the Special Tribunal to uphold necessary standards.
Summary
Internationalised courts have the benefit of being able to draw on a pool of both 
international legal expertise and the local legal profession. They are located in close 
proximity to the events concerned, and have reasonable good access to potential 
evidence and witnesses. Sitting in situ, moreover, contributes to domestic ownership 
and acceptance by the population, compared to distant trials in foreign States. The 
resultant heightened sense of credibility and legitimacy may contribute more easily to 
national reconciliation initiatives. There may also be greater willingness on the part of 
the territorial State to proceed with internationalised trials, since they may appear as 
less intrusive than purely international processes. Hybrid courts have the potential 
also to contribute to capacity building, to the enhancement of domestic jurisprudence 
and, more generally, to the reconstruction and reform of the judicial sector. 
Importantly, and in contrast to the ICC, the jurisdiction of these courts can be applied 
retrospectively to events occurring before their establishment91 Finally, hybrid courts
89 CPA/MEM/18 Jan 2003/03
90 HRW Memorandum (2003)
91 Benzing and Bergsmo, ‘Some Tentative Remarks on the Relationship Between Internationalized 
Criminal Jurisdictions and the International Criminal Court’, in Romano et al. (2004), 409-410; see 
generally
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are typically far less expensive than fully international courts, making significant 
savings in areas such as travel, translation, staff and defence costs.
Practice to date, however, has been less than satisfactory. The courts have 
often been unable to secure international judges and prosecutors with relevant 
experience. The discovery, application and interpretation of applicable laws have 
proved onerous. The specialised nature of these courts has meant that they have 
worked in vacuum from the rest of the domestic legal system, and have thus had 
limited impact on overall development of the justice sector. The courts have enjoyed 
lacklustre political support in the prosecution of high profile or sensitive cases. They 
also continue to suffer from the problems experienced by purely national courts in 
areas such staff security and witness protection. Moreover, the financial savings that 
internationalised courts have experienced has resulted, in part, from their severe 
under-funding.93
All of the above are practical considerations which could be overcome with 
sufficient political, administrative and financial assistance. The biggest weakness of 
hybrid courts as a model for enforcing international criminal law, however, is the 
failure of their constituent instruments to internationalise their cooperation regime. In 
particular, they enjoy a significantly weaker relationship with die national authorities 
of third States than do purely international courts. This is particularly important when 
addressing the issue of State immunity and the obligations on States to give effect to 
court rulings in matters of legal assistance. As the former Deputy Prosecutor for 
Serious Crimes in East Timor has noted, internationalised courts have proved 
particularly inadequate in response to conflicts where much of the relevant evidence, 
witnesses and accused persons are located abroad:
.... In my view, a hybrid tribunal, which includes professionals from the 
national government, is appropriate for dealing with a conflict that is largely 
civil in nature, such as the case of Cambodia and Sierra Leone, but predictably 
ineffective in dealing with international conflicts where perpetrators came 
from outside of the country in which the hybrid court is located. The Special 
Panels for Serious Crimes has successfully litigated cases involving the “civil” 
nature of the conflict in East Timor, but have been powerless to bring to 
justice those members of the police and armed forces and highest-level militia
92 See Ingadottir (2004), 285-289
93 Ingadottir argues that in some cases, the lack of resources has been so extreme as to undermine the 
ability of these courts to meet established minimum standards of an independent judiciary and fair trial, 
ibid, 288. See also Cohen ‘Seeking Justice on the Cheap: Is the East Timor Tribunal Really a Model for 
the Future?’ Asia Pacific Issues, No.61 (August 2002)
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commanders who organized the violence, because all of these accused are 
residing in Indonesia which refuses to cooperate.94
Thus, while hybrid courts are intended to achieve similar objectives as 
international courts, they cannot exercise the same powers. As argued earlier, if this 
was desired the Security Council could adopt a Chapter VII resolution modifying the 
obligations of States towards an internationalised court by, for example, obliging all 
States to cooperate and comply with decisions, or a particular decision, of a court. In 
the case of the Regulation 64 Panels in Kosovo, Sluiter argues that Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (1999) establishing UNMIK, which “[d]emands that all States in the 
region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution”, may be 
read to impose a legal obligation on such States to render cooperation on all aspects of 
the civilian administration of Kosovo, including the judicial system.95 Applying this 
analogy to other situations, Security Council Resolution 1272 (1999) establishing 
UNTAET is less clear and instead “[sjtresses the importance of cooperation between 
Indonesia, Portugal and UNTAET in the implementation of this resolution”. 
Similarly, Security Council Resolution 1470 (2003) on Sierra Leone merely “urges all 
States to cooperate fully with the Court” rather than ‘deciding’ they shall do so under 
Chapter VII.96 The Extraordinary Chamber in Cambodia and the BiH War Crimes 
Chamber, moreover, have not been the subject of Council resolutions on matters of 
cooperation.97 Thus while, particularly in the case of those courts created under the 
aegis of the UN, there appears to be a strong argument for the invocation of a duty to 
cooperation for all UN Member States in the interests of maintaining international 
peace and security,98 none of the resolutions cited above establishes a clear duty for 
third States to render cooperation in a manner similar to Security Council Resolutions 
827 (ICTY) and 955 (ICTR). Moreover, they do not address the relevance of 
immunities pertaining to incumbent officials under international law in relation to the 
exercise of jurisdiction by these courts.
94 Koumjian (2004)
95 Sluiter, ‘Legal Assistance to Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals’, in Romano et al. 
(2004), 390
96 The preamble to S/RES/1478 (2003) repeats this appeal by merely “[c]alling on all States, in 
particular the Government of Liberia, to cooperate fully with the Special Court for Sierra Leone”.
7 See GA Res.58/191(2004) which appeals for financial and personnel support to the Extraordinary 
Chambers; and S/RES/1503 (2003) which calls for capacity building and donor support for the BiH 
WCC. In the case of BiH, it could conceivably be argued that the standing obligations under Dayton 
Peace Agreements require FRY and Croatia to assist in the ongoing civilian implementation of the 
GFAP.
98 Sluiter (2004), 405
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In spite of these limitations, as the BiH War Crimes Chamber demonstrates, 
the fact that any international judicial process could only ever prosecute the top strata 
of criminal activity, while leaving the bulk of the cases to domestic courts, means that 
internationalised courts will continue to have a role in complementing international 
courts and tribunals, rather than representing an alternative to them.
2. AMNESTIES AND ABSENCE OF TRIALS
Another possible response to the question of accountability for past crimes is the 
decision to forego the criminal process in favour of other societal goals. To what 
extent are amnesties compatible with duty to prosecute internationally crimes? What 
impact does this have on the enforcement of international criminal law and on duty to 
prosecute for the State proclaiming the amnesty, for a third State, and for an 
international tribunal? It may be useful for this purpose to distinguish between four 
broad categories: (a) amnesties for crimes under domestic law in one State; (b) 
amnesties for crimes under international law; (c) amnesty granted in State A to all its 
nationals who have committed crimes in State B; and (d) the role of truth and 
reconciliation commissions.
(a) Amnesties for crimes under domestic law in one State
Amnesties have often been promulgated in States after armed conflicts or states of 
emergency. Their purpose has been, variously, to promote the reintegration of former 
combatants and insurgents in peace processes and to placate former security forces in 
order to ward off coups; to exempt draft evaders and deserters from military penal 
sanction; and to provide amnesty for domestic offences committed by members of 
opposition armed forces or insurgents, such as crimes against the State, crimes against 
the armed force, or the illegal possession of weapons. Where the conduct in question 
amounts to an ordinary offence, it is the prerogative of the State to grant immunities 
from prosecution. This concurs with die concept of ‘combatant immunity’ in the law 
of international armed conflict or article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II with respect to 
non-international armed conflict which provides that “[a]t the end of hostilities, the
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authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons 
who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for 
reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained.” 
However, where the conduct in question amounts to an international crime such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, failure to genuinely investigate and 
prosecute such crimes may incur a State’s international responsibility under 
conventional and customary law. As the Secretary-General has summarised,
While recognizing that amnesty is an accepted legal concept and a gesture of 
peace and reconciliation at the end of a civil war or an internal armed conflict, 
the United Nations has consistently maintained the position that amnesty 
cannot be granted in respect of international crimes, such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity or other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law."
Amnesties for domestic crimes have been linked to both peace negotiations and to 
truth and reconciliation commissions.100 The early release system under the Good 
Friday Agreement’ (or ‘Stormont Agreement’) in Northern Ireland differs again from 
this model since the accused have already been prosecuted and convicted, but are 
being released early from imprisonment.101 There is neither an amnesty bar on past or 
future prosecutions, nor are persons pardoned for crimes committed.
(b) Amnesties for crimes under international law
Blanket amnesties covering domestic and international offences have been used
extensively in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala,
102often arising in response to the findings of truth and reconciliation commissions. 
For States in transition from oppressive regimes, amnesties represent important tools 
to appease members of former regime who may be unrepentant for the atrocities that
99 Sierra Leone Report,Tf22; see also Secretary-General’s Rule o f Law Report, S/2004/616, p.21
100 See Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions -1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study (1994) 16 HRQ 598
101 See Annex B of the Agreement, ‘Review of the Criminal Justice System’ available at 
http://www.nio. gov.uk/agreement.pdf
102 It should be noted that truth and reconciliation commissions have varied considerably in mandate, 
form and outcome. See generally Hayner, ibid
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have been committed and retain variable amounts of power.103 The experience of the 
UN sponsored El Salvador Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for example, 
demonstrated how fragile political realities may be unwilling or unable to bend to the 
task of prosecuting former officials.104
National amnesties for serious violations of humanitarian law are prohibited 
under the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions; the try or extradite 
regime of numerous multilateral treaties; as well as international and regional human 
rights instruments. Both the Genocide Convention and the Torture Convention 
explicitly require States to punish violators, while article 2(3) of the ICCPR obliges 
States to provide an “effective remedy”. The Human Rights Committee has repeatedly 
interpreted the latter provision as incurring a positive obligation to investigate 
violations, hold persons responsible, and provide reparation to victims; although this 
arguably falls short of establishing an absolute duty to prosecute.105 The ECHR 
requires States to ensure an “effective remedy” for violations and explicitly obliges 
Parties to undertake prosecutions at the domestic level. The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights has similarly interpreted the American Declaration on 
the Rights and Duties of Man and the American Convention on Human Rights 
(‘ACHR’) as placing an affirmative obligation on States to investigate breaches of 
article 1 (life, liberty and personal security).106 In its judgment in the Velasquez 
Rodriguez case, the Inter-American Court held that “[t]he State has a legal duty to 
take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its 
disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its 
jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, impose the appropriate punishment and 
ensure the victim adequate compensation...”.107 The same judgment characterised the 
practice of involuntary disappearance as a crime against humanity and, thus, a subject
103 Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: Truth Commissions, Impunity and the 
Inter American Human Rights System (1994) BU Int'l LJ 12,343-4
104 ibid, Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations o f a Prior 
Regime (1991) Yale LJ, 2537; Americas Watch Reports, Challenging Impunity: The Ley de Caducidad 
and the Referendum Campaign in Uruguay (1989), 14-15, and Chile: The Struggle for Truth and 
Justice for Past Human Rights Violations IV (1992)
105 HRC General Comment No.20 (1992), H14-15. See also HRC CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988 (Uruguay); 
CCPR/C/79/Add.67 (Peru), 120; CCPR/C/79/Add.80 (France), ^13; CCPR/C/79/Add.l9 (Uruguay), 
17; CCPR/C/79/Add.46 (Argentina), 110;CCPR/C/79/Add.34 (El Salvador), 17, f l2
106 Kokott, No Impunity for Human Rights Violations in the Americas,(1993)HRLJ 14,157
107 Velasquez Rodriguez case, Judgment, LACtHR (Ser.C) No.4 (1988), 1174; see also Barrios Altos 
case, Judgment, IACtHR (Ser.C) No.75 (2001), H41-45, declaring “the manifest incompatibility of 
self-amnesty laws and the American Convention on Human Rights” and hence nullifying the legal 
effect of two amnesty laws passed in 1995
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of international law and not subject to statutes of limitations.108 The Inter-American 
Commission also has held that amnesty laws in Argentina, Uruguay and El Salvador 
violated article 18 (fair trial) of the American Declaration as well as articles 1(1), 8 
and 25 of the ACHR.109 Moreover, the 1992 UN Declaration on the Protection o f All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearances calls upon States to ensure that perpetrators 
“shall not benefit from any special amnesty law or similar measures that might have 
the effect of exempting them from any criminal proceedings or sanctions”.110
(c) Amnesty granted in State A to all its nationals who have committed crimes in State
B
A grant of immunity for actions committed in another State, be they domestic offence 
or international crimes, is clearly beyond the sole prerogative of that State. An 
amnesty for an offence committed in State A cannot act as a bar to prosecution for the 
same conduct in State B. The passage of amnesty legislation in one State, therefore, 
has no effect on the right of another State to initiate criminal proceedings. Similarly, 
an amnesty bar proclaimed in a State has no bearing on a prosecution brought before 
an international court.111 This, moreover, reflects the absence of any national or 
international principles governing the application of ne bis in idem across different 
jurisdictions.112
(d) Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
While the passage of blanket amnesty legislation for the crimes of a former or current 
regime would be incompatible with the duty to prosecute persons accused of 
committing international crimes, amnesties may play a role for lower-level, domestic 
criminal offences. Truth and reconciliation processes have been considered in some
108 Velasquez Rodriguez case, f  153; Pasqualucci (1994), 346
109 See Argentina Report and Uruguay Report,(1992) HRLJ 13,336-345; Chile Report, IACHR 
Rep.No.25/98, f76, IACHR Rep.No.36/96; Orentlicher (1991), 2540
110 See also Sierra Leone Report, %22 above
111 “A State cannot bring into oblivion and forgetfulness a crime, such as a crime against international 
law, which other States are entitled to keep alive and remember”; Decision on Challenge to 
Jurisdiction: Lome Accord Amnesty, SCSL Appeals Chamber (13 March 2004), f  17
112 See below, Chapter 7
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form in almost all States undergoing an internationalised judicial process, although to 
date the task of balancing criminal trials and truth-telling processes has arisen only in 
East Timor and Sierra Leone.113
UNTAET Regulation No.2001/10 entrusted die East Timorese Commission 
for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (known by its Portuguese acronym ‘CAVR’) 
with the traditional tasks of inquiry, establishing the truth, reporting, identifying 
practice and policies, and promoting reconciliation and reintegration.114 Significantly, 
however, the CAVR was also tasked with referring human rights violations to die 
Office of the General Prosecutor with recommendations for the prosecution of serious 
offences.115 Persons fulfilling a Community Reconciliation Agreement were granted 
amnesty from any criminal and civil liability arising out of the acts disclosed.116 
Amnesties could not be extended to serious criminal offences.117 Immunity was also 
stayed for any criminal acts which had not been the subject of a Community 
Reconciliation Agreement.118 The approach to coordinating between the judicial and 
reconciliation processes was, thus, planned from the start. The Commission 
procedures, moreover, relied on the backdrop of a functioning judicial system, which 
provided a major incentive for participation so as to avoid criminal prosecution.119 
Immunities were targeted, specific and conditional, and applicable to minor offences 
only.
By contrast, the concurrent operation of prosecutions and reconciliation 
processes was unplanned and haphazard in Sierra Leone. Whereas the East Timorese 
Commission was built into the prosecution framework, the national Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (‘TRC’) in Sierra Leone had already been established on 
paper several years before the creation of the SCSL.120 No formal agreement was ever 
established between the TRC and the Special Court, and the SCSL Statute only made 
passing reference to alternative truth and reconciliation mechanisms with respect to 
juvenile offenders (Art. 15(5)). Commentators noted early on that an uncoordinated
113 See similar plans propose for Burundi, S/2005/158
114 UNTAET/REG/2001/10(13 July 2001), Section 22(2)
115 The CAVR should not be confused with the Truth and Friendship Commission established in 2005 
by the governments of Indonesia and East Timor as an apparent pre-emptive response to the 
recommendation of the UN Commission of Experts on East Timor to establish an international tribunal
116 UNTAET/REG/2001/10, Sections 27(7),27(8),30(2),32
117 ibid, Section 32, Schedule 1
118 ibid, Section 33
119 JSMP, Report on East Timor's Draft Law on Amnesty and Pardon (November 2002)
120 Established by the Lome Peace Accord of 7 July 1999, the TRC only became operative on 5 July 
2002. The SCSL was established on 16 January 2002.
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approach in Sierra Leone would be counter productive and could undermine the 
efficiency and integrity of the two parallel processes in areas such as cooperation, 
confidentiality, information sharing, amnesties and witness protection. Other areas of 
potential conflict included the possibility for conflicting conclusions on similar facts, 
questions arising with respect to the admissibility of statements taken before one 
forum being used by another, and on the possibility for TRC access to SCSL 
detainees, bearing in mind their leadership role.121 In practice, with the exception of 
the question of access to SCSL detainees,122 significant problems have failed to 
materialise. However, this was not because of legal certainty or institutional linkage, 
but due to a policy decision taken by the SCSL Prosecutor not to use information 
from the TRC, including self-incriminating testimony.123 The ability of defence 
council to subpoena confidential information from TRC archives, however, remains 
unresolved and may yet surface, emphasising the continuing need for coherence.124
Summary
While the continued use of blanket amnesties remains a bar to prosecution in a 
number of States,125 there is emerging practice on the exclusion of serious human 
rights and international humanitarian law violations from the scope of national 
amnesties. At the same time, there is emerging acceptance for the operation of 
targeted and conditional immunity with respect to specific lower level offenders in 
tandem with judicial processes. In 2001, then ICTY President Jorda, however, 
referring to a possible BiH TRC, stated “amnesty would result in a two-tier justice 
system: one for the major criminals and one for those who carried out die orders. This
121 Compare Fritz & Smith who suggest the uncoordinated approached has been both justified - 
underlining the independence nature of each institution - and successful in practice; Current Apathy for  
Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2001) Fordham Int’l LJ 25
122 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman (SCSL-2003-08-PT-122)(28 November 2003)
123 See generally Evenson, Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone: Coordination Between Commission and 
Court (2004) Colum.LRev 104, 730
124 Schabas, The Relationship Between Truth Commissions and International Courts: The Case of  
Sierra Leone (2003) HRQ 25,1035-1066
125 See most recently, e.g., the Justice and Peace legislation approved by the Colombian Congress on 21 
June 2005 and ratified by the government in July 2005; and die September 2005 Algerian referendum 
approving President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, proposing a 
general amnesty for all human rights abuses committed in the country’s internal conflict.
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would be difficult to justify vis-a-vis die universal principles of human rights.”126 In 
order to encourage the lower ranking offenders to participate in the process of 
national reconciliation, he suggested that a truth commission could be empowered to 
make recommendations to local or even international prosecutors to consider their 
disclosures as mitigating circumstances for the purpose of sentencing at trial. This 
would be similar in effect to a guilty plea in consideration of sentencing in court.127
Jorda’s comments illustrate the degree of uncertainty surrounding the extent of 
State obligations to prosecute international crimes. Should a State prosecute all 
possible perpetrators, or should it focus on the persons most responsible and 
particularly grave violators?128 Orentlicher suggests that the prosecution of those most 
responsible for designing and implementing abuses or who committed particularly 
notorious crimes would seemingly discharge a government’s customary law 
obligation: it would not require the prosecution of every offender.129 The political, 
financial and social costs of mounting trials will normally militate against an 
exhaustive approach. The Rwandan experience has shown that the incarceration of 
tens of thousands of alleged perpetrators may strain a national legal system beyond 
capacity, may result in massive violations of pre-trial detention rights, and may 
hamper broader reconciliation and rehabilitation initiatives. There may thus be a need 
to strike a balance between pursuing accountability for serious criminal offences, 
while allowing truth and reconciliation initiates to offer specific and targeted 
amnesties for more wide-spread low-level crimes.
A successful framework for the interaction between prosecutions and 
reconciliation processes will require clearly defined procedural and institutional 
mechanisms to resolve issues regarding sharing of information, witnesses protection 
and confidentiality.130 Measures also will need to ensure that the sharing of 
information does not inadvertently compromise a person covered by witness 
protection. The manner in which the prosecution uses any confidential information
126 The ICTY and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ICTY Press 
Release, J.L./P.I.S./591-e (17 May 2001)
127 ibid
128 Robinson, ‘Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International 
Criminal Court’ (2003) EJIL 14,494
129 Orentlicher (1991), 2599; see also Kritz, ‘Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of 
Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights’ (1996) 59 Law & Contemp. Probs., 
136; Pasqualucci (1994), 334
130 Wierda et al., Exploring the Relationship Between the Special Court and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission o f Sierra Leone (24 June 2002), 8-11
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gathered will also need to be determined, such as, for example, for the sole purpose of 
generating new evidence and subject to assurances on non-disclosure.131 Solutions 
could include utilising in camera proceedings or resort to comparable rules governing 
privileged communication and information.132
Ultimately, national or collective responses to post-conflict environments must 
seek to address a variety of goals, including ending impunity, truth-seeking, 
reparations, institutional reform, vetting, dismissal and the transparent re-selection of 
qualified public servants.133 The re-building of the justice sector reform must be 
matched by reform of law enforcement agencies, prison services, legal education, 
crime prevention, victim protection, and above all, must be supported by transparent 
and accountable government.134 Finally, the need to devise strategies to preserve hard- 
won peace processes and to build democratic foundations may necessitate the careful 
exercise of discretion as to the sequencing and timing of accountability processes 
rather than the granting of blanket immunities.135
131 See ICC art.54(3)(e)
132 See ICC Rule 73
133 Rule o f Law Report, S/2004/616
m ibid
135 See ibid
129
Chapter V
V
Lessons Learned
Chapter 1 has shown that while individuals may be held criminally responsible 
directly under international law, there are a number of gaps in the norms and 
institutional apparatus governing the enforcement of international criminal law.
At the normative level, while it is clear that not every prohibition under 
customary or conventional norms carries individual liability, the ‘core crimes’ of 
international criminal law are governed by specific criminal sanction. More 
problematic is the issue of the resultant duties incumbent on States. As the section 
demonstrates, there is a paucity of enforcement provisions with respect to 
international crimes. Customary international crimes not based on a treaty instrument, 
such as crimes against humanity, have suffered for want of normative clarity. 
Although all States may have an interest in the repression of these crimes, the legal 
duty to do so remains uncertain. In terms of conventional obligations, certain war 
crimes offences, such as the non-grave breach provisions of the Geneva Conventions 
lack an explicit enforcement regime. The Genocide Convention carries a loose set of 
obligations, requiring action principally from the State where the offences occurred. 
Treaties containing an aut dedere aut judicare rule that obligate specific courses of 
action represent greater normative coherence. The grave breaches regime of the 
Geneva Conventions creates the most demanding set of obligations in this category, 
by requiring Parties to actively search out perpetrators on their territory in order to 
bring them to trial. National practice in actively implementing these duties, however, 
has remained piecemeal and sporadic. Typically, States have taken the view that there 
is no requirement to try an offender in the absence of an extradition request, much less 
to search them out. Thus, despite the varying precision of these enforcement 
frameworks, the bases for the exercise of jurisdiction may be said to be governed by 
permissive, as opposed to mandatory, rules. The discretionary nature of norm 
enforcement results from the absence of a mechanism to ensure compliance where 
States decline to assert their criminal jurisdiction or to fulfil their treaty obligations.
130
Chapter V
The system operates outside of an institutional context that would convert a specific 
legal duty into a mandatory responsibility incurring sanction. The gaps identified, 
thus, relate both to normative and structural weaknesses.
The establishment of international courts and tribunals can help close these 
gaps by placing the obligations of States into a vertical, supra-national paradigm. 
Nonetheless, as Chapter 2 explains, a supra-national institutional framework without 
an international enforcement agent will not be able to ensure compliance. Lacking 
this, international courts and tribunals will have to rely on the horizontally structured 
inter-State system for the implementation of their decisions, including those that 
require coercion. Within this framework, States will comply with their international 
obligations either on a voluntary basis or will be induced or coerced to do so by a 
more powerful third State, whether bilaterally or through the forum of an international 
organisation.1 Structural gaps will persist, therefore, even with the creation of 
international courts and tribunals with mandatory powers where they are not matched 
by adequate enforcement mechanisms.
Chapters 3 and 4 have examined how States have complied with their 
obligations under international criminal law. Of the different accountability models 
reviewed, the enforcement of international criminal law has proved most successful 
where the pursuit of justice has ridden rough-shod over State sovereignty, as in the 
unique example of post-WWII Allied controlled Germany and Japan, although this is 
unlikely to represent a model for future enforcement. As noted above, the immediate 
post-WWII trials can be considered an aberration from State practice. The 
convergence of a set of unique circumstances allowed for these trials to take place. 
The occupying Allied forces exercised complete control over the territory where the 
offences took place, were able to secure custody over all accused persons, and 
enjoyed an unprecedented unanimity of international political support. There was 
simply no question of the defeated nations withholding cooperation.2 The ensuing 
trials both at the international and domestic level, were able to rely on direct 
enforcement by the Allied powers within their respective military zones. As a result, 
there was a total vertical ordering of jurisdiction over core crime offences at the
1 On the lawfulness of belligerent reprisals see Greenwood, ‘The Twilight of the Law of Belligerent 
Reprisals’ (1989) Neth.Yrbk.EL 20, 54-55
2 The U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its subsequent occupation and control by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority may represent, despite sustained resistance, the nearest approximation to the 
control over territory and custody over accused persons exercised by the Allied powers after WWII.
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legislative, adjudicative and enforcement level; although, by the same token, there 
was a complete absence of international scrutiny over Allied offences. This 
confluence of politics and law on the international stage at the time represented the 
nearest approximation to an international legal order backed by full coercive powers, 
and revived failed inter-war efforts to establish a global collective security system. 
The accord between the community of nations, however, soon fractured as the Cold 
War set in, and the jigsaw pieces that had been temporarily thrown into flux by the 
global upheaval fell back into place in their time-honoured configurations of State 
sovereignty and national interest.
The meeting of global political will with international accountability has never 
been repeated since and, indeed, is unlikely to recur without a fundamental re­
ordering of humanity’s collective life. Later high profile war crimes trials have taken 
place in the traditional arena of competing political and legal interests, guided by the 
promptings of national sovereignty. In the case of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
although the concept of an international justice was revived, the scope for direct 
enforcement at the international level was far more reserved. Instead, the ad hoc 
Tribunal have had to relied on national cooperation for all issues pertaining to the 
exercise of their jurisdiction. Thus, on the normative level, the ICTY and ICTR 
represent vertical extensions of the Security Council’s Chapter VII authority. The 
scope for international executive powers, however, has been limited to post-conflict 
peace-enforcement presences in Bosnia and Kosovo (i.e. omitting the rest of the 
former Yugoslavia or Rwanda), while the appetite for robust military assistance to the 
Tribunals has suffered irregular political support from troop contributing capitals. In 
the place of direct enforcement, compliance has been coaxed or coerced primarily 
through the soft pull of external political, development and trading interests. Such 
linkage has sought to heighten the reputational risk attached to a notification of non- 
compliance by the Tribunals. The indirect nature of such leverage, nonetheless, has 
meant that both the ICTY and ICTR have been repeatedly frustrated in their efforts to 
seek the routine enforcement of their decisions by national authorities and have 
thereby been hampered in their efforts to ensure expeditious and efficient 
investigations and prosecutions. Despite their many notable achievements, the ad hoc 
Tribunals have been acknowledged by the UN as costly and time-consuming models 
and are unlikely to be replicated.
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Hybrid or internationalised courts, where matched by adequate support, fill a 
niche between fully international and domestic trials. The different variations on the 
hybrid model have all sought to strengthen national capabilities by combining the 
benefits of international expertise with ‘local’ justice. The proximity of these courts to 
the events has meant better access to evidence and witnesses than remote international 
bodies, and has resulted in cheaper operational costs. Typically, the scope for 
outreach has been considerable, as has the ability of the courts to generate a greater 
sense of credibility and legitimacy, thereby contributing more easily to national 
reconciliation efforts. The courts have also brought a number of potential benefits, 
including long-term capacity building, development of national jurisprudence and 
strengthening of the administration of justice. Hybrid courts have retained, 
nonetheless, many of their weaknesses of their purely domestic counterparts. Their 
delivery of post-conflict transitional justice has been particularly hampered by failings 
in areas such as staff security and witness protection. The courts have succumbed, 
moreover, to the familiar pressures of domestic political life in their attempts to 
pursue leadership offenders. The most significant weakness of hybrid bodes as an 
alternative to fully international courts, however, lies in their inability to override 
inter-State rules on immunities, mutual legal assistance and extradition. Despite these 
limitations, it is likely that internationalised courts will continue to play an important 
role in complementing international courts and tribunals, rather than representing an 
alternative model.
The national authorities, moreover, will continue to shoulder the main burden 
for the investigation and prosecution of international crimes. It is axiomatic that the 
system of international criminal justice will always rely on domestic adjudication. 
Even with an international process focussing on the top strata of criminal activity, the 
vast majority of cases involving mid to low-level offenders will fall to the national 
level. Indeed, as the preamble to the Rome Statute affirms, the primary duty to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over international crimes rests with States, not 
international institutions.
Equally, in historical perspective, it is clear that there has been little 
consistency in the exercise of jurisdiction over international criminal offences by 
national authorities, there being far too many instances in which prosecutions simply
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did not occur.3 The continued use of blanket amnesties remains a bar to prosecution 
in a number of States. The emerging practice on the exclusion of serious human 
rights and international humanitarian law violations from the scope of national 
amnesties is a welcome development. At the same time, there may be scope for the 
operation of targeted and conditional immunity for specific lower level offenders in 
tandem with judicial processes. Moreover, it is apparent that the peace and justice 
debate may require careful considerations exercise as to the sequencing of trials 
rather than the granting of amnesties.
Where trials are pursued, the State where the crime occurred will normally be 
best placed to exercise jurisdiction. Where that State is willing to proceed with trials, 
but is unable to do so due to resource constraints, international assistance may be 
possible. This may range from the provision of technical and financial assistance and 
training to strengthen domestic efforts, to the establishment of internationalised 
judicial processes as discussed above.
In addition to the State directly effected, there has been an increased tendency 
in recent years for other States to exercise their concurrent jurisdiction through a 
range of extra-territorial jurisdictional bases, including active personality and, more 
exceptionally, passive personality and universality. A third State may seek to assert 
jurisdiction, in particular, where the territorial State has failed in its duty to enforce 
treaty norms either because it lacks domestic willingness to enforce accountability or 
it is unable to mount resource-intensive trials. This echoes the well known dictum in 
the Barcelona Traction case where a distinction was drawn between obligations 
owed to particular States and those owed “towards the international community as a 
whole”. In relation to the latter, the ICJ held “[i]n view of the importance of the 
rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they 
are obligations erga omnes”.4
The Pinochet ruling of the House of Lords together with the several actions
3 Joyner estimates at least 220 non-international armed conflicts leading to 86 million deaths since 
World War II, for which there has been “relatively few prosecutions and only scarce accountability”, 
‘Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The Universal Declaration and the Search for 
Accountability’, (1998) Denver J. Int’l L. & Policy 26, 591
4 Barcelona Traction case, |^33. The statement has found expression in article 48(l)(b) of the ILC 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility o f States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), which provides 
that “[a]ny State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State ... if  
... the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole”; A/56/10 (2001). This, 
nonetheless, is subject to draft articles 43 (notice of claim), 44 (admissibility of claims) and 45 (loss of 
the right to invoke responsibility)
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brought by the countries asserting jurisdiction in that case have displayed the 
emergence of an acceptance of exceptions to the immunity ratio materiae attaching 
to State officials for serious international crimes.5 The Appeals Court decision in 
Jones together with established U.S. jurisprudence, moreover, appears to suggest an 
emerging State practice on the application of exceptions to functional immunity also 
for civil claims brought in respect of international criminal conduct offending jus 
cogens. This will have important implications for the ability of national courts to 
enforce international criminal law norms against State officials through the exercise 
of extra-territorial jurisdiction.
The upswing of activity by national authorities in recent years with respect to 
offences committed abroad comes as a welcome relief to the previous inaction.6 In 
part, this has been based on a reinvigorated legislative framework for the prosecution 
of serious human rights and humanitarian law violations introduced, in many 
instances, under the rubric of national legislation implementing for the ICC Statute 
(see below, Chapter 9). States are also increasingly allocating dedicated resources for 
core crimes investigations. Following initiatives started during the 1980s to 
investigate WWII related offences, a number of national authorities have established 
specialised agencies to handle the investigation and prosecution of contemporary 
core crimes. Canada’s Modem War Crimes Program, for example, was established in 
1998 to bring together criminal investigations and immigration authorities. As of 
March 2005, more than 100 files were being examined involving allegations from 
Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, 
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Iraq, Lebanon, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda,
*7
Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Sudan.
5 See cases cited above Chapter 2, n.72-73
6 See, inter alia, R. v Zardad, Central Criminal Court (Old Bailey) (18 July 2005), unreported, 
concerning torture and hostage taking in Afghanistan; 09 751105-04 55006-05, Rechtbank 
s’Gravenhage, Judgment (14 October 2005) (The Netherlands), unreported, concerning war crimes and 
torture in Afghanistan; Van Anraat, Rechtbank s’Gravenhage, Judgment (23 December 2005) (The 
Netherlands), unreported, concerning complicity in war crimes committed in Iraq; SN, Rechtbank 
Rotterdam, Judgment (7 April 2004) (The Netherlands), unreported, concerning torture in DRC; X E ly , 
Cour de Cassation (23 October 2002) (France), appeal no.02-85379, [2002] Bull.crim., no. 195, 725, 
concerning torture in Mauritania. For cases involving military personnel oversees see also: Evans et al., 
Judge Advocate General (UK), Decision following submission o f  no case to answer (3 November 
2005) OJAG Case Ref:2005/59, unreported, concerning murder in Iraq (dismissed); R. v Brocklebank, 
Court Martial Appeal Court, Judgment (2 April 1996)(Canada),134 DLR(4th)377, concerning torture in 
Somalia (dismissed); R. v Brown, Court Martial Appeal Court, Judgment (6 January 1994)(Canada), 
unreported, concerning torture in Somalia (dismissed).
7 Canada’s Program on Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, Eighth Annual Report 2004-2005; 
http://www.cbsa.gc.ca/general/enforcement/annual/wc-cg2005-e.html
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The Danish Special International Crimes Office was established in 2002 and has 
since received over 100 cases involving crimes committed in 30 countries, including 
cases from the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Uganda and Lebanon.8 The 
Dutch Unit for International Crimes Investigations and the Swedish War Crimes Unit 
have also been dealing with cases arising from multiple situations. European efforts 
are now coordinated via a network of focal points for war crime related offences 
established in each EU Member State,9 while Interpol has established a world-wide 
national focal points system to provide coordination and support for law enforcement 
agencies and international organisations responsible for the investigations of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.10 Such efforts bode well for the 
ability of national authorities to share a distribution of workloads with an ICC that is 
focussed on the prosecution of persons most responsible.
The expectation, however, that national authorities will be able routinely 
engage significant resources into costly trials for crimes committed abroad, and 
which may have little connection to the forum State, appears misplaced. At present, 
investigations leading to domestic prosecutions for crimes committed abroad remain 
exceptional. Rather, the majority of investigations lead to exclusion from refugee and 
immigration procedures and to deportations.11 As the burden will normally fall on the 
State where the offence occurred, one option may be for countries with dedicated 
expertise to share investigative materials related to exclusion case files with the State 
of the accused’ nationality for the purpose of prosecution at home. Other more recent 
initiatives suggest this could be buttressed by bilateral financial and technical 
assistance aimed at strengthening the domestic capacities of otherwise ‘unable’ 
States.12 In other situations, meanwhile, the State of nationality will be unwilling to 
undertake prosecutions; although this may possibly be tempered in specific cases by 
external inducement or coercion.
Even where States assert jurisdiction, however, there will remain a number of 
inherent weaknesses in an enforcement model that relies on domestic adjudication. As 
the Pinochet extradition proceedings have illustrated, differences in the application of 
laws based on the same international norms by national courts may obscure the
8 Source: http://www.sico.ankl.de/page34.aspx
9 See below, Chapter 8
10 Source: http://www.interpol.int/public/CrimesAgainstHumanitv/default.asp
11 See Art. 1(f), Convention Relating to the Status o f Refugees (1951)
12 See Justice Rapid Response Initiative (‘JRR’); updated information available at 
http://www.omm.com/webcode/navigate.asp?nodelHandle=486&idContent=5685
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emergence of consistent jurisprudence. As Simpson points out in a comment that
remains accurate almost a decade later, “[djomestic laws have been applied in an
irregular and often dubious manner to a very small number of suspected war
criminals...,” while “[mjunicipal tribunals have proved unsatisfactory, subjective and
1 ^selective in their definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity”. Domestic 
war crimes prosecutions, thus, remain highly selective and exceptional, subject to 
substantive and procedural variations, and ultimately unable to construct a general 
sense of a ‘rule of law’ for the crimes under consideration. Bhattacharyya has 
described this as a process of fragmentation in the application of international law:
The drawback of an international criminal justice system that relies on 
domestic adjudication ... is that even when each national adjudicatory 
mechanism is in compliance with the rule of law on an individual basis, in the 
aggregate, the international rule of law may suffer. The vagaries of national 
adjudication, the varying sophistication of national adjudicatory mechanisms, 
and the substantial danger that like cases will not be treated alike are factors 
which may hinder the development of an aggregate international rule of law.14
The most consistent under-performers in this category have been States in, or 
recently emerging from, conflict. The record shows that local courts are particularly 
unwilling or unable to handle war crime cases in an effective and impartial manner. 
The organisation and functioning of judicial systems in such settings has routinely 
fallen short of internationally recognised human rights and fair trial standards. 
Endemic failings have included high levels of political influence over proceedings; 
lack of judicial independence and impartiality; ethnic bias in the conduct 
investigations and prosecutions; low competence levels of the police and judiciary; an 
absence of suitable infrastructure and financial support for trials; deficient witness 
protection or safety for personnel, premises and information; and a dearth of inter­
state judicial assistance. Where they have occurred, prosecutions have focussed 
mainly on low to mid ranking officers, while ignoring senior members of the current 
and former military, police and political elite.
The reality is that these conditions represent the type of situation the ICC will 
most frequently confront. In most of the case studies examined above, the State
13 Simpson, in McCormack and Simpson (1997), 29
14 Bhattacharyya, ‘Establishing a Rule-of-Law International Criminal Justice System* 31 Texas Int’l 
Law Jml (1996), 73-4. See also Marschik, ‘European Approaches to War Crimes’, in McCormack and 
Simpson (1997), 65-101; Waibrick, ‘Co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia’, (1996) ICLQ 45, 947-954
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concerned would have likely fallen short of the unwilling or unable test established by 
the Rome Statute. Accordingly, jurisdiction would have reverted to the ICC. Given 
that the ICC Statute relies heavily on domestic modalities and cooperation by States 
for the implementation of its jurisdiction, this would have made the ICC dependent on 
the same institutional and procedural weaknesses that were deemed unwilling or 
unable to support domestic investigations and prosecutions. As Louise Arbour has 
commented,
No one should expect that States emerging from armed conflict marked by 
the commission of massive human rights violations, will revert to well- 
functioning and co-operative democracies as soon as hostilities cease.... The 
Prosecutor’s investigative powers should be seen against this sober 
background - and not through the spectrum of traditional judicial assistance 
and cooperation between like-minded democratic States in peace time.... The 
permanent Court should not be forced by the Statute into dependency on 
national authorities which find themselves in difficult transitions. Such 
dependency would probably harm the credibility of the Court, as it would 
unavoidably become either impotent, or else tainted by the lack of legitimacy 
of national authorities in question.15
The purpose of Part III of the study, therefore, will be to assess whether the 
ICC will be able to overcome the weaknesses that have hitherto plagued the 
enforcement of international criminal law. The proceeding sections will explore the 
concept of complementarity as a mechanism to bring disparate national and 
international efforts into a framework characterised by interaction, cross-fertilization 
and cooperation.
15 Arbour, ‘The Need for an Independent and Effective Prosecutor in the Permanent International 
Criminal Court’ (1999) Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 17,207-220
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Part III: The International Criminal Court 
VI 
Jurisdiction
The Rome Statute represents an effort by the international community to overcome 
the structural flaws in the inter-State system related to the enforcement of 
international criminal law. The Statute creates a framework for outside intrusion into 
one of the most traditional aspects of State sovereignty -  the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction.1 However, rather than imposing a vertical relationship from without, it 
invites States to voluntarily submit to the Court’s jurisdiction on the condition that an 
effectively functioning national system will exclude external interference in their 
domestic affairs.
Part III will explore whether the new system established by the Rome Statute 
will succeed in promoting compliance where other mechanisms have failed. In 
particular, the present chapter and the one that immediately follows will examine the 
two stage process by which cases may come before the ICC: the determination that a 
case falls within the jurisdiction of the Court, and that it would be admissible.
1. COMPLEMENTARY JURISDICTION
The complementarity regime of the ICC is the centrepiece of the Rome Statute. While 
confirming the notion of concurrent jurisdiction, it departs from previous international 
models of criminal jurisdiction by emphasising a preference for the exercise of 
domestic jurisdiction over international crimes. In establishing the relationship 
between the ICC and national courts, the preamble to the original 1994 ILC Draft
1 “Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a 
portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of 
a State.” Island o f Palmas Case (Netherlands v U.S.), Permanent Court of Arbitration (1928), 2 UN 
Rep. Int'l Arbitral Awards, 829
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emphasised that while “the court is intended to exercise jurisdiction only over the 
most serious of crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”, it is 
intended to be “complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where 
such trial procedures may be not available or may be ineffective”.2 This premise was 
kept throughout the drafting process leading up to Rome and is preserved in the 
preamble to the Statute. Thus, in line with the exhaustion of local remedies principle, 
the jurisdiction of the ICC will become effective only where national authorities fail. 
The Court is guided by principles of partnership and dialogue, encouraging genuine 
national proceedings, while remaining vigilant should such efforts fail.3 The ICC 
Prosecutor has already stated that he does not intend to ‘compete’ with States for 
jurisdiction and would welcome an absence of trials before the Court as a 
consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions.4
It is often suggested by commentators that the principle of primacy 
exemplified by the IMTs and the ad hoc Tribunals has been reversed in the Rome 
Statute. However, this confuses the issue of admissibility with that of primacy. Under 
the Rome Statute, while State Parties retain primary responsibility for the 
investigation and prosecution of core crimes, once a case has been found admissible 
before the Court it is the ICC that has primacy over concurrent domestic proceedings 
with respect to a particular case. Had die Statute created an inverted image of the ad 
hoc Tribunals, national courts would have been able to seek a deferral of a case from 
the ICC to the domestic level at any stage in the proceedings on the basis of a national 
decision to that effect. Instead, the Rome Statute establishes the competence of the 
ICC to review the bone fides of national proceedings and, moreover, empowers the 
Court to recall cases previously deferred where appropriate.
Others have suggested that the Rome Statute not only give States Parties the 
first right to prosecute violations, it creates an absolute duty for State Parties to do so. 
Schwartz, for example, pointing to article 17 of the Statute, observes that “provided 
that the alleged human rights violator is not surrendered to the ICC, a duty exists for 
states subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC to prosecute them in domestic courts”.5 
This incorrectly imports an aut dedere aut judicare standard into the Rome Statute.
2 A/49/10(1994), 44
3 Informal expert paper: The principle of complementarity in practice (ICC-OTP 2003), 3-4
4 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Statement (16 June 2003); Paper on some policy issues before the Office o f the 
Prosecutor (September 2003) (‘OTP Policy Paper’)
5 Schwartz, ‘Rectifying Twenty-Five Years of Material Breach: Argentina and the Legacy of the “Dirty 
War” in International Law’ (2004) Emory International Law Review, 342-43
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As recalled in the preamble, States have a pre-existent duty under customary and 
conventional law to repress international crimes. Article 17 of the Statute, however, 
relates only to the admissibility of a specific ‘case’. As such, a State’s legal obligation 
under the Statute to investigate or prosecute will be arise only in relation to a 
particular case that has been deferred to it by the Court. By the same token, a State’s 
challenge under article 19 that it has launched or undertaken investigations or 
prosecutions with respect to a situation before the Court will only have suspensive 
effect on ICC proceedings if it relates to the particular case that is the subject of the 
Prosecutor’s investigations. A general declaration by a State that it is initiating its own 
investigations will not be sufficient.6
Another feature of complementarity is its potentially beneficial effect for 
national authorities. In the case of the IMTs and the ad hoc Tribunals the distribution 
of case loads with domestic courts was guided by the primacy these institutions 
enjoyed, enabling cases to be transferred up or down at their discretion. Although the 
decisions flowing from these international bodies had some precedent setting value 
for national courts, because of their sui generis nature, these institutions have had 
limited impact on the enforcement of norms at the domestic level. In contrast, the ICC 
enjoys a much closer relationship with national proceedings since the triggering of its 
own jurisdiction is dependent on State action. The ability of the Court to make a 
finding as to genuineness of national efforts means that the ICC is likely to act as a 
catalyst for domestic action, and spur otherwise reluctant States to exercise their own 
jurisdiction so as to avert ICC intervention. National ICC implementing legislation, 
moreover, has come to set in motion a process of harmonisation of substantive 
definitions of crimes and general principles of international criminal law around the 
standards set by the Rome Statute (see below, Chapter 9). Thus, while the IMT at 
Nuremburg and Tokyo and ad hoc Tribunals were granted unchallengeable primacy 
over national courts, the ICC promises to exercise a far more profound influence on 
domestic investigations and prosecutions.
6 See below, Chapter 7
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2. PRECONDITIONS TO THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
While States were quick to achieve consensus over the principle of complementarity 
during negotiations, differences persisted over how this should be exercised. These 
debates displayed the opposing views over the relationship between national and 
international law discussed in Chapter 2. Those of a more ‘supranational’ viewpoint 
started from the perspective that international courts are designed to address the 
failings of national courts by exercising jurisdiction in a non-selective, non-partisan 
and genuine manner free from political interference. The ‘statist’ thesis held that 
granting intrusive powers to international judges and prosecutors would represent an 
inappropriate infringement on State sovereignty. These opposing views played 
themselves out in the options laid out for the jurisdictional regime of the Court. The 
analysis below suggests that the Statute offers a balanced approach to resolving these 
opposing tensions States act in good faith, but invites considerable scope for abuse by 
non-genuine States.
Two questions bring these issues into focus. What should be the effect of 
accepting the Statute? Should becoming a State Party constitute automatic acceptance 
of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae, or should a State Party have to indicate 
its specific consent to the Court’s jurisdiction over each of the listed crimes? 
Secondly, on what jurisdictional basis should the Court base its exercise of 
jurisdiction, namely which States must have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in 
relation to the situation in question?
(a) Effect of acceptance of the Statute
In its 1993 Report, the Working Group of the ILC presented two options for State 
acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction: an ‘opt-in’ regime, similar to that of the ICJ, 
whereby the ICC only intervenes with the consent of States concerned; and an ‘opt- 
out’ approach, whereby the competence of the Court's jurisdiction would be presumed 
unless prospectively indicated otherwise by State Parties, subject to sixth month's 
advance notice.7 The ILC favoured the former, with the proviso that the custodial
7 A/49/10 (1994),82-3; A/51/22 (1996), ^117-119
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State had the obligation either to cede jurisdiction to the ICC, or to try or extradite the 
suspect to a requesting State in line with the aut dedere aut judicare rule of inter-State
o
cooperation in criminal matters.
In its final 1994 Draft, the ILC distinguished between two separate regimes for 
the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction. Draft article 21(l)(a) granted ‘inherent’ or 
‘automatic’ jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, by virtue of article VI of the 1948 
Genocide Convention, meaning that a contracting State Party to the Statute 
automatically accepted the jurisdiction of the Court over the crime.9 By contrast, 
draft article 21(1 )(b) established an opt-in regime for the remaining crimes requiring 
separate State consent for the exercise of jurisdiction over each of the listed crimes. 
Draft article 22(2) established a procedure similar to that of the optional clause under 
article 36(3) of the ICJ Statute, enabling a State to declare its acceptance either 
generally or with respect to a particular conduct or to conduct committed during a set 
period of time. Withdrawal of such acceptance would be subject to six month advance 
notification and would not effecting proceedings already commenced. Draft article 
22(4) allowed a non-State-party to accept the jurisdiction of the Court by a declaration 
lodged with the Registrar.10
While inherent jurisdiction over genocide was recognised only by way of a 
standing treaty, for many States during subsequent negotiations it appeared 
unsatisfactory and undesirable to maintain a hierarchy of regimes given the proposed 
concentration of the Statute on the most egregious crimes. There was a fear also that 
failure to extend inherent jurisdiction to war crimes and crimes against humanity ran 
the risk of undermining the credibility and effectiveness of the Court, by creating an 
ICC ‘a la carte’11 that would burden the Court with subtle determinations of 
jurisdictional claims. As a result, the overwhelming majority of States during 
negotiations leading up to Rome accepted inherent jurisdiction, rendering the opt-in 
regime of draft article 22 redundant.12 Accordingly, under the Rome Statute consent 
to the exercise of jurisdiction over the listed crimes is rendered automatically upon
8 A/49/10(1994), 81
9 The ILC commentary cited article VI of the Genocide Convention together with its travaux 
preparatoire (E/794(1948),l 1-12) as the basis for the operation of inherent jurisdiction for State Parties 
to both the Genocide Convention and the Statute; A/49/10,(1994), 67-68, 81-82.
10 See options in Zutphen Draft article 6[21],article 7 [21Z) is],article 8[2Iter],article 9[22]; article 21-22, 
A/AC .249/1997/L. 8/Rev 1
11 A/51/22(1996)
12 The U.S., nonetheless, maintained its support for an opt-out regime for the crimes until the final day 
of the Conference; A/CONF/183/C. 1/L.90(1998)
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acceptance of the Statute. In the effort to bridge compromise proposals, however, a 
remnant of earlier debates remains by virtue of article 124, which enables a State to 
declare a temporary seven years opt-out with respect to war crimes alleged to have 
been committed by its nationals or on its territory. The article is framed as a 
transitional clause allowing a one-time non-renewal exception and will have thus 
limited impact on the overall principle of inherent jurisdiction. The provision, 
furthermore, is to be reviewed at a Review Conference seven years after the entry into 
force of the Statute. The other exception to the principle of inherent jurisdiction is the 
crime of aggression which is to operate on an opt-in basis. As article 121(5) of the 
Statute provides “[i]n respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment 
[e.g. establishing aggression], the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a 
crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party's nationals or 
on its territory”. The provision also acts as an exception to the jurisdictional regime 
established for the core crimes, whereby the Court may exercise jurisdiction where 
either the State of nationality of the accused or the territorial State is a State Party, by 
converting the alternative formulation to a cumulative one. The same cumulative rule 
will hold also for any other crimes added to the Statute.
States that are not party to the Statute may declare their consent ad hoc to the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court ad hoc.13 The possibility to include non-State 
Parties is consistent with the desire to include the broadest possible participation in 
the functioning of the Court. As foreseen by the ILC, the availability of the ICC 
enables, moreover, implementation of article VI of the Genocide Convention which 
provides that Parties may transfer jurisdiction to “such international penal tribunal as 
may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have 
accepted its jurisdiction”.14 Thus a State which is a party to the Genocide Convention 
could lodge a complaint with the Court without becoming a Party to the Rome 
Statute. Parties to the Genocide Convention, inversely, would not be bound by article 
VI thereof to adhere to the ICC Statute. A State declaring its acceptance of the Statute 
ad hoc, however, cannot thereafter avail itself of the opt-out provisions of article 124 
with respect to war crimes. The conditions under which the Court will exercise its
13 The uncertainty created by the poor wording of article 12(3) whereby a declaration is made “with 
respect to the crime in question” has been rectified by the RPE which clarify that a declaration under 
the article “has as a consequence the acceptance of jurisdiction with respect to the crimes referred to in 
article 5 of relevance to the situation...”.
14 A similar provision appears in art. 5, Apartheid Convention
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jurisdiction in relation aggression and any other crimes added to the Statute by 
amendment will need to regulate also the effect of article 12(3) declarations.
Where the Security Council refers a situation to the Court under article 13(b), 
any UN Member States so directed by the Council, whether a party to the Statute or 
not, must accept the exercise of ICC jurisdiction and cooperate fully with the Court.15 
Where a State Party has lodged a declaration under article 124 opting-out of the war 
crimes provision the Council can, by virtue of its Chapter VII powers and article 103 
of the Charter, modify the obligations of that State towards its treaty obligations by 
requiring it to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC also with respect to war crimes. As 
above, States not Parties to the Statute cannot avail themselves of the opt-out regime. 
Although the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to aggression and 
any other crimes added by amendment will need to be defined separately, it is 
assumed that a Council referral would also activate the inherent jurisdiction of the 
Court in relation to these crimes.
There is no simple formulation for the manner in which the Court will exercise 
jurisdiction over each of the listed crimes. The situation may be summarised as 
follows:
(1) in relation to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, jurisdiction is 
inherent for State Parties;
(2) in relation to war crimes, State Parties can opt-out of the Court’s jurisdiction for a 
one-time 7 year period upon acceptance of the Statute;
(3) in relation to aggression and any other crimes added to the Statute by amendment, 
jurisdiction will operate on an opt-in basis for State Parties;
(4) Where a non-State Party declares its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction ad hoc, 
jurisdiction will be inherent over genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. The effect of such a declaration in relation to aggression and any other 
crimes added to the Statute by amendment is yet to be defined.
(5) Where the Security Council refers a situation to the Court, jurisdiction will be 
inherent over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes. Inherent jurisdiction 
will likely extend also over aggression and any other crimes added to the Statute 
by amendment, although this remains to be defined.
15 As the Darfur referral has demonstrated, the Council need not render the obligation to accept ICC 
jurisdiction and to render cooperation binding on all States, but only on those so directed; S/RES/1593
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(b) State consent regime
Differences during negotiations persisted also over the setting of additional 
preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction. At one end of the spectrum, some 
delegations argued for a strict State-centric regime whereby the Court would need to 
secure the consent of all interested States before it exercised any aspect of its 
jurisdiction. At the other extreme, others sought to exclude additional preconditions 
subsequent to acceptance of the Statute in order to enable the Court to exercise as 
broad a base of jurisdiction as possible. Germany, in particular, argued that the ICC 
should not enjoy a lesser right than domestic courts did. Although this proposal 
generated some sympathy during negotiations, it was ultimately dropped in favour of 
elaborating an explicit jurisdictional nexus. Significant differences persisted as to the 
jurisdictional bases upon which such a nexus should rely. Several States, most notably 
the U.S., insisted on a regime which would require the consent of both the State of 
nationality of the accused as well as the State of territory of the offence. This would 
have effectively excluded the jurisdiction of the Court over nationals of non-Parties 
States without the prior consent of that State. In a proposal that gained widespread 
support and that would have enabled the Court to exercise in a manner resembling the 
German proposal, the Republic of Korea proposed that the Court’s jurisdiction be 
linked to fulfilment of one among a disjunctive list of four jurisdictional bases: the 
State of nationality of the accused, the State of nationality of the victim, the State on 
the territory of which the crime occurred, or the State with custody over the accused.
The final wording of article 12 as adopted reflects an attempt to bridge the 
majority preference for a broad approach and the narrow view adopted by a minority 
of powerful States. The article lists those States which must be Parties to the Statute 
or have given their ad hoc consent as either the State on the territory of which the 
crime occurred or the State of the nationality of the accused. Jurisdiction is therefore 
based on traditional principles of territoriality and active personality. Thus, subject to 
the application of article 16 and article 124, where ICC jurisdiction is asserted on the 
basis of the nationality of the accused, the Court will have jurisdiction regardless of 
the territory where die crime occurred. Where ICC jurisdiction is asserted on the basis 
of territoriality, the Court will have jurisdiction regardless of whether die State of the
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nationality of the accused is a State Party or not.16 These additional preconditions do 
not apply to Security Council referrals. In that instance, the source of the obligations 
of States to cooperate with the Court will be the Chapter VII resolution itself.17
As a number of State Parties and commentators have noted, the jurisdictional 
regime established under article 12 creates a serious lacuna by omitting the custodial 
State. This means that the Court will be unable to exercise its jurisdiction even though 
an offender may be in the custody of a State Party who is willing to surrender him or 
her to the Court unless the State in whose territory the crime occurred or the State of 
accused’ nationality has also accepted the Court’s jurisdiction or the Security Council 
has referred the situation.
From a negotiating perspective, the compromise wording for article 12 put 
forward by the Bureau of the Rome conference should be understood in the context of 
the make-or-break package that was presented to plenipotentiaries on the last day on 
the conference. Nonetheless, while it may be true that only a restrictive consent 
requirement could have secured the support of the overwhelming majority of States, 
the result represents a regrettable lapse in the jurisdictional reach of the Court. As 
such, the ICC will have less power to bring perpetrators to justice than do national 
courts.
3. TRIGGER MECHANISMS
Another critical factor affecting the assertion of jurisdiction is die Court’s trigger 
mechanism scheme. As stipulated in article 13 of the ICC Statute, situations may be 
brought before the Court via three routes: a State Party, the Security Council or the 
Prosecutor.
(a) State Party
A number of issues were raised during the drafting of this provision: should States be 
able to refer individuals, crimes or situations to the Court; which States should have 
the right of referral; and what safeguards should be put in place to guard against
16 For U.S. objections see Chapter 1; Scheffer (1999), 12
17 See below, Chapter 8
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frivolous complaints?
Draft article 25 of the ILC draft Statute envisaged complaints being lodged by 
State Parties with respect to both crimes and specific suspects. During early 
discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee concern was expressed that allowing States to 
forward individual cases could politicise the referral procedure. The provision also 
appeared inconsistent with draft article 23(1) whereby the Security Council could 
only refer a “matter” and not individual suspects. As pointed out by one PrepCom 
delegation, if the purpose was to prevent politicisation through the targeting of 
individuals, States were far more likely to lodge a complaint out of purely political 
considerations than the Security Council.18 States could selectively target individuals 
or a particular side of a conflict, particularly in internal armed conflicts. The other 
principal features of the ILC Draft were the requirements that a complainant State in 
the case of genocide be a contracting party to the Genocide Convention (draft article 
25(1)), and that for the remaining listed crimes, a State Party could only bring a 
complaint with respect to a crime for which it itself had accepted the jurisdiction of 
the Court (article 25(2)). To guard against possible abuse, further proposals in the Ad 
Hoc Committee and PrepCom process suggested restricting the right of referral to 
only those State Parties with an ‘interest’ in the matter. Interested States for this 
purpose included the State on the territory of which the crime occurred, the State of 
nationality of the accused or of nationality of the victim, and the State with custody 
over the accused.
Given the universal affront of the core crimes under consideration, the concept 
of interested States gave way during negotiations to the overarching principle that 
such crimes are of “concern to the international community as a whole”, thereby 
underlining the responsibility of all State Parties in their repression. At the same time, 
the incorporation of provisions governing which crimes could be referred to Court 
became obsolete as consensus developed over the referral of situations and not crimes 
or suspects to the Court and agreement was reached on the concept of inherent 
jurisdiction. Thus, article 14 as adopted stipulates that upon referral by a State Party 
the Prosecutor will conduct a preliminary examination of the situation in order to 
determine whether one or more specific persons should be charged with crimes under 
the Statute. In arriving at his decision, the Prosecutor will consider whether: (a) there
18 Statement by Russian Representative, PrepCom IV (August 1997); on file with author
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is a reasonable basis to believe that a crime under the Statute has been committed; (b) 
the case would be admissible under the complementarity provisions of article 17; (c) 
the investigation would not serve the interests of justice.19 The referral of situations 
instead of persons and the independent identification of individual liability by the 
Prosecutor act as important safeguards to guard against politically motivated referrals.
Article 14(2) of the Rome Statute requires States to accompany a referral with 
any supporting documentation available to the State and to “specify the relevant 
circumstances”. The requirement is supplementary in nature and as suggested by the 
phase “as far as possible” is left to the discretion of States. Rule 104(2) clarifies that 
the Prosecutor, as in the case of communications under article 15, will be able to 
“seek additional information from States, organs of the United Nations, 
intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable sources that 
he or she deems appropriate, and may receive written or oral testimony at the seat of 
the Court.” Nonetheless, one of the listed grounds by which the Prosecutor may 
decide against initiating an investigation is the lack of information “made available to 
him or her” that could provide a reasonable basis to believe a crime under the Statute 
has been committed or that a sufficient legal of factual basis exists to seek a warrant 
or summons. Where a negative determination is made, the Prosecutor must inform the 
State making the referral of the reasons for his conclusion. One purpose for this 
provision is to enable the State to provide such additional information as it may 
possess. As article 14 stipulates, “[t]he Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a 
decision whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts or 
information.” A State Party also may pass information directly to the Prosecutor 
under article 15, although this would involve the more cumbersome procedure of 
obtaining Pre-Trial Chamber authorisation for an investigation to proceed. 
Nonetheless, States may favour passing information in this manner rather than 
through a formal referral.20
One of the early concerns expressed by commentators was the likely limited 
invocation of State referrals procedure. Traditionally, State-based complaint 
mechanisms have not fared well under international conventions. Not a single inter-
19 Article 53 ICC Statute
20 To avoid any undue publicity that may occur from an abuse of the triggering process, one proposal in 
the PrepCom process suggested confidentiality for proceedings at preliminary stages, giving all 
interested States the opportunity to participate before a public indictment is brought. This would have 
served as an additional procedural guarantee to protect the interests and secure the confidence of 
States; A/51/22 (1996) Vol. 1,1J147
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State complaint has been filed under the ICCPR, the UN Convention Against Torture, 
UN Racial Discrimination Convention and the Inter-American Convention on Human 
Rights or the African Charter, while only 18 have been brought under the ECHR and 
two under the Genocide Convention. Although State complaints under the ICC deal 
with individual and not State liability, the anticipated political repercussions of such 
referrals were feared to induce an equal measure of reluctance. It is, therefore, of note 
that the first investigations before the ICC relating to the situations on the DRC and 
Northern Uganda have occurred in accordance with article 13(a). In addition, a State 
Party referral has been made by the Central African Republic, while an ad hoc 
declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court has been received from Cote 
d'Ivoire.21 Significantly, in each of the above, the State lodged a self-referral with 
respect to a situation arising within its own territory. Such self-referrals, however, 
should not underestimate the usefulness of the Prosecutor’s independent trigger 
mechanism. The threat of proprio motu powers can serve as a powerful incentive for 
States to make a self-referral in order to avoid the embarrassment of referral by an 
external agent. In the case of Northern Uganda and DRC, it is uncertain whether self­
referrals would have been forthcoming without the possibility for an independent 
trigger mechanism 22 The potential for self-referral was not foreseen by the drafters of 
the Statute. To date, it has come to represent a fruitful source of jurisdiction for the 
ICC. However, there will be a need to guard against countries ingeniously dumping 
cases on the Court so as to avoid their own responsibility, to gamer international 
attention, or to pursue their own domestic political agendas against rival groups. Self­
referrals, moreover, do not depart from the traditional mle that States are loath to 
lodge complaints against their peers.
21 To date, no investigation has been initiated by the Prosecutor in relation to CAR or Cote d'Ivoire.
22 Schabas, noting that after almost three years in office the ICC Prosecutor has yet to invoke his 
powers and shows little inclination to do so, suggests that, for all the battles fought in Rome, the 
exercise of proprio muto powers has become an “issue that has thus far proved to be of little 
importance”; ‘The enigma of the International Criminal Court’s success’, OpenDemocracy.net (17 
February 2006). This, however, fails to properly appreciate the ways in which the potential for proprio 
muto referral may prompt State action.
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(b) Security Council
The ICC is a free-standing organisation with international legal personality outside of 
the United Nations system, but brought in to relation with it. One of the primary 
reasons for this was the perceived need of some States during negotiations to 
safeguard the independence of the Court and, in particular, in its relationship with the 
Security Council. Despite the fact that the final text clearly stipulates die parameters 
of this relationship, the Court remains, rather unnecessarily, outside of the UN 
system.23
The Statute provides for a significant role for the Security Council in the 
exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction. The role of the Council with respect to aggression 
has already been referred to above. Examination below will focus on Security Council 
referral of situations to the Court and requests to defer an investigation or prosecution.
(i) Referrals
Since the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR, the legal authority of the Security 
Council to establish ad hoc criminal tribunals in exercise of its Chapter VII powers 
has been upheld by the ILC in its Commentary to the 1994 Draft Statute,24 by the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY25 and by the overwhelming majority of States 
participating in the PrepCom sessions and the Rome diplomatic conference. From 
the outset, one of the central purposes of establishing a permanent court was to avert 
resort to creating further ad hoc tribunals.27
As with State Parties, the Security Council can only refer a situation which the 
Prosecutor will then examine for the purpose of determining potential individual 
liability and the launching of an investigation. If the Prosecutor decides not to initiate 
an investigation the Security Council, as with a referring State in a State referral, can 
request the Pre-Trial Chamber to review the decision of the Prosecutor (article 
53(3)(a)). Such a review can at most result in a request that the Prosecutor reconsiders
23 This has created a raft of regulatory and operational issues for the Court in its early establishment 
and its ongoing relationship with the UN and third parties, since it must negotiate separate financial 
regulations, privileges and immunities, agreements and/or arrangements with States and UN funds, 
offices and programmes that would otherwise be subject to applicable UN System rules.
24 A/49/10(1994), 85
25 Tadic Interlocutory Appeal
26 A/51/22(1996), ^130-131. See art.29 UN Charter
27 A/49/10(1994), 85
151
Chapter VI
his initial decision, but die final determination remains with him. In contrast, where 
the Prosecutor bases his decision solely on the determination that the initiation of an 
investigation or prosecution in relation to a referred situation would not serve the 
‘interests of justice’ (article 53(1 )(c) and 53(l)(2)(c)) the Pre-Trial Chamber may, on 
its own initiative, rule against the Prosecutor’s decision and require him to proceed
9 o
with an investigation or prosecution.
A number of provisions of the Statute distinguish situations referred by the 
Security Council. A referral must be made by the Council “acting under Chapter VII” 
of the UN Charter, i.e. in accordance with a determination of a threat or breach of the 
peace or an act of aggression.29 This appear to indicate the application of a higher 
threshold compared to investigations triggered by State Parties or the Prosecutor 
proprio motu, for whereas the preamble to the Statute recognises that crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the 
world”, article 13(b) specifically requires that a Council referral be made in that 
context. As noted above, Security Council referrals are exempt from the jurisdictional 
nexus provisions of article 12. As such, the Security Council may refer a situation in 
relation to acts committed on the territory or by nationals of any State. This will be 
important where the situation relates to events occurring solely in a State not party to 
the Statute, or to a conflict that reaches across several national boundaries, including 
those of non-Party States.
Unlike the ad hoc Tribunals, however, the Security Council cannot define the 
scope and extent of the ICC’s jurisdiction and is itself bound by the framework
28 Article 53(3)(b), ICC Statute; Rule 110, ICC RPE. Note, review by the Pre-Trial Chamber is only 
possible with respect to the initial decision to initiate an investigation in relation to a referred situation, 
or the decision to proceed with a prosecution. It does not apply to sub-decisions taken within the 
context of a launched investigation or prosecutions as to the focus of investigative efforts (or lines of 
inquiry) or the selection of targets for prosecution.
29 The term “acting under Chapter VII” has been contrasted by some commentators with the phrase “in 
a resolution adopted under Chapter VII” in article 16, suggesting that article 13(b) may not necessarily 
require a formal determination under article 39 of the Charter; Oosthuizen, ‘Some Preliminary 
Remarks on the Relationship between the Envisaged International Criminal Court and the UN Security 
Council’ (1999) NILR XLVI, 320. The better view in the light of the drafting history is that the phrase 
is merely a lexical anomaly. The possibility of extending the Council’s referral authority to matters 
under its Chapter VI peaceful settlement mandate had also been proposed during PrepCom negotiations 
on the basis that articles 33 and 36 of the UN Charter encourage the Security Council in respect to any 
dispute, the continuance of which would likely endanger international peace and security, to seek a 
peaceful solution by resort to, inter alia, “judicial settlement”; (A/51/22 (1996) Vol.I, 1(134; Vol.II, 76; 
Zutphen Draft art.l0[23](l); art.23(l), A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Revl). Other proposals that sought to grant 
a referral power to the UNGA were rejected by both the ILC and the PrepCom, (A/49/10,86; 
A/51/22(1996), 1|132). There is nothing of course withholding the UNGA from calling on the Security 
Council or concerned States to refer a situation to the Court.
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established by the Rome Statute. Contrary to the view expressed elsewhere,30 the 
Security Council is unable to amend the definition of crimes within the Statute; to 
alter or add to the list of crimes; or change the temporal jurisdiction of the Court by 
referring situations that occurred prior to the entry into force of the Statute (see below, 
Chapter 8). Security Council referrals, moreover, lack the primacy accorded the ICTY 
and ICTR in relation to cases before national jurisdictions. As such, the referral of a 
situation by the Security Council does not alter the basic framework of the 
complementarity regime.31 The Security Council cannot circumvent the 
complementarity thresholds of article 17, for example, by declaring that a State is 
unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute. Such a finding would be 
merely indicative and could not bind the ICC. Article 19 provides that challenges may 
be brought by the Chamber dealing with the matter, the Prosecutor, the accused, a 
State with jurisdiction, or a State from which acceptance is required under Article 12. 
Since no exception is made to the general rule, such challenges are permissible also in 
the event of a case arising from a Security Council referral.32 A challenge, for 
example, may be brought as to whether the referral respected the procedural 
requirements of article 13(b) that it be made in accordance with the requirements of 
Chapter VII. Moreover, a State could challenge a determination by the Council, either 
implied or explicit, that it is unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate and 
prosecute cases arising out of a given situation (article 17). Where a challenge is 
upheld, the Prosecutor would have to refer the case to the relevant national authority, 
even in the instance of a Security Council referral. The lodging of a complaint under 
article 19 will also have suspensive effect on any investigations by the Prosecutor 
unless the Court rules otherwise.33
There is nothing of course preventing the Security Council from creating 
further ad hoc tribunals. Indeed, the Council may decide that the design of the ICC is 
structurally too weak to carry out its desired functions. The Council, also, may prefer 
to mandate the Secretary-General to negotiate agreements on the establishment of 
hybrid courts on the model of the SCSL and could pass an ancillary Chapter VII
30 Bergsmo (2000), 110
31 The only exemption from the complementarity regime under a Security Council referral is the non­
applicability of article 18.
3 Note, however, since a Security Council referral is exempted from the normal State consent for the 
exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction, there is no requirement under article 12 to secure the approval of 
jurisdiction from the listed States.
33 But see art. 19(8), on the authority to pursue certain investigative steps
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resolution to bolster the cooperation with such courts.34 Financial, political and 
strategic considerations, nonetheless, may caution against such an alternative where a 
situation would clearly fall within the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC, as debates 
surrounding the Darfur referral indicate.35
A more controversial option would be for the Council to invoke article 103 of 
the UN Charter in order to override the competing obligations of State Parties under 
the ICC Statute. The Council could, for example, establish a Chapter VII obligation 
binding States not to exercise their jurisdiction over a situation and not to bring a 
challenge against the admissibility of a case, with the intention of activating thereby 
the Court’s jurisdiction. Such a resolution could, in the interests of international peace 
and security, determine that trials before the ICC would be the most appropriate 
response. The purpose of ordering non-action by States would not be to grant 
impunity, but to enable the ICC to investigate and prosecute the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community, which itself would correspond with the 
objects and purposes of the Rome Statute.36 The resolution possibly could require 
national authorities to yield jurisdiction in leadership cases only, to be determined by 
the Court, and call for consultations in order to establish an appropriate division of 
labour with regard to lower level offenders. Theoretically, this would place the ICC in 
a comparable position to the ad hoc Tribunals, by establishing jurisdictional primacy. 
Equally, however, it may be argued that the Council cannot legitimately order States 
not to investigate or prosecute crimes which violate jus cogens prohibitions and which 
States are under erga omnes obligations to repress. Furthermore, the exercise of such 
powers would alter the treaty making process and the careful balance struck between 
the Security Council, States and the Court.
(ii) Deferrals
One article attracting some of the most heated controversy is the provision that the 
Security Council can not only trigger a situation, it can also halt ICC proceedings. 
Discussion on the issue arose out of the need perceived by the ILC and numerous
34 See above, Chapter 4; Reuters, Sierra Leone court seeks more authority (June 11)
35 See, e.g., U.S. proposals to create further a ad hoc court, hybrid court or AU regional court for the 
Darfur situation as an alternative to ICC intervention; see Security Council debates on adoption of 
S/RES/1593, S/PV5158(31 March 2005)
36 Informal expert paper: The principle o f complementarity in practice (ICC-OTP 2003), 21-22. See 
below Chapter 7 ‘uncontested complementarity’
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States, including the Permanent Members of the Security Council, to ensure the 
consistency of the ICC Statute with UN’s collective security system and the primary 
responsibility conferred therein on the Council for the maintenance and restoration of 
international peace and security. The aim was to coordinate the separate functions of 
the two bodies, and the complex roles of good offices, diplomacy, peace keeping, 
peace building, reconciliation and prosecution. In particular, the negotiating 
delegations proposed that the Security Council should be able to halt judicial 
proceedings where this was deemed appropriate for the Council’s broader functions, 
such as during the conduct of delicate peace negotiations.37 Moreover, in the light of 
the likely reliance of the ICC on Council assistance, it would have been highly 
undesirable for two bodies to compete or conflict with each other.
Under the 1994 ILC Draft, article 23(3) specified “[n]o prosecution may be 
commenced under this Statute arising from a situation which is being dealt with by 
the Security Council as a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, unless the Security Council otherwise decides.” The 
Security Council could also veto a trial or an investigation that had already 
commenced when it seized itself of a matter at subsequent stage. In the view of many 
States, the draft gave an unacceptable bias to the political rulings of the Council 
without guaranteeing a necessary degree of judicial independence. The provision 
could have, moreover, undermined the principle of the equality of State Parties by 
introducing a three tiered hierarchy between ordinary State Parties, those who were 
additionally members of the Security Council, and those with a right of veto within 
that body.38 The text also failed to define what was meant by a situation “being dealt 
with” under the Security Council’s Chapter VII mandate: whether this would include 
any matter on its agenda, under active discussion; the subject of a resolution; or the 
subject to enforcement measures. Given that some situations before the Security 
Council went back as far as 1947,39 and the high probability that any matter before the 
Prosecutor would simultaneously be under the consideration of the Security Council, 
die provision could have effectively prevented any serious crime of international
37 Examples include the ICTY indictment of Radovan Karadic during the negotiations leading to the 
GFAP for BiH; the ICTY indictment of Slobodan Milosevic before the Ramboulie settlement talks 
over Kosovo; and the SCSL indictment of Charles Taylor during peace talks in Ghana.
38 A/49/10(1994), 87-88
39 See Summary Statement by the Secretary-General on Matters o f which the Security Council is Seized 
and on the Stage Reached in their Consideration, S/2006/10(2006). As of the last annual statement on 
1 March 2006,148 matters were under the Council’s consideration.
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concern from reaching the ICC without the Council’s assent. Moreover, the provision 
would have established a new precedent for international adjudication. The ICJ 
Statute does not contain a provision for Security Council deferrals, and it has ruled 
that a case is admissible even if the matter is simultaneously being dealt with by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.40 Similarly, the ICTY and ICTR 
remain autonomous in the elaboration of a prosecutorial strategy, although it is the 
Security Council that ultimately dictates the continuation of both mandates. 
Moreover, PrepCom discussions pointed out that if national courts can prosecute a 
case that overlaps with a situation under the consideration of the Security Council, an 
international court should enjoy at least the same right41
The final text as adopted reverses the burden of the provision. Article 16 of the 
Statute provides that the Security Council is required to pass a resolution under 
Chapter VII in order to prevent the Court from commencing or proceeding with an 
investigation or prosecution for a renewal twelve month period. The most obvious 
consequence of this is that it prevents the exercise of a single veto from blocking ICC 
activity. A veto by any Permanent Member under this arrangement could only be 
wielded to prevent a deferral rather than to trigger it. A deferral resolution must be 
voted on under Chapter VII of the Charter, meaning that a determination must first be 
made, in accordance with the UN Charter, that there is threat or breach of the peace or 
an act of aggression. This indicates the intended exceptional use of deferrals power to 
address specific scenarios. Moreover, the resolution is time bound to a renewable 
twelve-month period, meaning that the Court is not to be indefinitely prevented from 
discharging its functions. This emphasises the point that while an article 16 deferral 
request from the Security Council would act as a procedural bar to suspend further 
ICC action, it cannot displace jurisdiction. Finally, deferrals can be made with respect 
to both investigations and prosecutions. Preliminary examinations by the Prosecutor 
prior to the initiation of an investigation, thus, are not effected by an article 16 
deferral. This includes the power to “seek additional information from States, organs 
of the United Nations, intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other 
reliable sources”; and to “receive written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court”.
Article 16 represents the only exception in the Statute to the over-riding
40 Libya v US; Libya v UK, ICJ Rep.1992; also Judgment on Preliminary objections. 27 February 1998. 
Revised Report o f the Working Group on the Draft Statute o f an International Criminal Court, 
(A/CN.4/L.490) A/CN.4/L.490/Add.l(1993); ILC Commentary on article 41, A/49/10(1994)
41 See A/51/22(1996), 1fl43
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principle of complementarity. For, in contrast to the conditions of article 18 governing 
the deferral of State Parties or Prosecutor triggered investigations to national 
authorities, there is no requirement on the authority to which the deferral is made, the 
Security Council, to take any action with respect to the situation in question. The 
Prosecutor is also excluded from reviewing the conditions predicating the request for 
deferral. Essentially, once an investigation or prosecution has been interrupted by the 
Security Council, it is out of the purview of the Court for as long as the Council so 
determines. The Court could, however, assert its competence to review the 
compatibility of a Security Council resolution with the procedural requirements of 
article 16 as to whether the resolution was passed under Chapter VII, respects the 
permissible duration, and relates to a specific investigation or prosecution. The Court 
would be excluded, however, from reviewing the substantive basis for the 
determination by the Council to invoke Chapter VII so as to ascertain the legality of 
the Security Council actions with the powers attributed it under UN Charter.42
Another feature that distinguishes article 16 from the general scheme of the 
Statute is the absence of any modalities either in the Statute or in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence clarifying how a deferral request is to be implemented. A 
host of issues not foreseen in the article, but noted during the preparatory process, will 
need to be addressed. This includes questions related to the preservation of evidence, 
the protection of witnesses and the continued apprehension of persons once 
proceedings have been initiated43 Absent specific guidance, protective measures may 
be regulated by the Security Council as a corollary to its deferral request, or could be 
ordered by the Pre-Trial Chamber.44 Moreover, the Security Council could decide 
under Chapter VII that all necessary protective measures be taken by States, and could 
invite the Prosecutor to ascertain, review and report on the effectiveness of such 
measures.
It is notable that the first provisions of the Statute that were called into effect
42 Compare Sharf (1999), 523, who argues, following the ICTY decision in the Tadic Interlocutory 
Appeal, 1fl8 (competence de la competence) that the ICC could assert an incidental power to determine 
whether the deferral request was consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Given 
the strictly defined corpus of law in the Rome Statute and its unique drafting history, however, it is 
highly doubtful that such an expansive interpretation would be permissible. Moreover, article 16 is 
merely a procedural mechanism: the basis of the Council’s power to request a deferral derives from the 
UN Charter itself, not from the Rome Statute.
43 Bergsmo and Pejic, ‘Article 16, Deferral of an investigation or prosecution’, in Triffterer (1999), 
380-1
44 See art.54(3)(f) and 56; ibid
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were article 16 on deferrals by the Security Council and article 98 on exceptions to 
the exercise of jurisdiction: both in relation to U.S. concerns. The conditions under 
which Security Council Resolution 1422 was adopted, on the eve of the entry into 
force of the Statute, is well known and does not require detailed elaboration. Suffice 
to recall that the U.S. had threatened to exercise its veto to block the otherwise routine 
extensions for all upcoming to UN peacekeeping operations, beginning with the 
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the absence of an operational 
ICC at the time of Council resolutions 1422 (2002) and 1487 (2003), and the failure to 
secure renewal in 2004, die ICC did not have the opportunity to review the procedural 
bone fides of these resolutions. Nonetheless, a number of States in open discussion 
before the vote on both resolutions and during parallel proceedings at the ICC 
Preparatory Commission suggested that the Council may have violated the express 
terms of article 16:45
1. Although resolutions 1422 and 1487 were adopted under Chapter VII, there was 
no determination of a threat or breach of the peace or an act of aggression, thereby 
violating the procedural conditions for the adoption of Chapter VII measures 
under the UN Charter.46 Instead, the Council determined “that it is in the interests 
of international peace and security to facilitate Member States’ ability to 
contribute to operations established or authorized by the United Nations Security 
Council”. This echoed the position of the U.S. Ambassador to the UN that failure 
to pass the resolution, and the resultant termination of all UN peacekeeping 
operations by the wielding of a U.S. veto, would itself constitute a threat to 
international peace and security 47 It is highly doubtful, however, that the aversion 
of this type of self-induced crisis was the intention of the drafters of the ICC 
Statute. In the absence of a specific determination under article 39 of the UN 
Charter, the resolutions appear to have contravened the procedural requirements
45 S/PV4568(Resumption 1) + Corr.l(10 July 2002); S/PV4772,(12 June 2003); PCNICC/2002/L.3 (18 
July 2002). See also Amnesty International, The unlawful attempt by the Security Council to give US 
citizens permanent impunity from international justice (2003)
46 Note, although the Council must determine that either a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression” exists, it does not need to necessarily expressly mention this in its decision; see 
Frowein and Krisch, in Simma et.al., eds., The Charter o f the United Nations, A Commentary (2002), 
717, 727
47 See Statement by U.S. Representative; S/PV4563(30 June 2002)
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for Chapter VII action and, therefore, by implication violate article 16.48
Two further aspects appear to affect the spirit, if not the letter of the article:
2. The drafting history of article 16 shows that the provision was viewed as an 
exceptional measure to be employed by die Council in rare situations, such as the 
repeated example of halting ICC proceedings that would disrupt peace talks. Its 
preventive and generalized usage to situations yet to arise appears to contradict the 
intention of the Statute.49
3. The drafting history indicates that the provision was to be applied on a ‘case by 
case basis’ to specific investigations and prosecutions.50 The broad coverage of 
resolution 1422 to exempt investigation and prosecutions yet to be initiated, 
against persons yet to be identified, before, indeed, any crime has occurred, 
contravenes this premise.51
As stipulated in the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, “[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. If 
interpretation nonetheless leaves the meaning “ambiguous or obscure” or “leads to a 
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable”, recourse may be had to 
supplemental means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and 
the circumstances of its conclusion.52 Contrary to the view expressed elsewhere,53 the 
drafting history, together with the views expressed by the majority of State Parties 
presenting statements in Council sessions, indicate that Security Council resolutions
48 Statements were heard on behalf of seventy-two countries at an open session of the Security Council. 
See, e.g., Statement by Representative of Samoa;S/PV4568(Resumption 1) + Corr.l(10 July 2002)
49 Statement by Representative of Switzerland, ibid
50 Statement by Ambassador of Canada, ibid: “The negotiating history makes clear that recourse to 
article 16 is on a case-by-case basis only, where a particular situation - for example the dynamic of a 
peace negotiation - would warrant a twelve-month deferral”
51 Several States argued the resolutions effectively altered obligations arising for State Parties under the 
Rome Statute. Canada, e.g., stated “[t]he proposed resolutions currently circulating would set a 
negative precedent under which the Security Council could change the negotiated terms of any treaty it 
wished, e.g. the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, through a Security Council resolution. The proposed 
resolution would thereby undermine the treaty-making process”, ibid
52 Art.31 -32, VCLT
53 MacPherson ‘Authority of the Security Council to Exempt Peacekeepers from International Criminal 
Court Proceedings’, ASIL Insights (July 2002)
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1422 and 1487 do not respect the objects and purposes of the Statute, and arguably 
lead to results that are unreasonable. To that extent, the exceptionalism that frames 
U.S. policy towards the ICC may have already weakened the normative strength of 
the Rome Statute, by providing for limitations to the exercise of the Court’s 
jurisdiction in ways not foreseen by the Statute. It also strengthens ‘realist’ assertions 
that, at least for the U.S., the institution of the ICC has become a focal point for the 
assertion of relative power in the world system, rather than a forum for the impartial 
prosecution of international crimes.54
(c) Prosecutor
The ability for the Prosecutor independently to trigger cases before Court was widely 
perceived as a critical test to prevent the ICC being constrained by State or Security 
Council inaction. In particular, it was argued that the powers of the ICC Prosecutor 
should analogous to those of the ICTY and ICTR Prosecutor in being able to receive 
information from any source.55 An independent trigger mechanism was also seen as 
vital to the truth-seeking dimension of the Court by guaranteeing that the Prosecutor 
would not be restricted in his ability to gather, receive and act on information. 
Opposing this power were the views of a shrinking minority of States who expressed 
fears over impartiality, manipulation and politicisation by an independent and
54 See above, Chapter 2
55 The U.S. delegation during PrepCom IV challenged the assumption that the ad hoc Tribunals serve 
as a precedent for ex officio powers, by arguing that the Prosecutor in those instances does not enjoy 
the power to independently initiate cases against any country, but only those arising out of the 
geographic limitation of a referred situation; intervention by U.S. delegation (11 August 1997). See 
also Kirsch and Robinson, who similarly suggest that the ICTY/R Prosecutor acts on the basis of a 
situation referred to him/her by the Security Council, which is more akin to an article 13(b) referral; 
‘Initiation of Proceedings by the Prosecutor’, in Cassese et al. (2002), 657-8. However, it is inaccurate 
to compare the establishment of the ICTY with 13(b) referrals, since the ICTY was established in 
reference to a sphere of territorial jurisdiction and not a situation stricto sensu. The ICTY has 
jurisdiction over the territory of six States that make up the former SFRY for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed therein since 1991. Within those six States, the ICTY 
Prosecutor is independent is bringing forward cases based on any situation that has or may arise. Thus, 
although the situation in Kosovo arose six years after the creation of the ICTY and was not originally 
foreseen by the Security Council, the Prosecutor was able to initiate investigations proprio muto in 
relation to this new situation without need of a new referral. Moreover, the ICTY Prosecutor stated that 
the actions of NATO countries that participated in the bombing campaign over Serbia fell within the 
purview of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The jurisdictional ambit of ICTY in relation to the former 
Yugoslavia, in this sense, is comparable to the jurisdictional reach of ICC under the Rome Statute. 
Within this jurisdictional sphere of competence, the ICC Prosecutor is, similarly, independent in 
bringing forward investigations proprio muto in relation to any situation that may arise, without need 
for a specific referral.
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possibly rogue Prosecutor. These views were also influenced by the concurrent 
processes at play in the U.S. and aptly expressed informally during one PrepCom 
session as the fear of creating a ‘global Kenneth Starr’.56 Concern was also raised that 
the provision for the receipt of information from any source could overwhelm the 
Prosecutor with frivolous complaints.
While these two positions appeared irreconcilable, the attention of the group 
of Like Minded States favouring a strong ICC turned to addressing these fears by 
strengthening procedures, reducing the discretionary powers available to the 
Prosecutor, and setting high admissibility thresholds, rather than denying the 
Prosecutor an independent triggering capacity. The most critical of these efforts was 
the proposal for judicial review and approval prior to the initiation of proprio motu 
investigations. As elaborated in article 15 of the Statute, a Pre-Trial Chamber of three 
judges will examine a request by the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation, 
together with all supporting documentation, in order to determine a reasonable basis 
to proceed. Victims also may make representations, while States may appeal any 
authorisation by die Pre-Trial Chamber. Additional procedures that limit, and allow 
significant oversight over, the Prosecutor’s discretionary powers include provisions 
over the qualifications of the Prosecutor and his/her election by the Assembly of State 
Parties (article 42); removal from office (article 46); disciplinary measures (article 
47); admissibility and challenges (articles 17-19); deferral by the Security Council 
(article 16); and confirmation of the charges before trial (article 61). Moreover, in 
order to grant States the earliest opportunity to exercise their own complementary 
jurisdiction, article 18 requires the Prosecutor to notify all State Parties and other 
States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned of his 
intention to initiate an investigation, and to defer to investigations undertaken by at 
the national level (see below, Chapter VII).
In order to guard against frivolous litigation, an additional admissibility 
threshold was introduced in relation to all three trigger mechanisms. This is the 
requirement under article 17(l)(d) that a case not only fall within the subject matter
56 Informal interventions at PrepCom IV (August 1997), on file with author. In response see Statement 
by Justice Louise Arbour to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment o f an International 
Criminal Court{8 December 1997): “there is more to fear from an impotent than from an overreaching 
Prosecutor. It is trite to recognise that an institution should not be constructed on the assumption that it 
will be run by incompetent people, acting in bad faith for improper purposes.... [I]f persons guilty of 
crimes within the statute are out of reach of the Prosecutor, the very purpose of the statute will be 
defeated.”
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jurisdiction of the ICC, but that, in addition, it is of sufficient gravity to justify further 
action by the Court. As such, the provision serves as a filtering mechanism to prevent 
the Court from being burdened with minor cases. How the gravity threshold will be 
applied in practice will be determined by the judges (see below, Chapter 7).
As to fear of the a proprio motu empowered Prosecutor being flooded with 
complaints, this has not been an overbearing issue in the practice of various human 
rights treaty monitoring bodies, and the ICC OTP has already established a filtering 
mechanism.57 These factors, together with the detailed articulation and threshold for 
the applicability of crimes under the Statute, act as significant safeguards against 
abuse. As Kirsch and Robinson note:
[ajlthough the concern was raised that this independent power could generate 
politically motivated or frivolous investigations, it would seem, given the 
numerous safeguards and requisite professionalism of the Prosecutor, that this 
is in fact likely to be the least politicized trigger mechanism. The Prosecutor is 
far more likely to exercise his or her power to dismiss ill-conceived referrals 
from State Parties with a political axe to grind than to be the originator of any 
frivolous investigations, wasting the valuable time and resources of the ICC.5
Conclusion
The jurisdictional regime of the Rome Statute provides for a system of inherent 
jurisdiction and a range of trigger mechanisms to enable the Court to act 
independently within the theatre of jurisdictional bases established by die Statute. As 
a safeguard against inaction on the part of State Parties or the Security Council, the 
inclusion of independent triggering powers for the Prosecutor ensures that cases will 
reach the ICC, either proprio motu or by prompting self-referrals. Such powers pose a 
serious challenge to the notion of a ‘statist’ Court. Where the Council does refers a 
situation, the jurisdictional ambit of the ICC can be extended to universal coverage. 
The Court’s consideration, nonetheless, is limited to crimes committed after 1 July
57 See Annex to OTP Policy Paper. See Update on Communications Received by the Office o f the 
Prosecutor,(10 February 2006); available at www.icc-cpi.int
58 ibid, 663
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2002, and is thus unavailable to deal with earlier situations, where other mechanisms 
will remain more appropriate.59
The Korean draft formulation for the State consent regime would have relied 
on the State jurisdictional basis of territoriality, active personality or passive 
personality or simple custody over the accused (universality). In a severely restricting 
compromise, the final provision was watered down to limiting the exercise of 
jurisdiction only to situations where acceptance has been secured from the territorial 
State or the State of nationality of the accused. This means that the ICC will be unable 
to act where future Pol Pots, Idi Amins, or Saddam Husseins massacres their own 
people on their own territory, and have not accepted the Statute. Similarly, it will not 
be possible to transfer a future Pinochet held by a custodial State to the ICC without 
his State of nationality’s acceptance of the Statute. Moreover, a State Party will be 
unable to trigger a case involving crimes committed against its nationals in a non­
signatory State. In this manner, unless the Security Council refers a situation, the ICC 
will have less power to bring perpetrators of mass violence to trial than do national 
jurisdictions. There will be much, therefore, for State Parties to do in extending their 
own domestic jurisdiction in order to fill the gaps left by the jurisdictional reach of the 
Court (see below, Part 9).
59 See, by contrast, the proposals cited in the Commission of Experts on East Timor Report that ICC 
jurisdiction could be applied retroactively via Security Council intervention to enable the Court to 
address the East Timor situation; S/2005/458. For the reasons noted in Chapter 8 (‘Enhanced 
Cooperation’), the suggestions have little legal merit or practical value. To be effective, the proposal 
would require amendment of the ICC Statute by the Assembly of State Parties according to the 
procedure foreseen in Part 13 of the Statute.
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VII
Admissibility
In order to understand compliance, it is necessary to examine avoidance techniques 
that States may employ in order to frustrate the Court’s jurisdiction. In particular, the 
present chapter will examine the manner in which competing claims to jurisdiction 
will be resolved by examining how complementarity will operate in practice. 
Attention will centre on the admissible regime established by article 17, as well as 
the procedure for challenges to admissibility and jurisdiction under articles 18 and 
19. A final section will consider issues related to forum determination where the ICC 
defers or declines jurisdiction.
1. COMPETING JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS
Complementarity presupposes a group of interested States with competing claims to 
jurisdiction amongst themselves and with the Court over an individual in any concrete 
case.1 Under complementarity, the general principle governing how these claims will 
be settled is that the Court should defer to domestic proceedings in all but a limited 
number of cases. This is reflected in the structure of article 17 which provides that 
national jurisdiction shall prevail unless one among a series of listed exceptions is 
satisfied. Namely, the Court is to reject any case brought by the Prosecutor where (a) 
a national investigation or prosecution is ongoing; (b) an investigation has been 
completed, but a decision has been taken not to prosecute; (c) the individual has 
already been prosecuted; or (d) the case is of insufficient gravity to warrant further 
action by the Court. As complementarity already leans heavily in deference to 
domestic proceedings, it soon became clear during negotiations that it must be left to 
the ICC, and not national authorities, to assess these four conditions and to determine
1 Bleich, ‘Complementarity’, 13 Nouvelles Etudes Penales (1997), 231
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its own jurisdiction against the competing claims of national forums.2 Defining the 
parameters by which the ICC would assess national action, thus, became a central task 
for the preparatory process.
The complementarity test established in article 17 draws on the experience of 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in distinguishing between situations where 
national authorities are unwilling or otherwise unable to take action. In order to 
determine unwillingness or inability in a particular case, the Court must determine 
whether investigations or prosecutions have been carried out ‘genuinely’, a term 
considered the least subjective from a series of options including ‘diligently’, ‘good 
faith’, ‘effectively’ and ‘sufficient grounds’.3 Nonetheless, the test will require the 
Court to satisfy itself as to the intent of State in the circumstances. While this may not 
be problematic in clear cut cases, unwilling States may quickly learn to employ 
elaborate foils to disguise their true intents.4 As with other parts of the Statute, the law 
will have to be tested in court to lend the provisions both clarity and form.
In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court is to 
consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognised by international 
law, whether one or more of the following exists, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings or a national decision seek to shield the person from criminal 
responsibility;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which is inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person to justice;
(c) The proceedings were/are not being conducted independently or impartially, 
or in a manner which is consistent with an intent to bring the person to 
justice.5
2 Art. 19, “[t]he Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case before it”. See also principle 
of competence de la competence as elaborated in Tadic Interlocutory Appeal, 18-19; Namibia case, 
16; Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) ICJ Rep. 1953, p. 119; Fisheries jurisdiction case (UK 
and Northern Ireland v Iceland) ICJ Rep. 1973, p.3; Nicaragua case (Nicaragua v U.S.), ICJ Rep. 
1984, p.392; see generally, Schermers and Blocker, International Institutional Law: Unity within 
Diversity (1995), 463; Brownlie, 6th ed (2003), 715
3 Holmes, ‘The Principle of Complementarity’, in Lee, ed., The International Criminal Court, The 
Making o f the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results (1999), 49
4 Holmes (1999), 75. Similar concerns arise, to a lesser extent, in the assessment the Court will have to 
give in determining what constitutes ‘significant’ collapse.
Contrary to the view by Holmes, the list is not exhaustive. An ordinary reading of the text indicates 
that the three grounds are factors to be taken into consideration by the Court when arriving at its 
determination, but there is nothing excluding admissibility should these factors not be established. The 
Court therefore is granted discretion to consider additional indicators of unwillingness; Holmes,
165
Chapter VII
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made 
for the purpose of shielding the person concernedfrom criminal responsibility for 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5
Evidence of sham proceedings may be brought in a number of ways. The treatment by 
domestic authorities of similar cases, or cases arising out of the same situation, for 
example, may be indicative. A failure to conduct a genuine investigation or 
prosecution in such circumstances will lend a strong presumption against willingness 
in relation to the proceedings before the Court. Other factors could include obvious 
departures from normal legal procedures, whether civil or military, such as by the 
appointment of special prosecutors or judges with political affiliations or the transfer 
of cases to secret tribunals, thereby bringing into doubt the observance of “the 
principles of due process recognised by international law”.6 In particular, this last 
provision serves to emphasise that the Court may have recourse to international 
standards and guidelines for the conduct of effective investigations and trials.7
National decisions aimed at shielding accused persons could include the 
intentional omission in national implementing legislation of certain categorisations of 
crimes or certain levels of responsibility. Examples include the absence of command 
responsibility or the failure fully to incorporate the crime of genocide in Serbia and 
Montenegro’s war crimes legislation. As noted above, such legislative lacuna could 
indicate an intent to shield the military and political leadership from prosecution. The 
Prosecutor would need to show, however, that such legislative deficiency would result
‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC’, in Cassese et al. (2002), 675
6 Holmes (2002), 675
7 See e.g. UN Principles o f international co-operation in the detection, arrest, extradition and 
punishment o f persons guilty o f war crimes and crimes against humanity, A/9030/Add.l(1973); UN 
Basic Principles on the Independence o f the Judiciary, A/CONF.121/22/Revl(1985); UN Declaration 
o f Basic Principles o f Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse o f Power, A/40/53(1985). UN Guidelines 
on the Role ofProsecutors, A/CONF. 144/28/Revl(1990); UN Basic Principles on the Role o f Lawyers, 
A/CONF.144/28/Revl(1990); UN Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, A/RES/55/89 Annex 4 
(2000); UN Body o f Principles for the Protection o f All Persons under Any Form o f Detention or 
Imprisonment, A/43/49(1988); UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment o f Prisoners', E/3048 
(1957), amended E/5988(1977); Question o f the impunity o f perpetrators o f human rights violations 
(civil and political) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Revl(1997); Art.2, HRC General Comment 3(1981); Art.9, 
HRC General Comment 8,(1982); Art.14, HRC General Comment 13,(1984); Art.7, HRC General 
Comment 20,(1992)
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in a genuine inability to hold persons accountable. The lacunae in and of itself without
O
establishing the practice that will flow as a result may not satisfy the Court.
More obvious national decisions aimed at shielding accused persons include 
the passing of amnesties and post-conviction pardons. In negotiations, the question of 
amnesties and pardons was raised as part of discussion on ne bis in idem. The U.S. 
circulated a non-paper summarising State practice in the implementation of amnesties 
and pardons.9 Examples included situations of transitions to democratic governments 
seeking to protect members of the outgoing regime; attempts at national reconciliation 
aiming to close a door on the conflict of a past era; and measures to encourage the 
surrender or reintegration of armed dissident groups. The issue was not discussed in 
detail either at PrepCom sessions or in Rome. There was a fear that opening the door 
to discussions could lead to the inclusion of specific exemptions from ICC jurisdiction 
that would run contrary to the emerging international custom on the core crimes.10
There were also a series of proposals that broadly sought to prevent an 
omission in the complementarity regime at the stage of sentencing. This would have 
empowered the ICC to take up a case tried domestically following a “manifestly 
unfounded decision on the suspension of the enforcement of a sentence or on a 
pardon, a parole or a commutation of the sentence excludes the application of any 
appropriate form of penalty.”11 The proposal was ultimately deemed to represent too 
high a level of intrusion into domestic administrative and executive decision making 
processes. The failure to secure the language in the text, however, does not mean that 
the Court is excluded from ruling on the issue. The bone fides of decisions could be 
challenged under the Court’s admissibility rules in order to show that “the national 
decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned” or was 
otherwise “inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice”. 
Although challenges would normally take place before or during the domestic trial,12 
there is nothing in the Statute excluding post-trial examination. The Court could
8 See, e.g., Amicus curiae brief of Croatia in Prosecutor v Mejakic et al. Rule 1 Ibis hearing, observing 
that the absence of command responsibility in its domestic legislation during relevant period could be 
overcome by application of other related provisions of national law; on file with author
9 U.S. Delegation Draft - State Practice Regarding Amnesties and Pardons, circulated 15 August 1997 
(PrepCom IV); on file with author
10 See above, Chapter 4
11 See Draft article 19, Report o f the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment o f an International 
Criminal Court, Draft Statute & Draft Final Act (A/Conf. 183/2/Add. 1, 1998). Earlier formulations 
were also included in the 1995 Siracusa Draft Statute and 1996 and 1998 PrepCom proposals
12 Van den Wyngaert and Ongena, ‘Ne bis in idem Principle, Including the Issue of Amnesty’, in 
Cassese et al. (2002), 726
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thereby determine whether the suspension of sentence enforcement or a pardon, 
amnesty, parole or commutation serves the interests of the Statute to “put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes”.
Alternatively, there may be conditions under which a national decision not to 
enforce a sentence or to grant amnesty may be observed by the Court. A Security 
Council deferral under article 16, for example, may have the effect, either explicitly or 
otherwise, of protecting a national amnesty decision. The Prosecutor also may 
exercise his discretion in order to honour a domestic decision not to prosecute by 
determining that a trial would not serve the ‘interests of justice’ (article 53). This may 
arise in relation to a truth and reconciliation or post-conflict transition process, or an 
undertaking of traditional-based forms of justice, especially where official inquiry, 
public disclosure and debate has taken place.13 The Prosecutor’s decision would have 
to take into account “all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the 
interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her 
role in the alleged crime”. It would be subject, moreover, to review by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber which could result in the decision being overturned.14 Finally, as the 
example of ICC intervention in Northern Uganda has shown, prosecutorial discretion 
will often go to the issue of sequencing peace-building process and international 
prosecutions, rather than the granting of blanket immunities.15 To the extent that the 
ICC will be able to review the bone fides of amnesties, the articulation and application 
of the guiding principles by the Chambers will establish important parameters for the 
international supervision of national amnesties.16
13 Compare Human Rights Watch, which argues that the Prosecutor should construct the ‘interests of 
justice’ narrowly so as to exclude all political considerations or calculations such as the impact of an 
investigation on ongoing peace processes or truth and reconciliation initiatives, which rather is a task 
for the Security Council via article 16; HRWPolicy Paper: The Meaning o f “the interests o f justice” in 
Article 53 o f the Rome Statute,(June 2005)
14 Sharf (1999), 524 argues that the Pre-Trial Chamber would have to consider also whether there is an 
international legal obligation to prosecute the offence. This criteria, however, does not appear in article 
53 and, as noted earlier, although the ICC Statute mirrors various substantive provisions of other 
conventions, it does not incorporate the procedural obligations relating thereto.
15 On the question of phasing and timing of possible ICC arrest warrants for the LRA leadership and 
concerns over its impact on the peace process, see ...
16 Broomhall (2003), 100
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(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances 
is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice
For a delay to be inconsistent with an intent to bring a person to justice, it must be 
unjustified. The original term “undue delay” was changed during the drafting process 
to the higher standard of “unjustified delay” in order to require the Court to seek the 
views of the State concerned.17 Evidence of such delay could include the adoption of 
timeframes that deviate from normal practice for similar cases, leading to prolonged 
and ineffective investigations. This will be less persuasive as an indicator if domestic 
proceedings routinely suffer from lengthy delays. Another possibility is the use of 
commissions of inquiry outside of the criminal justice system to stall actual 
investigations and prosecutions. The wording of the provision suggests that the 
burden will be on the State to justify delays that depart from the established patterns 
of national proceedings. Similarly, Rule 51 invites States to bring to the attention of 
the Court any information showing that its courts meet internationally recognised 
norms and standards for the independent and impartial prosecution of similar conduct 
with respect to an admissibility determination under article 17. The failure of a State 
to provide such information may weigh against it in the Court’s assessment.
Establishing an international standard for the length of proceedings will prove 
difficult. National practice varies considerably and the ad hoc Tribunals and the 
European Court on Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) have been notably tolerant of lengthy 
criminal proceedings and pre-trial detention.18 In Mutimura v. France, ECtHR held 
that the applicant had not received an effective remedy in respect of domestic judicial 
investigations into genocide and torture offences which had lasted over eight years 
and eight months.19 ICTY and ICTR decisions on the length of pre-trial detention 
have dealt primarily with delays by the Tribunals themselves. In the case of the ICC,
17 Holmes (1999), 34
18 See Prosecutor v Drljaca and Kovacevic, Decision on Defence Motion for Provisional Release,(20 
January 1998); Prosecutor v Kanyabashi, Decision on the Defence Motion for the Provisional Release 
o f the Accused (21 February 2001). ECHR cases: Stogmiiller v Austria, Judgment,(10 November 1969) 
(reasonable time cannot be assessed in abstracto),]\4; Wemhoff v Germany, Judgment,(21 June 1968) 
(the reasonableness of an accused person's continued detention must be assessed in each case according 
to its special features),^ 10; Zimmerman and Steiner v Switzerland, Judgment,(13 July 1983),^f24 
(reasonableness depends, inter alia, on complexities of case-specific factual and legal issues, and the 
conduct of the applicant and the competent authorities); W v Switzerland, Judgment,(26 November 
1992)(finding no violation for pre-trial detention of four years)
19 Mutimura v France, Judgment (8 June 2004) (finding violation of right to a hearing within a 
reasonable time and right to an effective remedy)
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tolerance of lengthy delays by national authorities could allow substantial scope for 
non-genuine States to abuse the principle of complementarity. The ICC will therefore 
need to establish timeframes and possibly develop standards applicable under the 
Rome Statute if it is to effectively administer the deferral of cases.
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or 
impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the 
circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
The test in the last subparagraph of 17(2) appears at first glance to repeat the main 
features of subparagraphs (a) and (b). During preparatory discussions, however, it 
emerged that there may be scenarios where a State endeavours to institute genuine 
proceedings, but may be individuals who manipulate the process to ensure that 
accused persons are not found guilty by, for example, engineering a mistrial or by 
deliberately violating a defendant’s right in order to taint evidence or testimony.20 In 
this type of instance, although the tests of shielding or delays may not be met, there 
may be still doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the proceedings 
sufficient to call into question the intent of the State to bring the person to justice. 
Factors which may indicate a lack of independence and impartiality include evidence 
of improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, either direct 
or indirect, on judicial officials; exposing officials to unwarranted and irregular 
discipline, suspension or removal proceedings; as well as inappropriate or 
unwarranted interference with the judicial process, or subjecting judicial decisions to 
revision outside of legal procedures.
(d) In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider 
whether, due to a total or substantial collapse of its national judicial system, the State 
is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise
unable to carry out its proceedings
20 Holmes (1999), 50-51
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As the chair of the PrepCom working group on complementarity has stated, the 
negotiation of article 17(3) was less contentious than defining ‘unwillingness’, largely 
because ‘inability’ is a more objective, fact-driven notion: “[t]he absence of a 
functioning prosecutor’s office or a court system are facts which either exist or do not 
and therefore lend themselves to less subjective interpretation.”21 The Court is to 
consider whether “due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national 
judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence 
and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.” The article, thus, 
provides three fact-based criteria to test the health of the national judicial system: the 
ability to obtain the accused, the ability to obtain the necessary evidence and 
testimony, and the ability to otherwise carry out proceedings.
‘Total or substantial collapse’ covers situations such as those faced by post­
genocide Rwanda or East Timor, where the criminal justice system is no longer 
functional. The original term ‘partial collapse’ was changed to ‘substantial’ during the 
Rome conference to rule out situations where the national judicial system is intact, but 
because of an armed conflict or loss of territory in a particular area, it is partially 
affected. The provision, thus, requires there to have been a substantial impact on the 
national judicial system as a whole 22 The ‘unavailability’ of a national judicial 
system, again either total or substantial, is the second criteria of inability. 
Unavailability may characterise situations where the judicial system is intact, but may 
not be functioning due to systemic failures: for example, the non-execution of 
warrants and judicial order because of a lack of cooperation between the judiciary and 
the police, or between different law enforcement agencies within a State. In BiH, for 
example, judicial orders issued by Cantonal Courts in the Federation BiH, particularly 
in war crime related cases, have seldom been implemented by the authorities in 
Republika Srpska, and vice versa?3 The difference between unavailability under 17(3) 
and national decisions taken under article 17(2)(a) is the absence of a requirement to 
prove intent on the part of the State to shield the accused. A system that is not 
functioning correctly is different from a system that is intended to fail.
For a finding of inadmissibility, these factors must be applicable to a particular
21 Holmes (2002), 677
22 ibid, 678
23 Because of the constitutional arrangement under the DPA and the fragmentary political culture, BiH 
has separate police structures for the 10 Cantons, the FBiH, RS, Brcko District, and specialised 
agencies at the State level (SEPA, SBS). In addition there are Court Police services at the entity and 
State levels, and a FBiH Finance Police.
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case before the Court. As referenced earlier, one indicator may be to compare the 
conduct of national authorities in relation to similar serious domestic cases. Thus, 
while reference to international standards or the comparison of one State with another 
may provide useful benchmarks, the record of enforcement for similar conduct in the 
State concerned may best help reveal whether the national authorities have acted in a 
manner that is not consistent, independent or impartial.24
An ordinary reading of article 17(3) suggests that the enumerated factors are 
non-exhaustive. There is no indication that the absence of the said factors will 
invalidate a finding of inability, and there is nothing restricting the discretion of the 
Court to consider factors additional to those identified. This may include legislative 
bars to investigation or prosecution, such as amnesties and pardons, or deficiencies in 
national implementing legislation defining the crimes, or in failing to incorporate 
principle of criminal law such as command responsibility.
(e) Uncontested complementarity
One further scenario, not foreseen during negotiations, is where no competing 
jurisdictional claim is brought by States, thereby effectively enabling a waiver of 
admissibility requirements for the purpose of complementarity. The test of unwilling 
or inability becomes operative where a State has initiated domestic proceedings or has 
otherwise challenged the jurisdiction of the Court. Absent this, the limitations to 
admissibility under article 17(l)(a)-(c) become redundant and a case can proceed.25 
The position has been articulated in a policy paper issued by the Prosecutor:
There is no impediment to the admissibility of a case before the Court where 
no State has initiated any investigation. There may be cases where inaction by 
States is the appropriate course of action. For example, the Court and a 
territorial State incapacitated by mass crimes may agree that a consensual 
division of labour is the most logical and effective approach. Groups bitterly 
divided by conflict may oppose prosecutions at each others’ hands and yet 
agree to a prosecution by a Court perceived as neutral and impartial. There 
may also be cases where a third State has extra-territorial jurisdiction, but all 
interested parties agree that the Court has developed superior evidence and
24 Holmes (2002), 676-7
25 Informal expert paper (complementarity), 7. Challenges, nonetheless, may be forthcoming at later 
stages from other parties (see below, article 19)
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expertise relating to that situation, making the Court the more effective forum. 
In such cases there will be no question of “unwillingness” or “inability” under 
article 17.26
This is the simplest way for a case to proceed: what Moreno Ocampo has termed 
“positive complementarity”.27 Where complementarity is uncontested the Prosecutor 
may be able to enter into agreements with the State concerned, in accordance with 
article 54(3)(d), to facilitate its cooperate and to discuss the possible distribution of 
caseloads through a consensual “division of labour” 28 Accordingly, the ICC could 
focus on senior level offender while the State builds the necessary capacity and 
generates the required political will to pursue mid to low level offenders. The best 
outcome of such engaged dialogue would be a ‘self-referral’. Where the State in 
question does not object to ICC jurisdiction, but nonetheless fails to refer the 
situation, the Prosecutors could proceed proprio motu on an expedited basis given the 
likely unforthcoming challenges to admissibility.
Uncontested complementarity may come to represent one of the more fruitful 
mechanisms for enabling jurisdiction and for establishing a cooperative relationship 
between international and national jurisdictions. Indeed, the Prosecutor has indicated 
that, as a matter of policy, whenever he intends to initiate a situation proprio motu, he 
will in general seek where possible to make the support and cooperation of the State 
concerned explicit through referral.29 Self-referral will have several practical benefits 
in comparison to proprio motu, Security Council or third State triggered jurisdiction. 
The State concerned is likely to engage cooperatively with the Court to assist the 
investigation, to accord any necessary privileges and immunities, and to provide for 
staff security and the protection for victims and witnesses.30 In delicate post-conflict 
transitions, international involvement may help also to externalise the political costs 
of prosecutions by shifting spoiler effects away from weak national governments onto 
the ICC.31
26 OTP Policy Paper, 5
27 Statement of the Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo to Diplomatic Corps (The Hague, 12 February 
2004)
28 ibid
29 Annex to the "Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor Referrals and 
Communications (ICC-OTP), 5
30 ibid
31 ibid", Burke-White, ‘Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal Court as Part of a 
System of Multi-level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2005) Leiden JIL, 
567
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Self-referrals, nonetheless, may not always have genuine considerations of 
accountability in mind. Particularly in an ongoing conflict, referrals may be motivated 
by a desire to internationalise a conflict, to bolster the legitimacy of the government, 
or to de-legitimise and isolate opponents.32 Equally, it is possible that States may 
exploit uncontested complementarity by flooding the Court with cases so as to avoid 
their own responsibility or to otherwise play to external constituencies. Case-dumping 
would undermine complementarity, which relies on the notion of primary and 
concurrent duty of States, and could, moreover, entrench patterns of impunity. Burke- 
White suggests that the dangers for politicisation and manipulation should caution the 
Prosecutor against acting upon such referrals:
... where the ICC becomes an implement of a potentially despotic national 
government whose own hands may not be clean, the Prosecutor might be well 
advised to encourage national prosecutions that fully account for the political 
costs of justice or to delay international investigation until his actions are less 
likely to alter domestic political outcomes.33
This appears to simplify the nuances of prosecutorial discretion, as the risks 
accompanying each situation will need to be weighed against numerous variables. 
What is clear is that the Prosecutor will need to carefully consider the policy 
implications of his stated preference for uncontested complementarity by encouraging 
and assisting State Parties to develop, possibly in cooperation with neighbouring 
States and other international organisations, comprehensive long-term anti-impunity 
strategies to address the responsibilities of domestic authorities to burden their 
primary share of prosecutorial initiatives.34
2. CHALLENGES
Where the Court deems a case admissible, challenges may be brought in two ways: (i) 
a request for a deferral, and (ii) a challenge as to jurisdiction or admissibility.
32 See the selective referral by the Government of Uganda of the “situation concerning the Lord’s 
Resistance Army”, Referral letter to the ICC Prosecutor of 6 December 2003, on file with author. The 
Prosecutor interpreted the referral as covering crimes committed by all parties to the conflict; Letter 
from the Prosecutor to the President of the ICC (17 June 2004), on file with author
33 Burke-White (2005), 568
34 Informal expert paper (complementarity), 18-21; see below, Chapter 9
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(a) Request for deferral by States (article 18)
Article 18 allows States to request the deferral at the earliest possible stage even 
before a case has been brought, by putting States on one month’s advance notice of 
the Prosecutor’s intention to initiate an investigation.35 The article aims to address the 
need to prevent overlap of parallel investigations by the ICC and national authorities, 
and the desire to expedite the clarification of intentions with respect to the exercise of 
jurisdiction. It also affirms the principle enunciated in die preamble that “it is the duty 
of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for 
international crimes”. Together with article 17, the provision serves as a further 
prompt for State action. It reinforces, moreover, the notion of partnership and 
dialogue between national authorities and the ICC. To guard against non-genuine 
manoeuvres, the Prosecutor can challenge deferral requests before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and apply for authorisation to proceed with his investigation. Article 18 
does not apply to situations referred by the Security Council, since such referrals are 
not triggered on the basis of State consent.
The approach that the ICC judges adopt towards article 18 and the related 
provisions on challenges will be critical for the integrity of the Court. It is likely that 
the Chambers will develop a margin of discretion doctrine for the assessment of 
national efforts undertaken in good faith. Too great a degree of deference to States 
requiring high thresholds of proof, however, could undermine incentives to encourage 
compliance with the Rome Statute.36 Over reliance on assertions of State misconduct 
without adequate factual assessment, on the other hand, could paralyse domestic 
efforts and undermine the complementarity goals of the Statute.
When deciding to launch an investigation, either proprio motu or via State 
referral, the Prosecutor will have made a determination as to the genuineness of 
national proceedings in accordance with the article 17 test.37 Accordingly, the Pre- 
Trial Chamber may determine a presumption against the bone fides of a State 
subsequently declaring jurisdiction under article 18(2) on the grounds that it will now
35 See, conversely, a rejected Italian proposal (PrepCom V, December 1997) to require State Parties to 
inform the Prosecutor of any national investigations or proceedings relating to crimes under the Statute, 
in part in reaction to article 18; Holmes (1999), 64, 72
36 Broomhall (2003), 92
37 See article 53, ICC Statute
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undertake genuine investigations and prosecutions. In making its determination that a 
State’s notification is without merit, Pre-Trial Chamber will rely on the article 17 
factors and any supporting information presented by the Prosecutor and the State 
concerned (Rules 51, 53, 55). Where the case is deferred, the judges may apply the six 
month review period strictly, by placing a strong burden on the State to demonstrate 
the genuineness of its proceedings and any concrete progress made.
It is equally possible, however, that the Pre-Trial Chamber will hold that the 
Statute is designed to foster a presumption in favour of State jurisdiction, except in 
very obvious cases. Such an approach could be fraught with dangers. Given the 
context in which the crimes have been or are being committed, States acting in bad 
faith could exploit the one month advance notice to launch their own domestic 
proceedings, while quietly moving to intimidate witnesses, tamper evidence, or shield 
offenders. Although article 18 enables the Prosecutor to notify States on a confidential 
basis or to limit the scope of information provided, Rule 52 obliges him to provide 
sufficient information to assist the State in its application of the deferral request, and 
stipulates that the State can request additional information.
Where the investigation is deferred to national authorities, there may be 
several ways a non-genuine State could postpone further ICC intervention. The 
construction of an investigation and case file will take time. It is not uncommon for 
domestic investigative, preparatory and trial proceedings in serious, complex criminal 
cases to take up to two or three years. The ICC’s own activities in Northern Uganda 
lasted approximately a year from the date of referral before the issuance of arrest 
warrants, and have taken even in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘DRC’).38
In the interim, the Prosecutor may seek an exceptional ruling from the Pre- 
Trial Chamber to “pursue necessary investigative steps for the purpose of preserving 
evidence where there is a unique opportunity to obtain important evidence or there is 
a significant risk that such evidence may not be subsequently available.” The Statute 
is silent on the degree of leniency to be granted national authorities and the extent of 
information to be provided on domestic progress. Where the Court has determined a 
deferral was appropriate, it may apply its discretion in favour of continuing domestic
38 The ICC OTP investigations into the DRC and Northern Uganda were launched on the 22 June 2004 
and the 28 July 2004 respectively. The first arrest warrants in relation to Northern Uganda were issued 
under seal on 8 July 2005; Situation in Uganda, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Warrants 
of Arrest under Article 58 (ICC-02/04-01/05-1 -U S-Exp)(unsealed 20 October 2005). The issuance of 
arrest warrants in the DRC situation is pending.
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action. In such circumstances the Prosecutor will be allowed merely to request 
periodic updates from the State concerned on “the progress of its investigation and 
any subsequent prosecutions”. The deferral to national investigations will be open to 
review by die Prosecutor six months after the deferral or at any time when a 
significant change in domestic unwillingness or inability can be demonstrated. 
However, since much of die case file on offenders will be of a confidential nature, it is 
unclear the extent to which the Prosecutor can demand access to the details of an 
investigation. While lack of requisite cooperation could be presented as evidence of 
domestic unwillingness to enable independent assessment, this may not be deemed 
sufficient to warrant the case being recalled. A recalcitrant State, therefore, may soon 
learn that in order to block cases before the ICC it need not engage in the kind of 
overt opposition that would immediately signal unwillingness. Instead, it may come to 
employ more subtle, procedural stalling mechanisms that are consistent with the letter 
of the Statute and short of bringing its actions in violation of its terms.
Moreover, it may not be during the investigative phase, but at later trial, 
conviction or post-conviction stages that a State may seek to undermine or postpone 
genuine progress. National proceedings could continue for a considerable period of 
time, including investigation and prosecution, before the case is finally deemed, 
possibly in relation to the final judgement or sentencing, to have been insufficiently 
genuine. Alternatively, a complex trial lasting several years which is conducted 
genuinely may conclude with the conviction being set aside under the terms of a 
parole, pardon or amnesty. As most important pieces of material and testimonial 
evidence are lost in the earliest stages after a crime, referral of the situation at this late 
stage may have serious repercussions on the Court’s ability to collect evidence and to 
take uncontaminated witness statements. In the worst scenario, the Prosecutor may be 
trapped in a recurring cycle whereby preliminary examinations leading to an 
investigation are undertaken only to result in cases being deferred. He may repeatedly 
be left to observe cases being carefully strung out in domestic proceedings through 
multiple stage delays that only after several years are formally deemed not genuine, 
by which time international support for trials for that situation may have waned. Thus, 
the application of a strong presumption in favour of domestic action may enable a 
non-genuine State to exploit the procedural mechanisms made available by the 
Statute.
The trials held in Indonesia relating to the crimes committed in East Timor
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offer a telling example of avoidance techniques employed prior to, during and at the 
conclusion of domestic trials. As reviewed above, after the numerous postponements 
and sustained international pressure, domestic legislation establishing the special 
Human Rights Courts was finally passed, but with a selectively circumscribed scope 
and timeframe. This was followed by delays and allegations of political influence 
over the appointment of judges and prosecutors, and controversy over the list of 
accused persons which glaringly omitted the most senior military officers alleged to 
be most responsible. The resultant trial and appeals process, concluding four years 
after the atrocities, has been widely condemned as inconsistent with an intent to bring
i 39the perpetrators to justice.
It is hoped that the Court will take a more robust approach towards assessing 
unwillingness or inability and will exercise greater scrutiny in applying any margin of 
appreciation. In the Darfur situation, shortly after the adoption of the Security Council 
Resolution 1593, the Government of Sudan announced the establishment of an ad hoc 
Sudanese Court to investigate and prosecute crimes committed in its eastern region. 
The initiation of national judicial proceedings would potentially enable Sudan to 
challenge, by way of Article 19, the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with the 
test set in Article 17. However, Sudan will need to show that a particular case brought 
by the Prosecutor is the subject of genuine national proceedings, not just that it has 
initiated domestic processes generally. As indicated in the first two reports of the 
Prosecutor to the Security Council, while the ICC is following closely the progress of 
these trials, the information available to date indicates that they are not focussing on 
the type of cases that are the focus of his current investigations: that is, cases relating 
to persons who bear the greatest responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.40 Thus, for the purpose of admissibility, national proceedings will need to 
encompass both the person and the conduct which is the subject of a case before the 
ICC. The manner in which the ICC Chambers apply this standard will be critical for 
the success of the enforcement system created by the Rome Statute.
39 Commission of Experts on East Timor Report; see above, Chapter 4. A similar verdict followed the 
parallel trial in relation to the 1984 Tanjung Priok massacre. See also trials of TNI officers for abuse of 
authority during military assaults on Aceh Province, which appear to have been held to deflect 
attention from more serous allegations of arbitrary killings and targeting of civilians; U.S. questions 
RI's will to prosecute rights cases, Jakarta Post (18 June 2003); Aceh trial for Indonesian troops, BBC 
News (25 September 2003). This suggests, in the light of the complementarity regime, that States will 
learn to adjust their methodology to provide a veneer of compliance with international norms.
40 Report o f the Prosecutor o f the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the 
Security Council pursuant to UNSR 1593 (2005), (1st Rep: 29 June 2005) (2nd Rep: 13 December 2005)
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(b) Challenges to jurisdiction or admissibility (article 19)
The second opportunity for States to lodge challenges begins once the Prosecutor has 
brought a case. Article 19(1) stipulates that the Court shall satisfy itself that is has 
jurisdiction “in any case brought before it”, and may determine “the admissibility of a 
case” on the grounds referred to article 17. This means that a challenge may only be 
brought once a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear has been issued, since prior 
to that moment there is no case before the Court.41 Jurisdiction and admissibility 
challenges, therefore, cannot be brought with respect to a situation in general. 
Challenges may be brought by the Prosecutor, the accused, a State with jurisdiction, 
or a State from which acceptance is required under article 12. The Court may also act 
on its own motion. Such proceedings are permissible even in the event of a Security 
Council referral, since the Statute makes no exceptions to the general rule 42
Although article 19 and the accompanying rules seek to ensure an expedited 
process for challenges, there is wide scope for procedural delays. Challenges can only 
be brought once and must be lodged prior to or at the commencement of a trial, 
although “in exceptional circumstances, the Court may grant leave for a challenge to 
be brought more than once or at a time later than the commencement of the trial.” 
Moreover, while States are required to make their challenge at the earliest possible 
stage, there is no sanction if they fail to do so. The Pre-Trial Chamber is to decide on 
the procedure to be followed in challenge proceedings. It may hold a hearing, 
although this is not obligatory, or it may join the question to a confirmation or trial 
proceeding. It is possible, however, that several States may have jurisdiction and they 
may each bring challenges at different times. The accused may bring a challenge also 
at the latest stage possible as s/he is under no obligation to challenge at an early stage. 
Victims also may seek representation. Since the Statute does not strictly define who 
may be a victim, there may be several victims or victims groups, possibly rivals, who 
may argue that the other group cannot represent them and each of whom may wish to 
submit observations. The Court may, thus, hear several challenges from different
41 See Situation in DRC, Decision following the consultation held on 11 October 2005 and the 
Prosecution's submission on Jurisdiction and admissibility filed on 31 October 2005 (ICC-01/04-93) 
(9 November 2005), 4
42 As noted above, the only difference is that since a Security Council referral is exempted from the 
normal State consent regime, there is no precondition under article 12 to secure the acceptance of the 
Court’s jurisdiction from these States (see above, Chapter 6)
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parties, at different stages of the proceedings. Attempts made during the PrepComm 
to introduce a Rule that would require challenges to be heard together to avoid such 
delays were considered contrary to the Statute.43
Another factor that the Court must take into consideration at the admissibility 
stage is the gravity of the case. There are several provisions in the Statute dealing with 
the subject of gravity. Recital 10 of the preamble to the Statute stipulates that the 
Court has jurisdiction over ‘the most serious crimes of international concern’. Article 
5(1) strengthens this notion by stating that the jurisdiction of the Court is limited to 
‘the most serious crimes of concern of to the international community as a whole’. 
Specific indicators of gravity are contained also in the contextual elements of the 
crimes as stipulated in the Statute and the Elements of Crimes, such as: ‘manifest 
pattern of similar conduct’, ‘widespread’, ‘systematic’, ‘multiple commission of acts’, 
‘State or organisational policy’, and ‘as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large 
scale commission of such crimes’. The most explicit reference to gravity as a 
determinative factor on the selection of cases, however, is contained in article 
17(l)(d), which stipulates that a case will be inadmissible where it is not of sufficient 
gravity to justify further action by the Court. The provision, thereby, establishes a 
filter mechanism to prevent the Court taking up relatively minor cases. This means 
that any case presented to the ICC will therefore need to pass a two fold test: (i) it 
must fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, and (ii) it must be sufficiently grave to 
be admissible.
Again, the manner in which the Court determines the scope of gravity will 
shape the pattern for future case selection. As noted in Chapter 4, much of the 
discussion on gravity determination has focussed primarily on issues related to the 
seniority of offenders and/or the degree of their participation in particularly serious 
crimes. The ICC judges may decide to interpret article 17(l)(d) in a narrow manner 
by elaborating a specific threshold that must be met before any cases can proceed. 
One such standard, drawing on the criteria applied by the SCSL Prosecutor and the ad 
hoc Tribunals as part of their completion strategies, could be to require that cases 
focus on leadership suspects only.44 This would aim at strictly defining the scope of
43 Holmes (2002), 684
44 See ICTY Rule 28, as amended on 6 April 2004 as part of the completion strategy, which requires 
Tribunal’s Bureau to determine “whether the indictment, prima facie, concentrates on one or more of 
the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal”; see also ICTY Annual Report A/50/365 (1995); see above, Chapter 4
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ICC investigations at the criminal policy level where the principal decisions are 
orchestrated. The Chamber may, however, determine it inappropriate for a permanent 
institution that is not time-bound in its longevity to so circumscribe its scope, 
particularly given that the legislators of the Statute refrained from doing so. A narrow 
focus on rank could limit also the overall deterrent impact of the Court if it 
paradoxically serves to bolster impunity for the actual perpetrators of major crimes. 
Establishing hierarchy as a legal test, moreover, would expose the ICC to 
admissibility litigation by defendants, who could challenge the jurisdiction of the 
Court based on their comparative seniority. It would also ignore the fact that 
command structures and policy/decision-making levels can be fluid and not readily 
susceptible to easy distinction. Thus, while hierarchical consideration no doubt will be 
an important policy determination in the selection of cases by the Prosecutor,45 it 
would appear counter-productive to set it as a legal precondition.
Other authorities indicate that a wider approach should be taken to gravity so 
as to encompass also other factors, such as the commission of offences by particularly 
serious or notorious perpetrators, as well as the overall impact of a criminal episode 
on the situation as a whole or its temporal and geographic scope 46 Particularly, in 
terms of hierarchy, it may be necessary in certain situations, due to the unavailability 
of evidence or senior suspects, to build a pyramid of cases starting with mid-level 
commanders, as the early prosecutorial strategy of the ICTY demonstrates. 
Maintaining a level of uncertainty as to the potential focus of ICC investigations and 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, moreover, may heighten the deterrent effect 
of the ICC. A broad and flexible rendering of gravity, thus, would militate against the 
definition of explicit thresholds. Instead, it would represent a relatively straight 
forward assessment of gravity aimed at excluding the prosecution of cases that, while 
falling within the jurisdiction of the Court, would be essentially minor in scope.
Where a case falls within the Court’s jurisdiction and would be admissible, a
45 The ICC Prosecutor has taken a policy decision to focus on “those who bear the greatest 
responsibility, such as leaders of the State or organisation allegedly responsible for those crimes”. At 
the same time, his policy paper states that “[t]he concept of gravity should not be exclusively attached 
to the act that constituted the crime, but also to the degree of participation in its commission”; OTP 
Policy Paper, 7
46 See, inter alia, Carla Del Ponte, ‘Prosecuting the Individuals Bearing the Highest Level of 
Responsibility’ (2004) 2 Jml Int’l Crim. Justice, 517. See also above Chapters 3-4 regarding 
jurisdiction over leaders (seniority) and those who committed the worst atrocities (scale/severity): 
definition of category 1 offenders in Rwanda’s Organic Law No.8/96; discussion accompanying the 
adoption of article 1 SCSL Statute, S/2000/915, ffl|29-30; article 1, Agreement on the Extraordinary 
Chambers in Cambodia
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third, challengeable threshold applies at the level of the Prosecutor’s discretion to 
initiate an investigation in relation to a referred situation or to proceed with a 
prosecution. The decision on cases for which there is sufficient factual and legal basis 
and which would be admissible, but which would not be desirable on other case 
selection grounds is resolved by way of Article 53(l)(c) and 53(2)(c).47 The 
Prosecutor, for example, may determine that a particular line of inquiry may detract 
from the ability of the Court to pursue more grievous cases, or he may compare the 
overall gravity of one situation with another in deciding which investigations to 
initiate.48 The preamble citations and references in Article 5 to limiting the focus of 
the Court to the most serious crimes of international concern support this position.
3. NON BIS IN IDEM
(a) The ICC with respect to its own trials
Article 20(1) provides that the conviction or acquittal of a person by the ICC will 
preclude subsequent prosecution for the same conduct by the Court. The *idem’ 
relates to the same conduct being re-tried under a different categorisation, i.e. murder 
of civilians as a war crime being subsequently re-tried as a crime against humanity or 
genocide.49 The only exception provided is for revision of a conviction or a sentence 
based upon newly discovered evidence, the discovery of the fraudulent nature of 
evidence entertained during the trial that would be sufficient to alter the final verdict, 
or proof of serious misconduct by one of the participating judges (article 84). In these 
situations, the Appeals Chamber may reconvene the original trial chamber or 
constitute a new one.
47 On the scope of Pre-Trial Chamber review over the Prosecutor’s discretionary decisions see above, 
Chapter 6, n.28
48 Because of infinite jurisdictional scope of the Court and its strictly defined resources, the OTP will 
need to adopt a resource-driven, rather than case-driven prosecutorial strategy (see below, Chapter 10)
49 The provision is without prejudice to the possibility of the Prosecutor to bring cumulative charges in 
the indictment. As has been established in the practice of the ICTY, cumulative charges have been 
permitted where the crimes charged protect different values or contain different elements; Prosecutor v 
Kupreskic et al., Decision on Defence Challenges to Form o f the Indictment rendered in Kupreskic et 
al. (15 May 1998). In relation to consideration of cumulative charges at the penalty stages, see 
Prosecutor v Tadic, Decision on Defence Motion on Form o f the Indictment (14 Nov, 1995), 10
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(b) Domestic courts with respect to an ICC trial
Article 20(2) prevents the prosecution of an individual by another court for a crime 
that has been already tried by the ICC. The term ‘another court’ is not defined, but 
from the drafting history indicates that it refers to national courts of State Parties, as 
they are the only relevant authorities that are bound under the Statutes provisions.50 
Nonetheless, the ICC judges may interpret the phrase to include other international 
criminal tribunals, particularly those established through UN participation, as well as 
other quasi judicial forums. The adherence of non-State Parties to the rule would 
depend on general and voluntary respect for the ICC.
In contrast to paragraph 1, the ‘idem’ relates to the crime and not the conduct. 
Thus a person who has been tried by the ICC for rape as a war crime could be later re­
tried for rape as a crime against humanity51 or rape as an ordinary crime by another 
court. This corresponds to the right recognised in many national legal systems to 
prosecute an individual who has been tried abroad, and which is accompanied in most 
States with a deduction of sentence for previous time served abroad. The provision 
also reflects the fact that neither national nor international principles exist for the 
application of ne bis in idem across different jurisdictions. This has resulted in the 
complete non-recognition of foreign judgements by some States and limited 
recognition (deduction of sentence principle) by others.52
(c) The ICC with respect to a national trial
One of the central themes of negotiating States favouring a strong ICC was the 
principle that Court must be the final arbiter of its own jurisdiction and in ruling on 
the bone fides of national action. Without this, complementarity would render the ICC 
powerless if it enabled national authorities to avert the Court’s jurisdiction simply by 
instituting domestic proceedings. The ne bis in idem rule under article 20(3) acts as 
one of the guarantors of this principle by providing that the ICC is to determine its
50 Tallgren, ‘Article 20 Ne bis in idem’, in Triffterer (1999), 427
51 Compare Wyngaert and Ongena (2002), who suggest that the article 20(2) prevents another court 
from retrying any crime under article 5; 723. Article 20(2) does not bar subsequent prosecution by 
another court for a crime listed under article 5 which was not charged in the case before the ICC.
52 Wyngaert and Ongena (2002), 708
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jurisdiction against a competing claim by a national authority.53 Accordingly, article 
20(3) enables the ICC to prosecute a person who has been tried in another court where 
the proceedings “(a) [w]ere for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (b) 
[ojtherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the 
norms of due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a 
manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
person concerned to justice.” There are several important components to this 
provision. The ‘idem’ that is protected is “for conduct also proscribed under articles 6, 
7 or 8”.54 Thus the categorisation of offence in the domestic forum is not relevant for 
this purpose. What matters is that the conduct alleged is proportionately penalised. 
For the same reason, the exception found in the Statute of the ad hoc Tribunals over 
acts characterised as an ordinary crime was not included in the Rome Statute. Hence, 
complementarity does not rely on the identical categorisation of crimes, or on 
ensuring identical outcomes in alternate proceedings, but rather in securing adequate 
coverage for the repression of each specific criminal conduct.55
Finally, as noted above, the ICC Statute does not require any application of the 
deduction of sentence principle. Articles 9 and 10 of the Statutes of the ICTR and 
ICTY respectively provide that “[i]n considering the penalty to be imposed on a 
person convicted of a crime under the present Statute, the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda shall take into account the extent to which any penalty imposed by a national 
court on the same person for the same act has already been served”. In contrast, article 
20 is silent on the question and the matter is only taken up as part of sentencing under 
article 79(2), which provides that the Court may, but is not required to, deduct any 
time spent in detention in connection with the conduct underlying the crime. The 
negotiating history indicates that the absence of a deduction of sentence rule may 
have been an unintended omission of the final drafting process.56 Nonetheless, it is
53 ibid, 429; see also article 19(1)
54 The crime of aggression is not listed in the provision. Wyngaert and Ongena (2002) suggest this may 
based on the premise that the conduct proscribed by aggression that can only be prosecuted pursuant to 
a determination by the Security Council, rather than by individual States; 725
55 The categorisation of an ICC offence as an ordinary crime, however, may result in other limitations 
that may effect admissibility claims by the State; see below, Chapter 9
56 The deduction of sentence principle appears in earlier ILC (Art. 42(3)) and PrepCom (Art 12(3)) 
drafts, and was omitted during the final drafting stages on the view that its placement in the provision 
on ne bis in idem was superfluous, and could better be addressed under sentencing. See Tallgren 
(1999), 433
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expected that the Court will make reference to the practice of other domestic courts 
and international tribunals in the development of its sentencing policies and will be 
guided by the principle of reasonableness.
4. DETERMINING WHERE JURISDICTION RESIDES
(a) Burden o f proof
The Statute does not indicate which party bears the burden of proof at the 
admissibility stage. The general principle guiding the allocation of the burden of proof 
under international law and both common and civil law traditions is that the party 
asserting a claim bears the burden of proving the facts disputed: onus probandi actori 
incumbitF Accordingly, depending on the source of the challenge, the burden may 
fall on the accused, a State with jurisdiction, a State from which acceptance of 
jurisdiction is required under article 12, or the Prosecutor. All the above may 
challenge the determination with respect to the jurisdiction of the Court or the 
admissibility of a case. In addition, a State with jurisdiction may lodge an appeal 
against a ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber on its deferral request (article 18(4)). The 
Prosecutor, in turn, may challenge the deferral procedure before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber (article 18(2)) and the Appeals Chamber (article 18(4)), and may request a 
review on a determination of inadmissibility under article 17 on the basis of new facts 
(article 19(10)). The Prosecutor will also bear the burden of proving the absence of 
genuine domestic investigations or prosecutions before the PTC where he seeks to 
initiate an investigation proprio motu (article 15(4)). Cases initiated in accordance to 
a State or Security Council referral carry a presumption in favour of the Prosecutor’s 
determination on admissibility until challenged.
Where a State brings a jurisdiction or admissibility challenge, the burden of 
proof in determining the effectiveness of its national procedures will lie with that 
State. In particular, it will have to show that it is acting in good faith and not merely 
attempting to delay or deflect ICC proceedings. This makes formidable sense since it 
is national authorities that, by virtue of their own resources and familiarity with their
57 Kazazi, Burden o f Proof and Related Issues: A study on Evidence before International Tribunals 
(1995), 369; Lillich, ed., Fact-Finding Before International Tribunals (1990), 34
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system, are best positioned to give evidence as to the effectiveness of their 
procedures.
The Court may, however, adopt other commonly accepted principles for 
allocating the burden of proof. It may, for example, place the burden on the party 
making the disfavoured contention, which will almost always be the Prosecutor.58 In 
particular, the judges may opine that the structure of article 17 provides a presumption 
in favour of domestic action. Since a case will be inadmissible unless lack of domestic 
genuineness can be proven, the Court may decide that the burden of demonstrating 
bad faith or inability rests with the Prosecutor. Equally, the Prosecutor may try to 
balance or shift the burden towards the State by relying on the principle that the party 
that has exclusive or superior knowledge of the facts is in the best position to provide 
the required evidence.59 Proof of obstruction by State authorities, such as by 
unreasonable restrictions being placed on access to information on national 
proceedings, may enable adverse inferences to be drawn by the Court.60
(b) Standard of proof
The standard of proof at the admissibility stage should be the ‘balance of 
probabilities’ and not a higher standard such as ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’, 
since what is at issue is the forum in which the alleged conduct is to be tried, not the 
determination of the actual conduct itself. The drafting history demonstrates, 
nonetheless, that appropriate deference should be granted to domestic jurisdictions 
when assessing the ‘genuineness’ of national proceedings, including decisions not to 
prosecute, as a precaution against the ICC sitting in judgement as an appellate body 
over the efficacy of national proceedings.
58 OTP Policy Paper, 55
59 Eduardo Bleier v Uruguay, HRC Comm.No.R.7/30 (23 May 1978),HI3.3; Avsar v Turkey (25657/94) 
ECHR 435 (10 July 2001),1(392; Salman v 7wrfey,(21986/93) ECHR 356 (27 June 2000),1(100; Cakici 
v Turkey,(22651/94)[\999] ECHR 41 (8 July 1999),1(87; Ertak v Turkey,(20164/92) ECHR 192 (9 May 
2000),1(131; Timurta§ v Turkey,(23531/94) ECHR 221 (13 June 2000),1(82; Selmouni v France, 
(25803/94) ECHR 66 (28 July 1999),1(87; Ribitsch v Austria,(18896/91) ECHR 55 (4 December 
1995),1(34; Tomasi v France,(12850/87) ECHR 53 (27 August 1992),1(108-111
60 Informal expert paper (complementarity), 1(56
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(c) Forum determination
Another set of issues governing the interaction between national courts and the ICC is 
the question of how the trial venue will be determined where the ICC either declines 
or defers jurisdiction. On the inter-State level, there is no general rule of international 
law establishing a hierarchy between the various bases of jurisdiction where different 
national authorities want to prosecute the same conduct. Multilateral extradition 
instruments normally leave the requested State with discretion to decide which State 
is given priority. In the absence of guiding rules, forum determination is normally 
made on practical grounds such as the availability of witnesses and evidence, the 
location of the accused, and the decisions on extradition made by the custodial State. 
It may also be influenced by the manner in which a particular State has prescribed the 
jurisdiction of its domestic courts.
Territorial jurisdiction is widely held to be the strongest and primary basis for 
jurisdiction.61 Literature on the topic, thus, normally grants preference to the place 
where the offence took place, subject to there being a genuine ability and willingness 
to effectively prosecute the conduct in question. Prosecution in the territorial State 
will normally have several advantages, including the convenience to the parties, cost- 
effectiveness and procedural efficiency.62 It also corresponds to the principle that a 
criminal defendant should be tried by his ‘natural judge’.63 The proximity of the 
courts to the events, moreover, will enable a better appreciation of die socio-political, 
historical, cultural context of the case, and is more likely to contribute to restorative 
justice for the victims and affected communities. Domestic legitimacy and 
acceptance, furthermore, may better contribute to public debate and deliberation, and 
heighten pedagogical initiatives to deter the future recurrence of violence and to 
inculcate a culture of accountability.
Other valid reasons, however, may militate against assigning priority to the 
State where the crime occurred. The State of nationality of the accused or the State of 
nationality of the victim may have equally compelling arguments for prosecuting the 
case. Granting primacy to the territorial State may risk creating priority claims to 
ownership which could be linked to concepts of sovereignty and non-intervention in
61 Jennings and Watts (1996), 458
62 Cottier, in Fischer, Kress and Liider, eds., International and National Prosecution o f Crimes under 
International Law: Current Developments 2 (2004), 851
63 Commentary to Princeton Principles, 53
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order to limit action by other States.64 Moreover, aside from the inability or 
unwillingness of the territorial State to entertain genuine prosecutions, there may be 
practical factors, such as the presence of the victim and the accused, perhaps by way 
of asylum, in another country. Finally, States with no direct nexus to die crime enable 
the exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of universality, although this represents the 
weakest basis of jurisdiction. Some national courts require a legitimising link between 
the crime and the forum State,65 or evidence that the territorial State is unwilling or 
unable to genuinely prosecute,66 before allowing the cases to proceed.
As at the inter-State level, there are no guiding rules in the ICC Statute or 
Rules on how the Court should select the venue for prosecution where it decides to 
defer a case and there are several competing claims to jurisdiction.67 Article 90, on 
competing extradition requests, provides a list of criteria which the judges may decide 
to apply by analogy. This include such factors as the respective dates of the request, 
the interests of the requesting State including, where relevant, whether the crime was 
committed in its territory, and the nationality of the victims and of the person sought. 
ICTY Rule 1 Ibis on the referral of cases to domestic courts provides for the transfer 
of cases to the State in whose territory the crime was committed, or in which the 
accused was arrested, or to a State having jurisdiction and being willing and 
adequately prepared to accept such a case, without indicating a priority of ranking.68 
As the ICTY Referral Bench has stated, “it has not been shown that there is an 
established priority in international law in favour of the State in whose territory a 
crime was committed. International extradition treaties, whether multilateral or 
bilateral, offer some analogy, but these do not typically provide for primacy of any 
one ground of jurisdiction. In domestic jurisdictions, the question is often regulated by
64 Ferdinandusse, ‘The Interaction of National and International Approaches in the Repression of 
International Crimes’ (2004) EJIL15,1050
65 See discussion on German practice, Chapter 3, n. 118-122 and accompanying text. See also, more 
generally, adoption o f ‘genuine link’ principle in the Nottebohm case, ICJ Rep (1955)
and rulings in Spanish courts
66 See Decision of the National Court (Spain), Criminal Chamber, Plenary Session, Appeal Record No. 
115/2000, Preliminary Proceedings 331/99, Central Court of Instruction No. 1, Madrid, 13 December 
2000, concerning action brought against former Guatemalan military and government officials
67 See Morris, ‘Complementarity and Its Discontents: States, Victims, and the International Criminal 
Court’, in Shelton, ed., International Crimes, Peace, and Human Rights: The Role o f the International 
Criminal Court (2000) who points out that “the ICC Treaty articulates no principles or policies to 
govern ... decision making on fundamental issues”
8 See Prosecutor v Mejakic et al., Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral o f Case Pursuant to 
Rule 77bis (20 July 2005), f40: “As a matter of construction, the Rule appears, relevantly, to be 
concerned only to identify the alternatives and gives no indication of a hierarchy of, or priority 
between, states.”
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statute and there is no universal provision or practice.” The Princeton Principles on 
Universal Jurisdiction provide a non-exhaustive set of criteria for States to take into 
consideration when deciding whether to try or extradite a person over which it has 
custody solely on the basis of universal jurisdiction based on an aggregate balance of 
multilateral or bilateral treaty obligations; the place of commission of the crime; the 
nationality connection of the alleged perpetrator to the requesting State; the 
nationality connection of the victim to the requesting State; any other connection 
between the requesting State and the alleged perpetrator, the crime, or the victim; the 
likelihood, good faith, and effectiveness of prosecution in the requesting State; the 
fairness and impartiality of the proceedings in the requesting State; convenience to the 
parties and witnesses, and the availability of evidence in the requesting State; and the 
interests of justice.69 Burke-White suggests the guiding rules for the selection of the 
forum conveniens can be found by application of the principle of subsidiarity. As 
employed in the Treaties of the European Union, the principle seeks to by defer 
matters to the lowest practicable level for execution.70 Applied to the field of 
international criminal law, he suggests that enforcement should occur “as close to the 
affected populations as considerations of justice and fairness will allow”.71 The 
implications of subsidiarity, however, arguably go beyond the level of horizontal 
inter-State relations. For subsidiarity, like complementarity, deals primarily with the 
distribution of competencies between the State and supra-State levels along an axis of 
vertical powers, which seeks to avoid excessive centralism by ceding sovereignty 
upwards only where essential and appropriate. Moreover, once delegated, States can 
neither block nor withdraw competence and must refrain from taking concurrent 
action on the same issue.
In the hypothetical situation where all factors as to willingness and ability are 
equal, the Court may have to decide between competing bases of jurisdiction claimed 
by different States. In practice, the various principles of jurisdiction may often 
interweave, and a State claiming jurisdiction may do so on several related bases.72 
Given that the ICC explicitly recognises the bases of jurisdiction founded on 
territoriality and active personality, the most difficult choice will be between States
69 Principle 8, Princeton Principles
70 See 1992 Treaty on European Union
71 Burke-White, ‘A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law 
Enforcement’ (2002) 24 Michigan Journal of International Law 1, 87
72 Brownlie,3 06
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asserting jurisdiction on these bases. As noted above, practical factors, including the 
interests of victims, the interests of justice, the impact on reconciliation and external 
considerations may influence the ultimate outcome of the decision.
The practice of the ICTY Referral Bench is illustrative of the dilemmas the 
ICC will face. In the case of the Vukovar Three, relating to one of the most notorious 
episodes of the Croatian war, the Prosecutor’s Rule 1 Ibis motion provoked competing 
claims for transfer from Croatia (the territorial State) and Serbia and Montenegro (the 
State of nationality of the accused). The Referral Bench had to choose between 
approximately equivalent degrees of political willingness and domestic capacity to 
prosecute the accused. In addition, several practical factors were considered including 
the impact on die effected population and local reconciliation in Croatia, and the 
judicial efficiency of joining the case with ongoing related domestic proceedings 
against several co-perpetrators being put on trial in the Ovcari case in Belgrade. Faced 
with the unenviable task before the judges and controversy caused in the region, in the 
end the Prosecutor decided to withdraw the motion after concluding that “any 
decision by the Chambers to transfer it would provoke deep resentment in one or the 
other country considered for the transfer” and “would not be in the interest of 
justice”.73 The case was therefore retained by the Tribunal, an option that will likely 
not be open to the ICC Prosecutor in an admissibility determination before the Court.
In the case of Mejakic et al., the choice before the ICTY Referral Bench was 
less evenly balanced between BiH, which claimed jurisdiction on the bases of 
territoriality, active nationality and passive nationality, and Serbia and Montenegro, 
which claimed jurisdiction also on the basis of active nationality as well as on the 
basis that the transfer of the accused had been executed by that State.74 The authorities 
of BiH argued that it had a significantly greater nexus with the trial of each of the 
accused for the offences alleged against them. In addition, the BiH authorities in 
conjunction with the international community had recently set up a special War 
Crimes Chamber - a forum that had been central to the development of the 
International Tribunal’s own completion strategy.75 There was a clear preference, 
thus, for the ICTY to transfer cases to an institution it had helped engender and which
73 Address by ICTY Prosecutor to the Security Council (13 June 2005) CDP/MOW/977-e. The choice 
of wording recalling the Statutory grounds under article 53 by which the ICC Prosecutor may decide 
against a particular prosecution is interesting.
74 Prosecutor v Mejakic et al., Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral o f Case Pursuant to Rule 
77bis (20 July 2005)
75 See above, Chapter 4
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retained an international component. By contrast, SCG argued, inter alia, that the 
Tribunal could not transfer the case to another forum without its consent based by 
analogy on the inter-State rule prohibiting re-extradition whereby an individual is to 
be returned to the Sending State upon completion of the legal process in the 
requesting State. In rejecting the argument the Referral Bench considered, inter alia, 
the fact the three accused had voluntarily surrendered, albeit under some pressure, and 
thus, even under extradition law, could not be considered as having been transferred 
by SCG. More importantly, the Bench noted the established distinction between 
extradition and surrender and, in particular, the difference between a bilateral 
agreement between States and the obligation to render cooperation pursuant to 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.76
As with the ICTY, determinations on competing jurisdictional claims by the 
ICC will most likely be determined by reference to factors such as the genuineness of 
the link between the crime and the State (base of jurisdiction claimed) and practical 
factors affecting the availability of potential evidence. Experience demonstrates, 
however, that such decisions may prove controversial, particularly in volatile conflict 
or post-conflict political settings.
Conclusion
The admissibility regime of the ICC establishes a pragmatic system for enabling cases 
to be heard by the Court. While States can lodge challenges at different stages, once a 
situation has been referred it falls to the Court to determine where jurisdiction resides. 
Much will depend, therefore, on the manner by which the Court applies any margin of 
appreciation in favour of State challenges. As the scenarios cited above indicate, 
without robust application, the Statute may prove a weak instrument to counter the 
tactics of recalcitrant State bent on exploiting its numerous procedural devices. The 
Court will have to determine carefully, therefore, at each stage whether national 
efforts are undertaken in a genuine manner or otherwise designed to shield offenders 
from justice. These supervisory functions represent the cornerstone of 
complementarity, in granting the Court exclusive competence to rule on all matters
76 ibid, H129-31
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related to its jurisdiction and the admissibility of cases against the competing claims 
of national forums.
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VIII
International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance
Having determined its jurisdiction with respect to a situation, the ICC will depend on 
the cooperation of States to give effect, inter alia, to its ability to conduct 
investigations, identify and locate persons, take testimony and produce evidence, 
access documents and to effect arrest and surrender. Of all the provisions on the 
Rome Statute, Part 9 dealing with international cooperation and judicial assistance 
most clearly encapsulates the tensions between vertical and horizontal regimes. In 
some respects, the system established echoes the ad hoc Tribunals, while in others it 
models itself on traditional and consensual mutual assistance provisions. The chapter 
will show that without good faith cooperation or robust Security Council intervention, 
the ICC may lack the adequate tools to conduct its investigative activities.
The use of term ‘cooperation’ under the Statute encapsulates a range of 
functions. A first cluster of activities include requests from the Prosecutor at the 
preliminary examination stage for the provision of additional information from any 
reliable source pursuant to article 15 and Rule 104; requests for cooperation from 
States and intergovernmental organisations under article 54(3)(c) -(d); and requests 
for cooperation under Part 9. It is in this sense that the term cooperation is used in this 
study. Other references to cooperation in the Statute include the authority of the Pre- 
Trial Chamber, acting either on the motion of the Prosecutor, the defence, or its own 
initiative, to request cooperation pursuant to an order issued under articles 56 and 57. 
The Trial Chamber may exercise the same powers in accordance with article 61(11) 
and 64(6). The Court may seek also cooperation for the enforcement of sentences in 
relation to a core crimes conviction or for an offence against the administration of the 
Court.
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1. HORIZONTAL V. VERTICAL POWERS
(a) A mixture o f powers
As a number of commentators have suggested, the Rome Statute creates a unique 
mixture of horizontal and vertical regimes.1 In some respects, the ICC follows the 
supra-State model of the ad hoc Tribunals.2 Thus, surrender to the Court is 
distinguished from extradition in order to exclude traditional objections under 
extradition law, as well as constitutional bars in those States that prevent the 
extradition of nationals.3 Similarly, the term ‘other forms of cooperation’ is employed 
in place of mutual legal assistance. The general duty to cooperate specifies that 
“States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully 
with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court” (article 86). This duty to cooperate is applicable to the whole Statute and 
not, as some delegations had proposed during negotiations, only to Part 9.4 Article 88 
requires that States Parties “ensure that there are procedures available under their 
national law for all of the forms of cooperation which are specified under this Part.” 
State Parties are required, therefore, to adopt requisite implementing legislation and 
cannot plead deficiencies in their domestic law against a failure to perform their treaty 
obligations.5 As with die ad hoc Tribunals, the Court is under no obligation of 
reciprocity towards States, although it may respond to incoming requests for 
assistance.6 The Court is also the final arbiter of disputes over the extent of 
cooperation owed by States under the Statute, and may make a finding of non- 
compliance and report the matter either to the Assembly of States Parties or to the
1 See, e.g., A. Cassese, ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections’ 
(1999) 10EJIL, 144
2 ibid
3 Some states had urged for a flexible system in the ICC Statute that would allow for their special 
constitutional requirements; A/51/22 (1996), Vol.I, [^311; Zutphen Draft Article 79[53], 2(b) permitted 
a ground for refusal where the person sought was a national of the requested State; A/CN.4/L.490 & 
A/CN.4/L.490/Add. 1(1993); ILC Commentary on Article 41, A/49/10,(1994)
4 Article 77[51] of Zutphen draft consolidated text read “States Parties shall, in accordance with the 
provisions of this [Part] [Statute], fully co-operate with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of 
crimes under this Statute. State Parties shall so co-operate without [undue] delay”; A/AC.249/1997/L.9/ 
Revl,p.41
5 Art.27 VCLT
6 Article 93(10)
194
Chapter VIII
Security Council where the Council has triggered the situation (article 87(7)).7 The 
role of national bodies in relation to Court requests is strictly confined. In arrest 
proceedings, for example, while the competent judicial authority of the custodial State 
is to determine whether proper process has been served and the arrested person’s 
rights have been respected, it may not examine the legality of the warrant itself 
(article 59(4)).
Other provisions of Part 9 reflect traditional mutual legal assistance between 
States. Thus, in contrast to the ICTY and ICTR, only States that have accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court are obliged to cooperate, barring Security Council 
intervention.8 Article 87, moreover, speaks of ‘requests for cooperation’ rather than 
the language of ‘obligation’ and compliance with ‘orders’. In contrast to the ICTY 
and ICTR, the Rome Statute grants States numerous grounds for refusal, any one of 
which could potentially delay cooperation or could be exploited to avoid obligations 
arising from die Statute. The requested State may seek consultation, modification, or 
postponement of the particular measure of cooperation based on national security 
considerations (article 72); third party interests (articles 73 and 93(9)(b)); competing 
requests for extradition from a non-Parties State (article 90), or a competing request 
for cooperation (article 93(9)); a prohibition in domestic law (article 91 & 99); other 
requirements of its domestic law (article 91 & 96); interference with an ongoing case 
different from that to which the request relates (article 94); lack of information 
provided, pre-existing treaty obligations with non-Parties States, or an inability to 
affect an arrest (article 97); or the immunity of persons or property of a third State 
under international law or of a national of a sending State under an international 
agreement (article 98). Moreover, the requested State may raise issues for 
consultations with respect to any problems it identifies which may “impede or 
prevent” the execution of a request, although the object of such consultations must be 
to resolve the matter without delay (article 97). An admissibility challenge under 
articles 18 and 19, moreover, may postpone execution, absent instructions from the 
Court to the contrary (article 95). Such postponement, however, does not effect the 
ability of the Prosecutor to exceptionally seek measures from the Pre-Trial Chamber
7 Where the Security Council did not refer the matter there is nothing preventing the Court from asking 
for the cooperation and assistance of the Council pursuant to article 87(6) ICC Statue and article 15 of 
the UN-ICC Relationship Agreement; ICC-ASP/3/Res.l
8 Non-Party States may cooperate either by accepting ICC jurisdiction ad hoc (article 12(3)), or 
otherwise by providing assistance on the basis of an arrangement, an agreement or any other 
appropriate basis (article 87(5))
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“to take testimony or a statement from a witness of to examine, collect or test 
evidence, which may not be available subsequently for the purposes of the trial” 
pursuant to article 56. As to compulsory measures, the Trial Chamber can only 
compel a person a witness or require the production of evidence if the domestic 
legislation of the State where the witness or evidence is located enables national 
authorities to assist the Court in this manner.9
(b) Domestic modalities
The mixture of the vertical and horizontal regimes is displayed best perhaps in the 
proviso that requests for arrest and surrender and requests for assistance are to be 
executed in accordance with both Part 9 and the procedures under domestic law 
(articles 89 and 93). This presupposes that Part 9 of the Statute and a State’s national 
laws are mutual compatible.10 A State Party, therefore, cannot be restrained by 
national law from rendering cooperation to the Court pursuant to its obligations under 
Part 9 in ways not anticipated by the Statute. A State Party would violate its 
obligations, for example, where its legislation permits the application of a political 
offence exemption to surrender, or otherwise enabled national authorities to consider 
whether an arrest warrant is properly issued, to entertain a ne bis in idem claim 
contrary to article 89(2), or to hear challenges related to admissibility.
Other provisions leave open the question of the balance to be achieved 
between the investigative requirements of the Court and observance of domestic 
procedures. The Statute does not determine, for example, whether the taking of 
evidence and the carrying out of requests should be led by the Prosecutor and assisted, 
where necessary, by national authorities or if, instead, States should be in charge of 
request execution.11 This ambiguity reflects the varying practice of States. It also 
corresponds to the possibility provided in some jurisdictions for the involvement of 
the requesting authority in request execution. Modem mutual legal assistance regimes, 
moreover, depart from the traditional rule that requests should be execution according
9 Article 64(6), art.58(7)
10 Broomhall (1999),131
11 Cassese (1999), 165
196
Chapter VIII
to the law of the requested State.12 This movement has occurred because of problems 
where, as a result of differences between national procedures, information gathered by 
one State may be inadmissible before the courts of another State because it does not 
meet its domestic procedural requirements. Article 99(1) of the Statute, thus, provides 
that requests for assistance are to be executed “in accordance with the relevant 
procedure under the law of the requested State and, unless prohibited by such law, in 
the manner specified in the request”. Accordingly, a State Party will not be able to 
argue that the manner specified in the request cannot be observed because of an 
absence of domestic provisions, because it departs from normal domestic practice, or 
it is otherwise cumbersome: it must show a specific prohibition in law. Moreover, the 
provision does not rule out the possibility for the Prosecutor to control elements of 
request execution. For example, while the OTP may request the assistance of the State 
authorities in the identification and location persons, or to facilitate the voluntary 
appearance of a witness, it may request that the questioning of the individuals be 
undertaken by its own officials without the presence of State authorities. A witness, 
for example, may feel intimidated by the presence of domestic officials during 
questioning.13 Moreover, enabling States to control the manner in which ICC requests 
are executed could undermine the effectiveness of the results achieved. As Arbour 
and Bergsmo have noted, “[b]ased on the experience of the two ad hoc Tribunals, 
merely allowing Tribunal investigators to be present at and assist in the execution 
process would fall far short of the requirements of effective international investigation 
and prosecution. How can cases be prepared effectively if the Prosecutor cannot 
control the gathering of evidence?”14 Failure to secure such control could render the 
obligation to cooperate only as effective as the national laws and procedures of each 
State.15 This will be all the more important given that investigative measures will be 
undertaken predominantly on the territory of conflict or post-conflict States.
12 See art.6 Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, A/45/117(1990), A/53/112(1998); 
art. 18(17) Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, A/55/383(2000); and art.4(l) EU 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European 
Union (2000)
13 The presence of the territorial State’s law enforcement personnel is normally required in most civil 
law jurisdictions, but is typically less strict for inter-State requests between common law jurisdictions; 
interview with Kimberly Prost, Head of the Criminal Law Section, Commonwealth Secretariat (2004); 
on file with author
14 Arbour and Bergsmo, ‘Conspicuous Absence of Jurisdictional Overreach’, in von. Hebei, Lammers, 
and Schukking, eds., Reflections on the International Criminal Court (1999), 137
15 Bassiouni, ‘Observations Concerning The 1997-98 Preparatory Committee’s Work’, 13 Nouvelles 
Etudes Penales (1997), 20
197
Chapter VIII
Articles 91 and 96 provide that the requested State can require that a request is 
accompanied by such information as may be required under its domestic law. These 
provisions should be interpreted narrowly to avoid them operating as an obstacle to 
speedy cooperation. In relation to requests for arrest and surrender, article 91(2)(c) 
points out that such requirements “should not be more burdensome than those 
applicable to requests for extradition pursuant to treaties or arrangements between the 
requested State and other States and should, if possible, be less burdensome, taking 
into account the distinct nature of the Court”. This relates, in particular, to the 
requirement in some jurisdictions that evidence, such as witness statements, is 
produced before its courts to support an extradition request. A number of common 
law countries have already eliminated this requirement for extradition proceedings 
with certain States. The UK, for example, has lifted the requirement with respect to 
EU Member States under the 1957 European Convention on Extradition,16 In a 
similar manner, the common law States that have, to date, adopted implementing 
legislation for the Rome Statute have deleted the requirement for the production of 
evidence in ICC surrender proceedings.17 Despite the absence of a similar caveat with 
respect to other forms of cooperation, article 96(2)(e) should arguably be interpreted 
in the same spirit as article 91(2)(c) in order to prevent inconsistencies and the raising, 
similarly, of undue obstacles.18
(c) Competing requests
Although the Rome Statute distinguishes requests for arrest and surrender from 
extradition proceedings, a number of the procedural aspects of the ICC surrender 
process are borrowed from domestic practice. Article 90 deals with the complex 
situation where a State Party receives a request for arrest and surrender from the Court 
and a request for extradition from another State for die same person and for the same 
conduct. If the competing request originates from another State Party, the requested 
State is to give priority to the ICC, but does not have to affect the surrender unless the 
Court has ruled on admissibility of the case. Priority is to be accorded to the Court
16 1990 SI 1507, reg.3
17 See UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa
18 Informal expert paper: Fact-finding and investigative functions o f the Office o f the Prosecutor, 
including international co-operation (ICC-OTP 2003) (‘Informal expert paper (cooperation)’), [^60
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where the competing request comes from a non-Party State with which the requested 
State does not have any extradition treaty obligations, and where the case has been 
found admissible by the Court. If the case has not been found admissible, the request 
of the ICC and that of the non-Party State are to be placed on an equal footing, 
leaving the requested State free to proceed with extradition if it so chooses. Similarly, 
where the competing request comes from a non-Party State with whom the requested 
State does have extradition treaty obligations, and the case has been found admissible 
by the Court, the requested State is again granted discretion to determine which 
request shall be given priority.19 The requested State, however, must take a number of 
factors into consideration in arriving at its decision, including the respective dates of 
the requests; the interests of the requesting State, in particular as to whether it is the 
territorial State or the State of the nationality of the victim or of the accused; and the 
possibility of subsequent surrender between the ICC and the other State. These last 
criteria have been taken over from extradition instruments. Finally, where a 
competing extradition claim is presented by any State for the same person, but for 
different conduct, the requested State is to give priority to the Court where it does not 
have extradition treaty obligations with the requesting State, and where it does, to 
apply the above factors as to the interests of the requesting State, but while giving 
special consideration to the relative nature and gravity of the conduct in question. The 
same set of principles are to be applied in relation to competing requests for assistance 
(other form of cooperation) where the matter cannot be resolved by consultation 
between requested State, die Court and the third State (article 93(9)(a)). The Rome 
Statute, thus, attempts to strike a balance between the cooperation regime binding on 
States Parties and their existing reciprocal obligations towards other States under 
extradition law. As is apparent, the procedure is both complicated and cumbersome, 
and distinguished from the absolute obligatory regime under the Statute and Rules of 
the ad hoc Tribunals.21
In reviewing this system, Prost argues that it would be incorrect to suggest that 
the regime established by the ICC Statute imports a horizontal, State-centric approach 
to cooperation since the issue of competing requests relates to the obligation of State 
Parties to other States, not of State Parties towards the ICC:
19 Compare the ability of the ICTY to issue binding orders for surrender to all States, irrespective of 
competing treaty obligations
20 See, e.g., art. 17, European Convention on Extradition (1957)
21 See Rule 58, ICTY & ICTR RPE
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If the requested State were obliged to give the Court priority over a non-State 
Party, this would amount to affecting the rights of States not Parties to the 
Statute. This would be in conflict with the principles reflected in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Instead, the obligations owed to the non- 
State Party are placed on equal footing with those owed to the Court and 
thereby, while the decision of the requesting State may be in favour of the 
Court as opposed to the State, nothing in the Statute itself affects the rights of 
non-States Parties.22
Although Prost identifies the correct legal issues involved, the results flowing from 
the negotiated text of the Statute may be less than satisfactory, particularly where they 
may lead to postpone, delay and possibly to non-surrender. Moreover, where a 
requested State is bound under treaty obligations to a non-Parties State to try or 
extradite an accused, the requesting non-Party State may refuse to recognise transfer 
to the ICC as satisfaction of treaty obligations.
Indicative of the compromise text which the Statute represents, Part 9 oddly it 
incorporates the extradition rule of speciality. This means that an indictment against 
an accused cannot be amended after surrender even where, for example, through new 
witnesses only coming forward after the arrest, new evidence overwhelmingly 
supports the addition of crimes or a withdrawal of counts, without the consent of the 
surrendering State. The amendment of indictments has proven to be essential for the 
ICTY and ICTR Prosecutors, and the imposition of a speciality requirement seems to 
be an unnecessary restriction. Sensitivity to this concern during negotiations led to the 
inclusion of the second subparagraph to the article, as a counter compromise, enabling 
the Court to request a waiver of speciality from the surrendering State and 
encouraging the requested State to grant such waiver.
(d) Additional forms of cooperation
The forms of cooperation listed in Part 9 are not exhaustive. Pursuant to article 
93(1)(1), the Court may request States to provide “any other type of assistance which 
is not prohibited by the law of the requested State”. Article 93(3) provides that any
22 Prost, ‘Article 90’,in Trifterer (1999), 1088. Compare Cassese (1999), at 166, who argues somewhat 
unconvincingly and without tackling the issues raised by the law of treaties, that the obligations 
stemming from the Rome Statute should have taken precedence over those flowing from other treaties.
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applicable domestic bar must be “on the basis of an existing fundamental legal 
principle of general application”. Thus, the prohibition must be pre-existing and not 
adopted after the ratification of the Rome Statute; it must offend a fundamental 
principle, which may be evidenced by other domestic statutory or constitutional 
provisions; and it must apply generally to other situations under domestic law and not 
just to ICC proceedings. The burden of proof in this respect should be placed on the 
State {onus probandi actori incumbit).
The Court could utilise article 93(1 )(1) to seek forms of cooperation not 
prohibited in domestic law, such as the intercept of communications, DNA testing, or 
the provision of forensic and other expertise and assistance. As with article 99(1), the 
provision could also be used for the rendering of passive assistance by States, by 
permitting the OTP to undertake specific investigations steps in its territory without 
the participation or presence its domestic authorities. Where the requested measure of 
assistance is prohibited under domestic law, the State concerned must “promptly 
consult with the Court to try to resolve the matter”. In particular, the requested State 
may propose to provide the assistance sought “in another manner or subject to 
conditions”. If, after consultations, the matter cannot be resolved, it is for the Court to 
modify the request as necessary: a result that is considerably at odds with the absolute 
normative obligations imposed by the ad hoc Tribunals.
(e) National security and request denial
The Statute provides that a State may deny a request relating to national security 
outright, either in whole or in part, although it may consider whether the assistance 
can be provided under “specified conditions, or whether the assistance can be 
provided at a later date or in an alternative manner”.23 If the requested material is in 
the possession of the OTP, for example pursuant to an article 54(3)(e) confidentiality 
agreement, the Court may order disclosure. If the material is in the sole possession of 
the State, the Court may merely make such inference in the trial as to the existence or 
non-existence of a fact related to the evidence withheld (article 72(7)). In addition, if 
the Court concludes that by invoking such grounds for refusal the State is not acting
23 Article 93(4)-(5)
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in accordance with it obligations under the Statute, it may make a finding also of non- 
compliance and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or the Security 
Council, as appropriate.
Other possibilities for request denial are strictly limited to where the request 
relates to a type of assistance not listed in Part 9 and which is prohibit by national law 
(article 93(3)); where the request relates to documents or information received in 
confidence from a third party (article 73); where the State Party receives a competing 
request from a non-Party State pursuant to an existing international obligation (article 
90); or in connection with die immunity of a third party (article 98). Denials made in 
addition to those foreseen in the Statute would place a State in breach its treaty 
obligations and would expose it to a possible finding of non-compliance. Other 
factors which may prevent a State Party from executing a request without further 
consultation, but which cannot form the basis of a denial, include: insufficient 
information received; inability, despite best efforts, to locate the person sought for 
surrender; or the fact that execution of the request in its current form would require 
the requested State to breach a pre-existing treaty obligation undertaken with respect 
to another State (article 97).
(j) Immunities pertaining to third States or Organisations
Whereas article 27 of the Statute provides that immunities under national or 
international law shall not bar the jurisdiction of the Court, article 98 deals with the 
immunities owed by a requested State Party to a third State or organisation. Thus, 
while a State Party may not invoke immunities to deny a request for the arrest and 
surrender of its own nationals, article 98 provides that it will not be asked to proceed 
with the arrest and surrender of a national of a third State who enjoys State or 
diplomatic immunity under international law absent the consent of that State (article 
98(1)). The provision serves to maintain the well-established system of inter-State 
immunities discussed in Chapter 2. Equally, paragraph 2 of article 98 provides that 
the Court may not proceed with a request that requires a State Party to act 
inconsistently with an international agreement pursuant to which the consent of a 
sending State is required for the surrender of one of its nationals to the Court. This 
helps clarify that the prohibition on re-extradition common to bilateral extradition
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agreements also applies to request for surrender to the Court. Moreover, the provision 
is meant to cover persons who enjoy privileges and immunities under military 
arrangements providing for the stationing of forces abroad. Status of Force 
Agreements (‘SOFA’) or Status of Mission Agreements (‘SOMA’), such as those 
governing the deployment of national armed forces or UN peacekeepers around the 
world, typically provide for the retention of exclusive criminal jurisdiction by the 
sending State over their personnel for offences committed on the territory of the 
receiving State.24
The result of these provisions means that, as with competing extradition 
requests, where a surrender request affects the interests of a third State, the ICC will 
be bound by die regulations of inter-State practice. This may have significant impact 
on the ability of the Court to secure accused persons, particularly since the focus of 
the Prosecutor on the persons most responsible may well result in the targeting of 
individual in senior military or political office. If the Court is unable to secure the 
cooperation of the State of nationality of the accused, a suspect may be able to take 
shield behind the cover of State or diplomatic immunity in a third State.
The scope of article 98 will be subject to the interpretation of the Court.25 The 
ICC judges may hold, for example, following the Pinochet ruling, that immunity 
ratione materiae under article 98 is not available for official acts that are contrary to 
ICC core crimes. A strict observance of the House of Lords decision, however, would 
require a link to an express waiver of immunity, such as by way of a treaty 
requirement that has been domestically incorporated by the requested State and the 
third State, and which criminalises the act in question. Immunity ratione personae, 
moreover, would remain in force. A narrow construction of the ICJ decision in Congo 
v. Belgium, by contrast, could lead the judges to deny any exceptions to functional 
immunity for acts that were not conducted in a purely private capacity.26 
Alternatively, the judges may rule that article 27 of the Rome Statute establishes a 
waiver of immunity between State Parties for the purpose of the arrest and surrender 
of their own officials to the Court. Because Parties would be acting pursuant to an 
ICC request and in the delegated fulfilment of Court powers accepted by them, 
immunity would not attach either to the person or the functions of any State Party
24 See above, Chapter 6
25 See generally this section Broomhall (2003), 141-6
26 See discussion above, Chapter 2
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official sought by the Court. Immunities would continue to exist, meanwhile, subject 
to article 98, for the officials of non-Party States.27
Kleffner goes further and argues that by consenting to article 27(2) State 
Parties “implicitly waive the international immunities of their incumbent senior 
officials vis-a-vis other State parties in their national proceedings.” The Rome 
Statute, however, only creates obligations between State Parties and the Court. It does 
not regulate nor alter the regime of inter-State horizontal relations between Parties 
except in explicit circumstances.29 As noted in Chapter 2, the observance of personal 
immunities of incumbent senior officials forms one of the most traditional tenants of 
inter-State relations. Absent explicit consent, the acceptance by a State Party of article 
27(2) cannot be read so as waive such immunities for its officials before foreign 
courts. Moreover, in the light of the legislative and constitutional considerations 
highlighted above, it is highly doubtful that State Parties intended such an outcome.
Another controversial postulate would be for the Court to hold that both 
immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae under international law 
are no longer applicable between States with regard to perpetrators of core crimes, 
irrespective of whether they are Parties to the Statute or not.30 This would render the 
formulation in article 98(1) of immunities “under international law” sufficiently 
flexible so as to take into account emerging developments in State practice and 
opinion juris: thereby reducing the applicability of article 98 essentially to non core 
crime offences.31
Finally, as noted below, it is possible for the Security Council to adopt a 
resolution under Chapter VII requiring States to lift or disregard immunities for 
persons named in a particular ICC arrest warrant, thereby overriding any pre-existing 
obligations of UN Member States under international law (article 103, UN Charter).32
27 See Broomhall (2003), 144-5; Swart and Sluiter, ‘The International Criminal Court and International 
Criminal Cooperation’, in von Hebei, Lammers and Schukking (1999), 120-1
28 See Kleffer (2003), 103-6, although he argues that personal immunities would continue to apply in 
respect of non-Party States
29 Articles 90 and 93(9) on competing requests for judicial assistance and extradition; see above, 
Chapter 8
30 Broomhall (2003),146
31 Namely, offences against the administration of justice, art.70
32 See ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ below
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(g) Direct execution of investigative measures
Two further features of the Rome Statute demonstrate how the ICC cooperation 
regime departs from traditional mutual legal assistance regimes. Firstly, article 99(4) 
authorises the Prosecutor to execute a request directly in the territory of a State Party 
without having secured its consent and, if necessary, without the presence of the 
authorities of the requested State. The provision is strictly limited to measures that can 
be conducted on a non-compulsory basis. This includes die interviews of witnesses on 
a voluntaiy basis, or the examination of a public site or place, such as a mass grave, 
but without ‘modification’. Such measures can be executed directly in two situations: 
(1) in the territorial State, where there has been a determination of admissibility, and 
following “all possible consultations with the requested State Party”; and (2) in other 
cases, “following consultations with the requested State Party and subject to any 
reasonable conditions or concerns raised”. With respect to both situations, Prost and 
Schlunck point out that the language of consultation “was chosen to reflect that the 
Prosecutor should pursue consultations whenever possible, but at the same time 
recognising that consultations may not be possible, in which case there will be no 
discussion with the State Party, prior to execution.”33 By distinguishing between the 
State where the crime is alleged to have been committed and others State Parties, the 
provision creates creative ambiguity in relation to the latter by imposing conditions 
that fall short of a strict consent requirement, but go further than mere consultation.34 
Nonetheless, in both situations the requested State cannot raise concerns and propose 
conditions that are unreasonable and contrary to the express terms of Article 99(4), 
such as by requiring die presence of domestic authorities during the execution of the
o r
measure. Finally, since notice of an intention to undertake non-compulsory 
measures is distinguished from routine article 93 requests, the Prosecutor does not 
need to provide the supporting information normally required for a request for 
assistance (article 96) and may withhold, as appropriate, the identity of witnesses or
33 Prost and Schlunck ‘Article 99’, in Trifterer (1999),1141. The Informal expert paper (cooperation) 
suggests “[i]t would be advisable for the Prosecutor to set a deadline for the consultations and indicate 
that in the absence of a response by that time the Prosecutor will presume that the State has no concerns 
to raise and that the consultations are thus concluded”; ^68
34 Kaul and Krefi, ‘Jurisdiction and Cooperation in the Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Principles and Compromises’ (1999) Yrbk IHL V ol.2,169
35 Informal expert paper (cooperation), ^ 70
205
Chapter VIII
the location of sites to be visited.36
Secondly, the Pre-Trial Chamber may authorise the Prosecutor to take specific 
compulsory measures within the territory of a State Party without having secured its 
consent under Part 9. This it may do where it has determined that the requested State 
is “clearly unable to execute a request for cooperation due to the unavailability of any 
authority or any component of its judicial system competent to execute the request for 
cooperation”. Article 57(3)(d) represents the only exception to the principle that the 
execution of a compulsory measure is subject to State consent and is to be undertaken 
in accordance with the procedure of the requested State. The provision aims to 
remedy the void created where there is no domestic judicial authority competent to 
authorise the measure: failed State scenario. Accordingly, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, 
“whenever possible” having regard to the views of the State concerned, authorise the 
Prosecutor to take specific investigative steps. This may include, inter alia, the 
compulsory interview of persons, the conduct of searches and seizures, and 
exhumation of sites. Authorisation under the provision takes the form of an order, and 
may include specific procedures to be followed (rule 115). Conversely, the provision 
does not apply where the State is able, but unwilling to cooperate.
(h) Resource constraints
A final practical consideration bearing on the functioning of the Court’s power is its 
financial health. As a product of a treaty that is places the Court outside of the UN 
System, the ICC depends on assessed contributions made by its own State Parties or 
through voluntary contributions. The Statute also provides that funds may also be 
provided by the UN, particularly in relation to the expenses arising from a Security 
Council referral. However, at U.S. insistence, all activity undertaken to date by the 
UN for the Court, such as the execution of requests by UN operations in the field, has 
been done at a strictly reimbursable basis. The Security Council Darfur referral, 
similarly, specifies that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral 
are to be borne by the UN.37 The annual resource allocation recommended by the 
Committee on Budget and Finance to the Assembly of State Parties, therefore, will
36 ibid, 1|69
37 S/RES/1593(2005), V
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have a crucial impact on the ability of the Court to fulfil its functions.
Former ICTY/R Prosecutor Goldstone noted early on that budgetary delays 
and uninformed decision-making repeatedly frustrated the work of ad hoc tribunals 
and undermined prosecutorial independence.38 The initial years of the ICC have been 
no different. Although the Court’s financial plan is based on projections provided by 
the organs, the 2004 and 2005 budgets suffered significant cuts in a number of critical 
areas including the recruitment of investigative personnel for new referrals; the 
establishment of field offices to support operational activities; and the funding of 
victim and witness protection programmes.39 Moreover, the Committee on Budget 
and Finance questioned issues that did not have a budgetary impact, such as the 
organisational management and administration of the Prosecutor’s Office, bringing 
into doubt the Prosecutor’s authority in these matters under the Statute.40 The 
resolution of the tension between the need for efficient budgetary planning and the 
flexibility necessary to respond to new situations or conditions as they arise will be 
critical for the successful functioning of the ICC.
Questions of funding also go to the heart of legal, financial and strategic 
choices regarding the type Court envisaged by stakeholders 41 As of end 2005, the 
Court was investigating three situations, had received a State referral from the Central 
African Republic and a declaration of acceptance of jurisdiction from the Cote 
d’Ivoire and, in addition to these two, was analyzing a further five situations of 
concern 42 A case driven approach would require the ICC to act in all situations where 
crimes appear to fall within its jurisdiction and are grave enough to be admissible. 
This would result in a Court dealing with multiple situations. Such routine 
intervention, however, could encroach on the responsibility of national authorities and
38 “Without the cooperation of States, and without the necessary funding and support the 
accomplishment of our essential task is seriously jeopardized”; ‘Symposium International Criminal 
Law: Living History Interview with Judge Richard Goldstone’(1995) 5 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. 
Probs., 373 cited in O’Donohue, ‘Towards a Fully Functional International Criminal Court: The 
Adoption of the 2004 Budget’ (2004) LJIL 17, 586
39 Report o f the Committee on Budget and Finance, ICC-ASP/3/18 (13 August 2004). See O’Donohue, 
‘The 2005 Budget of the International Criminal Court: Contingency, Insufficient Funding in Key Areas 
and the Recurring Question of the Independence of the Prosecutor’ (2005) LJIL 18, 591-603. See e.g. 
the CBF recommendation for 2005, later rejected by the ASP, to cut the Prosecutor’s proposed budget 
for a third investigative team -  the budget that later went into establishing the Darfur investigative 
team; ICC-ASP/3/18,1J67
40 See, in particular, objections raised in relation to the establishment of the OTP Jurisdiction, 
Complementarity and Cooperation Division; ICC-ASP/3/18, ^61-62
41 Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Informal meeting o f Legal Advisors o f Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs (24 October 2005)
42 ibid
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represent too high a level of intrusiveness. Moreover, increasing the demands for 
intervention in comparatively less grave, although admissible, situations might fail to 
accurately reflect the concern of the international community and could lead to a 
diminishing of support.43 A resource driven approach, by contrast, would require the 
Prosecutor to adopt a highly focussed strategy that would limit the overall impact of 
the ICC, meaning that many situations involving massive crimes would not be 
investigated. A narrow focus, however, may increase international consensus towards 
ICC prosecutions.44 The budgetary priorities set by States and their financial 
commitment to the process, therefore, will dictate the much of the shape and form the 
institution will take.
2. ENHANCED COOPERATION
While Part 9 of the Statute stipulates the obligations on State Parties to render provide 
cooperation, there are a number of ways in which cooperation could be enhanced. 
One mechanism, that of bolstering the powers of the Prosecutor through Pre-Trial 
Chamber authorisation under article 57(3)(b), has already been noted. Other 
possibilities are discussed below.
(a) Domestic legislation
States may provide for additional types of assistance or facilitated modes of 
execution in their domestic legislation. Parties may include provisions in their ICC 
implementing legislation that voluntarily grant cooperation for one or more 
categories of investigative measures. Domestic modalities for cooperation may be 
strengthened also through regional decision making. In the context of EU, Members 
States, building upon the EU Council Common Position on the ICC 45 adopted a 
Council Decision in June 2002 establishing a European Network of contact points in 
respect of persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war
43 ibid
44 ibid
45 EU Council Common Position 2001/443/CFSP(l 1 June 2001)
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crimes?6 The Decision, in particular, recalls the affirmation in Rome Statute 
preamble citation four that the effective prosecution of the core crimes “must be 
ensured by taking measures at national level and by enhancing international 
cooperation”. It calls on EU Member States to enable direct communication between 
centralised, specialised contact points, and the provision of facilitated exchange of 
information, where possible without the requirement of a formal request. In a second 
Decision, the Council calls for the exchange of core crimes information between 
relevant national law enforcement and immigration authorities within and between 
EU Member States in connection with either suspicious applications for residence 
permits or in relation to domestic core crime investigations and prosecutions. The 
Decision also calls on EU Member States to consider establishing dedicated war 
crimes units within competent law enforcement authorities, and calls on the EU 
Council Presidency to promote interaction between national contact points and to 
invite representatives of the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC to coordination meetings 
as appropriate.47 Such heightened interaction between and within competent national 
authorities promise to augment the scope for complementary support for the ICC’s 
own investigative efforts.
(b) Agreements or arrangements
Article 54(3)(d) empowers the Prosecutor to enter into such arrangements or 
agreements, not inconsistent with the Statute, as may be necessary to facilitate the 
cooperation of a State, intergovernmental organisation or person. The provision has 
become a fruitful source for enhancing cooperation and a number of arrangement and 
agreements have already been concluded with State Parties, non-Party States and 
international organisations. For non-Party States and international organisations such 
agreements may form the sole legal basis for rendering cooperation48 The 
arrangement or agreement may grant assistance for the purpose of a concrete 
investigation or may enhance cooperation more generally. For example, a State Party 
may be willing to allow the Prosecutor to take voluntary witness testimony without
46 EU Council Decision 2002/494/JHA(13 June 2002)
47 EU Council Decision 2003/335/JHA(8 May 2003)
48 In addition, a non-Party State may be bound to render cooperation by a Security Council Chapter VII 
resolution
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following the consultation and notice procedures of article 99(4), or it may specify an 
advance notice period (e.g. 48 hours) that the Prosecutor must give to its central 
authority before entering its territory to conduct non-compulsory activities. An 
agreement may substitute also for domestic implementing legislation on an interim 
basis where there has been a delay in its adoption, or it may regulate in more detail 
practical arrangements which would normally not be covered by primary legislation. 
It may set out rules, for example, for the exchange of information in accordance with 
domestic law, or the types of information required under domestic law for the 
provision of assistance under articles 91(2)(c) or 96(2)(e). The Prosecutor may also 
enter into arrangements for the protection of classified information by agreeing not to 
disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents or information that he obtains 
on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the puipose of generating new 
evidence, unless the information provider consents.49 For territorial States where the 
Prosecutor will conduct investigative activities, an agreement may clarify other legal 
and practical issues such as the provision of security, modalities for witness and 
victim protection, and the provision of administrative services and logistical 
assistance.
A dualist State will typically insist that an international agreement, such as one 
entered into with the OTP or the Court as a whole, is implemented by domestic law, 
as the agreement itself will function only at the international law plane and will not be 
effective within national law without some form of domestic incorporation. This may 
undercut the utility of such ad hoc agreements as stop gap measures to remedy a lack 
of adequate implementing legislation. At the same time, poorly constructed 
agreements may result in the downgrading of assistance by enshrining into text 
restrictive modalities and interpretations on the scope of cooperation owed. The 
experience of the ICTY, which relied upon such agreements in its early phases in the 
absence of national implementing legislation, has indicated that the elaboration of 
modalities sometimes only served to highlight the differences in views between the 
Prosecutor and States about who should be in control.50
49 Article 54(3)(e); see also ICTY/ICTR Rule 70
50 Letter from ICTY OTP to ICC Director of Common Services (6th March 2003); on file with author
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(c) Security Council
The referral of a situation by the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, will render the duty to cooperate binding on all States so directed by the 
Council, including States not Parties to the Statute. As noted earlier in Chapter 6, the 
basis for the cooperation to be rendered here will be the Security Council resolution 
itself, not the Rome Statute. But can the Security Council substantively alter and 
enhance the Statutory cooperate regime to enable the Prosecutor to circumvent the 
cooperation provisions laid down in Part 9?
The Security Council cannot authorise the ICC to act beyond the powers 
conferred upon it under the Statute. Unlike the ad hoc Tribunals, the ICC is not a 
subsidiary organ of the Council in the sense that the principal organ possesses the 
competence to determine the membership, structure, mandate and duration of 
existence of its subsidiary organ.51 The ICC, as an international organisation with 
distinct legal personality, cannot be bound by Security Council obligations. 
Furthermore, the principle of attribution holds that an international organisation 
cannot act beyond the powers attributed to it by its constituent treaty.52 As Sarooshi 
points out, the Security Council cannot expand the subject-matter jurisdiction or 
temporal scope of the Court beyond the provisions of the Statute, since the ICC 
would then be acting ultra vires its own Statute.53 Similarly, the Council cannot 
enable the Court to circumvent the complementarity provisions of the Statute, such 
as the admissibility and challenge regime of article 17 and 19, or to bypass the State 
cooperation regime of Part 9.
The Security Council can, however, place a binding obligation on ICC State 
Parties that modifies their corresponding treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, 
by virtue of article 103 of the UN Charter. For example, the Council could require 
State Parties to enact legislation enabling them to render specific additional forms of 
cooperation either by way of article 93(1 )(1) or by entering into article 54(3)(d) 
agreements. Moreover, it could direct ICC State Parties to amend the Rome Statute 
via the procedure foreseen in Part 13 of the Statute to enable the Court to fulfil the
51 Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development o f Collective Security: the Delegation by the UN 
Security Council o f its Chapter VII Powers (1999),130
52 Schermers and Blokker (1995), 141
53 Sarooshi, ‘The Peace and Justice Paradox’, in McGoldrick, Rowe and Donnelly, eds., The Permanent 
International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (2004), 106-7
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objective desired by the Security Council; although the Council would be limited in 
its ability to enforce actual compliance with its decision by the Assembly of States 
Parties.54 More controversially, the Council could trump the obligations of ICC State 
Parties to require them to act in a manner that would be inconsistent with the Rome 
Statute. It could, for example, require State Parties to desist from entering a 
challenge to the jurisdiction or admissibility of a case under article 19; to require 
States (or certain States) to share information and documents sensitive to national 
security under in camera proceedings; or to require States to prioritise ICC requests 
for surrender over competing requests for extradition. By the same token, the 
Council could obligate States in a manner that would diminish support to the Court 
by, for example, demanding the non-surrender of nationals of States not Party to the 
Rome Statute without that State’s consent.55
As noted earlier, in case of non-compliance by States with a Security Council 
referred situation, the Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to 
the Council. Security Council practice in the area of non-compliance with Chapter 
VII resolutions, however, is not encouraging. Repeated ICTY notifications of non- 
compliance by States of the former Yugoslavia has led to little more than verbal 
admonition.56 Notification to the Council or the Assembly of State Parties, 
nonetheless, could trigger customary and emerging international norms on State 
responsibility.57 This could lead to the imposition of bilateral or collective 
enforcement action, or the adoption of regional and bilateral sanctions such as the 
imposition of trade and aid conditionality measures, travel bans and the freezing of 
assets.
The Court’s resort to the Security Council need not be limited to infractions 
based on Council referrals. The Security Council could enhance cooperation at any 
time at the Court’s request.58 The ICC, thus, could call for the Council’s assistance to 
obligate non-Party States (or particular non-Party States) to render cooperation in
54 See Article 48, UN Charter “[s]uch decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United 
Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are 
members.”
55 See, e.g., Darfur referral, S/RES/1593(2005),Tf6 in relation to personnel attached to UN or AU 
operations
5 Bass, Stay the Hand o f Vengeance: The Politics o f  War Crimes Tribunals (2000), 223
57 See ILC Commentary on Draft Articles on the Responsibility o f States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, A/56/10 (2001)
58 Article 87(6): “The Court may ask any intergovernmental organisation to provide ... forms of 
cooperation and assistance which may be agreed upon with such an organisation and which are in 
accordance with its competence or mandate”.
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relation to a situation not referred by the Council, or to mandate a peacekeeping 
operation to provide cooperation in the gathering of evidence, the protection of 
victims and witnesses and the arrest and surrender of suspects.59
(d) Rule amendment and the Review Conference
One area in which the ICC Prosecutor will have less flexibility than the Prosecutors 
of the ad hoc Tribunals is in the use of implied powers: i.e., the invocation of those 
powers which, although not expressly provided for in the Statute, are deemed 
essential for the performance of the Court’s functions.60 Given the rudimentary form 
of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, the formalisation of such powers through rule 
amendment has been an important feature of the Tribunals’ development and the 
enhancement of their cooperation regimes.61 The ICC Prosecutor will need to be far 
more cautious in the invocation of implied powers given the express intention of the 
drafter to create a detailed framework in the Statute and the Rules,62 if he is to avoid 
accusations of acting ultra vires. Moreover, although rule amendment may be 
proposed by any State Party, the judges acting by majority or the Prosecutor, the 
procedure is far more burdensome than the judge-created Rules of the ad hoc 
Tribunals. Adoption of amendments will require a two-thirds majority of the 
Assembly of States Parties before it enters into force (article 51).
In the case of the ICTY and ICTR, changes of a more fundamental nature to 
their Statutes have required the proposal of amendment by the Tribunal Presidents to 
the parent organ.63 The Rome Statute is open to amendment on the proposal of any 
State Party, either at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or by way of a 
Review Conference seven years after the Statute’s entry into force. The amendment 
process is subject to a series of conditions and requirements that will render it a
59 See Informal expert paper (cooperation), ^95. Of course, the Council could act also at its own 
initiative in the absence of a request; Sarooshi, ‘Aspects of the Relationship between the International 
Criminal Court and the United Nations', 32 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (2001),36
60 Reparations case, ICJ Rep. 1949, p. 182
61 See, inter alia, ICTY Rule 39 (prosecutorial summons), Rule 40 (provisional measures), Rule 54bis 
(orders directed to States for the production of documents), Rule 58 (non applicability of national 
extradition provisions), Rule 70 (matters not subject to disclosure)
62 See early discussion in Report o f the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment o f an 
International Criminal Court A/51/22 (1996), [^55, ^184-8
63 Amendments have included increases to the number of Trial Chambers, the number of permanent 
judges, and on the appointment and status of ad litem judges
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highly cumbersome mechanism (see articles 121-123). It is unlikely, thus, that the 
Court, at least in the foreseeable future, will be able to rely upon treaty amendment to 
enhance its Part 9 powers.
(e) External Coercion
As noted earlier, the ability of the ICC to independently coerce compliance from 
unwilling States is extremely limited. While it may issue requests and make orders 
for the compulsory attendance of witnesses, for the surrender of accused persons, or 
for the freezing of assets, it has no direct sanctioning capacity beyond the threat of 
reporting non-compliance. The effectiveness of coercive measures against 
recalcitrant States, therefore, will rely in large part on the linkage of ICC cooperation 
to the threat of exclusion from other areas of international life. As shown above, the 
policy of linking trade benefits to EU association and eventual membership as well 
as other bilateral conditionality efforts have had a considerable impact on the 
cooperation of the States of the former Yugoslavia. By comparison, in the case of 
Sudan, the Security Council has taken a multidisciplinary approach by passing a 
package of Chapter VII measures comprising UN peacekeeping troops with a limited 
use of force mandate (S/RES/1590), the establishment of a Sanctions Committee 
(S/RES/1591), and referral of the Darfur situations to the ICC (S/RES/1593). 
Although consideration of economic sanctions on Sudan’s critical oil industry has 
been blocked by China, the Sanctions Committee has been mandated to consider the 
imposition of travel restrictions and freezing of assets on persons who, inter alia, 
“commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other 
atrocities”.64 Such measures may, moreover, lead to political marginalisation and 
diplomatic isolation, which may have a causal effect on other areas, including trade 
and commerce. The commitment of the international community to robustly apply 
coercive linkages in this manner may prove critical in guaranteeing the cooperation 
of the Sudanese authorities with the Court.
64 See Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1591, S/2006/65
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3. EXECUTION OF REQUESTS
Irrespective of the type of obligation owed under Part 9, a request will only be 
effective if it is complied with in the manner requested by the Court. In domestic 
settings, the judiciary can supervise the observance of criminal procedure to guarantee 
die integrity of the process and the admissibility of evidence. The section below will 
explore the extent to which the ICC Chambers will be able to examine, regulate or 
supervise the execution of Court requests by domestic authorities. In particular, the 
ICC judges will be guided by Part 9 and by article 69 which holds that “[ejvidence 
obtained by means of a violation of this Statute or internationally recognized human 
rights shall not be admissible if: (a) The violation casts substantial doubt on the 
reliability of the evidence; or (b) The admission of the evidence would be antithetical 
to and would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings.” Moreover, the 
admissibility criteria of unwillingness and inability will enable the Court to exercise 
its supervisory functions over the adequacy of national criminal jurisdictions.65 In the 
absence of related ICC jurisprudence, an examination of Tribunal practice is provided 
below with some observations on its relevance by analogy for the ICC.
(a) Admissibility of evidence
In the case of Mucic et al, the ICTY Trial Chamber considered a defence motion to 
exclude statements made by the accused before the Austrian police without the 
presence of counsel, prior to his transfer.66 The motion was brought under ICTY Rule 
95, which provides for the exclusion of evidence obtained by means contrary to 
internationally protected human rights. The Chamber noted that although the Austrian 
procedural rules preclude the right of a suspect to counsel until after questioning, s/he 
is able to consult a lawyer before deciding whether to give an interview, and that this 
was not necessarily at odds with the scope of “legal assistance” under article 6(3) of 
the ECHR, as interpreted by the Strasbourg Court. Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber 
argued that the correct standard to be applied was not only ICTY Rule 95, but also the
65 Kleffher, ‘The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive International 
Criminal Law’ (2003) JICJ 1, 87
66 Prosecutor v Delalic et al., Decision on Zdravko Mucic’s Motion for the Exclusion o f Evidence (2 
September 1997)
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law of the Tribunal governing the admissibility of evidence. As such, the conditional 
right to counsel under Austrian procedure was held to be inconsistent with the 
unfettered right to counsel under Article 18(3) of the ICTY Statute and sub-Rule 
42(A)(i). As the Chamber held, “the Austrian rights of the suspect are so 
fundamentally different from the rights under the International Tribunal’s Statute and 
Rules as to render the statement made under it inadmissible”. Accordingly, the 
Chamber determined that implementation of a request for assistance by non-Tribunal 
organs must be compatible not only with international human rights standards, but 
with the Tribunals’ own Rules even where they may not strictly offend such 
standards. The law on the Tribunal applied thus to the entire criminal procedure.
In a later decision in the same case, the Trial Chamber determined that 
procedural irregularities by the requested State in the implementation of an OTP 
request did not foreclose admissibility. The decision relied in part on the absence of 
applicable procedural rules in the ICTY Statute and Rules, and partly on the 
assumption of competence by the Chamber to review the consistency of the requested 
State’s conduct with its domestic law. Relying on Rule 89, the Chamber determined 
that the deviations by the Austrian police from their own criminal procedure during a 
search was outweighed by the relevance and probative value of the evidence tendered. 
It held that since the breach of rules was minor in nature, the means by which the 
evidence had been obtained did not cast substantial doubt on its reliability, and the 
admissibility of the evidence collected would not be antithetical to, or seriously 
damage, the integrity of the proceedings.68
67 Notwithstanding the above, the Trial Chamber appears to have based part of its reasoning on a faulty 
analysis of die required standard of proof. As the Chamber held: “[t]he Tribunal is established for the 
trial of criminal offences of the most serious kind. Hence nothing less than the most exacting standard 
of proof is required. It is universally accepted that the burden o f proof lies on the Prosecution. The 
standard of proof on the Prosecution is proof beyond reasonable doubt”; ibid, ^48. It is highly doubtful, 
however, that the standard of proof for admissibility of evidence as opposed to conviction is ‘proof 
beyond reasonable doubt’ and not the ‘balance of probabilities’; even more so in the case of a non-jury 
trial before professional judges who can assign appropriate weight to admitted evidence. The decision 
was not appealed by the prosecution, possibly because of the limited utility of the material sought.
68 ICTY Rules 89(D) & 95. Prosecutor v Delalic et a l, Decision on the Tendering o f Prosecution 
Exhibits 104 -1 0 8  (9 February 1998), ffl|18-20
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(b) Pre-trial detention by national authorities
The Barayagwiza case was subject to two ICTR Appeal decisions on the pre-trial 
detention on the accused. In its first decision, the Appeals Chamber held that there 
had been a violation of the length of detention in Cameroon prior to transfer; the 
accused right to be promptly informed of the charges against him; the right to 
challenge the legality of his detention before a court of law; and the duty of 
prosecutorial due diligence.69 In the face of egregious and repeated violations of the 
accused rights by the OTP, the Appeals Chamber instituted the remedy of the 
termination of proceedings. On review by the Appeals Chamber, the findings as to the 
violations were upheld, but the remedy was altered in the light of new facts tendered 
by the OTP. Determining that responsibility for the violations fell principally on the 
authorities of Cameroon, the Chamber held that the extraordinary remedy of release 
would be disproportionate and instead ordered that the accused receive a reduction of 
sentence in case of conviction, or financial compensation in case of acquittal.
It is worth examining the original basis for which OTP was found responsible. 
The Appeals Chamber relied on the argument that although the accused was not in the 
physical custody on the Tribunal, he was in its constructive custody. It held that the 
situation was analogous to the ‘detainer’ process in U.S. jurisdictions, whereby a 
special type of warrant (known as a ‘detainer’ or ‘hold order’) is filed against a person 
already in custody to ensure that he will be available to the demanding authority upon 
completion of the present term of confinement. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Appeals Chamber held “[i]n such a case, the State holding the prisoner in immediate 
confinement acts as agent for the demanding State...”.70 Given facts indicating that 
Cameroon was willing to transfer the accused (disputed on review), the Appeals 
Chamber accordingly attributed the length of detention and the related violations to 
the OTP.71
The Appeal Chamber in its decision also emphasised the competence of the 
Tribunal to exercise supervisory powers to review assistance rendered by requested 
authorities pursuant to a request for assistance:
69 In particular, the Chamber noted the improper initial provisional detention of 29 days in Cameroon 
pursuant to an OTP request issued under Rule 40 (9 days more than the maximum 20 permissible); and 
a second period of provisional detention pending transfer of over 7 months subsequent to a Rule 40bis 
request (against a maximum of 90 days permissible)
70 Prosecutor v Barayagwiza, Decision (3 November 1999), [^56, [^61
71 ibid,h 59
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The use of such supervisory powers serves three functions: to provide a 
remedy for the violation of the accused’s rights; to deter future misconduct; 
and to enhance the integrity of the judicial process.72
As the Chamber went on to state, “it is irrelevant that only a small portion of that total 
period of provisional detention is attributable to the Tribunal, since it is the Tribunal -  
and not any other entity -  that is currently adjudicating the Appellant’s claims.”73 The 
Chamber thus determined that the ICTR has competence to exercise supervisory 
powers over action attributable to non-Tribunal organs with regard to all pre-trial 
actions that occur in the context of its proceedings.
(c) Irregular arrest and rendition
The issue of unlawful arrest and rendition has been addressed in a number of cases 
before the ICTY and ICTR and has been extensively researched elsewhere.74 These 
cases mainly relate to the lawfulness of cross-border abductions and their impact on 
the exercise of jurisdiction {male captus bene detentus principle).
In the Dokmanovic release decision, the first case before either Tribunal where 
the legality of arrest was challenged, the Trial Chamber found that although the 
accused was ‘lured’ from the territory of FRY into territory administered by the 
United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, the arrest was not 
unlawful as it did not amount to forcible abduction of kidnapping, and did not violate 
the sovereignty of the FRY.75 The decision also established the lawfulness of the 
execution of arrest warrants by entities other than States.76
11 ib id ,] 76
73 ibid, 1[85. The passage refers to the period in which the accused’ right to be promptly informed of the 
charges against him was violated, 35 days out of a total of 11 months of which were clearly attributable 
to the Tribunal.
74 See, inter alia, Bank, ‘Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia in the Production of Evidence’ (2000) Max Planck Yrbk UN Law 4, 233-269; Lamb, ‘The 
Powers of Arrest of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (1999) BYIL 70, 
165-244; Sloan, ‘Prosecutor v Todorovic: Illegal Capture as an Obstacle to the Exercise of 
International Criminal Jurisdiction’ (2003) Leiden JIL 16/1, 85-113
75 Prosecutor v Mrksic el al., Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanovic 
(22 October 1997), H57
76 Sluiter, in Klip and Sluiter, eds., ‘Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals: The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 1993- 1998’ (1999), 155
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In the case of Stevan Todorovic, the accused alleged that he was kidnapped 
from his home in FRY by bounty hunters hired by SFOR (and the OTP) and abducted 
to the territory of BiH, where he was arrested by SFOR. The Chamber initially 
refused an evidentiary hearing on the matter given the lack of sufficient factual and 
legal materials in the Defence motion.77 The Trial Chamber subsequently issued at the 
request of the defence an order for judicial assistance from the OTP, and thereafter 
from SFOR, in order to obtain evidence pertinent to the motion for release.78 The 
matter was later dropped after Todorovic entered into a plea bargain agreement with 
the prosecution.
In the Nikolic case, the ICTY Appeal Chamber rejected the accused motion to 
set aside jurisdiction on the basis of his alleged illegal abduction and transfer from 
FRY by unknown individuals to BiH and into the hands of SFOR and the OTP.79 
After reviewing national case law on irregular arrest and rendition,80 the Appeals 
Chamber identified a number of factors in favour of asserting jurisdiction 
notwithstanding irregularities in arrest, where: (i) the case involves a crimes such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes; (ii) the State whose sovereignty has 
been breached has not lodged a complaint; and (iii) the treatment of the accused 
during the course of the arrest is not of an egregious nature.81 These factors were held 
to be all the more relevant where cooperative from die State concerned had been 
ineffective. In its opinion, which is worth quoting at length, the Appeals Chamber 
held:
This fundamental expectation [that those accused of universally condemned 
offences will be brought to justice] needs to be weighed against the principle 
of State sovereignty and the fundamental human rights of the accused .... In 
the opinion of the Appeal Chamber, the damage caused to international justice 
by not apprehending fugitives accused of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law is comparatively higher than the injury, if any, caused to the 
sovereignty of a State by limited intrusion in its territory, particularly when the
77 Prosecutor v Simic, Decision Stating Reasons for Trial Chamber’s Order o f 4 March 1999 on 
Defence Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on the Arrest o f the Accused Todorovic (25 March 1999)
78 Prosecutor v Simic, Order on Defence Requests for Judicial Assistance for the Production of  
Informational March 2000); Decision on Application for Leave to Appeal Against Trial Chamber 
Decision o f 7 March 2000 (3 May 2000); Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be provided by 
SFOR and Others (18 October 2000)
79 Prosecutor v Nikolic, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality o f Arrest,(5 June 2003)
80 See ibid, ffl|21-23
81 ibid, ][28; Prosecutor v Nikolic, Decision on Defence Motion challenging the Exercise o f Jurisdiction 
by the Tribunal,(9 October 2002), [^114. No remedy was rendered by the Chamber, despite a finding of 
irregularity in the pre-trial proceedings.
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intrusion occurs in default of the State’s cooperation. Therefore, the Appeals 
Chamber does not consider that in cases of universally condemned offences, 
jurisdiction should be set aside on the grounds that there was a violation of the 
sovereignty of a State, when the violation is brought about by the 
apprehension of fugitives from international justice, whatever the 
consequences for the international responsibility of the State of organisation 
involved. This is all the more so in cases such as this one, in which the State 
whose sovereignty has allegedly been breached has not lodged any complaint 
and thus has acquiesced in the International Tribunal’s exercise of 
jurisdiction.82
Interestingly, despite of the supervisory powers doctrine adopted by the 
Appeals Chamber, ICTR Trial Chamber II has repeatedly declined to exercise any 
review competence over the legality of searches, seizures and arrests by domestic 
authorities.83 Relevant cases include the Ngirumpatse case, which held, “the Tribunal 
is not competent to supervise the legality of arrest, custody, search and seizure 
executed by the requested State.”84 The Kajelijeli case held, “the manner and 
execution of arrest is an area within the States’ responsibility. When the Prosecutor 
makes a request for the arrest of the Accused, the matter falls within the domain of the 
requested State and it is that State which organizes, controls and carries out the arrest 
in accordance with their domestic law.”85 In the Karemera case, the Chamber opined 
that a request made by the Prosecutor is executed and controlled by the State 
authorities using their law enforcement organs and that “the Trial Chamber therefore, 
considers that it cannot provide any remedy concerning such arrest and custody as 
these are still matters within the jurisdiction of the requested State.” Finally, in the 
Nzirorera case, “the Chamber held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the legal 
circumstances attending the arrest of a suspect, under Rule 40 of the Rules, in so far 
as the arrest has been made pursuant to the laws of the arresting state.”87
82 Nikolic Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, 1(26
83 Sluiter (2002), 3
84 Prosecutor v Ngirumpatse, Decision on the Defence Motion challenging the Lawfulness of the Arrest 
and Detention and seeking Return or Inspection o f Seized Items (10 December 1999), 1(56
85 Prosecutor v Kajelijeli, Decision on the Defence Motion concerning the Arbitrary Arrest and Illegal 
Detention of the Accused and on the Defence Notice of Urgent Motion to Expand and Supplement the 
Record o f 8 December 1999 Hearing (8 May 2000) 1(34
86 Prosecutor v Karemera, Decision on the Defence Motion for the Restitution o f Documents and other 
Personal or Family Belongings Seized (Rule 40 (C) o f the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence), and the 
Exclusion o f such Evidence which may be used by the Prosecutor in preparing an Indictment against 
the Applicant (10 December 1999), 1(4.3.1
87 Prosecutor v Nzirorera, Decision on the Defence Motion challenging the Legality o f the Arrest and 
Detention o f the Accused and requesting the Return o f Personal Items Seized,(7 September 2000)1(27. 
See also Prosecutor v Nyiramasuhuko, Decision on the Defence Motion for Exclusion o f Evidence and 
Restitution o f Property Seized (12 October 2000), 1(26
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(d) Request criteria for production o f documents
In the practice of both Tribunals, it has not been uncommon for States to criticise the 
form of a request, whether in the form of a binding order from Chambers or request 
for assistance from the Prosecutor, on the grounds that it lacks sufficient clarity. In 
genuine cases, the Prosecutor has been able to engage in a dialogue with the requested 
authorities to define with greater precision the parameters of the request. In other 
instances, national authorities have set unreasonable standards by requiring the 
Prosecutor to identify a document with exact precision by name, reference number, 
location and date. Clearly, in many situations, the Prosecutor may lack a detailed 
description, but will know of the purported existence of a particular piece of evidence 
and will be able to establish reasonable parameters to facilitate its recovery.
Uncooperative States, moreover, have often resorted to sophisticated methods 
to limit assistance in place of overt refusal. This has ranged from counter-requests for 
more information; explanations that the documents were stored during the conflict 
period when good record keeping was poor, or that archives have been destroyed or 
damaged; pleas for understanding that it does not have modem record keeping 
facilities. Complaints have also not been infrequent with respect to the volume of the 
request, with exaggerated protests that the entire government administration would 
have to stop working for a year in order to fulfil the request. The Tribunals 
themselves, however, have also been at fault. Besides general problems with poorly 
drafted requests for assistance, early on the OTP would at times intentionally shroud 
requests in broad parameters for fear of exposing its prosecutorial strategy or risking 
the destruction or disappearance of the documents sought.89
In the Blaskic Subpoena Judgment, the Appeals Chamber set out four 
“mandatory and cumulative”90 criteria with which any request for a binding order 
under article 29(2) for the production of documents must comply in order to avoid a 
“fishing expedition”. The Appeals Chamber held that a request for a binding order 
must identify specific documents and not broad categories; set out the relevance of
88 Interviews with senior ICTY OTP officials, on file with author
89 ibid
90 The use of the term “mandatory and cumulative” in connection with four criteria was employed by 
the later Kordic Trial Chamber and subsequently adopted by die Appeals Chamber in the same case; 
Prosecutor v Kordic et al., Decision on the Request o f the Republic o f Croatia for Review o f a Binding 
Order (9 September 1999)
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such documents to the trial; not be unduly onerous; and give the State sufficient time 
for compliance. The Chamber also made a distinction between cooperative and 
mandatory compliance: endorsing the Prosecutor’s contention that, as a matter of 
policy, the OTP should first seek “through cooperative means, the assistance of 
States, and only if they decline to lend support, then to request a Judge or Trial 
Chamber to have recourse to the mandatory action provided for in Article 29”.91 
These various criteria were subsequently incorporated into ICTY Rule 54bis.
In the Krstic case, the Trial Chamber tested the request of the Prosecutor 
against these criteria and dismissed three of the requested documents because their 
relevancy had not been demonstrated, and a further ten documents because the 
Prosecutor had not previously sought, through cooperative means, the assistance of 
the Republika Srpska 92
In the Kordic case, the Republic of Croatia filed before the Appeals Chamber 
a request for the review of a binding order issued to it on the grounds, inter alia, that 
it was inconsistent with the criteria stipulated by the Appeals Chamber in its earlier 
Judgment93 In particular, Croatia criticised (i) the lack of specificity of some of the 
documents sought, which referred to entire categories; (ii) die inability to determine 
relevance of documents unsatisfactorily identified; (iii) the onerous nature of request; 
and (iv) the deadlines set by the Chamber, which it had decided after ex parte 
proceedings with the Prosecutor. The Appeals Chamber interpreted its earlier criteria 
and concurred with the prosecution claim that the Blaskic Subpoena Judgment did not 
prohibit the use of categories, but only the use of broad categories which lack 
“‘sufficient clarity to enable ready identification’ of the documents falling within that 
category.” Having determined the test of specificity had been met, the Chamber also 
rejected the challenge with respect to relevance. Moreover, Croatia lacked locus 
standi to challenge the matter since such determinations fell exclusively within the 
discretion of the Tribunal. As to the third criterion with respect to volume, the 
Chamber held that the criterion was relative and entailed striking a balance between 
the difficulty of producing the evidence and the extent to which it was “strictly 
justified by the exigencies of the trial”. While an obligation to render the Tribunal
91 Blaskic Subpoena Appeals Judgment, ^31
92 Prosecutor v Krstic, Binding Order to the Republika Srpska for the Production o f Documents,(12 
March 1999). See also Prosecutor v Kordic et al., Binding Order (4 February 1999) wherein the Trial 
Chamber dismissed the prosecution request for two documents on the grounds of lack of relevance.
93 Prosecutor v Kordic et al., Decision on the Request o f the Republic o f Croatia for Review o f a 
Binding Order (9 September 1999)
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assistance may be onerous for a State, the correct test was whether it was unduly so. 
With respect to timelines, the Appeals Chamber held that it was within the right of the 
Requested State to consult with the Trial Chamber in order to establish “workable and 
reasonable deadlines” pursuant to Rule 1086/s. The Chamber held that a State is not 
entitled, however, to a right to be heard before a binding order is issued.94
(e) Observations on the Rome Statute
With the benefit of their experiences, the Rome Statute is clearer than the Statutes and 
RPE of the ad hoc Tribunals in a number of areas. Article 69(7) of the ICC Statute, 
partly based on ICTY Rule 95, explicitly provides for the exclusion of evidence 
obtained by means of a violation internationally recognised human rights or the 
Statute. Thus, the requested State cannot obtain evidence in a manner that, while it 
may accord with domestic law and internationally recognised human rights, offends 
die Rome Statute. The exclusion, however, is conditional. As in ICTY Rule 95, the 
violation must be of sufficient gravity before it triggers inadmissibility as set out in 
the provision. Evidence obtained by means that violates the Rome Statute or 
international human rights, but which does not raise ‘substantial doubt’ as to its 
reliability or would not be ‘antithetical to’ or ‘seriously damage’ the integrity of the 
proceedings, would be admissible.
The interpretation of the criteria for the production of documents by the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber will be of assistance to the ICC in the application of article 96 of 
the Rome Statute, which is based substantially on the Blaskic Subpoena Judgment 
and the relevant provisions of ICTY Rule 546/s.
Article 67(8) of the Rome Statute clarifies that the Court “shall not rule on the 
application of the State’s national law” when deciding on the relevance or 
admissibility of evidence. This will prevent the kind of review undertaken by the 
ICTY Trial Chambers on the observance of domestic procedures by the national law 
enforcement agencies. Nonetheless, while the Court may not rule on the application of 
national law, it may take domestic legislation into consideration as a factor bearing on
94 Despite this finding, a new sub-Rule (D) was later added to Rule 54bis providing for a notification 
and hearing procedure before the issuance of a binding order. The provision, however, is subject to 
sub-Rule (E), whereby a Judge or Trial Chamber may issue an order with giving the State notice, if, 
having regard to all the circumstances, there are good reasons to do so.
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the admissibility or the probative weight of evidence.95 Article 67(8) of the Statute 
acts as a corollary to the requirement that in order to be admissible, evidence should 
be obtained in accordance with the Statute. The case law of the Tribunals, 
nonetheless, indicates the need for the ICC Prosecutor to promote compliance with 
the Rome Statute and ICC RPE, and supervise to the extent possible national 
execution of requests.
Less clear is the extent to which the Court will deem it necessary to review 
the application of domestic law in relation to national surrender proceedings. In 
contrast to the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, the ICC Statute requires the custodial State 
Party to bring the arrested person promptly before a competent judicial authority in 
order to determine, in accordance with its domestic law, whether the warrant applies 
to the person, s/he has been arrested in accordance with proper process, and his/her 
rights have been respected.96 As such, the Court may deem itself competent to 
examine a complaint by a surrendered individual relating to the failure of a State 
Party to observe this procedural requirement.97 Although the Court is likely to avoid 
ruling upon the application of national law it may, nonetheless, hold a State Party in 
breach of its obligations under the Statute.98 In considering any appropriate remedy 
for the individual, the Court will most probably be guided by a balancing of factors 
such as those elaborated by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in order to determine 
whether the breach is sufficiently grave to set aside jurisdiction, particularly where 
the conduct is attributable to the Court. It may indicate also the need for an 
appropriate remedy under the national law of the surrendering State Party.
As with the ICTY and ICTR Statues, the Rome Statute attempts to strike a 
balance between undue intrusion into the sovereign domestic domain and the need to 
ensure efficient proceedings. In so doing, it seeks to harmonise the numerous values 
represented by the Statute such as respect for States sovereignty, respect for the 
rights of the accused, the protection of victims and witnesses, and the need for
95 This would be a necessary function of the Trial Chamber in order to enable it to make an assessment 
as to the application of exclusionary rules under article 69(7). PiragofF suggests that the provision, 
nonetheless, would limit the judges consideration of the facts where the alleged procedural irregularity 
was contested and, as such, required adjudication; PiragofF, ‘Evidence’, in Triffterer (1999), 915916
96 Article 59(2), ICC Statute
97 A failure to observe these procedures may arise, e.g., because of the absence of Rome Statute 
implementing legislation in the custodial State. In dualist systems, this may mean that the ICC has no 
legal personality under domestic law for the purpose of a national judicial hearing to effect surrender.
98 Note, however, article 59 falls outside of Part 9 and the obligations to incorporate under article 88
224
Chapter VIII
effective punishment." While the ICC judges will be independent in their 
determination of how these competing values will be assessed, they will be more 
restricted than their Tribunal counterparts in appraising national law, and thus 
represent a lower of intrusiveness.
4. INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
In the situations under ICC investigation, field missions of international organisations 
or peacekeeping of peace-enforcement operations may often represent the only 
interlocutor on the ground with access to certain information or to a particular piece of 
territory. Securing such cooperation, therefore, will be vital for the Court. As noted 
above, the Prosecutor may seek the cooperation of any intergovernmental 
organisation or ‘arrangement’ (a term adopted to refer, inter alia, to peacekeeping 
operations),100 and may enter into specific agreements pursuant to article 54(3)(d). 
Article 87(6) of the Statute, moreover, enables the Court to ask any intergovernmental 
organisation to provide information or documents, or other forms of cooperation that 
are consistent with its mandate.101 The manner and modalities for the operation of 
such forms of cooperation fall outside of regime established by Part 9 which deals 
with the State Party obligations, and are therefore subject to separate negotiation. As 
such, subject to agreement, none of the conditions for rendering of assistance in 
articles 93, 96 or 99 apply to a request for cooperation to an international 
organisation. Moreover, outside the forms of cooperation voluntarily agreed upon, 
international organisations, like third States, are under no legal obligation to cooperate 
with the Court. An international organisation, thus, cannot be bound by a decision of 
the Court, even when the ICC is acting pursuant to a Security Council referral.102
ICTY case law is mixed on the issue of whether international organisations are
99 Lonsdale and Trapp, ‘The International Criminal Court: Excluding Evidence under Article 69(7)’, 
unpublished manuscript (1998), cited in ibid,9\5
100 Article 54(3)(c); see KreB and Prost, ‘Article 87’, in Trifterer (1999), 1065
101 Such court-wide agreements will be particularly relevant for areas under the competency of the 
Court Registrar such as victim and witness protection, privileges and immunities, and finance and 
administration.
102 It is Security Council practice to “call upon” international organisations to implement its resolutions 
rather than requiring them to do so; see Frowein & Krisch, ‘Chapter VII: Action with respect to Threats 
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression’ in Simma, ed. Commentary on the 
Charter o f the United Nations (2002), 715
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subject to the Chapter VII based mandatory cooperation. In the Kovacevic case, the 
Trial Chamber, in an unreasoned decision, held that it had no authority to issue a 
binding order to the OSCE under article 29 of the ICTY Statute, as the provision 
applied to States not international organisations.103 In Kordic, the Trial Chamber first 
issued a request to the European Commission Monitoring Mission in BiH (‘ECMM’), 
the Presidency of the EU Council and the EU Commission, and thereafter issued an 
order to ECMM and Member States of the European Community at the time of the 
establishment of the ECMM in BiH, requiring the production of the certain 
documents in accordance with article 29. The order was complied with.104 In Simic 
(Todorovic), the Trial Chamber held that it was competent to issue a binding order 
under article 29 for the production of documents to the 33 participating States of 
SFOR and to SFOR itself. The order drew sharp criticism from NATO and a number 
of Member States who filed requests for review of the decision. The Appeal remained 
unheard given the subsequent entry of a guilty plea by the accused following a plea 
bargaining agreement with the prosecution.105
In terms of agreements entered into, the experience of the ICTY with SFOR 
has shown that the conclusion of such agreements will be particularly essential where 
an international organisation exercises military or law enforcement competencies over 
territories where the Prosecutor is conducting his investigative activities. In the case 
of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, known by its French 
acronym ‘MONUC’, the mandate of the mission was specifically revised to enable the 
possibility for ICC cooperation. After much debate which resulted in the deletion of 
explicit reference to the Court, the Security Council adopted a compromise text in 
Resolution 1565 which authorises MONUC to “cooperate with efforts to ensure that 
those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law are brought to justice, while working closely with the relevant 
agencies of the United Nations”, while at the same time excluding this provision from 
the categories of tasks where the use of force is permitted.106 In conjunction with
103 Prosecutor v Kovacevic, Decision Refusing Defence Motion for Subpoena (23 June 1998)
104 Prosecutor v Kordic et al., Order for the Production o f  Documents by the European Community 
Monitoring Mission and its Member States (4 Aug. 2000)
105 Prosecutor v Simic et al., Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and 
Others (18 Oct. 2000)
106 S/RES/1565(2005), 1f5(g), but see 1J6. See also interpretative statements of the U.S. upon adoption 
S/P V5048
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article 18 of the Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the UN,107 the 
provision enables MONUC to respond to a request for cooperation from the ICC. 
However, in order to invoke its use of force provisions, MONUC will need to rely on 
other provision of its mandate. Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1565, for example, 
authorises MONUC to use all means necessary under a broad heading enabling 
assistance to the DRC authorities in re-establishing confidence, discouraging 
violence, and deterring use of force threatening the “political process”, and to enable 
free movement of UN personnel. Also of relevance, paragraph 5(c) authorises use of 
force for the disarming of “foreign combatants”. Moreover, Security Council 
Resolution 1493 “[authorizes MONUC to use all necessary means to fulfil its 
mandate in the Ituri district and, as it deems it within its capabilities, in North and 
South Kivu”. In the past, MONUC has implemented its use of force provisions to 
assist in arrest and detention of combatants and militia leaders located in its areas of 
deployment. In similar vein, the MoU concluded between MONUC and ICC provides 
that MONUC will give consideration, in principle, to a request from the DRC 
Government in carrying out the arrest of persons sought by the Court in the areas 
where it is deployed, where this would be consistent with its mandate.108 The 
provision is likely to prove critical for the Court. Given that the current intelligence 
indicates that members of the LRA leadership have fled into North-Eastern DRC,109 
the ICC will likely rely on substantial MONUC assistance with respect to the arrest 
and detention of wanted persons in both the DRC and Uganda situations.
Conclusion
The Statute suffers from a litany of loopholes and obstacles in its State cooperation 
regime that could be abused in order to stall or effectively prevent a case from 
reaching trial. Included in this compound level assault course are multiple stage 
appeals of jurisdiction and admissibility that could suspend cooperation; execution of 
requests for assistance, arrest and surrender through national procedures;
107 ICC-ASP/3/15. Article 18, inter alia, enables the ICC Prosecutor to enter into supplementary 
agreements with the UN or its programmes, funds and offices.
108 Signed 8 November 2005; on file with author; forthcoming UNTS
109 See, inter alia, IRINnews.org ‘UGANDA: LRA's Joseph Kony now in DRC, says military’, (7 
February 2006)
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modification, conditions or refusal of a request that violate domestic legislation or 
national security; competing request for extradition or assistance; and the application 
of immunities for third State officials. The Security Council also may at any stage 
intervene to suspend the whole process. Any of these mechanisms could be used to 
stall and undermine the Prosecutor’s ability to secure evidence for trial or to conduct 
independent on-site investigations. Filtering procedures for investigation through the 
direction or assistance of the national authorities, moreover, may compromise the 
integrity of the evidence collected.
These concerns are all the more relevant bearing in mind the situations in 
which the ICC must act, where national authorities may be implicated in the crimes or 
may be otherwise incapable of rendering assistance. The political necessity of 
securing widespread acceptance of the Rome Statute clearly necessitated the adoption 
of comprises. However, the practical outcome means that the ICC in practice may be 
left dependent on the cooperation of those same States that have been found unwilling 
or unable to undertake genuine investigations and prosecutions.
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IX
Implementing Legislation
Part II highlighted the divergent approaches in national legislation and practice in the 
prosecution of core crimes. The present chapter suggests that the obligations of State 
Parties under the Rome Statute, coupled with the Court’s admissibility provisions, 
will promote broad harmonisation of national law with ICC standards and increased 
domestic activism. Chapter 9 assesses the effectiveness of implementing legislation 
passed to date, and the manner in which State Party obligations been transposed, 
interpreted, applied in domestic law. For, upon the actual incorporation and execution 
of these obligations at the national level will depend the ultimate enjoyment of the 
Court’s powers.
Parties to the ICC are required to enact implementing legislation in order to 
enable them to observe their obligations under the Rome Statute. In particular, State 
Parties are required to ensure that procedures are available under national law for all 
forms of cooperation foreseen in Part 9; must extend their criminal laws to include 
offences against the administration of justice (article 70); and are obliged to enforce 
fines or forfeitures ordered by the Court (article 109). Since the Rome Statute does 
not permit reservations, Parties must accept these obligations in full. A State Party 
that does not observe its treaty obligations may risk a finding of non-compliance.
In a different category is a set of measures whose domestic incorporation is 
not obligatory, but is implicitly encouraged to enable States to avail themselves of the 
Court’s complementarity regime. Included here is the assumption that State Parties 
will largely adopt the categorisation of substantive crimes under articles 6 to 8 of the 
Statute; that they will incorporate the general principles of applicable criminal law 
outlined in Part 3 of the Statute (such as command responsibility, irrelevance of 
official capacity, and definitions of mental element): and the guarantees of minimum 
fair trials and due process protections of Parts 5 and 6. A State Party that does not 
adopt such measures may risk an admissibility challenge under article 17, on the basis 
of any lacunae or deficiencies in its domestic law which renders it unable to carry out
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genuine investigations and prosecutions. The Statute is based on the assumption that 
complementary national jurisdiction exists.1 If domestic legislation fails this test, 
jurisdiction must revert to the Court. The proper functioning of both the cooperation 
and complementarity regimes, thus, will rely in large part on the effectiveness of 
national implementing legislation.2
1. NATIONAL APPROACHES TO IMPLEMENTATION
Security Council resolutions 827 and 955 established an obligation for all States to 
cooperate fully with the ad hoc Tribunals and to “take any measures necessary under 
their domestic law to implement the provisions” of the respective resolutions, 
including the obligation to comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by the 
Tribunals. From early on, however, the Tribunals noted the problem of divergent and 
unsatisfactory approaches that national authorities had taken in implementing these 
obligations. As the Tribunal President reported to the Security Council,
A few countries have laid down an ad hoc procedure, while others plan to 
apply mutatis mutandis their national provisions relating to extradition, though 
only as regards questions of procedure and without making the transfer of the 
accused to the Tribunal subject to the same restrictions that apply to 
extradition (e.g. non-extradition of nationals or of persons accused of political 
crimes). In certain countries, provision has been made for appeals against or 
review of decisions of national courts on the Tribunal’s requests for transfer.3
The repeated failures of national authorities to distinguish between extradition and 
surrender and the unsatisfactory outcomes resulting from the utilisation of mutual 
legal assistance regimes for Tribunal cooperation attest to the inadequacies of 
adapting horizontal mechanisms to vertical relationships.4 Since obligations under the 
Rome Statute relate not just to cooperation, but to the right to exercise domestic
1 See Triffterer, ‘Legal and Policy Implications of Domestic Ratification and Implementation 
Processes’, in Krefi and Lattanzi, eds., The Rome Statute and Domestic Legal Orders Volume I: 
General Aspects and Constitutional Issues (2000)
2 See generally Duffy and Huston, ‘Implementation of the ICC Statute: International Obligations and 
Constitutional Considerations’, in Krefi and Lattanzi (2000), 29
3 ICTY first annual report, A/49/342(1994)^1180; see also Warbrick, ‘Co-operation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia’ (1996) ICLQ 45,948
4 See, inter alia, the initial failed attempts of the ICTR to secure the surrender of Elizaphan 
Ntakirutimana from the U.S., which relied on its inter-State legal assistance instruments; Sluiter (1998)
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jurisdiction over core crimes, State Parties have been comparatively more vigilant in 
their domestic implementation.
In the interest of expeditiously bringing the Statute into force, most States 
have chosen to separate die two related processes of ratification and implementation 
by opting for speedy ratification of the Statute, while proceeding carefully with the 
more demanding and resource intensive implementation process. For this reason, as of 
writing, the majority of State Parties are yet to enact the required implementing 
legislation. States leaning towards the monist school may enable the Statute to have 
automatic effect as part of domestic law upon ratification without the need for 
implementing legislation. Their domestic legal orders may even grant ratified 
international treaties such as the Rome Statute a privileged position vis a vis 
conflicting domestic laws.5 Other States may require only a very basic legal 
framework stipulating general powers to render the obligations owed under the 
Statute. Most States whether dualist and monist, however, have chosen to engage in 
the task of comprehensive incorporation in order to capture fully the scope of duties 
under the Statute and to provide for efficient procedures and modalities for 
cooperation.6 Where necessary, this has included the adoption of specific amendments 
to constitutional law. As the Statute is silent on the manner of implementation, the 
methods adopted by States have range from verbatim incorporation of various ICC 
provisions to incorporation with amendment of ICC definitions. The implementing 
legislation of other States refers, in part, to pre-existing provisions of domestic law or 
a modification thereof.
2. IMPLEMENTATION AS OBLIGATION
For a number of States ratification will raise questions of constitutional compatibility. 
To date, the most problematic issues have related to the constitutional immunities 
attaching to current or former State officials, the constitutional prohibition on the 
extradition of one’s own nationals, and the constitutional prohibition on die
5 See, e.g., art.96(l), Constitution of Spain
6 Broomhall, ‘The International Criminal Court: A Checklist for National Implementation’, in 
Bassiouni, ed., ICC Ratification and National Implementing Legislation, 13 quarter Nouvelles Etudes 
Penales(1999), 115
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imposition of life imprisonment.7 The manner in which such questions will be 
resolved will differ for each State. Under some constitutions ratified treaties, 
particularly those related to human rights, have constitutional rank or take precedence 
over other constitutional provisions or conflicting domestic legislation. The reception 
of the Rome Statute as hierarchically superior to conflicting norms, thus, may avoid 
any inconsistencies. Other States may chose to adopt an interpretative approach 
whereby the object and purpose of the constitution, such as the protection and 
promotion of internationally recognised human rights, is read in the light of the values 
represented by the ICC. Constitutional provisions such as the protection of nationals 
from uncertain legal proceedings in foreign jurisdictions, for example, could be read 
consistently with the objective of the ICC to prevent impunity and in the lights of the 
internationally recognised guarantees of fairness contained in the Rome Statute. For 
other States, constitutional amendment of either a general or specific nature, however, 
may represent the preferred option.8 A brief review is provided below of some the 
chief constitutional and legal difficulties that have arisen to date.
(a) Arrest and Surrender
(i) Immunities
Article 27 of the ICC Statute specifies that “[ijmmunities or special procedural rules 
which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or 
international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a 
person”. As a result, incorporation of Rome Statute has encouraged a significant re­
examination of immunities under national legislation.9 Some States have taken the 
view that amendment of their constitutions is not necessary for this purpose since 
immunities can be lifted, for example by parliament, in the light of treaty obligations. 
Other States have decided against amending constitutional immunities given the 
unlikelihood of a conflict ever arising. Spain, Norway and Denmark, for example,
7 See Venice Commission, Report on Constitutional Issues Raised by the Ratification o f the Rome 
Statute o f the International Criminal Court (Council of Europe, 15 January 2001)
8 See generally Duffy, ‘National Constitutional Compatibility and the International Criminal Court’, 11 
Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 5 (2001)
9 Broomhall (2003), 139
232
Chapter IX
have deemed the possibility of their monarch being accused by the Court to be so 
remote as not to warrant concern, particularly in the light of the marginal role they 
play in relation to military or political affairs.10 The Venice Commission of the 
Council of Europe has suggested that such States could maintain that “a tacit 
exception from immunity for the purpose of surrender to the Court was inherent in its 
constitution and consistent with the fundamental principles thereof’.11 Where States 
opt for an interpretative approach, it should be noted, a conflict with the Statute would 
only arise if the required waiver was not granted in a specific case.12
In other cases, in order to guarantee certainty, certain States have adopted 
amendments specifying that constitutional immunities do not apply to the crimes 
listed in the Statute. France and Luxembourg, for example, have adopted a general 
constitutional amendment that enables full cooperation with the Court, including the 
surrender of persons sought by the Court, but does not specifically amend 
constitutional immunities under national law. This means that immunity could not be 
lifted for the purpose of domestic prosecutions.13 In order to avert the Court 
exercising its jurisdiction over their national and to enable trial domestically, some 
States have gone further by providing for the lifting of legal and constitutional 
immunities of their nationals for the purpose of domestic proceedings also.14
The incorporation of article 27, however, must remain consistent with other 
parts of the Statute. As noted in Chapter 8, article 98 subjects the surrender 
obligations of State Parties to their obligations under international law with respect to 
the State or diplomatic immunity of third State nationals. Outside of requests from the 
ICC, the observance of State immunities between States is not affected by Rome 
Statute. Thus, for example, while there is emerging domestic practice rejecting 
functional immunities with respect to jus cogens violations, current international law 
maintains the inviolability of personal immunities attaching to certain incumbent 
senior government officials. Therefore, a State Party which incorporates article 27 
verbatim by declaring the non-applicability of immunities per se, including for the
10 Duffy (2001), 28
11 Venice Commission (2001)
12 See generally Duffy and Huston (2000), 36-42
13 See Buchet,‘L'integration en France de la convention portant statut de la Cour penale intemationale - 
Histoire breve et inachevee d'une mutation attendue’, in Krefi and Lattanzi,65; Venice Commission, 
ibid
14 Duffy and Huston (2000), 36-42
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purpose of national prosecution or extradition, may run afoul of general international 
law.15
(ii) Constitutional bars
One of the goals of distinguishing between surrender and extradition in the Statute 
was to enable this legal distinction also in domestic law.16 This has allowed certain 
countries to ratify the Statute without amending their constitutions, by incorporating a 
general clause or interpretation that permits the prohibition to be read in conformity 
with their treaty obligations under die Statute.17 For other States, constitutional 
amendment will remain the preferred route because either their domestic law does not 
admit such an interpretation or does not alter the prohibition on delivering up 
nationals to foreign jurisdiction, or otherwise because they wish to avoid legal 
uncertainty and to limit the scope for future challenges.18
There is, of course, nothing preventing the Court from returning an convicted 
person to his State of nationality for enforcement of the sentence provided it has 
indicated its willingness to accept sentenced persons. In this context, article 103 of the 
Statute includes the nationality of the sentenced person as a factor to be taken into 
account by the Court when designating the State of enforcement. Although a State 
Party could not make this a condition for surrendering a person to the Court, a non- 
Party State could make its ad hoc cooperation under article 87(6) contingent upon 
such an agreement.19
Another obstacle facing arrest and surrender some in domestic systems is the 
constitutional prohibition against life imprisonment. This includes bars on extraditing 
persons to States where life imprisonment can be imposed, which is interpreted as part
15 See above, Chapter 2; Kleffher (2003), 103-6
16 The ban on extraditing or expelling nationals is to be found in many countries' constitutions. See, 
e.g., art. 19 Constitution of Germany, art.ll(2f) and 14 Constitution o f Cyprus; art.9 Constitution of 
Croatia; art.36 Constitution of Estonia; art. 13 Constitution of Georgia; art.69 Constitution of Hungary; 
art. 13 Constitution of Lithuania; art.4 Constitution of "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"; 
art.23 Constitution of Slovakia; art.47 Constitution of Slovenia; art.55 Constitution of Poland; art. 12 
Constitution of the Czech Republic; art.19 Constitution of Romania; art.61 Russian Constitution and 
section 7 Finnish Constitution; Venice Commission (2001)
17 See, e.g., procedure adopted by Italy and Norway; ibid
18 See, e.g., constitutional amendments adopted in Germany and the Czech Republic; ibid
19 During negotiations in Rome Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland tabled a failed proposal 
which would have required this as an explicit condition; Mochochoko, ‘International Cooperation and 
Judicial Assistance’, in Lee (1999), 311
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of the prohibition against cruel and inhuman treatment.20 The prohibition seeks, 
moreover, to secure the right to rehabilitation. Although article 77 of the Statute 
provides for the imposition of life imprisonment, it is envisaged as an exceptional 
measure to be justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual 
circumstances of the convicted person. Additionally, the Statute provides for 
mandatory review by the Court of all life sentences after 25 years has been served 
with a view to a reduction of sentence. The criteria for review includes the conduct of 
the sentenced person, the prospect of rehabilitation, and individual circumstances such 
as physical or mental health or advanced age.21 The protection of mandatory review 
may in and of itself be a sufficient guarantee for those States that allow extradition in 
exceptional cases where sentence review is provided.22 For other States, the 
constitutional prohibition may require amendment for the purpose of surrender to the 
Court.
Other provisions related to arrest and surrender that must be provided for 
domestically include, inter alia, the obligation to provide for provisional arrest under 
the terms of article 59; the duty to notify the Court of any application for interim 
release in the custodial State and to consider the recommendations of the Court before 
rendering a decision on such release;23 and the duty to resolve competing requests in 
the manner contemplated in article 90. In addition, States may need to adopt a specific 
constitutional amendment providing that statute of limitations, amnesties and pardons 
will not apply to the crimes listed in the Statute.
(b) Other forms of cooperation
Most State Parties have chosen to incorporate verbatim the list of assistance types 
under article 93(1) of the ICC Statute, such as the taking of evidence, the questioning
20 Duffy and Huston (2000), 36^42
21 If review is initially denied, the Court is to continue to review the case at least every three years or at 
shorter intervals; see art. 107 ICC Statute, Rules 223-4 ICC RPE
22 See, e.g., Portugal LawNo.144/99 (31 August 1999); Duffy (2001), 35
23 In its Report the Venice Commission examined also whether the prohibition under art.59(4) 
preventing domestic courts from considering, for the purpose of interim release, whether the arrest 
warrant was properly issued endangered the principle of habeas corpus under art.5 ECHR. The 
Commission held that the character of deprivation of liberty in question was not of the nature foreseen 
in art.5(l)(c) ECHR, but was rather fell within the meaning of art.5(l)(f) which authorises a 
deprivation of liberty if it is pursuant to “...the lawful arrest or detention of a person ... against whom 
action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition”; Venice Commission (2001)
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of persons, the conduct of searches and seizures, and the freezing of assets. Domestic 
procedures here will need to incorporate the conditions applicable to the execution of 
requests for assistance under the Statute and Rules. For example, national law must 
permit requests not only from the Prosecutor, but from the Court as a whole. The Pre- 
Trial or Trial Chamber may, for example, issue a request for cooperation at the 
request of the accused person or at the Chamber’s own initiative.24 State Parties will 
also need to adopt national procedures to enable compliance on a practical level by, 
for example, granting the relevant domestic authorities with the requisite powers to 
respond to ICC requests. Among other provisions, a State Party must have in place a 
mechanism to enable it to respond to urgent requests for documents or evidence 
(article 99(2)). When national authorities question a person in accordance with articles 
93(l)(b) and 93(1 )(c), due regard must be given to the rights of persons during an 
investigation and the person must be informed of his or her rights 25 When national 
authorities facilitate the appearance of witnesses before the Court under 93(1 )(e), 
State Party authorities must provide the witness an instruction from the Court relating 
to self-incrimination 26 State Parties must be able ensure that information that is made 
available is provided and handled in a manner that protects the safety and physical or 
psychological well-being of any victims, potential witnesses and their families.27 A 
State Party must also have consultative mechanisms available in case of denial or 
postponement, or where the State has identified problems with the execution of a 
request, in order to enable it to “consult with the Court without delay in order to 
resolve the matter” 28
24 Article 57; see also article 61(11) which enables the Trial Chamber, after confirmation of the 
charges, to exercise any function of the Pre-Trial Chamber that is relevant and capable of application.
25 Article 55; Rule 111
26 Rule 190
27 Article 87(4)
28 See articles 89(2), 89(4), 91(4), 93(3), 93(5), 96(3), 97. For other conditions applicable to Part 9 see 
above, Chapter 8
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(c) Direct execution o f investigative measures
The other major issue that has necessitated constitutional amendment is the provision 
in article 99(4) empowering the Prosecutor to directly execute non-compulsory 
measures on a territory of a State Party. The Conseil Constitutionnel in France 
declared that the provision breached the 1958 French constitution and necessitated 
constitutional amendment, holding that “although the measures are in no way 
compulsory, the authority granted to the Prosecutor to take such measures without the 
presence of the competent French judicial authorities may violate the essential 
conditions of the exercise of national sovereignty”.29 In response, France adopted a 
broad new constitutional article in order to that enable the Republic to observe its 
treaty obligations under the Rome Statute.30
3. IMPLEMENTATION AS SAFEGUARD
Unlike other international treaties which oblige State Parties to repress certain 
conduct, the Rome Statute does not impose an express obligation on Parties to 
criminalise the listed crimes or to investigate or prosecute them. The regime 
established by complementarity, however, assumes that such an obligation prevails 
under existing conventional and customary sources.31 Thus, the preamble recalls that 
it is “the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible 
for international crimes”, that “effective prosecution must be ensured by taking 
measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation” and that
29 Decision No.98-408 DC, 1999 J.O.(20)1317. The Conseil Constitutionnel also held that an 
application of an amnesty act or a national statute of limitations with respect to ICC crimes could lead 
to a determination of France’s unwillingness or inability by the Court; ibid
30 The provision reads “the French Republic may recognise the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court under the conditions specified by the treaty signed on 18 July 1998”; Constitutional 
Law No. 99-568 of 8 July 1999. For discussion see Turns, in McGoldrick et al. (2004), 366-375. Note, 
the absence trial by jury may also present difficulties for States that provide for a constitutional 
guarantee to that right. However, this guarantee is normally restricted to a State’s own national 
proceedings, and does not form a bar to extradition or surrender of persons to jurisdictions that do not 
provide for jury trials. See e.g. art.38 Irish Constitution; art. 150 Belgian Constitution and art.97 Greek 
Constitution; Venice Commission,(2001)
31 Duffy and Huston (2000), 31. Compare Kleffner (2003), 92-94, who reviews arguments based on a 
teleological interpretation whereby the Statute itself creates an implied obligation for Parties to 
investigate and prosecute ICC crimes and therefore to faithfully incorporate the listed crimes.
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the establishment of the ICC will be “complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions”. The Statute is, thus, intended to serve as a catalyst for national action, 
although it does not form the basis for the obligation. Because the jurisdiction of the 
Court will only become operative if a State is shown to be unwilling or unable to 
genuinely investigate or prosecute, it is assumed that States will want to avoid the 
referral of a case over which they would have jurisdiction.
States may decide to implement ICC offences by referring to pre-existing 
provisions of domestic criminal law or modifications thereof.32 The ordinary crimes 
approach, however, raises a number of problems: there may be lacunae in domestic 
law;33 it may cover a narrower range of offences;34 the sentencing framework may not 
adequately reflect the gravity of the offence;35 or the domestic crime in question may 
be subject to defences not available under international law,36 to statutes of limitation 
or to conditional amnesties.37 Although the ICC judges are likely to apply a margin of 
discretion, such discrepancies could call into doubt a State’s genuine ability to 
undertake guarantee the prosecution of ICC crimes.
In order to ensure the successful prosecution of core crimes and, at the same 
time, to guard against admissibility challenges, the vast majority State Parties to date 
have opted to repeal previous legislation and to incorporate afresh the crimes under 
the Statute. Thus, although the Statute does not formally require States to amend the 
substantive categorisation of crimes under national law, or to match them exactly with 
the terms of articles 6-8 of the Statute, most States have chosen to do so in order to 
limit the likelihood of a finding of unwillingness of inability. Accordingly, they have 
sought to exclude ICC jurisdiction by exhaustive capture.38
For similar reasons, many States Parties have incorporated also the general 
principles of criminal law under the Statute. As a result, concepts hitherto alien to 
certain legal system, such as command responsibility, have required the incorporation
32 Broomhall (1999), 149; Kleffiier (2003), 95-100
33 E.g., persecution or enforced disappearances, articles 7(l)(h)-(i) ICC Statute; making improper use 
of flag of truce, or forced conscription of nationals or prisoners of war belonging to a hostile party; 
articles 8(2)(v), (vii), (xv) ICC Statute
34 E.g. charging assault or murder in the absence of the contextual elements for war crimes or crimes 
against humanity
3 E.g. resulting in a reduced sentence disproportionate to the applicable international offence, and 
which could thereby bring into doubt the intent of the State to bring the person to justice.
36 E.g. the exclusion of defences of superior orders, article 33 ICC Statute
37 Article 29 ICC Statute; on amnesties for domestic offences see above, Chapter 4
38 “We want to ensure that UK courts can always investigate allegations against a British national so 
that the ICC cannot have jurisdiction”; HC Hansard, Standing Committee D (3 May 2001)
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of new, although not wholly unfamiliar, principles of criminal law.39 Furthermore, the 
minimum fair trials and due process protections under Parts 5 and 6 of the Statute 
have also been reproduced, to varying degrees of faithfulness, in national 
implementing legislation so as to minimise discrepancies.40 This includes the right to 
remain silent without adverse inference; the right of a suspect (and not just an accused 
person) who is indigent to legal assistance at State expense; the right of a suspect to 
be questioned in presence of counsel during all investigative proceedings; the right, in 
principle, of the accused to be present at the trial (prohibition against in absentia 
trials); the right, in principle, of the accused to examine a witness against him or her; 
as well as certain mental element requirements and defences.
Compared to the international humanitarian law and human rights treaty 
obligations of States, the ‘instutionalisation’ of treaty norms through the creation of 
the ICC, coupled with a regime threatening intervention in the face of State inaction, 
has proven to be a far more effective way of securing domestic incorporation of 
international crimes than the often unfulfilled express obligations of prior 
instruments 41 In this process, the Rome Statute has served as both a standard-setting 
instrument and a compliance-inducing mechanism. This process of increased 
harmonisation promises to reinforce the normative value of the international law 
provisions 42 By improving coherence, moreover, the Statute is helping to enhance the 
credibility and effectiveness of the whole system. As such, one of the benefits of 
harmonisation between national laws and the ICC Statute will be to diminish the 
shortcomings prevalent in the previous incorporation of international humanitarian 
law, arising from national variations as to the substantive definition and interpretation 
of international offences.43 Such processes represents a ‘hybridization’ of norms 
around a common set of international rules, which are themselves the outcome of 
negotiated interactions between different legal systems44 Most importantly, 
complementarity promises to strengthen actual State practice in the enforcement of 
those norms.
39 See, e.g., §65 International Criminal Court Act 2001 (Eng) [UK Act]; see above, Chapter 3
40 See, e.g., UK Act, Schedule 3, incorporating verbatim article 55 ICC Statute
41 See Kleffiier (2003), 94; Bothe, National Implementation o f International Humanitarian Law (1990), 
xviii
42 Turns, ‘Aspects of National Implementation of the Rome Statute: The United Kingdom and Selected 
Other States’, in McGoldrick et al. (2004), 340
43 See above, Chapters 3 and 4
44 See Delmas-Marty (2002); Chapter 2 above
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4. IMPLEMENTATION BEYOND THE ROME STATUTE
While the harmonisation of national law with the Rome Statute is a welcome 
development, it is important that other obligations arising from international treaty 
and custom which did not make it into the Rome Statute do not fall thereby into 
desuetude or obsolescence at the national level. As article 10 recalls, the Statute 
should not be interpreted in a manner that would limit or prejudice in any way 
existing or developing rules of international law.45 The inclusion of a treaty review 
mechanism providing for the possible inclusion of new crimes emphasises further the 
notion of the evolving nature of substantive international criminal law. Accordingly, 
the process of adopting implementing legislation may well go beyond the minimum 
obligations under the Statute to comprehensively consolidate under domestic law 
other criminal conduct arising from pre-existing treaty and custom norms. This may 
include certain forms of war crimes not included in article 8, or other international 
crimes which were omitted from the Statute once the idea of including of treaty 
crimes was abandoned. The German ‘Code of Crimes against International Law’ 
(Volkerstrafgesetzbuch) provides a notable example of domestic efforts that have 
gone far beyond the minimum requirements of the Statute by adopting a 
comprehensive new criminal code 46
Conversely, the adoption of broad framework in national implementing 
legislation could prove counter-productive. States may decide, for example, to 
provide grounds excluding criminal responsibility in addition to those foreseen in the 
Statute, whether derived from national or international law 47 States that have matched 
ICC offences to ordinary crimes under national law are, similarly, likely to provide 
for all the applicability of all domestic defences. The Court may rule that national 
legislation which permits additional defences in a manner that narrows the range of 
punishable offences would render a national forum unable to genuinely prosecute a 
particular case.
45 See ILC Commentary to draft text for VCLT (art.39(5)), YBILC (1966), 237
46 See Zimmerman, ‘Implementing the Statute of the International Criminal Court: The German 
Example’, in Vohrah et al., eds., Man’s Inhumanity to Man (2003), 977-994
47 Kleffiier (2003), 102; see, e.g., implementing legislation in Canada and Germany; ibid.
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5. JURISDICTION
Another area not explicitly framed as an obligation, but implied by the Statute’s 
complementarity regime, is the availability of domestic jurisdiction under the bases 
foreseen in the Statute. Some States have adopted a minimalist approach that just 
satisfies the Statute’s jurisdictional requirements. Thus, section 51(2) of the ICC Act 
(UK) limits jurisdiction to ICC offences committed in the UK or by UK nationals, 
residents and those subject to service jurisdiction abroad. As the Foreign and 
Commonwealth (‘FCO’) Minister of State expressed in parliamentary debate “We 
have a long-established practice of taking universal jurisdiction only as part of 
international law”.48 Despite attracting criticism from academic and NGO 
commentators, the position of the FCO has been that since the Rome Statute does not 
require the assumption of jurisdiction under bases other than territoriality and active 
personality, UK jurisdiction should be limited thereto. As a result, where a foreign 
suspect is taken into custody in the UK for conduct committed abroad, the UK will 
seek to yield jurisdiction to either the ICC or to the State of territoriality or 
nationality 49 The Act also contains a hard-won provision that extends jurisdiction to 
“a person who commits acts outside the United Kingdom at a time when he is not a 
United Kingdom national, a United Kingdom resident or a person subject to UK 
service jurisdiction and who subsequently becomes resident in the United 
Kingdom”.50 As Cryer indicates, since no nexus to the UK may have existed at the 
time of commission of the offence, the provision enables the application of a very 
limited form of universal jurisdiction subject to the requirement of later UK residency 
or citizenship, as opposed to mere presence on UK soil.51 The Act also removes the 
traditional requirement of dual criminality for extradition in relation to ICC crimes.52 
This will enable the UK to extradite suspects to States that proscribe extra-territorial
48 HC Hansard, vol.366, col.278 (3 April 2001); see also HL Hansard, vol.623, col.418-9 (8 March 
2001)
49 Turns argues that the minimalist approach of the UK turns complementarity on its head, since the 
object of Rome Statute is to encourage States to fulfil their duty to prosecute cases domestically and the 
Court is only meant to intervene where a State is unwilling or unable genuinely to prosecute. The 
position of the UK that it will pass up cases where there is no nexus to the UK defeats this purpose; 
Turns, in McGoldrick et al. (2004), 351
50 UK Act, §68(1)
51 Cryer, ‘Implementation of the International Criminal Court in England and Wales’ (2002) ICLQ 51, 
742
52 UK Act, §§72-73
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offences via jurisdictional bases that the UK does not itself assert.53
Others States have taken a more progressive route by utilising the adoption of 
new legislation to extend the bases under which they can exercise jurisdiction over 
international crimes. Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act 
provides jurisdiction over a person alleged to have committed an ICC offence if “(a) 
at the time the offence is alleged to have been committed, (i) the person was a 
Canadian citizen or was employed by Canada in a civilian or military capacity, (ii) the 
person was a citizen of a State that was engaged in an armed conflict against Canada, 
or was employed in a civilian or military capacity by such a State, (iii) the victim of 
the alleged offence was a Canadian citizen, or (iv) the victim of the alleged offence 
was a citizen of a State that was allied with Canada in an armed conflict; or (b) after 
the time the offence is alleged to have been committed, the person is present in 
Canada.”54 The legislation thus recognises jurisdiction on the bases of nationality, 
protective principle, passive personality (extended to allied States), as well as 
universality by enabling the taking of custody regardless of the place of commission. 
South Africa’s Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court Act, 2002 similarly provides for the assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction 
based on nationality, passive personality, and universality (presence of the accused in 
South Africa).55 New Zealand’s International Crimes and International Criminal Court 
Act (2000) goes one step further by providing for jurisdiction over article ICC 
offences “regardless o f -  (i) the nationality or citizenship of the person accused; or (ii) 
whether or not any act forming part of the offence occurred in New Zealand; or (iii) 
whether or not the person accused was in New Zealand at the time that the act 
constituting the offence occurred or at the time a decision was made to charge the 
person with an offence.”56 The last ground, whereby jurisdiction may be asserted in 
the absence of custody over the offender, provides the broadest variant on universal 
jurisdiction by enabling New Zealand to request the extradition of any person
53 Cryer (2002), 739
54 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000, c. 24) (Canada)
55 Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 2002 (South Africa), 
§4(3)
56 International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000 (New Zealand), §8(l)(c)
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suspected of committing an ICC offence anywhere. German domestic legislation 
provides for a similar application of jurisdiction.57
Arbour has suggested that the adoption of extraterritorial bases of jurisdiction 
may come to be encouraged as a deliberate policy by the Court in order to prevent 
gaps in enforcement. She suggests that the Assembly of State Parties, moreover, may 
develop consensus towards the widespread exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by 
national authorities as a cheaper and more efficient exercise of jurisdiction than 
maximal funding of multiple situations before the ICC.58
6. NON-PARTY STATES
While the adoption of the Rome Statute primarily impacts on States that have 
become Parties, the Statute may create repercussions for States non-parties in a 
number of ways. The Rome Statute itself, which was adopted by an overwhelming 
majority of States, may come to be viewed by non-Party States as a crystallisation of 
substantive and procedural international criminal law. It may influence general State 
practice by serving as a template for the definition of crimes and principles of 
criminal law in domestic legislation.59
Another way in which the ICC Statute may positively influence the behaviour 
of third States is the opportunity provided under the complementarity regime for all 
States, including non-Party States, to challenges the admissibility of cases.60 In order 
to invoke complementarity, a non-Party State will have to show that it can genuinely 
meet the test of willingness and ability. The existence of the Court may persuade 
non-Party States that the most effective way to exclude ICC jurisdiction over their 
nationals is to harmonise their domestic legislation with the Statute.61
The most obvious ‘external’ impact of the ICC, however, will arise from 
Security Council referrals of situations involving States non-parties. Consistent with 
article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Statute cannot create
57 Volkerstrafgesetzbuch (VStGB),§ 1: “Dieses Gesetz gilt fur alle in ihm bezeichneten Straftaten gegen 
das Volkerrecht, fur die in ihm bezeichneten Verbrechen auch dann, wenn die Tat im Ausland 
begangen wurde und keinen Bezugzum Inland aufweisf ’ (emphasis added). See Wirth (2003), 158
58 Arbour, ‘Will the ICC have an Impact on Universal Jurisdiction?’ (2003) J Int’l Crim. Justice 1, 587
59 See, e.g., adoption of ICC standards in East Timor and Iraq; Chapter 4
60 See articles 18(1), 18(2) and 19(2)
61 Kleffiier (2003), 111-2
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obligations for a State that is not party to the treaty without its consent. Accordingly, 
cooperation by non-Party States under the Statute is framed in voluntary terms, as 
reflected in article 87(5)(a) of the Statute, which provides that the Court “may invite 
any State not party to this Statute to provide assistance under this Part on the basis of 
an ad hoc arrangement, an agreement with such State or any other appropriate basis”. 
Where the Security Council refers a situation to the ICC, the source of an obligation 
for a non-Party State to cooperate with the Court stems not from the Rome Statute, 
but from the resolution of the Council adopted under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.62 Thus, Security Council Resolution 1593 referring the situation in Darfur 
recognises that “States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the 
Statute”, but decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the Darfur 
conflict shall cooperate fully with the Court “pursuant to this resolution”.
Notwithstanding the limitation of the resolution to the Government of Sudan 
and parties to the Darfur conflict, the legal nature of the obligation imposed by 
Resolution 1593 is similar to the mandatory regime established by article 29 of the 
ICTY Statute (article 28, ICTR Statute). It creates binding obligations for the 
identified entities to take whatever steps are necessary to implement the decision.63 
In the case of resolution 1593, this requires the Government of Sudan and all other 
parties to the Darfur conflict to respond to requests for cooperation from the Court. 
The Government of Sudan cannot plead deficiencies or lacunae in its domestic law to 
relieve it of its international treaty obligations under the UN Charter.64 Nor can it 
argue the existence of competing international obligations to avoid its duty under the 
Council resolution.65 The Court, in turn, cannot act ultra vires its Statute since its 
authority to seek the cooperation of a non-Party State stems from the Statute and not 
from the Council resolution. Thus, the Court cannot request forms or modalities of 
cooperation that are beyond its competencies under the Statute absent the consent of 
the State concerned.
62 KreB and Prost ‘Article 87’, in Trifterer (1999), 1061
63 See Report o f the Secretary General, S/25704,1J125
64 Article 27, VCLT
65 Article 103 UN Charter
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Part IV: Conclusions 
X 
Closing the Gap
This study has sought to examine why the behaviour of States in the field of 
international criminal law is so markedly at variance with their international 
obligations. In particular, the aim has been to discover, firstly, whether there are gaps 
in compliance and if such gaps matter; in which specific areas have they occurred and 
why; what lessons can be learned from past experience with enforcement models; and 
lastly, what the prospects are for closing these various gaps with the entry into force 
of the Rome Statute.1 The review undertaken in this study has identified persistent 
gaps that hamper enforcement at the normative level, in die application of substantive 
law and the discovery of specific enforcement obligations and at the structural level, 
as to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. The divergence between norms and practice 
may be partly an inevitable consequence of the increasingly regulated nature of 
international life which, as it has placed more intrusive demands on Parties, has raised 
the bar for expected behaviour.2 At the same time, compliance rates show variability 
across different areas of international law, depending on the cost-benefit calculations 
of national actors.3 Most States routinely observe their obligations under international 
law most of the time because compliance redounds to the functional interest of the 
State. In a minority of difficult, high-profile areas, however, participants may view 
their interests best served by non-compliance. The enforcement of human rights and 
humanitarian law regimes has traditionally suffered the highest degrees of defection. 
This has led to a preponderance of a culture of impunity, in particular, in the States 
directly affected by conflict. The persistence of gaps in these fields matters because 
they may have far reaching consequences for international peace and security and for 
the long term stability of entire regions. As the experience of the Balkans and the
1 The methodological framework set out here is drawn from Luck (2004), 303
2 See above, Introduction; Luck (2004), 304-5
3 See above, Chapter 2
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Great Lakes region of Africa demonstrates, the perpetration of massive atrocities 
often precipitates future conflicts, including in neighbouring countries, as small arms, 
soldiers and extremist rhetoric migrate from one conflict zone to another, leaving in 
their wake a bankrupt society wracked by organised crime and unstable governance.
Enforcement gaps at the national level
The review of domestic practice has displayed gaps in the compliance levels of States 
with their pre-existing duty to prosecute crimes in their national courts. This has 
occurred because of variations in the manner in which States have prescribed, 
adjudicated and enforced their jurisdiction over internationally criminal conduct. As a 
result of these deficiencies, an offender will be able to exploit the gaps in the system 
of jurisdictional coverage spanning the globe. He or she may take shelter in States 
that have failed to legislate adequately for the conduct in question or to have 
established the extra-territorial bases required for the assertion of jurisdiction with 
respect to the particular offender. The offender will be also benefit in cases where 
States do not have mutual legal assistance or extradition agreements with the national 
forum pursuing the case or may recognise exemptions thereto.
Wide discrepancy between the construction, interpretation and application of 
core crime offences, moreover, has undercut the emergence of consistent State 
practice. As a rule, violations of core crime norms have seldom been the object of 
domestic sanction, there being far too many examples of an absence of trials, either 
through inaction or a deliberate passing of blanket amnesties. Despite the aut dedere 
aut judicare requirement of numerous conventions, third States not involved in a 
particular conflict have proved reluctant to exercise their jurisdiction. As experience 
has shown, the main weakness of a system relying on domestic enforcement is that 
rules bearing on exercise of jurisdiction display permissive rather than mandatory 
characteristics. This is because the obligation to prosecute or extradite an offender 
remains subject to domestic principles related to prosecutorial discretion, 
proportionality, and forum non conveniens. Thus, despite the legal certainty of even 
the most robust treaty provisions, a State is not obliged to try or extradite every 
possible offender that it finds within its territory, but will have to balance its available 
resources and capacities against other public goals and interests. The rules are 
permissive, moreover, in terms of their practical implementation, because there is no
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central authority with the capacity to sanction States for their inaction. Where States 
do comply with their enforcement obligations, they typically do not do so out of a 
sense of a sanctionable legal duty. Moreover, States may be coerced or induced to 
comply because of factors unrelated to the treaty mechanisms themselves, whether by 
way of media exposure, diplomatic exchanges, economic leverage or threat of 
military action.
It is at this level that the introduction of the ICC Statute may have its most 
important impact, both in terms of the content of national legislation and actual 
enforcement in practice. The analysis above suggests that the Court is altering 
incentive structures for national authorities and profoundly altering State behaviour. 
The admissibility provisions of the ICC are serving as base-line standards for 
domestic reform efforts by States both in terms of substantive law as well as in 
respect of principles of criminal law and procedural law. This has occurred despite the 
absence of an express obligation in the ICC Statute requiring Parties to do so. Instead, 
States have matched domestic law closely to the Statute in order to limit the 
likelihood of an admissibility challenge to their jurisdiction based on substantive 
inconsistencies or lacunae. By doing so, States have improved the overall coherence 
of international criminal law, which in turn serves to enhance both its credibility and 
effectiveness. Such harmonisation between national laws and the ICC Statute is 
helping to diminish the discrepancies in the previous incorporation of international 
law by national authorities. Moreover, the ICC judges will come to exercise 
increasing influence in guiding this internal reform process as the Pre-Trial Chambers 
develop jurisprudence on the application of the admissibility provisions.4 This 
includes elaborations on the definition of ‘genuineness’, the applicability of certain 
amnesty exceptions, basic standards for judicial integrity, and the unavailability of 
national jurisdictions because of an incomplete rendering of international offences in 
domestic law. Compared to the oft unfulfilled obligations deriving from international 
humanitarian law, or the requirements of parties under monitored human rights 
conventions, or even the duties flowing from the Security Council resolutions creating 
ad hoc Tribunals, the complementarity framework of the Rome Statute establishes a 
far more profound set of interactions between international norms and domestic 
practice.
4 Burke-White (2005), 576
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Moreover, complementarity promises heightened prospects for actual 
enforcement. The ability of the Court to supervise the compliance of States with their 
pre-existing international duties and its ability to assert jurisdiction where a State fails 
to do so serves as a powerful incentive for domestic activism. The Statute, thus, 
serves as a catalyst for national action, although it does not form the basis for the 
obligation. Evidence for this assertion comes from the statements of governments 
during their own internal adoption process expressly declaring their intention to 
exhaustively capture the requirement of the Rome Statute so as to ensure the 
successful assertion of national jurisdiction whenever required. This suggests that the 
admissibility provisions of the Statute will have a significant impact on the policies of 
national authorities in the actual repression of crimes. The prosecutorial and strategic 
choices made by the ICC Prosecutor in selecting particular situations or targets, 
moreover, may have a causal impact on the enforcement of national law. The most 
important contribution of the ICC, therefore, will not be the number of trials it 
conducts, but rather its compliance-inducing effect in promoting regularity in the 
functioning of national enforcement mechanisms.
Because of the gaps in the jurisdictional regime of ICC Statute itself, this 
influence may initially be limited to the State of the territory where the crime occurred 
and the State of the nationality of the offender (article 12). The international attention 
that such trials will attract, however, may have some impact on inducing a virtuous 
cycle of accountability. Third States may be influenced by public exposure, moral 
persuasion or political expediency to try, extradite or deport co-perpetrators found on 
their territory. The experience of trials held in a number of third States during the 
1980s and 1990s related to the WWII and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda lend some credibility to this assertion. For the reasons outlined above, 
however, the expectation that third States will routinely be willing or able to exercise 
their extra-territorial jurisdiction over offences committed abroad appears misplaced.
Enforcement gaps between the national level and the ICC
The complementarity relationship of the ICC to national authorities provides a 
number of strong guarantees for an effective Court. Despite initial proposals to limit 
the referral mechanism to State Parties and the Security Council, the conferral of 
proprio motu powers on the Prosecutor guarantees that there are no significant gaps in
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the ICC enforcement regime at the triggering stage. This is particularly important 
given the traditional under-utilisation of inter-State complaint systems and the 
anticipated exceptional use the Security Council would make of its referral power. An 
independent trigger mechanism is an important aspect also of the catalytic effect of 
the Court. The prospect of proprio motu powers provides a significant incentive for 
States to take domestic action so as to avert ICC intervention or to otherwise submit a 
self-referral to avoid the embarrassment of an external trigger. Without the threat of 
cases being independently initiated the incentive for national action would have been 
drastically reduced. As such, the Prosecutor will be able to use his good offices, in 
line with the goals of complementarity, to provide early warning to States and 
intergovernmental organisations of gross violations; to crystallise international 
attention; and to encourage domestic action, with possible international support, in 
order to avert ICC intervention. The inclusion of such an oversight mechanism 
capable of regulating State behaviour poses a serious challenge to the notion of a 
sovereignty bound ‘statist’ Court, and heightens the prospects for reducing gaps in 
enforcement at the national level.
The Court will also be the final arbiter of its own jurisdiction where States 
challenge the admissibility of a case. Thus, although States may invoke national 
proceedings to deflect the Court’s jurisdiction, it is for the ICC judges to decide 
whether such efforts are undertaken in good faith. The manner by which the Court 
will weigh the genuineness of political will and national capacity, however, will be 
critical. Too deferential a margin of appreciation may undermine the credibility of 
ICC intervention and reduce incentives to promote compliance; too much intrusion 
could inhibit national efforts and undermine complementarity.
Although the ability of the Court to determine its own jurisdiction is 
unqualified, as noted above, the disappointing result of the negotiation on article 12 of 
the Statute means that significant gaps will remain in the jurisdictional reach of the 
Court. To this extent, unless the Security Council refers a situation, the ICC will have 
less power to bring perpetrators of mass violence to trial than do national 
jurisdictions.
It is at the cooperation stage, however, that gaps in the Statute’s enforcement 
regime are most apparent. If heightened domestic compliance is predicated on the 
avoidance of ICC intervention, the incentive for good behaviour will arguably 
disappear where a State fails an admissibility challenge and, as a result, the Court
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exercises its jurisdiction. Unless jurisdiction is uncontested and the States concerned 
provide full cooperation, the ICC will face a considerable structural gap due to 
unavailability of an international enforcement agent. This lacuna creates both 
normative and structural ambiguities. The Court is supra-national in so far as it 
exercises its jurisdiction over individuals directly under international law, irrespective 
of the official capacity of the accused. Yet, the ICC cannot enforce its jurisdiction 
without State cooperation. The transposition of a vertical normative regime over a 
horizontal structure is a product of compromise. It is indicative of the differences that 
persisted during ICC negotiations between supra-national and statist positions. The 
manner in which the tension between State sovereignty and the Court’s powers plays 
out over time remains to be seen. It may, however, lead to absurd results: where a 
State has been found unwilling or unable, the Court could be placed in the paradoxical 
situation of having to depend on the same institutional and procedural weaknesses that 
were deemed unsuitable to support domestic investigations and prosecutions. Thus, 
without either States acting in good faith or robust international intervention, the 
Court may lack the tools for the effective discharge of its investigative functions.
The experience of the ad hoc Tribunals demonstrates that notification of non­
cooperation to the Security Council may do little to effect concerted action. Instead, 
enforcement is likely to depend on the extent to which the international community is 
prepared assign a credible reputational risk to non-cooperation, by instituting issue 
linkages with other areas of international activity. Successful enforcement, therefore, 
will depend on the convergence of a number of policy considerations for each State. 
In the case of the countries of the former Yugoslavia, it is only some ten years after 
the end of the Bosnian war that national authorities in the region have been reported 
as providing satisfactory cooperation, despite periodic relapses, with the ICTY and to 
have become suitably reformed to try cases transferred from The Hague. As the soft 
power pull of EU and NATO membership and conditional donor assistance has 
heightened the reputational risk of non-compliance these States have, somewhat 
reluctantly, ventured down an unsteady path towards transparent government, public 
scrutiny of their war time past, and the entrenchment of the rule of law. This suggests 
that compliance with international norms, ultimately, may rely upon the extent to 
which the international community is able to establish concrete and tangible tools to 
reward satisfactory performance and punish transgressions. Moreover, the fact that 
progress with cooperation in these States has been linked to the development of
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democratic governance suggests there may be some support for the view that the ad 
hoc Tribunal, together with the panoply of international, governmental and civil 
society actors that have operated in the region over the past decade, have induced a 
trickle-down process of normative internalisation. These same factors, nonetheless, 
may lend themselves equally to a realist critique. As Rubin has stated, “[international 
law is not a criminal law system; it is more akin to constitutional laws, where 
enforcement rests on political counterpressures and foreseeable middle- and long-term 
reactions.”5
The referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC provides a good example. 
Unlike the Uganda and DRC self-referrals, Sudan has contested the jurisdiction of the 
ICC and has openly stated that it will not cooperate with any trials of its nationals 
before the Court. Without Sudanese support, the Prosecutor will have limited capacity 
to gather evidence inside Darfur. The mandate of the African Union peacekeeping 
mission in Darfur (AMIS) does not extend to providing investigative assistance to the 
ICC, nor does its current capacity allow it to do so. It is uncertain the extent to which 
the mandate of the UN military presence in Sudan (UNMIS) may be expanded to 
enable direct cooperation with the Court when it takes over duties in Darfur from the 
AU.6 The possibility for targeted sanctions by the Security Council sanctions 
committee on Sudan of persons responsible for serious human rights and 
humanitarian law violations is a positive example of issue linkage.7 However, the 
imposition of assets freezes and travel bans on individual Sudanese officials aimed at 
restricting their movement abroad, if at all forthcoming, may also limit the 
opportunities for arrest in third States. Economic sanctions against Sudan’s critical oil 
industries have been ruled out by China, on the basis of its own linked energy needs, 
how much more military intervention. Moreover, the absence of U.S. engagement 
with the ICC, even if nuanced by the Darfur referral, limits the potential for successful 
policy linkage and external coercion.
It remains unclear the extent to which the referral of the situation to the ICC 
has had any preventative impact in reducing the scale of crimes being committed in 
Darfur. With the current spotlight of international attention on the region, nonetheless, 
should renewed massacres recur in Darfur the call for robust military intervention
5 Rubin, ‘International Crime and Punishment’, The National Interest (1993), 73
6 AU PSC/PR/Comm.(XLV) (12 January 2006); S/PRST/2006/5 (3 February 2006); PSC/MIN/Comm. 
(XL VI) (10 March 2006)
7 S/RES/1591(2005)
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may prove irresistible. The pressure for collective action may also be guided by recent 
debates in the General Assembly and the Security Council on die international 
community’s responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
o
cleansing and crimes against humanity where a State has failed its primary role. Even 
then, however, such action would be aimed primarily at putting a stop to the specific 
humanitarian crises unfolding on the ground: it is unlikely that it would include a 
mandate to arrest the most responsible military and political officials in that nation’s 
capital. As the Somalia experience demonstrates, moreover, it is doubtful that such an 
operation would prove successful. Thus, while NATO forces intervened in Kosovo to 
protect civilian life, the Alliance did not storm Belgrade to execute the warrant for the 
arrest of Milosevic et al that had been issued by the ICTY.
Thus, in the absence of an international enforcement agent, the ICC will be 
severely curtailed in its ability to enforce its jurisdiction where a powerful State 
contests its jurisdiction. Even more than in other circumstances, enforcement here will 
be determined by factors external to those foreseen in the Rome Statute.
Enforcement gaps at the ICC level
Lastly, even with a well functioning cooperation regime, there will be gaps in 
enforcement because the ICC cannot deal with possible every situation. As noted 
above, the ICC faces territorial, temporal, and resource bound limitations to the 
exercise of its jurisdiction. In addition, the Prosecutor has determined that he will 
focus only on the persons most responsible for the commission of crimes. In the case 
of the ICTY and ICTR, the focus on the senior leadership and gravest atrocities has 
resulted in the trial of approximately 100 individuals per institution, over a protracted
8 See 2005 World Summit Outcome A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005)^138-9; Security Council debate 
S/PV5319 (9 December 2005). As UK Home Secretary, Jack Straw, has stated: “... [T]he work of the 
International Criminal Court runs in parallel to this very important extension of the jurisprudence of the 
Security Council of the U.N. that it should intervene where the responsibility to protect has been 
broken by a sovereign member state. So what you now have in place of the old, sort of, Westphalian 
idea that what goes on inside a state has nothing to do with anybody else provided it doesn't threaten 
any other state, is, first of all, this concept of the state's responsibility to protect qualifying, as it were, 
an absolute view of sovereignty; and, alongside that, an individual responsibility, which is based on 
individuals inside those governments and others, not to commit international crimes, which would 
bring them before the International Criminal Court if their own local courts prove ineffective”; Press 
conference on UN reform (London, 31 January 2006); CICC news-list
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period.9 In the interests of conducting expedited proceedings within a relatively short 
span of years, by contrast, the Special Court for Sierra Leone will try approximately 
ten individuals out of thirteen indicted. A strategic question for the ICC, therefore, is 
how many people it should try in each situation and how restrictively the Prosecutor 
should define his policy determination of focusing on the persons most responsible. 
Given its far more limited resources compared to its ad hoc predecessors and the need 
to balance multiple situations, the ICC is likely follow a path similar to the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone and focus on an extremely limited number of individuals per 
situation.10 This may have significant implications in terms of public expectations. It 
may also negatively influence reconciliation efforts, particularly if one of the purposes 
of attributing individual responsibility is to prevent the ascription of collective guilt to 
a particular ethnic or national group. The prosecution of the most responsible may 
come to be seen as token justice if it paradoxically exonerates the many co- 
offenders.11
A related strategic question is how many situations the ICC should 
concurrently handle. Should the Prosecutor investigate more than three situations at a 
time? With the issuance of arrests warrants in relation to Uganda and DRC, should 
limited resources be focussed on pursuing more perpetrators in these situations or on 
opening investigations in relation to another referral such as that of Central African 
Republic or the declaration of Cote D’Ivoire? These choices are not straightforward. 
Continuing investigations in Uganda and DRC would serve to consolidate the impact 
of the ICC in these countries, but could weaken the deterrent effect of the Court 
elsewhere. Perpetrators in other conflicts may be emboldened if they perceive that the 
Court focus is absorbed in its current investigations. Abandoning ongoing 
investigations to maximise the global impact of the Court, on the other hand, may 
result in mere superficial engagement with each situation, thereby undermine the 
credibility of the Court and the expectations of victims.
9 As of March 2006, the ICTY had indicted 161 persons, and concluded proceedings against 85 
persons. As of March 2006, the ICTR had arrested over 70 persons, and has concluded proceedings 
against 26.
10 “A focused prosecutorial strategy: This means centring our efforts on perpetrators bearing the 
greatest responsibility, with a policy of short investigations, targeted indictments and expeditious trials, 
and an interdisciplinary investigative approach, adjusted to the peculiarities of each situation”; Address 
by the Prosecutor to the Assembly o f State Parties (2004), available at www.icc-cpi.int. The first ICC 
arrest warrant relating to the investigation in Northern Uganda charges five members of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army leadership; Situation in Uganda, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for  
Warrants o f Arrest under Article 58 (ICC-02/04-01/05-l-US-Exp) (20 October 2005)
11 Cote, ‘Compliance with the Laws of War’, in Luck and Doyle (2004), 164; Bass (2000), 300-301
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The effort to close these gaps raises a host of legal questions bearing on the 
exercise of the Prosecutor’s discretion under article 53 and the supervisory functions 
of the Pre-Trial Chamber. Should the Prosecutor investigate and prosecute all crimes 
over which the Court has jurisdiction, or only the most serious occurrence of these 
crimes?12 What is the threshold for a determination that a case is of insufficient 
gravity to justify action by the Court?13 For cases that are of sufficient gravity, how 
should decisions not to proceed that are based on ‘interests of justice’ or ‘interests of 
victims’ be balanced? WTiat factors should guide such determinations?14 Which 
prosecutorial decisions should the Pre-Trial Chamber review: all discretionary 
decisions to initiate or continue an investigation or prosecution, or only the initial 
decision to initiate an investigation or prosecution, but not subsequent determinations 
made within the scope of that decision?15 In addition, these discussions have a 
financial implication relating to the budget set by the Assembly of State Parties and 
the levels of commitment States are willing to invest: the Court cannot act beyond its 
means. It also has a strategic perspective as to the desired scope and role of the Court, 
and which therefore includes all stakeholders, including victims, effected 
communities, tribal and religious leaders, NGOs, national authorities and 
intergovernmental organisations.16
As it would be highly undesirable, and contrary to the intent of the Statute, for 
the ICC to deal with every possible situation or to try all offenders, the primary 
burden of prosecuting these crimes will reside at the national level.17 However, this 
assumes that national legal systems have the capacity and political will to enforce 
such a duty. Where domestic authorities cannot fulfil their complementary role, a gap 
may persist in the enforcement of international criminal law at the national level. As 
Madeline Morris points out:
Clearly the rational for a regime of “stratified-concurrent jurisdiction,” in 
which the international tribunal prosecutes (or strives to prosecute) the leaders, 
leaving to national governments the rest of the defendants, cannot rest on a 
view of international tribunals as supplements or substitutes for reluctant,
12 See art.53(l)(a), 53(2)(a) ICC Statute
13 See art.53(l)(b), 53(2)(b), 17(l)(d) ibid
14 See art.53(l)(c), 53(2)(c) ibid
15 See art.53(3) ibid
16 Q jp  p resentation to UN Legal Advisors (2005), available at www.icc-cpi.int
17 See above regarding ICTY and ICTR completion strategies and resource concerns which have led to 
a reduction in the number of cases through the withdrawal of indictments and the transfer of less grave 
cases to national jurisdictions
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ineffective, or incapacitated national courts. Having an international tribunal 
try a few top-level defendants while leaving the staggering bulk of the 
caseload to the national courts would not necessarily be a sensible strategy for 
an incapacitated or unwilling national judicial system.18
The Rome Statute will clearly fail in its goal to prevent impunity if it merely creates 
an instrument to replace failed national courts. The vast majority of cases, therefore, 
will continue to rely on national prosecutions. This means that effective incorporation 
and interpretation of statutory obligations in domestic law will be vital. It may require 
also the strengthening or rebuilding national justice systems or the provision of 
international assistance, including through possible internationalised processes.19 
Enhancing the domestic extra-territorial jurisdiction will also help close remaining 
gaps in enforcement,20 as will extending the number and range of their treaties for 
extradition and mutual cooperation in criminal matters. In particular, national efforts 
will be critical where the offence was not committed on the territory of a State Party 
or by one of its nationals, or occurred prior to the entry into force of the Rome Statute. 
Thus, without parallel domestic efforts, the Prosecutorial policy of focusing on the
decision makers may entrench patterns of impunity for the actual perpetrators of
21crimes.
Conclusion
With the coming into force of the Rome Statute, an enforcement system has been 
established between ICC and States subject to its jurisdiction. This new system will 
encourage the closing of enforcement gaps at the national level through the catalytic 
presence of the ICC as a compliance-inducing institution on the world stage.
18 Morris, ‘The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda’, (1997) Duke Jm’l Comp.& 
Int’l Law 7,367. See also OTP Policy Paper
19 See, e.g., Ferrero-Waldner, EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood 
Policy: “As has been repeatedly said, in an ideal world, there would be no need for an institution such 
as the ICC because all States would themselves prosecute genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. We believe that the ICC should not have the ambition, and will never have the means, to 
respond to all existing international justice needs. It is crucial that national jurisdictions should play 
their role. This is why the EU has provided significant financial support for the reconstruction of legal 
structures in countries concerned with crimes under the Rome Statute. Training judges, prosecutors and 
lawyers is a powerful way to avoid impunity, facilitate the implementation of the principle of 
complementarity and thus assist the ICC in its mission.” The International Criminal Court, 
Transatlantic Relations and Co-operation with Third Parties to Promote the Rule o f Law, 
SPEECH/05/228 (European Parliament, Strasbourg, 14 April 2005)
20 See above, Chapter 1; Commentary to Princeton Principles, 24
21 OTP Policy Paper, 7
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Enforcement gaps will persist, however, at the level of State cooperation. The system 
established by the Rome Statute, moreover, is unlikely to result in routine State 
compliance with the requests and decisions of the Court. This is because the Court’s 
normative framework has been interposed on top of an inter-State enforcement 
structure. Moreover, practical gaps will remain in the global coverage the ICC. It is 
important, thus, that the Court is not drowned under the weight of expectations.22
A measure of perspective may also be warranted. As Roberts reminds us, 
international courts and tribunals “are only likely to have a minor impact on vast 
problems, and are not necessarily the most important mechanism even for the limited 
objective of securing implementation of the laws of war.”23 It is therefore hoped that 
increased activity at the enforcement end of the law will have a virtuous effect on the 
prevention of offences. In particular, the credible prospect of enforcement may lead 
States to more vigorously disseminate applicable laws and regulations among their 
armed forces through their military manuals, codes of conduct, rules of engagement 
and training systems, as well as by maintaining and enforcing military discipline. In 
this manner, the Rome Statute may be able to contribute to the gradual transformation 
of the State practice.
Ultimately, enforcement will depend on the observance of critical norms by 
individuals and on the degree of their commitment to the values and ideas so 
represented, whether as perpetrators, commanders, prosecutors, judges, diplomats, 
member of civil society, national officials, or policy decision makers. For, although 
norms, standards, and even the institution with vertical binding authority have 
emerged, their effectiveness and ability to adjust national behaviour remain largely in 
the shackles of traditional debates over sovereignty, national interest and political 
will. As has been observed, “any agency whatever, though it be the instrument of 
mankind’s greatest good, is capable of misuse. Its proper use or abuse depends on the 
varying degrees of enlightenment, capacity, faith, honesty, devotion and 
highmindedness of the leaders of public opinion.”24 The key issue for closing the gap 
between norms and practice may therefore remain one of enlightened leadership 
rather than law.
22 Roberts (1995), 73
23 ibid
24 ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Secret o f Divine Civilization, 16
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